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Theological Ethics After MacIntyre: 
The Significance of Alasdair MacIntyre's 
Moral Philosophy For Lutheran Ethics 
Abstract 
Three aspects of MacIntyre's writings are significant for Lutheran ethics. 
These are his criticism of Enlightenment rationality, his constructive account of a 
rational morality, and the relationship of his moral philosophy to theology. I first 
discuss MacIntyre's critique of Enlightenment thinkers whose conception of 
rationality follows a path that leads to the denial of rationality in emotivism. 
Secondly, I consider MacIntyre's alternative account of rationality which entails the 
recovery of the notions of the teleological framework of morality and the rationality 
of tradition. Teleology and tradition provide the rational foundation whereby moral 
judgements are substantiated by their ability to advance moral progress. Thirdly, I 
argue that the incompleteness of MacIntyre's constructive account of rationality 
moves his philosophy in a theistic direction. My discussion then turns to the writings 
of Stanley Hauerwas whose appropriation of MacIntyre's writings demonstrates the 
importance of MacIntyre's notion of rationality for theology. I then discuss the 
significance of MacIntyre for Lutheran ethics by considering the writings of Gilbert 
Meilaender who demonstrates how a rational Lutheran ethic is possible. The thesis 
concludes with a discussion of the necessity for Lutheran theology to sustain rational 
moral reflection in these postmodern times. 
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The widespread impact and general importance of Alasdair MacIntyre's moral 
philosophy is incontestable. This thesis pays tribute to the importance of MacIntyre's 
work by considering its significance for Lutheran ethics. Before entering into the 
heart of the argument, it is important to offer a general reflection on the current moral 
situation to which MacIntyre's writings are addressed. The past two decades have 
witnessed a growing consensus that American culture and the church in America are 
in the process of moral decline. Ironically, this growing consensus regarding our 
moral decline results from the perception that we are increasing unable to sustain 
certain co-operative relationships and activities. Insofar as we are unable to agree on 
some standard of the good, we are increasingly incapable of ordering our lives 
through a common vision or of finding rational resolutions to our moral 
disagreements. Signs of this decline within the Christian community include the rise 
of divorce and contentious divisions within the church. I In culture, this moral decline 
is captured in the characterisation of American public life as a culture war. Let us 
briefly consider the culture war phenomenon as a sign of moral decline. 
Father Richard John Neuhaus, whose book The Naked Public Square did 
much to bring the term culture war to the American political lexicon, argues that 
America has become dangerously divided along apparently irreconcilable moral fault 
lines. 2 'It is no exaggeration to say', states Neuhaus, 'that our society is embroiled in a 
Kulturkampf, a war over the meaning of American culture. '3 The sociologist James 
Hunter presents systematic studies of the culture war phenomenon in his books Culture 
Wars: The Struggle to Define America and Before the Shooting Begins: Searching/or 
I Cf. Maggie Gallagher, The Abolition of Marriage: How We Destroy Lasting Love (Washington, 
D.C.: Regnery, 1996). Gallagher's argument, simply stated, is that the American therapeutic culture has 
advanced the destruction of the family by elevating selfishness over moral commitment to the co-
operative good of the family. In terms of division within the. church: Gilb.ert Meilaender notes how it 
was the inability of Missouri Synod Lutherans to resolve theIr doctnnal dIsputes that led to the 
catastrophic schism in 1974. Gilbert Meilaend~r,. 'How Ch~c~es C~ack Up: ~e Case of the Lutheran 
Church-Missouri Synod', review of John H. TIetjen, MemOirs in EXile: ConfesslOnal Hope and 
Institutional Conflict (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1991), in First Things 14 (June/July, 1991), pp. 38-
:~chard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1984), pp. 21,36--37.. ' . 
3 Richard John Neuhaus, America Against Itself: Moral V,SlOn and the PubliC Order (Notre Dame, IN. 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 14. 
7 
Democracy in America's Culture War.4 Hunter and Neuhaus see the culture war as in , 
MacIntyre's words, a 'civil war carried on by other means.'s Furthermore, as the title 
of Hunter's second book indicates, the culture war increasingly threatens to become 
an all out civil war. To a significant degree, MacIntyre's analysis of our cultural 
situation has provided a historical and philosophical foundation for the work of 
Hunter, Neuhaus and others chronicling the cultural decline. 
MacIntyre spells out the nature of the decline in a historical and philosophical 
narrative. The central feature of this story is that once a culture is rendered incapable 
of rationally sustaining its moral commitments and resolving its moral conflicts, order 
will be established by other means. In particular, MacIntyre argues that modernity is 
displacing moral order with manipulative therapeutic and bureaucratic techniques. 
Exemplifying the extent of this displacement, the Christian ethicist Stanley Hauerwas 
notes the ill effects of bureaucratisation on the public ministry. He observes that we 
have now come to 
expect our ministers to exemplify the same kind of bureaucratic mentality so 
characteristic of modem organizational behavior and politics. I sometimes think 
that there is a conspiracy afoot to make Alasdair MacIntyre's account of the 
manager in After Virtue empirically verifiable. That the manager has become 
characteristic of liberal politics should not be surprising, but I continue to be taken 
aback by the preponderance of such character types in the ministry.6 
As is evident in Hauerwas' criticism, the influence of the therapeutic and bureaucratic 
is ubiquitous. MacIntyre is troubled by the cultural acceptance of and dependence on 
bureaucratic and therapeutic technique not for what it presently is but for what it 
threatens to become. Hence what may presently appear to be a benign or even 
beneficial use of manipulative techniques develops into coercive control. David 
Toole (a former Ph.D. student of Stanley Hauerwas at Duke University) catches this 
feature of MacIntyre's argument when he writes: 
[A]ccording to MacIntyre, Nietzsche gives to the twentieth ... century one of its 
possible courses: an increasingly conflictual and violent world in which either truth 
is relative and we carry guns to settle inevitable disputes, or truth has left the world 
4 James D. Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic Books, 1991) and 
Before the Shooting Begins: Searchingfor Democracy in America's Culture War (New York: The Free 
Press, 1994). . . f N 
S Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: Umversity 0 otre 
Dame Press 2nd ed. 1984) p. 253. (Hereafter: After Virtue.) 
6 Stanley H~uerwas, 'Prea~hing As Though We Had Enemies', First Things 53 (May, 1995), p. 46. 
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altogether, which just leaves the guns - and our inability to offer any reasons at all 
for using them, though use them we will. 7 
While Hauerwas and Toole alert us to the practical upshot of this failure of 
rationality, Wendy Kaminer illustrates it in her recent consideration of the problem of 
cnme. 
Debates about crime are rarely sensible. They're ruled by politics and fear and the 
mindless exchange of attitudes that dominates the worst talk shows .. .I expect that 
we'll proudly become even less rational as the millennium approaches: more people 
will report being visited by aliens or abused by Satanic cults in childhood or graced 
by their guardian angels. In my worst moments, I imagine that this book would be 
taken more seriously by a broader audience if I claimed to be channeling the spirit 
of a two-thousand-year old shaman or an extraterrestrial.8 
Kaminer argues that the irrationality of the therapeutic culture demonstrably threatens 
rational debate over crime and its solutions. In view of this threat, she states that her 
aim is emphatically not to solve the problem of crime but merely to rationalise the 
discussion of crime-related issues. 
Kaminer's modest aim alerts us to what is perhaps the most important merit of 
MacIntyre's writings. He has made clear how moral reflection may fail or succeed in 
being rational as well as the practical consequences of success or failure. In this vein, 
the historian Robert Wilken concludes that the concern for rationality must be front 
and centre in the theological task: 
At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the new millennium we are 
witnessing a major rethinking of the nature of human reason, and in particular how 
it functions in religious thought. The hegemony of the Enlightenment model of 
autonomous and critical reason, reason disengaged from its object, is swiftly 
coming to an end. Weare, perhaps, living at a time when the understanding of 
reason and its relation to faith will be transformed as profoundly as it was in 
Anselm's day. Last fall Pope John Paul II issued a new encyclical, Fides et Ratio. 
It may be the last papal encyclical of the millennium, and it is not insignificant that 
it deals with the relation of faith and reason, anticipating a discussion that will 
certainly accelerate in the new century.9 
I shall argue that MacIntyre's theoretical and practical arguments are crucial 
resources for understanding the importance of rational moral reflection within 
Lutheranism. My argument unfolds in the following way. The first chapter considers 
MacIntyre's critique of the cultural drift into the irrationality of emotivism, where 
moral judgements have no more force than personal feelings or tastes. Responding to 
this disorder, the second chapter considers MacIntyre's theory of rationality, which is 
7 David C. Toole, Waiting For Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy, and 
Apocalypse (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), p. 35.. . 
8 Wendy Kaminer, It's All the Rage: Crime and Culture (Readmg, MA: Addlson-Wesley, 1995), p. 8. 
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centred in the notions of a teleological framework and the rationality of tradition. The 
force of MacIntyre's argument is that, unless and until our moral discourse becomes 
teleological and acknowledges the notion of rival historical traditions, we will be 
unable to sustain a rational moral order. 10 My third chapter moves from a description 
of MacIntyre's critical and constructive arguments to a critique of his account of 
rationality. In the main, my criticism is that MacIntyre's work depends on a theistic 
foundation which he has been too hesitant to acknowledge. After discussing this 
deficiency, I consider the theological implications of MacIntyre's work, briefly 
turning to the writings of Stanley Hauerwas. Hauerwas, for all intents and purposes, 
is the principal theological interpreter of MacIntyre's ethics, as he capably 
demonstrates MacIntyre's importance for ecclesial ethics. Hauerwas' appropriation of 
MacIntyre's ethics serves as a transition to the specific consideration of the 
importance of MacIntyre's writings for Lutheran ethics. 
MacIntyre's work is an important critical and constructive resource for discussing 
the possibility and necessity of a rational Lutheran ethic. As MacIntyre and Hauerwas 
raise doubts about Lutheranism's ability to sustain a rational ethical reflection, chapter 
four discusses the possibility of a rational Lutheran ethic. Here I consider the writings 
of the Lutheran theologian Gilbert Meilaender who demonstrates how rational moral 
reflection is possible within the Lutheran tradition. The fifth chapter considers the 
implications of MacIntyre's writings as I discuss why a Lutheran ethic is necessary 
for the Lutheran church in the postmodern world. I argue that MacIntyre's critical 
writings make clear why it is necessary for the church to be a refuge from the moral 
disintegration in culture while his constructive account of rationality aids the church's 
mission to rationally engage a world which is increasingly sliding into irrationality. 
9 Robert Louis Wilken, 'Gregory VII and Politics of the Spirit', First Things 89 (Jan., 1999), pp. 27. 
10 Neuhaus' essay, 'The Idea of Moral Progress', First Things 95 (Aug./Sept., 1999), pp. 21-27, 
appeared too late for me to do anything more than commend ~t as a concise argu~ent for ~e , 
importance of progress. Neuhaus argues that the modem notIon of progress, th.at change IS good .' 
conflicts with the Christian notion of progress that change must be m accord WIth the good. That IS to 
10 
To the end that Lutheranism may better fulfil its task as refuge and mission, I offer the 
following argument. 
say, progress requires the kind of teleology that modernity spurns. I discuss this at length in the third 
section of my second chapter. 
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CHAPTER 1 
EMOTIVISM AND THE FAILURE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
1. Introduction 
The publication of After Virtue is a defining episode in the recent history of 
theological and philosophical ethics. The theologian Stanley Hauerwas claims that 
this book 'changed the agenda of contemporary philosophers and theologians by an 
almost violent redirection of their attention.' 1 This redirection includes such changes 
as a shift in focus from acts and consequences to the character of the agent; a 
questioning of modem individualism and the move toward a renewed appreciation of 
community; a recovery of the notion of tradition, and a tum from abstract analysis to 
narrative theory with its emphasis on relationships and coherence. In view of 
MacIntyre's contribution to these changes, Giovanna Barradori observes that 
'Alasdair MacIntyre has enriched contemporary moral debate to an unparalleled 
extent.,2 John Horton and Susan Mendus, introducing a volume of essays on 
MacIntyre's work, remark that After Virtue 'surprised the philosophical world by the 
depth of its disillusion with modem morality in general, and ... "the Enlightenment 
project" in particular.,3 
Few scholars disagree that After Virtue has made a marked impact on recent 
moral discussions. However, there is considerable difference of opinion on the 
philosophical, cultural and, most important to this thesis, theological upshot of 
MacIntyre's argument. MacIntyre himself did not anticipate the theological direction 
I Stanley Hauerwas, Character And The Christian Life: A Study In Theological. E~hics ~San Antonio, 
TX: Trinity University Press, 1985), p.xv. (Hereafter: Characte,: An~ The Chnstzan Life): 
2 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Nietzsche or Aristotle?' [Conversation WIth GI~va~a Borrad.on]. m ed. 
Giovanna Borradori, The American Philosopher (Chicago, IL: The Umverslty of ChIcago Press, 1991), 
p.137. 
3 John Horton and Susan Mendus, 'Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue and After', in eds. John Horton 
and Susan Mendus, After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 1. 
his argument would take. In a 1983 symposium, two years after the publication of 
After Virtue, MacIntyre reflected on the significance of After Virtue. 4 His intention, he 
noted, was to write two books, one analysing the state of modem morality, the other, 
the philosophy of the social sciences. In developing each thesis, he discovered that 
the arguments were so interdependent as to be inseparable. The alternative was to 
offer for criticism to the academic community a single and essentially incomplete 
argument. One criticism was that After Virtue gave no serious attention to the role of 
theology in modem morality. MacIntyre is clear that this omission was not 
accidental. Rather, religion's short shrift reflected his erstwhile view that religion is 
relatively unimportant in the rise and fall of morality in the modem world. When 
asked how he might give more attention to religion, his answer was to improve his 
treatment ofKierkegaard, Hume and Pascal. Interestingly, Aquinas, who emerges as 
the hero in later works, merits no mention. 
This exclusion of religion is only noteworthy in the light of MacIntyre's move 
toward Christian theology. Prior to this, he consistently viewed religion as morally 
irrelevant. For example, in his Secularization and Moral Change (1967), MacIntyre 
asserted that it is wrong to claim that modem moral change is due to the decline of 
religion or that the upshot of a reinvigorated religious life would be a change in 
society's moral life. 'In so far as there is a causal relationship between morals and 
religion', MacIntyre argued, 'it has been changes in the moral climate and in the 
forms of social life that have rendered Christianity apparently irrelevant or incredible, 
rather than unbelief in Christianity which has produced moral change.'5 Concepts 
such as urbanisation and industrialisation had greater explanatory power for 
MacIntyre than the function of religion. 
MacIntyre's change of opinion about religion takes place in two steps, the first 
of which is evident in After Virtue. The first step, which I consider at length in this 
chapter, is the doubts that he raises regarding the claims of social-scientific expertise 
and the predictive ability of the social sciences. The second step, which I consider in 
the following chapter, concerns the necessity of theism for rescuing a teleological 
framework for ethics. Although the critique of the social sciences did not necessitate 
4 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Moral Rationality, Tradition, and Aristotle: A Reply to Onora O'Neill, Raimond 
Gaita, and Stephen R.L. Clark', Inquiry, 26 (1983), pp. 447. . . 
5 Alasdair MacIntyre, Secularization and Moral Change (London: Oxford UmversIty Press, 1967), p. 
58. 
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a reconsideration of MacIntyre's earlier rejection of religion, it cleared the way for 
this development to take place. Mark R. Schwehn, in a review of MacIntyre's Three 
Rival Versions (1990), reflects on this development as he credits MacIntyre with 
bringing religious questions to the centre of the academic agenda.6 Schwehn 
observes that while MacIntyre was once a 'relentless critic' of theology, 'he has done 
more than any other contemporary philosopher' to bring theology back to centre stage 
in philosophical ethics.7 Neuhaus observes that 'MacIntyre has had a singular part in 
changing the map of moral philosophy.'s Finally, in an essay that is not altogether 
appreciative of the use to which MacIntyre's argument has been put by students of 
theological ethics, Fergus Kerr, the Roman Catholic philosopher and theologian, 
questions MacIntyre's 'vehement rejection of all moral philosophy, Humean, Kantian, 
utilitarian and Nietzschean' and the conclusion that Enlightenment philosophy is 
responsible for the 'moral wilderness of our culture.,9 
MacIntyre's argument is important for Lutheran ethics in two ways. First (pace 
Kerr), I agree with MacIntyre's analysis that we are presently in the midst of a moral 
decline which, in large part, can be linked to a mistaken understanding of the 
relationship of morality to rationality. I consider this argument in the first chapter. 
Second, MacIntyre offers an alternative notion of rationality that is essential for the 
recovery of a post-Enlightenment Lutheran ethic because it levels important 
criticisms of Lutheranism's understanding of rationality, while offering resources to 
repair the disorder. 10 In the present chapter, I will consider MacIntyre's criticism of 
the Enlightenment notion of rationality in the following way. The first section attends 
to MacIntyre's argument that the emergence of emotivism is the sure sign that 
morality is badly disordered-a disorder that reflects a wrong understanding of 
rationality. The second section considers MacIntyre's controversial thesis that 
emotivism is the unintended consequence of the failure of modem deontological and 
6 Alasdair MacIntyre of Moral Inquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). (Hereafter: Three Rival Versions.) 
7 Mark R Schwehn, 'Alasdair MacIntyre's University', review of Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Inquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1990), First Things 13 (May, 1991), p. 51.. .. ,. . 
S Richard John Neuhaus, 'Reconnecting MoralIty and RelIgIOn, First Thzngs 43 (May, 1994), pp. 66-
67. d Th . 'S d' . 
9 Fergus Kerr, 'Moral Theology After MacIntyre: Modem Ethics, Tragedy an orrusm, tu les zn 
Christian Ethics 8 (1994), p. 33. , .. 
10 I consider MacIntyre's criticism of Luther in the fourth chapter and apply MacIntyre s posItIve 
account of rationality to Lutheranism in the fifth chapter. 
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utilitarian understandings of what constitutes a rational morality. The third section 
considers MacIntyre's suggestive opposition of Aristotle to Nietzsche, focusing 
primarily on the Nietzschean alternative. MacIntyre argues that the emergence of 
Nietzschean ideas, embodied in bureaucratic social order, signals the failure of the 
Enlightenment project. This account lays the groundwork for the following chapter's 
consideration of MacIntyre's Aristotelian alternative. Let us now consider 
MacIntyre's account of emotivism as a sign of the Enlightenment's failure. 
2. Emotivism: The Sign of Moral Decline 
2.1. Three Stages to Emotivism 
After Virtue begins with what MacIntyre calls a 'disquieting suggestion.' In the 
form of a parable, MacIntyre advances the thesis that we are faced with a moral 
disorder that is beyond recognition and repair. MacIntyre's parabolic depiction of the 
modem moral dilemma begins with a series of environmental disasters that the 
general public blames on the scientific community. After this, 
[w]idespread riots occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books 
and instruments are destroyed. Finally a Know-Nothing political movement takes 
power and successfully abolishes science teaching in schools and universities, 
imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists. Later still, there is a reaction 
against this destructive movement and enlightened people seek to revive science, 
although they have largely forgotten what it was. But all that they possess are 
fragments: a knowledge of experiments detached from any knowledge of the 
theoretical context which gave them significance; parts of theories unrelated either 
to the other bits and pieces of theory or to experiment; instruments whose use has 
been forgotten; half--chapters from books, single pages from articles, not always 
fully legible because tom and charred. 11 
This parable suggests a three-stage understanding of how emotivism emerged. In the 
first stage, moral language, norms, customs and practices are understood to be in the 
category of things that may be evaluated as true or false. Objective moral evaluations 
are possible insofar as they are rendered within a systematic framework. 12 In the 
second stage, the decline begins with the increasing abstraction of moral judgements, 
rules, customs and practices from the overarching moral framework. Rather than 
11After Virtue, p. 1. .. 
12 The second chapter of this thesis gives a detaIled treatment of thIS structure. 
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being parts in a coherent whole, each rule, each custom, each practice is treated as a 
self-sufficient whole that must be justified in isolation from any moral framework. 13 
This second stage on the way to emotivism is evident in Captain James Cook's 
(1728-1779) observations of the function of taboo rules in Polynesian society. Cook 
records the perplexity of the English explorers as they attempted to understand what 
appeared to them to be arbitrary rules of conduct that allowed lax sexual practices but 
prohibited men from eating in the company of women. When inquiry was made into 
the reasons for the regulation, the response was that eating together was taboo. Taboo 
did not mean, notes MacIntyre, 'forbidden for this or that reason.' Rather, because 
these rules were severed from a now forgotten cultural and moral framework that 
once provided a coherent rationale, they were incoherent and unaccountable 
prohibitions. That is, they were rules for which no justifying reasons could be 
offered. 14 
The theologian Jeffery Stout concludes that MacIntyre is rhetorically effective, 
thought finally wrong, in drawing an analogy between the incoherence of taboo rules 
and the failure of modem ethics. IS According to Stout, MacIntyre, who claims to 
champion plain language philosophy, fails to recognise how, in common use, 'ought' 
statements rarely suffer from the kind of incoherence he sees in Polynesian taboo 
prohibitions. In response to this criticism, MacIntyre further develops his point about 
the incoherence of modem moral language in an analysis of the morality of 
nineteenth-century academics and particularly the editors of the ninth edition of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. It was their belief that the empirical sciences and human 
rationality supplied a sufficient framework for a universally normative morality. 16 
MacIntyre surmises that if put to the question, these academics would have fared no 
better than the Polynesians in their attempt to justify their moral norms. Their rules 
and principles were fragments of a theistic moral system that had ceased to be 
relevant. This point is made by Nietzsche when he states, 'Naivete: as if morality 
13 F detat·led consideration of the impact of abstraction on particular moral details, see, 
or a more f S d H· ,. 
Al d · M I tyr 'Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble? The Relevance 0 ystem an IS tory , m as atr ac n e, C Duk U· . 
ed. Patricia Cook, Philosophical Imagination and Cultural Memory (Durham, N: e mverslty 
Press, 1993), pp. 73 ff. 
14 After Virtue, pp. 111-113. 
IS Jeffery Stout, Ethics After Babel: Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Boston, MA: Beacon, 
1988), pp. 67-68. 
16 Three Rival Versions, p. 185. 
16 
could survive when the God who sanctions it is missing!"7 Hence MacIntyre states 
that the attempt to justify universal moral norms that were, in fact, the 'incoherent 
fragments of a once coherent scheme of thought and action,' was not merely an 
impossible, but a 'quixotic' task 18 
Following this second-stage divorce of moral judgements from their 
framework, emotivism emerges in the third stage. It is probably a misnomer to call 
emotivism a moral system. It is better understood to be a cultural situation that has 
developed from the recognition that every attempt to justify moral systems has failed 
and must continue to fail. 19 Rationally defensible moral judgements are justified by 
appeal to some objective moral standard. When such a standard is believed to exist, 
moral judgements may employ the metaphor of weights and measures, or the 
language of progress. The meaning of emotivism is that we have come to see that it is 
no longer possible to justify moral judgements according to some accepted standard 
of measure. Emotivism is an embodied conclusion that there is 'no rational way of 
securing moral agreement in our culture. '20 At this stage of deterioration, the notion 
of 'weighing moral claims is not just inappropriate but misleading. '21 Emotivism 
marks a shift in the paradigm of moral judgements from objective measures to 
subjective tastes. This view, which MacIntyre ascribes to Max Weber, is summarised 
by MacIntyre in the following way: 
Questions of ends are questions of values, and on values reason is silent; conflict 
between rival values cannot be rationally settled. Instead one must simply 
choose ... the choice of anyone particular evaluative stance or commitment can be 
no more rational than that of any other. All faiths and all evaluations are equally 
non-rational; all are subjective directions given to sentiment andfeeling.22 
According to MacIntyre, we are presently between the second and third stages. At 
this transitional stage, 'the language and the appearances of morality persist even 
though the integral substance of morality has to a large degree been fragmented and 
then in part destroyed.'23 We are in a precarious situation because the form of morality 
exists though its foundation is eroded. This means that, insofar as we continue to 
think that our moral judgements are rational, even though they are not, our moral 
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to PowerJ. ed. and trans., W. Kaufman (New York: Random, 1967), p. 
147. 
18 After Virtue, p. 55. 
19 After Virtue, pp. 18-19. 
20 After Virtue, p. 6. 
21 After Virtue, p. 246. . 
22 After Virtue, p. 26 (my emphaSIS). 
17 
decline must go undetected. We now live in the experience of moral disorder while 
being incapable of giving a rational account of this disorder. Like the occupants of 
Plato's cave, we lack the will or the ability to see our moral situation clearly. So long 
as the moral house still stands, we do not have to face the fact that it is built on sand. 
Moreover, were our culture to recognise this disordered state, MacIntyre argues 
that it is too late; there are no remedies available to us. The last and best hope is that 
a new and different St. Benedict will provide a way of constructing communities that 
are capable of surviving the moral collapse. Having no large-scale remedy available, 
we must take our cue from the fifth-century monastic communities and construct 
moral refuges to survive whatever hard times may come. 
MacIntyre admits that the depth of his disillusionment with modernity cannot be 
vindicated by a 'few brief striking events whose character is incontestably clear. ' 
Because this moral situation 'is open to rival interpretation, '24 the aim of After Virtue 
is to make the incoherent fragments cohere within a single philosophical/historical 
story. Where the fragments lack the necessary framework, he intends to render the 
fragments intelligible and coherent within a narrative structure. Reflecting on this 
story of decline, Richard Bernstein states that After Virtue 
reads like a brief but extremely dense novel: its plot gradually unfolds; it has its 
moments of suspense and discovery; there are climaxes and anticlimaxes. Indeed, it 
is written in that very genre of dramatic narrative that MacIntyre tells us is so vital 
for understanding human action.25 
As indicated, MacIntyre begins his story in the present, and works backward through 
the genealogy of emotivism. Let us further consider how we have come to this 
present disorder of emotivism. 
2.2. Emotivism in Theory and Practice 
It may be surprising that MacIntyre accords such importance to the theory of 
emotivism. It is not, of course, that he is unaware of the theoretical and practical 
deficiencies ofC.L. Stevenson's notion of moral language. Emotivism is important 
only because 'to a large degree people now talk and act as if emotivism were true. '26 
23 After Virtue, p. 5. 
24 After Virtue, p. 3. , 1 d' M I ' Aifi V:' t ' 
25 Richard J. Bernstein, 'Nietzsche or Aristotle? ReflectIons on A as alI ac ntyre s ter lr ue , 
Soundings, 67 (Spring, 1984), p. 7. 
26 After Virtue, p. 22. 
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In a densely packed paragraph, MacIntyre summarises the moral importance of 
emotivism: 
Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all 
moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude 
or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character. Particular judgments 
may of course unite moral and factual elements. 'Arson, being destructive of 
property, is wrong' unites the factual judgment that arson destroys property with the 
moral judgment that arson is wrong. But the moral element in such a judgment is 
always to be sharply distinguished from the factual. Factual judgments are true or 
false; and in the realm of fact there are rational criteria by means of which we may 
secure agreement as to what is true and what is false. But moral judgments, being 
expressions of attitude or feeling, are neither true nor false; and agreement in moral 
judgment is not to be secured by any rational method, for there are none. It is to be 
secured, if at all, by producing certain non-rational effects on the emotions or 
attitudes of those who disagree with one. We use moral judgments not only to 
express our own feelings and attitudes, but also precisely to produce such effects in 
others.27 
This quotation suggests three reasons for MacIntyre's sense of disquiet. First, 
emotivism, in accepting the fact/value distinction, collapses moral judgements into 
'expressions of attitude or feeling.' As such, these judgements may be judged to be 
effective or ineffective. However as moral statements cannot be judged as either true 
or false, they have no purchase on reality. Thus, David Lewis' observation about 
philosophy is true of an emotivist culture's understanding of evaluative moral 
judgements as well. Lewis states: 'Once the menu of well-worked out theories is 
before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion. '28 Regardless of the speaker's intention, 
moral statements are never truth statements. They cannot be vindicated or falsified by 
appeal to an objective, underlying moral structure. Morality is no longer a matter of 
fact. In later arguments, MacIntyre stresses that this divorce of morality from fact 
reflects both our changing views of morality as well as our changing understanding of 
'facts'. The contrast is between 'fact' as understood within the mechanistic, 
empiricist worldview over against its use prior to the widespread mis-application of 
Newtonian categories to human behaviour. MacIntyre states: 
On the former view the facts about human action include the facts about what is 
valuable to human beings (and not just the facts about what they think to be 
valuable); on the latter view there are no facts about w~at is valuabl~. 'Fact' 
becomes value-free, 'is' becomes a stranger to 'ought and explanatIOn, as well as 
27 After Virtue, pp. 11-12. . . . 
28 Alasdair MacIntyre, First Principles, Final Ends And Contemporary Phllosophlcal Issues: The 
Aquinas Lectures (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1990), p. 66. (Hereafter: Flrst 
Principles, Final Ends.) 
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evaluation, changes its character as a result of this divorce between 'is' and 
'ought' .29 
Once moral judgement is sufficiently divorced from fact, moral utterances are reduced 
to taste, which presumably admit no rational disputation. MacIntyre observes that this 
reduction of morality to taste does not, in fact, put an end to arguments. Rather, the 
central characteristic of the emotivist culture is stated in the maxim de gustibus est 
disputandum. When there is no rational way of settling arguments, we do not cease to 
argue; arguments rather become interminable, shrill, and tend to escalate into greater 
violence. 
Second, a practical problem arises from the inadequacy of emotivism as a 
metaethical theory. Stevenson claims that emotivism clarifies the use of plain moral 
language when it actually mystifies and confuses moral utterances by driving a wedge 
between the real function of moral speech and the speaker's intended use. Emotivism 
claims to simplify moral language by reducing all moral speech, such as obligation, 
commands, duty and imperatives, to expressions of personal preference. The problem 
is most evident when language users do not understand themselves to be expressing 
opinions or feelings but objective moral judgements based in a certain view of the 
world or of human nature. According to the theory of emotivism, such moral 
language still only expresses personal feelings and sentiments. Emotivism is a theory 
of language that explains away moral utterances by steadfastly ignoring the actual 
language and intentions of the language users. All contrary evidence aside, evaluative 
judgements finally mean nothing more than, 'I approve of this; do so as well' or 
'Hurrah for this!' '30 
Emotivism thus gives the hearer of moral utterances the broad license to 
deconstruct moral judgements as concealing personal will.3 ! This view introduces a 
certain arbitrariness into our public moral conversation. In theory, emotivism offers 
no hope of rational reconciliation of our disagreements. Moral discourse is reduced to 
assertions and counter-assertions about what are finally matters of taste. As I noted 
above, that our moral arguments are interminable and increasing shrill strongly 
suggests that we do not view our moral judgements to be in the same category of 
disagreement as whether coffee is better with or without cream. We argue over those 
29 After Virtue, p. 84. 
30 After Virtue, p. 13. 
3! After Virtue, p. 14. 
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matters which do matter. For this reason, an emotivist culture cannot consistently 
reduce all moral language to taste. Rather, it will arbitrarily and selectively 
deconstruct some moral language while according moral authority to other 
jUdgements. This fragmentation of moral language allows modems to simultaneously 
give moral weight to their moral assertions while the moral judgements of others are 
heard as 'mere expressive assertion. '32 MacIntyre puts it in this way: 
F or the modem radical is as confident in the moral expression of his stances and 
consequently in the assertive uses of the rhetoric of morality as any conservative has 
ever been. Whatever else he denounces in our culture he is certain that it still 
possesses the moral resources which he requires in order to denounce it.33 
MacIntyre additionally notes: 'It is easy also to understand why protest becomes a 
distinctive moral feature of the modem age and why indignation is a predominant 
modem emotion. '34 We assert our view as ifit is rationally defensible. But once we 
discover that we have lost the ability to argue rationally, we are left to express 
resentment that others 'just don't get it!' What is very hard to get is the reason why 
some matters of taste ought to be treated as having more moral weight that other 
matters. This arbitrariness leads us to the third disquieting feature of emotivism, 
namely, the nonrational forms of persuasion that must be used to overcome the 
problem of interminable moral disagreement. 
In most language use, 'This is good' does not merely mean 'I approve of this. ' 
Rather, as emotivist theory claims, 'this is good' implies the imperative, 'You (must) 
approve of this as well.' Implicit in the statement 'This is good' is the intention to 
influence the attitude of the hearer.35 However, if the 'good' does not refer to a shared, 
authoritative, factual, evaluative standard, then we are left to find nonrational means 
and methods to convince others to adopt this point of view as their own. Emotivism, 
says MacIntyre, 'entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between 
manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. '36 The problem with emotivism is 
that it cannot distinguish between something so simple and so important as 
manipulative and non-manipulative means of persuasion. The propaganda of Joseph 
Goebels' is indistinguishable from the preaching of Martin Luther King Jr. It does 
not matter if language treats others as ends or as means. What matters is what works. 
32 After Virtue, p. 11. 
33 After Virtue, p. 4. 
34 After Virtue, p. 71. 
35 After Virtue, p. 12. 
36 After Virtue. p. 23. 
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MacIntyre makes his point by contrasting the Kantian concern for the person as end 
with the very different view of emotivism: 
For Kant ... the difference between a human relationship uninformed by morality 
and one so informed is precisely the difference between one in which each person 
treats the other primarily as a means to his or her ends and one in which each treats 
the other as an end. To treat someone else as an end is to offer them what I take to 
be good reasons for acting in one way rather than another, but to leave it to them to 
evaluate those reasons. It is to be unwilling to influence another except by reasons 
which that other he or she judges to be good.37 
An emotivist culture presumes that moral agreements are won by nonrational 
.' 
means. The two most obvious forms of nonrational means are manipulation and 
coercion. The force of MacIntyre's argument lies not in a theoretical account of the 
nonrational moral modes of control. Rather he shows how these irrational means are 
embodied in certain emotivist characters: the rich aesthete, the therapist and the 
bureaucrat manager. Let us briefly consider each of these characters. 
MacIntyre presumes that the erosion of the distinction between persons as 
ends or means is alarming. To treat others as ends is to be rationally accountable to 
them, to offer them reasons for one's moral commitments. Conversely, to treat others 
as means turns persons into instruments of one's own chosen ends, to be utilised in 
whatever ways serve to achieve one's calculated goals. The rich aesthete 
instrumentalises persons because his or her world is characterised by consumption. 
This is a world where the aesthete aims to be a consumer of persons, and to avoid 
being a person consumed by others.38 The aesthete's ideal is to use 'a plethora of 
means' in a restless search 'for ends on which he may employ them.' The social world 
of this leisured class is 'nothing but a meeting place for individual wills, each with its 
own set of attitudes and preferences and who understand that world solely as an arena 
for the achievement of their own satisfaction ... for whom the last enemy is 
boredom. '39 
Given the unmitigated selfishness of the rich aesthete, it is not immediately 
obvious how the therapist, a 'helping' professional, embodies the obliteration of the 
distinction between the manipulative and nonmanipulative modes of relationships. 
MacIntyre notes that, in spite of the obvious differences, the therapist treats ends as 
chosen and not given. Hence the task of the therapist has nothing to do with facts or 
37 After Virtue, p. 23. 
38 After Virtue, p. 24. 
39 After Virtue, p. 25. 
22 
objective moral standards. Rather, the therapist's task is to use certain techniques 
effectively to transform 'neurotic symptoms into directed energy, maladjusted 
individuals into well-adjusted ones.' 40 Insofar as therapeutic ends are chosen, 'truth 
has been displaced as a value and replaced by psychological effectiveness. '41 
MacIntyre's account of the therapist and aesthete is more suggestive than 
systematically developed. When, however, he discusses the bureaucratic manager, he 
offers a more extensive account of the problem of emotivism. The character of the 
bureaucratic manager most clearly discloses how the social and political embodiments 
of emotivism fail to distinguish persons from instruments. In order to adequately 
attend to this development of the bureaucratic manager, I must first rehearse the 
genealogy of the path that has brought us to emotivism. In tracing the evolution of 
the bureaucratic manager, we are following the trajectory of the Enlightenment's rise 
and fall. In contrast to the Enlightenment's claims to have uncovered rational 
morality, MacIntyre makes the remarkable claim that deontological and utilitarian 
forms of moral deliberation were the praeparatio evangelica of emotivism.42 Let us 
consider MacIntyre's account of those moral theories whose failure to justify a 
rational foundation for morality led to emotivism's emergence. 
3. The Genealogy of Emotivism 
Richard Bernstein notes that MacIntyre's account of the Enlightenment has struck 
many as 
both shocking and scandalous. For what MacIntyre seeks to show, in what may be 
called his genealogical unmasking, is that despite the rationalistic pretensions of 
post-Enlightenment moral philosophy, it is nothing but a disguised expression of 
the emotivism which has become embodied and well-entrenched in modem society 
and culture.43 
It may seem unusual that MacIntyre, whose argument is finally directed against 
Nietzsche, should adopt a method of historical writing that is so closely tied to 
Nietzsche. In a recent essay, MacIntyre notes that his project to articulate a rational 
ethic requires a genealogy that discloses, rather than argues, how 'the predicaments of 
40 After Virtue, p. 30. .. . . . 
41 After Virtue, pp. 30-31. MacIntyre refers to Phlhp Rieffs works, The Trzumph of the Therapeutlc: 
Uses of Faith After Freud (New York: Harper & Row 1966). 
42 After Virtue, p. 66. 
43 Bernstein, 'Nietzsche or Aristotle?', pp. 7-8. 
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contemporary philosophy ... were generated and under what conditions, if any, they 
can be avoided or left behind. '44 
The genealogical narrative is a subversive history that makes no pretence of 
value-neutrality or impartiality. 45 Rather, it aims to disclose how Enlightenment 
thinkers came to that impasse where they could no longer 'recognise or diagnose 
adequately out of their own conceptual and argumentative resources the nature of 
their predicament. '46 As Marx Wartofsky points out, it was MacIntyre's task to show 
how liberalism became 'unaware of its own situation, its own limits, and its own 
incoherence,' and so was 'incapable of self-criticism. '47 While MacIntyre recognises 
the critical importance of deontology and consequentialism, he largely ignores their 
positive contributions. This is not surprising as his aim is offer a counter-history that 
makes clear, to a morally blind age, how Kantian deontology and utilitarianism have 
historically and philosophically brought us to emotivism. Let us first consider 
MacIntyre's account of what at first seems to be an unlikely intellectual path from 
Kant to emotivism. 
3.1. From Kant to Emotivism 
'For many who have never heard of philosophy, let alone of Kant,' MacIntyre 
writes, 'morality is roughly what Kant said it was. '48 Morality is understood as a 
system of categorical rules, duties and obligations to which compliance is the only 
rational alternative. 49 MacIntyre's account of Kant is, in many respects, an answer to 
the question, 'What happens when rules become the primary concept of the moral 
life?' 50 'In Kant's moral writings', says MacIntyre, ' ... we have reached a point at 
which the notion that morality is anything other than obedience to rules has almost, if 
44 First Principles, Final Ends, p. 57. 
45 MacIntyre states that his history is a decline and fall narrative that is informed by standards. 'It is not 
an evaluatively neutral chronicle.' After Virtue, p. 3. 
46 First Principles, Final Ends, p.57. 
47 Marx W. Wartofsky, 'Virtue Lost or Understanding MacIntyre', Inquiry 27 (1984), p. 240. 
48 A Short History of Ethics (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 190. 
49There is, of course, much more to Kantian moral philosophy than the justification of action by means 
of moral rules. See, for example, MacIntyre's, 'Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can 
We Learn from Mill and Kant?' The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 16 (Salt Lake City, UT: 
University of Utah Press, 1995), pp. 335 ff. A more even-handed treatment of Kant would point out 
how, for example, the good behind Kant's aspiration for universal justice and benevolence has been the 
right kind of therapy for past philo.sophical a~d theological errors. S.ee C~arles Taylor, Sources of the 
Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambndge, MA: Harvard Umverslty Press, 1989), pp. 81 ff. 
50 After Virtue, p. 119. 
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not quite, disappeared from sight. '51 Now the central problem facing Kantian moral 
philosophy is to answer the question, 'How do we know which rules to follow?' 
MacIntyre's account of Kant's inability to answer this question, begins with the 
jolting assertion that Kant is finally unable to avoid a moral philosophy that looks 
very similar to Kierkegaard' s notion of radical choice. 
MacIntyre notes that in focusing on Kierkegaard's polemics against Hegel, we 
tend to miss the importance of Kant to Kierkegaard's philosophical conclusions. 
MacIntyre claims that Kant's account of a rational religion and his moral philosophy 
provided the essential background for Kierkegaard's treatment of the ethical. 52 It is 
Kant's failure to provide a rational foundation for moral choice which moves 
Kierkegaard to the conclusion that moral choice is finally a 'leap of faith.' This is a 
remarkable claim given Kant's intent to anchor morality in the function of human 
reason which 'lays down principles which are universal, categorical, and internally 
consistent. '53 In the wake of Kant's failure, moral choices had could have no rational 
moral foundation. Agents could still choose but could give no rational reasons for 
their choices. This severing of choice from rational accountability leads, argues 
MacIntyre, to Kierkegaard's conception of radical choice. 
According to MacIntyre, Kierkegaard's Either-Or presents us with the 
discovery that arbitrariness characterises much of what we think are rational moral 
choices. Kierkegaard's opposition of aesthetic experience to the ethical serves to 
demonstrate how deep this arbitrariness runs. For Kierkegaard, aesthetic experience 
leads one to act so as to 'lose the self in the immediacy of present experience. '54 The 
model of the aesthetic experience is immersion in the passions of romantic love. 
Alternatively, the guide of ethical action is that commitment to first principles and 
ultimate reasons, of which commitment in marriage is the ruling model. Here, 
sentiments, preferences or feelings are 'irrelevant to the question of how I must live. '55 
Although Kierkegaard finally comes down on the side of the ethical, he presents both 
51After Virtue, p. 236. Although MacIntyre backs away from this point ~ hi~ respons~.to Onora 
O'Neill's criticism of this account of Kant (Cf. MacIntyre, 'Moral RationalIty, TradItion, and 
Aristotle' , p. 448), 
he continues to assert that the central problem of liberalism remains in how to identify those unarguable 
rules to which all rational beings must comply. 
52 After Virtue, p. 43. 
53 After Virtue, p. 45. 
54 After Virtue, p. 40. 
55 After Virtue, p. 41. 
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alternatives as equally attractive, though mutually incompatible. The question is what 
criterion or criteria are to guide one's choice between these two goods.56 
Kierkegaard does not and cannot answer the question. His response is rather 
to assert that we do not choose because we have rational reasons; we have reasons 
because we have first chosen. Choosing our good gives us reasons for action. The 
problem is that the reasons cannot be given for this initial choice. It is 'a choice that 
lies beyond reasons, just because it is the choice of what is to count for us as reason. '57 
Clearly, Kierkegaard's fideism and Kant's notion of rationality could not be further 
apart. Nevertheless, MacIntyre argues that Kant's moral philosophy 'is the essential 
background for Kierkegaard's treatment of the ethical.'58 Put differently, 
Kierkegaard's radical choice is not a departure from Kant but a disclosure of Kant's 
notion of rationality taken to its logical extreme. The plausibility of this thesis 
depends on MacIntyre showing how Kant's failure leads to Kierkegaard's notion of 
radical choice. Let us consider this account of Kantian deontology. 
MacIntyre notes that his genealogy of Kant's notion of a rational moral choice is 
based on two deceptively simple theses. These are: 
if the rules of morality are rational, they must be the same for all rational beings, in 
just the way that the rules of arithmetic are; and if the rules of morality are binding 
on all rational beings, then the contingent ability of such beings to carry them out 
must be unimportant-what is important is their will to carry them OUt.59 
The first thesis presumes that rational actions are justified by the appeal to universal 
moral rules. The second thesis presumes that free moral agents are always able and so 
must will to accept the obligations of universal moral commands. As such, a rational 
moral choice cannot be justified by an appeal to happiness nor by an appeal to 
heteronomous divine commands. For Kant, MacIntyre states, 'the realm of 
inclination is as alien to our rational natures as any divine commandments.' Neither 
Aristotle's eudaimonia nor Christ's commands have rational moral authority.6o 
Consider Kant's rejection of happiness. Although happiness was viewed as a 
universal desire, Kant rejected it as a suitable foundation for morality. Happiness 
does not meet the test of universality because its moral authority is contingent upon 
meeting a nonmoral condition. Imperatives which are contingent on antecedent 
56 After Virtue, p. 40. 
57 After Virtue, p. 42. 
58 After Virtue, p. 43. 
59 After Virtue, pp. 43-44. 
60A Short History o/Ethics, p. 195. 
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conditions are 'hypothetical' rather than 'categorical' imperatives. The form of the 
hypothetical imperative is, 'You ought to do this ifit makes you happy.' The 
conditions which follow the if are the reasons which justify a certain course of action. 
The hypothetical imperative supplies a reason for action which is external to the 
agent. For this reason divine commands must be rejected because, as hypothetical 
imperatives they are heteronomous commands which do not originate in the 
rationality of the moral self. 
This jUdgement does not necessarily mean that divine commands are 
irrational. MacIntyre points out that Kant, by and large, accepted the moral content 
articulated as divine commands. His argument was rather that divine commands were 
at one remove from the source of rationality. That is, their authority lay not in the 
belief that God had revealed his will but in the belief that the commands expressed 
that which had universal applicability. A rational rule was one that the agent could 
'consistently will that everyone should always act on it. '61 In order for moral agents 
to act in accordance with divine commands, they must already possess 'a standard of 
moral judgment independent of God's commands by means of which [they] could 
judge God's deeds and words and so find the latter morally worthy of obedience.' 
But if agents already know this standard by which God's commands are judged to be 
rational or not, 'the commandments of God will be redundant. '62 
For Kant, a rational moral rule was analogous to the function of laws in 
Newton's cosmology.63 In the Critique of Pure Reason, he asserts that human agents 
know, a priori, that all human experience 'will tum out to be law governed and to be 
law governed after the manner of Newtonian causality.'64 Categorical moral rules 
must somehow imitate scientific knowledge.65 As with the natural sciences, a rational 
morality must be expressed as 'necessary and invariant laws.' These laws admit no 
exception, are lucid and are beyond question by rational beings.66 Second, natural 
61After Virtue, p. 45. 
62 After Virtue, p. 45. 
63 After Virtue, p. 52. MacIntyre states that Enlightenment writers: 'share in the project of cons~cting 
valid arguments which will move from premises concerning human nature as they understand It to be to 
conclusions about the authority of moral rules and precepts' , 
64A Short History of Ethics, p. 190. MacIntyre similarly sees Freud attempting to imitate a kind of 
Newtonian systematic explanation of the unconscious. See The Unconscious: A Conceptual Study 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 15. . ,. 
65 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Hume, Testimony to Miracles, the Order of Nature, and lansemsm , m eds. 1. 
MacIntosh and H. Meynell, Faith. Skepticism and Personal Identity (Calgary: University of Calgary 
Press, 1994), pp. 95-98. 
66 MacIntyre, 'Hume, Testimony to Miracles, the Order of Nature, and lansenism', p. 96. 
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science leaves no gaps in the understanding of nature. Everything in the phenomenal 
world, be it biological, psychological or social, must be articulated in these invariant 
laws. This analogy between the laws of morality and natural science requires that 
human bodies behave in a mechanistic or predictable fashion. MacIntyre unpacks the 
implications of understanding human action in mechanical terms: 
[A]t the core of the notion of mechanical explanation is a conception of invariances 
specified by law-like generalizations. To cite a cause is to cite a necessary 
condition or a sufficient condition or a necessary and sufficient condition as the 
antecedent of whatever behavior is to be explained. So every mechanical causal 
sequence exemplifies some universal generalization and that generalization has a 
precisely specifiable scope. Newton's laws of motion which purport to be universal 
in scope provide the paradigm case of such a set of generalizations.67 
Because morality aspires to the level of certainty of knowledge within the physical 
sciences, it must be capable of being fully articulated in general and irrefutable rules, 
principles or laws. This reduction of morality to a certain kind of rule is finally 
Kant's undoing. 
Kant has committed a category error. Moral rules are not of a piece with laws of 
physical nature. MacIntyre illustrates this error with an extended metaphor: 
If widespread brain lesions resulted in the loss of all our beliefs about atoms and 
molecules so that not a trace of such concepts remained in our thought or our 
language or was embodied in our practice, there would still be atoms and molecules, 
just as there are now, and nothing that is now true in particle theory would then be 
false. If similar lesions resulted in the loss of all our beliefs about representative 
government so that not a trace of that concept remained in thought or language or 
was embodied in practice, there would be no such thing as representative 
government any longer. Beliefs about the concepts of physical realities are always 
secondary to those realities; the physical world does not require us to have any 
particular beliefs about it or concepts of it, for it to exist. But with social reality it is 
quite otherwise. Social practices, institutions and organizations are partially 
constituted by the beliefs and concepts of those who participate in, have transactions 
with and attitudes towards them ... mere behavior by itself, abstracted from beliefs 
and concepts, is meaningless.68 
The reality to which scientific laws refer is not like the reality to which moral laws 
refer. This means that a rational morality cannot be law-governed in the way that 
Kant imagined. This error becomes clear in Kant's inability to justify the universal 
applicability of truth-telling. 
In the essay, 'On the Supposed Right of Telling a Lie from Benevolent 
Motives,' Kant gives reasons why the categorical imperative can admit no exceptions, 
67 After Virtue, pp. 82-83. 
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even when good comes from telling a lie. MacIntyre lays out the context of Kant's 
rigorous defence of truth-telling as he states: 
Suppose that a would-be murderer inquires from me the whereabouts of his 
intended victim. And suppose that I lie in order to save the victim. The murderer 
then proceeds to follow my directions, but, unknown to me, the victim has in fact 
removed himself to precisely the place to which I have directed the murderer. 
Consequently, the murder is effected as a consequence of my lie, and I am 
responsible precisely because I lied. But had I told the truth, I could not have been 
held responsible, no matter what happened. For it is my duty to obey the imperative 
and not to look to the consequences.69 
For Kant, to admit variation in a rational moral rule would be to undermine its 
universal application and claim of rationality. The problem is that this universality is 
purchased by advocating a form of honesty that is morally repugnant. 70 
Samuel Johnson offers an alternative to the Kantian understanding of truth-
telling which is not consequentialist while admitting exception: 
The general rule is, that Truth should never be violated, because it is of the utmost 
importance to the comfort of life, that we should have a full security by mutual 
faith ... There must, however, be some exceptions. If, for instance, a murder should 
ask you which way a man is gone, you may tell him what is not true, because you 
are under a previous obligation not to betray a man to a murderer. .. But I deny the 
lawfulness of telling a lie to a sick man for fear of alarming him. You have no 
business with consequences; you are to tell the truth. 71 
Johnson's view is much closer to Kant's contemporary, Benjamin Constant, who was 
'outraged' at Kant's rigourism. He argued that 'obedience to a moral principle 
unconditionally enjoining everyone to speak the truth and unmodified by other 
principles would make all social life impossible.'72 While Kant's morality seemed to 
uphold a lofty moral ideal, it was unfit for historically situated beings. Kant seemed 
blind to the different obligations that the relationship of friendship required over 
against the obligations to one intent on malevolent action. Constant's rebuff of Kant 
was to argue that the duty to tell the truth is 'only towards a person who has a right to 
truth. '73 
68 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Social Science Methodology as the Ideology of Bureaucratic Authority', in ed. 
M.S. Falco, Through the Looking Glass (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1979), pp. 
46-47. 
69A Short History of Ethics, p. 195. 
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In Constant's and Johnson's position, there is a sense in which the conflict of 
two obligations can be weighed one against the other, in order to discern the greater 
good or the lesser evil. This notion of weighing does not necessarily commit one to a 
consequentialist ethic, as Kant argued. Nor does the weighing of one's relationship to 
the friend over against the murderer reduce moral choices to arbitrary choices. 
Rather, these considerations offer a way out of Kant's dilemma. MacIntyre states that 
this alternative would, on principle, prohibit lying in almost all circumstances, but on 
certain and rare occasions, lying would be required. 74 However, this view of truth-
telling would require the rejection of two fundamental aspects of Kant's definition of 
a rational morality. These are that morality is articulated as invariant laws, and that 
these laws are self-legislated by an autonomous individual. 
By abandoning these two assertions, MacIntyre argues that truth-telling could 
then be defined by its function in preserving the good of particular social 
relationships. He states: 
Instead of first asking, 'By what principles am I, as a rational person, bound ?' we 
have first to ask, 'By what principles are we, as actually or potentially rational 
persons, bound in our relationships?' We begin, that is, from within the social 
relationships in which we find ourselves, the institutionalized relationships of 
established social practices, through which we discover, and through which alone 
we can achieve, the goods internal to those practices, that give point and purpose to 
those relationships.75 
The solution to Kant's quandary of lying is not difficult. Once we consider the moral 
agent's web of social relationships, it is clear that the protection he owes to his friend 
requires that he lie to the would-be murderer. 
In view of Kant's aspiration to articulate a universal morality, the admission of 
one's social circumstances into moral reasoning and the acceptance of exceptions 
would have seemed to subject morality to arbitrary forces. The criticism of 
arbitrariness is turned back on Kant in the ironic criticism that Kantianism may be 
called on to support a moral rigorism or an empty formalism. 76 It is an ethic that is 
able to sanction excessive moral content or no moral content. Kant himself supplies 
an anecdotal argument supporting the criticism of the arbitrary nature of his moral 
philosophy. When King Friedrich Wilhelm II demanded that Kant refrain from 
making his thoughts on Christianity public, MacIntyre reports that Kant weighed the 
74 MacIntyre, 'Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers', p. 350. 
75 MacIntyre, 'Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers', pp. 352-353. 
76 MacIntyre, 'Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers', p. 340. 
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consequences of compliance. He then declared his fealty to the King and his intent to 
'completely desist from all public lectures or papers concerning religion, be it natural 
or revealed!' MacIntyre then states: 
The Prussian censors and, if it was reported to him, the king himself would have 
understood Kant to be saying that he would never so publish. But that is not of 
course what Kant had in fact declared. As he later pointed out, his pledge to desist 
was made only 'as your Majesty's faithful subject,' a status that Kant would lose 
when this particular king died. 'This phrase,' wrote Kant in recounting the story (in 
the preface to The Quarrel between the Faculties), after the king's death in 1797, 
' ... was chosen by me most carefully, so that I should not be deprived of my 
freedom ... forever, but only so long as His Majesty was alive' and Kant knew that 
the death of Friedrich Wilhelm II was expected imminently.77 
Kant cleverly misled without, in his mind, technically lying.78 This example 
shows the potential for legalism as well as elasticity in Kantian ethics. MacIntyre 
concludes that the content and application of Kant's maxims are decided upon by 
'something other than reason as Kant understands it. '79 Finally, MacIntyre notes, 
'with sufficient ingenuity' almost any moral content can be justified in Kantian tenns. 
'It follows', says MacIntyre, 'that in practice the test of the categorical imperative 
imposes restrictions only on those insufficiently equipped with ingenuity. '80 Kantian 
ethics proves quite capable of the kind of arbitrariness that Kant attempted to avoid. 
This failure to avoid the arbitrary, as I noted above, becomes a central characteristic in 
Kierkegaard's conclusion that moral choice is radical before it is rational. 
We are now in a position to complete the movement from the categorical 
imperative to emotivism. MacIntyre's essay, 'Imperatives, Reasons for Action and 
Morals' makes explicit the connection between deontology and emotivism. The 
argument presumes that rules are not sufficient moral guides to action. Consider the 
variation of meanings that a simple imperative may be given. For example, the 
command, 'Pick that up!', may be a simple command, a warning and threat (,Pick that 
up or else! '), or advice (I think you should pick that up). Until we determine the 
sense of the imperative, we cannot understand how it is being used. This means that 
the command must take into account the tone and intention of the speaker.8l Abstract 
the imperative from the social context and intention of the speaker, and the hearer will 
77 MacIntyre, 'Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers', p. 337. 
78 MacIntyre, 'Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers', p. 337. 
79 MacIntyre, 'Moral Rationality, Tradition, and Aristotle', p. 449. 
80 A Short History of Ethics, pp. 197-198. 
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be unable to discern the aim of the utterance. Most importantly, were the agent called 
on to say why she acted on the imperative, her reasons would necessarily have more 
to do with how she subjectively perceived the imperative rather than with some 
objective understanding of its intent. This ambiguity in rules which are abstracted 
from social or narrative context leads MacIntyre to the conclusion that imperatives 
without contexts have 'little but emotive force.' Once morality is reduced to rules, 
MacIntyre claims that it is not surprising to find the flourishing of emotivist and 
prescriptivist theories. This is because 'they would be describing correctly the role in 
language which a certain class of sentences had assumed when cut off from the 
background of beliefs necessary for them to be understood as they had been in the 
past. '82 
MacIntyre offers two reasons why emotivism follows on the heels of Kant's 
failure. First Kant presents a formal theory of morality that may be called on to 
support incompatible moral assertions. Once moral rules and theory are abstracted 
from an overarching moral framework, they may be called on to fulfil any number of 
conflicting functions. 83 Second, where these rules do not function in an arbitrary way, 
it shows that they are still sufficiently connected to an unacknowledged moral 
framework. 84 MacIntyre argues that the content of Kant's moral maxims were not, as 
he thought, timeless truths but rather reflected his eighteenth-century conservative 
German Pietistic Lutheran context. In the end, Kant acknowledged this dependence 
on religion by asserting that obedience to moral rules must in the end be crowned with 
happiness.85 This leads MacIntyre notes that Kant, in the second book of the second 
Critique, 
does acknowledge that without a teleological framework the whole project of 
morality becomes unintelligible. This teleological framework is presented as a 
'presupposition of pure practical reason'. Its appearance in Kant's moral 
philosophy seemed to his nineteenth-century readers, such as Heine and later the 
neoKantians, an arbitrary and unjustifiable concession to positions which he had 
already rejected. Yet, if my thesis is correct, Kant was right; morality did in the 
eighteenth century, as a matter of historical fact, presuppose something very like the 
81 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Imperatives, Reasons for Action and Morals', in Against the Self-Images a/the 
Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 
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teleological scheme of God, freedom and happiness as the final crown of virtue 
which Kant propounds.86 
Kant's moral philosophy is, MacIntyre notes, 'fully intelligible only when understood 
as a late and secularised rational moral theology ... I should contend that, detached 
from its theological background, Kant's concept of the connection between moral 
worth and desert, so crucial to the structure of his thought, makes no sense. '87 In this 
judgment, MacIntyre's account of Kant echoes Iris Murdoch's conclusion that 'Kant's 
conclusive exposure of the so-called proofs of the existence of God, his analysis of 
the limitations of speculative reason, together with his eloquent portrayal of the 
dignity of rational man, have had results which might possibly dismay him. '88 
MacIntyre concludes that any effort to understand Kantian moral philosophy apart 
from the theological framework is 'doomed to failure. '89 Emotivism is a theory that 
acknowledges Kant's failure while attempting to explain the continued use of moral 
language as if Kant had actually succeeded. 
Having considered MacIntyre's account of the path from Kant to emotivism, let us 
now consider MacIntyre's account of utilitarian rationality as an alternative path to 
emotivism. 
3.2. From Consequentialism to Emotivism 
MacIntyre observes that the British philosopher, economist, and jurist Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1832) was aware of how enormous was the project to provide a 
rational foundation for morality. His task was to divide the Christian moral norm 
from its 'superstitious' teleology without undermining the categorical character of its 
commands. To fail at this task threatened to make morality 'appear as a mere 
instrument of individual desire and will. '90 His task was to vindicate morality by 
articulating a new scientific teleology. By scientific, Bentham had in mind the study 
of human psychology, which he claimed demonstrated that the sovereign masters of 
the human will were attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain. This claim provided 
Bentham with the basis for an alternative teleology upon which his social ethic was 
founded. 
86 After Virtue, p. 56. . 
87 MacIntyre, 'Moral Rationality, Tradition, and Aristotle', p. 450 (my emphasls). 
88 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), p. 80. 
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Furthennore, this claim led Bentham to interpret all action as avoidance of 
pain or desire for pleasure, no matter what account of the action was given by the 
agent. In social policy, Bentham was able to reject any ordering of society that did 
not, by his own calculations, aim at maximising pleasure and minimising pain. This 
thesis is plausible as it rests on a deceptively 'lucid and convincing' psychology of 
pleasure. Pleasure, it is assumed, needs no further justification. The acceptance of 
pleasure as a sufficient reason for action is evident in the view that 'it is always silly 
to ask a man why he wants pleasure. '91 Moreover, Bentham asserted rather than 
demonstrated that in a properly organised society there was coincidence between 'a 
man's pursuit of his private pleasure and his pursuit of the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number.' 92 The problem with this theory is that neither the belief that 
pleasure is the fundamental reason for human action nor that pleasure and justice are 
coincident can be verified. Nevertheless, pleasure as the foundation of morality 
continued to be a plausible theory for two reasons. 
First, the acceptance of utilitarianism signalled the general belief that the 
attempt to ground morality either in philosophical principles or in religious commands 
had now failed. MacIntyre explains that the success of utilitarian philosophy was due 
less to the merits of its positive argument and due more to the failure of its 
philosophical and religious predecessors. Bentham, MacIntyre states, was 'trenchant 
in his criticism of the revolutionary doctrine of the rights of man, a doctrine which he 
declares to be nonsense, and in his criticism of the doctrine of imprescriptible natural 
rights "nonsense on stilts.",93 Furthennore, Bentham argued that where morality was 
seen to be centred in religion or metaphysics, its plausibility depended on the implicit 
appeal of pleasure or the threat of pain. Where religion or metaphysics were correct, 
they were merely echoes of the rational calculations of utilitarianism. Second, 
utilitarianism offered a materialistic and scientific foundation for social refonn. 
Whatever social refonns Bentham proposed, he claimed that their moral authority was 
founded on the objective, scientific calculation of cost and benefits.94 Such objectivity 
was possible, because of the four historical foundations of pain and pleasure - the 
91 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Pleasure as a Reason for Action', in Against the Self-Images of the Age: 
Essays on Ideology and Philosophy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 173, 
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physical, the moral, the religious, and the political - the physical had priority. 
Physical sensation was empirically quantifiable in terms of the categories of intensity, 
purity, duration, approximation, certainty, fruitfulness, and the extent to which either 
pleasure or pain were shared among the greatest number of people. Desire and 
aversion would provide 'an empirical basis for morality' that supplied 'good reasons 
for adopting one type of standard for making such judgments and discriminations 
rather than another. '95 Those who shared Bentham's vision presumed that it was the 
rational and practical conclusion of the utilitarian calculus. In reality, Bentham's 
utilitarianism was a theory constructed to support conclusions already in place. 
The ability to calculate and weigh the relative utility of possible actions proved 
ambiguous and elusive because, MacIntyre writes, 'different pleasures and different 
happinesses are to a large degree incommensurable: there are no scales of quality or 
quantity on which to weigh them. '96 This problem was considered by lS. Mill (1806-
1873). MacIntyre states that Mill's nervous breakdown was precipitated by his 
inability to accept the view that unenlightened self-interest, guided from within by the 
avoidance of pain and the increase of pleasure, and guided from without by the 
enlightened social reformer, would lead inexorably to the greatest social happiness. 
F or Mill, the ethical and social foundation of pleasure was always beyond the realm 
of empirical justification.97 Rather, the empirical evidence supported the conclusion 
that happiness was irreducibly 'polymorphous', and so was 'useless for utilitarian 
purposes. '98 Happiness furnishs not one but many standards. 
In coming to this conclusion, Mill had to determine how one chooses between 
conflicting pleasures. MacIntyre writes: 
If someone suggests to us, in the spirit of Bentham and Mill, that we should guide 
our own choices by the prospects of our own future pleasure or happiness, the 
appropriate retort is to enquire: 'But which pleasure, which happiness ought to 
guide me?' Consequently appeal to the criteria of pleasure will not tell me whether 
to drink or swim and appeal to those of happiness cannot decide for me between the 
life of a monk and that of a soldier.99 
94 MacIntyre, 'Pleasure as a Reason for Action', p. 186. 
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As persons are as different as monks and soldiers, pleasures are similarly dissimilar. 100 
Yet Mill thought that it was possible to distinguish higher and lower pleasures, so that 
one might objectively make the moral judgment that it was better to be a dissatisfied 
Socrates than a satisfied pig. This preference for a dissatisfied Socrates over a 
satisfied pig cannot be justified by appealing to pleasure. This inability to sustain 
such a clear moral judgement suggests two weaknesses in utilitarian theory. 
First, utilitarianism does not articulate a single, unitary moral account that is 
able to distinguish between conflicting claims of happiness. Hence where the 
happiness of the military conflicts with the happiness of the cloister, utilitarianism can 
offer no rational means to resolve the conflict. lol The failure of utilitarianism is its 
inability to say how incommensurable pleasures can be judged within a 'single scale 
of evaluation. '102 As such, it could not say why the pleasures of nineteenth-century 
social elites and educated classes were superior to the pleasures of crass hedonism, or 
why it was more rational to act out of benevolence rather than egoism. Second, where 
utilitarianism was successful in generating consensus regarding social reform, the 
consensus owed itself to the inherited morality and practice of the religious culture. 
Utilitarianism was a potent social reform movement built on a conceptual fiction. 
MacIntyre's judgement is that while one might wholeheartedly agree with reforms in 
woman's suffrage and health policy, it does not alter the fact that 'a conceptual fiction 
in a good cause does not make it any less of a fiction.' 103 
The moral seriousness of utilitarian thinkers was evident in their continued 
willingness to subject their theory to critical questioning. The culmination of this 
questioning was Henry Sidgwick's conclusion that the rational justification of one set 
of beliefs over its rivals requires that there be something like a moral cosmos. 
MacIntyre notes that Sidgwick, who set out to find this moral cosmos, finally came to 
the conclusion that the moral world was chaos.l04 This led to the conclusion that 
ultimately morality is based on beliefs for which 'no further reason can be given. '105 
Intuition and not reason is the basis of moral judgement; and this appeal to intuition, 
in MacIntyre's view, 'is always a signal that something has gone badly wrong with an 
\00 MacIntyre, 'Pleasure as a Reason for Action', p. 185. 
101 After Virtue, p. 64. 
102 A Short History of Ethics, p. 236. 
103 After Virtue, p. 64. 
104 After Virtue, p. 65. 
105 After Virtue, pp. 64-65. 
36 
argument. '106 In MacIntyre's narrative, this appeal is a sure sign that that the 
Enlightenment project to defend a rational and objective foundation of morality had 
discovered its own failure. Having failed in this task, Enlightenment ethics could not 
resist the charge that its claims of objectivity were effective masks that disguised 'the 
preferences of arbitrary will and desire. '107 
To conclude that ours is an emotivist age is, for MacIntyre, to recognise a 
certain despair of rational solutions for moral problems and conflicts. In that 
emotivism is not a solution the Enlightenment's failure, it must be recognised as a 
transitional stage. This leads one to ask: 'A transition to what?' MacIntyre offers two 
possibilities, Nietzsche or Aristotle. That is to say, we are faced with a choice of 
either returning to a premodern understanding of rationality or accept the postmodern 
abandonment of a rational morality. The remainder of this chapter is given to 
discussing MacIntyre's understanding of the Nietzschean alternative, while the 
discussion of the Aristotelian alternative follows in the next chapter. 
4. Nietzsche and the Bureaucratic Order 
4.1. The Nietzschean Sequel 
Nietzsche plays a complex role in MacIntyre's narrative of rise and fall. He is one 
of the contributing philosophical sources of emotivism, and, over against Aristotle, 
Nietzsche is one of two possible sequels to emotivism. l08 Recognising the undeniable 
importance of Nietzsche to our contemporary moral understanding, MacIntyre states 
that 'it was Nietzsche's historic achievement to understand more clearly than any 
other philosopher ... not only that what purported to be appeals to objectivity were in 
fact expressions of subjective will, but also the nature of the problems that this posed 
for moral philosophy.' 109 After Nietzsche, moral judgements are increasingly seen as 
106 After Virtue, p. 69. 
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nothing more than 'the non-rational phenomena of the will.' 110 MacIntyre notes that 
in The Gay Science, Nietzsche jeered at the various attempts to contrive some account 
that provided morality with an objective foundation. His genealogy disclosed that 
'the deontological character of moral judgments is the ghost of conceptions of divine 
law,' while 'the teleological character is similarly the ghost of conceptions of human 
nature.' As divine law and the notion of a single human nature were grounded in a 
theism that was no longer' at home in the modem world,' the ethical systems based on 
these outdated beliefs were also to be rejected. III 
Moreover, moral judgements that were thought to be grounded on these 
suspect foundations were now to be heard as fulfilling a function other than what they 
claimed. 112 According to Nietzsche, moral judgements are neither dispassionate nor 
objective: they are disguised expressions of human will intent on power. In the wake 
of the rejection of premodern notions of rationality and the modem failure to give 
morality a rational foundation, the Nietzschean alternative of the will to power to 
rational morality is increasingly plausible. One of the reasons that MacIntyre can 
claim that Nietzsche has triumphed is that the will to power is now exercised in a 
decidedly non-Nietzschean character. That is, the will to power is not found in 'the 
absurd and dangerous fantasy' of the Obermensch nor in the tragic, heroic characters 
of the Greater Dionysian festival. Rather, the contemporary manifestation of the 
Nietzschean will to power is in the emotivist character of the bureaucratic manager. 
In advancing this surprising association of the bureaucrat with Nietzsche, MacIntyre 
states, 'in our culture we know of no organized movement towards power which is 
not bureaucratic and managerial in mode ... All power tends to coopt and absolute 
power coopts absolutely.' 113 
Locating the contemporary expression of the will to power in the bureaucratic 
manager is somewhat confusing as the bureaucrat is for MacIntyre an Enlightenment 
character who develops into a post-Enlightenment character. This is to say that the 
character of the bureaucrat outlives the failure of modem bureaucratic theory through 
a seamless transformation into a Nietzschean character. According to MacIntyre, it 
was Max Weber who best understood that just beneath the modem bureaucratic 
110 After Virtue, p. 117. 
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claims and practices were 'suppressed Nietzschean premises. '114 MacIntyre brings to 
light these suppressed premises by unpacking the nineteenth-century lament, 'if only 
government could learn to be scientific.' lIS The plea refers to the practical application 
of a mechanistic view of human action. Because human action was subject to law-
like predictability, it was assumed that there were conditions when it was appropriate 
for those with the special insight into these laws to manipulate and control others. 
MacIntyre further explains this license to manipUlate as the duty of those who have 
special knowledge of the antecedents and outcomes of actions: 
As an observer, if I know the relevant laws governing the behavior of others, I can 
whenever I observe that the antecedent conditions have been fulfilled predict the 
outcome. As an agent, if I know these laws, I can whenever I can contrive the 
fulfilment of the same antecedent conditions produce the outcome. I 16 
According to MacIntyre, the name of this license to control is 'bureaucratic 
expertise' which presumably meets five conditions. These are: 1) That the subject of 
study admits discrete variables that are themselves subject to statistical analysis. 2) 
These variables are evaluatively neutral and treated as being beyond dispute. 3) Even 
as the variables are beyond dispute, the conceptualisation of the subject matter cannot 
admit that there are rival conceptualisations. (It is important to note that two of the 
five conditions depend on assertions that are treated as indisputable and so beyond 
rational debate. 117) 4) The subject of study may be characterised by law-like 
generalisations which imitate, though they do not rise to the level of, laws in the 
physical sciences. 5) Based on these generalisations, the bureaucrat is able to claim 
knowledge of predictable human behaviour and a kind of manipulative ability over 
this behaviour. I 18 
The plea for a more scientific government turns out to be a plea for the few with 
special insight to exercise manipulative control over others. Furthermore, this 
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exercise of manipulative control requires that the manager apply laws of human 
behaviour to others while being himself exempted from these laws. As such, the 
manager stands over the manipulated in a way analogous to the chemist's exercise of 
his will over the elements of an experiment. 119 This results in the loss of the 
distinction between persons as means rather than ends as the bureaucrat's function is 
to adjust 'means to ends in the most economical and efficient way.' To achieve this 
the bureaucrat, in Weber's, view presumes to 'deploy a body of scientific and above 
all social scientific knowledge, organized in terms of and understood as comprising a 
set of universal law-like generalizations. '120 In this understanding of the relationship 
between bureaucratic expertise and the ability to predict and calculate human 
behaviour, MacIntyre states that 'Weber provided the key to much of the modem 
age. '121 Expertise is thus defined as the exercise of manipUlative power in a value-
neutral way. The question is whether the manager possesses this kind of predictive 
power and whether his or her manipulations can be effected in a value-neutral way. 
The following section considers MacIntyre's argument against the displacement of 
moral order by a managerial calculus. 
4.2. Questioning Bureaucratic Expertise 
Bureaucratic expertise is a fiction. It depends on a kind of knowledge that is 
unavailable and a notion of human predictability that is untenable. It is a theory that 
is finally wrecked on the shoals of systematic unpredictability. MacIntyre notes that 
Machiavelli had a correct appreciation of this kind of unpredictability in his 
understanding of governance because he (Machiavelli) recognised that 'no matter how 
good a stock of generalizations one amassed and no matter how well one reformulated 
them, the factor of Fortuna was ineliminable from human life.' 122 While an increase in 
knowledge may limit unpredictability, Fortuna was the bitch-goddess who could 
never be dethroned. 
119 After Virtue, pp. 84-85. 
120 After Virtue, p. 86. 
121 After Virtue, p. 86. 
122 After Virtue, p. 93. 
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MacIntyre offers several examples of this kind of unpredictability. Citing Sir 
Karl Popper, he states that the claims of expertise are called into question by 
invention, novelty and discovery. If the world is predictable, then the atypical and 
original will generally be anticipated. Popper considers the wheel and notes that this 
invention could not have been predicted because, 'a necessary part of predicting an 
invention is to say what a wheel is.' 123 To predict would be to invent. Another 
example is found in military strategy, where unpredictability is intentionally 
introduced. MacIntyre's example is that of Napoleon, who recognised that the 
Prussian Generals had codified the military practices of Frederick the Great into a 
series of rules, which they now took to be the military equivalent of a natural law. 
Napoleon's response was to constitute 'himself a counter-example to their law-like 
generalizations.' Then, with tactical and organisational innovation, he planned his 
movements to upset their putative laws. This intentional unpredictability resulted in 
decisive victories. 124 The history of military strategy is in large part a history of the 
failure of strategists to predict the movements of their enemies. These and other 
examples of systematic unpredictability lead MacIntyre to conclude, 'Our social order 
is in a very literal sense out of our ... control. Noone is or could be in charge. '125 
Kant, MacIntyre notes, saw further problems in the mechanical explanation of 
human behaviour. If human behaviour were predictable in ways analogous to 
predictability in mathematics, astronomy or physics, then the notion of freedom 
would be jeopardised. This quandary led Kant to conclude that 'actions obeying and 
embodying moral imperatives must be from the standpoint of science inexplicable and 
unintelligible.' 126 However, the plea for a more scientific government requires the 
very kind of mechanical predictability that Kant could not admit and still maintain the 
notion of moral freedom. MacIntyre states that 'if social science does not present its 
findings in the form of law-like generalizations, the grounds for employing social 
scientists as expert advisors to government or to private corporations become unclear 
and the very notion of managerial expertise is imperilled.' 127 Expertise turns out to be 
123 After Virtue, p. 93 . . , 
124MacIntyre, 'Social Science Methodology as the Ideology of Bureaucratlc Authonty , p. 43. 
125 After Virtue, pp. 105-107. 
126 After Virtue, p. 82. 
127 After Virtue, p. 89. 
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more a fiction than a reality 'because the kind of knowledge which would be required 
to sustain it does not exist.' 128 
MacIntyre concludes that managerial expertise is 'a masquerade of social 
control rather than a reality.' 129 The expertise of the bureaucratic manager lies in 
histrionics. The effective manager does not effectively manage but successfully acts 
'the part of the natural scientist on the stage of the social sciences with the more 
technical parts of the discipline functioning as do grease point, false beards and 
costumes in the theatre. '130 The notion of 'expertise' is a fiction that functions in 
similar ways to Carnap and Ayer's understanding of 'God's' function in religion, 
namely as a fiction that gives credibility to religious pronouncements and insulates 
religion from criticism. 131 However, with increased knowledge of actual causes, belief 
is displaced by explanation and faith withers away. Faith in bureaucratic expertise 
functions in the same way. So long as it is believed that the reduction in crime, or 
improved educational testing scores, or a higher standard of living have been effected 
by bureaucratic manipulation, no evidence to the contrary can effectively subvert this 
belief, even when history proves to be a record of 'predictive ineptitude.' 132 
Finally, the incoherence of bureaucratic theory is captured for MacIntyre in the 
locution bureaucratic individualism. \33 While the two terms seem to suggest a way of 
ordering the individual in society, they are antagonistic. To combine the terms 
together does not solve the problem of reconciling the claims of individual autonomy 
with the notion of a scientific and manipulative social order. This leads to the 
paradoxical situation where we simultaneously strive for personal autonomy while 
being engaged in the kind of manipulative relationships with others that 'each of us 
aspire to resist in our own case.' 134 Individual autonomy require limits on the 
autonomy of others. Like the rich aesthete, we desire to be a 'consumer of persons' 
while looking for some form of safety from being consumed by others. \35 How then 
are the demands of individualism squared with the demands of social order? 
128 After Virtue, p. 75. 
129 After Virtue, p. 75. . . , 
130MacIntyre, 'Social Science Methodology as the Ideology of Bureaucrahc Authonty , p. 50. 
131 After Virtue, p. 76. 
132 After Virtue, pp. 89-90. 
133 After Virtue, p. 35. 
134 After Virtue, p. 68. 
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The theory of bureaucratic individualism presumes that there is a kind of 
nonmoral, neutral expertise which is capable of balancing these complex demands. 
Against this notion of expertise, MacIntyre argues that the attempt to meet both 
demands must result in incoherence rather than balance. This incoherence becomes 
clear when one pits the demands of universal rights against the standard of utility. 
MacIntyre states: 
The concept of rights was generated to serve one set of purposes as part of the social 
invention of the autonomous moral agent; the concept of utility ... for quite another 
set of purposes ... Hence when claims invoking rights are matched against claims 
appealing to utility or when either or both are matched against claims appealing to 
claims based on some traditional concept of justice, it is not surprising that there is 
no rational way of deciding which type of claim is to be given priority or how one is 
weighed against the other.136 
Autonomy requires rights. Society requires utility. To conclude that there is no 
rational way to adjudicate the conflicting claims of the individual and society does 
not mean that bureaucracies cease to function. It means that they function in ways 
very different from the theory of a scientific management of society. The 
bureaucrat's claim that he or she is able to order society scientifically, by means of 
dispassionate neutrality, proves to be untenable and incoherent. If, as MacIntyre 
asserts, the acceptance of managerial expertise is based in faith in value neutrality and 
the effectiveness of manipUlative power, we must ask what it means when trust in the 
bureaucratic order continues after the notion of neutrality has been undermined. 
This question returns us to a central characteristic of emotivism - that of the 
'obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative 
social relations. ,137 The choice between Nietzsche or Aristotle is stark: either we 
order our lives together by means of an ongoing rational debate about the good or we 
must resort to non-rational power transactions mediated through nonrational means of 
persuasion. 138 G.E. Moore's appeal to intuition is exemplary of this kind of 
nonrational persuasion. John Maynard Keynes, notes MacIntyre, observed how the 
disciples of Moore had used his theory of intuition to advance private preferences 
'under the cover of being able to identify the presence or absence of Moore's notion 
of a non-rational property of goodness.' \39 When disagreement arose between two 
advocates of intuition, the resolution of the dispute owed itself to the rhetorical 
\36 After Virtue, p. 70. 
\37 After Virtue. p. 23. 
\38 After Virtue. p. 24. 
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effectiveness of the disputants rather than to any kind of appeal to an objective 
evaluative standard. While it was asserted that discerning the absence or presence of 
the property of goodness could resolve moral disagreement, this appeal only disguised 
certain effective social manipulations. Keynes reports that 'In practice, victory was 
with those who could speak with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting 
conviction and could best use the accents of infallibility,' all supported with properly 
placed 'gasps of incredulity,' 'head-shaking', 'grim silences,' and 'shrugs'.140 When 
actions are justified by their apparent effectiveness, rather than by some objective 
standard, 'success is whatever passes for success. )\41 When truth mattes less than 
effective persuasion, the most effective bureaucrat,' MacIntyre states, 'is the best 
actor.' 142 
Emotivism, as I stated above, is a transitional stage. MacIntyre states that when 
one considers what the philosophical and historical argument reveals about the failure 
of the Enlightenment, one must either accept 
the Nietzschean diagnosis and the Nietzschean problematic or one must hold that 
the Enlightenment project was not only mistaken, but should never have been 
commenced in the first place. There is no third alternative and more particularly 
there is no alternative provided by those thinkers at the heart of the contemporary 
conventional curriculum in moral philosophy, Hume, Kant and Mill.143 
This analysis leads MacIntyre to the remarkable assertion that 'It is no wonder that the 
teaching of ethics is so often destructive and skeptical in its effects upon the minds of 
those taught. ' 144 The inescapable conclusion is that any public discussion of the good 
or ends proper to a human being must be regarded 'as systematically unsettlable.' 145 
As such, ethics ceases to be that science which enables persons to move from disorder 
to order and is reduced to a 'mock rationality,' the sole purpose of which is to conceal 
the arbitrary exercise of the will to power. 146 
Moral order stands as the only alternative to managerial manipulation. Only by a 
return to a moral order will others be treated as persons rather than objects. 
MacIntyre states: 'To treat someone else as an end is to offer them what I take to be 
good reasons for acting in one way rather than another, but to leave it to them to 
139 After Virtue, p. 107. 
140 MacIntyre provides no reference for this quote. After Virtue, p. 17. 
141 After Virtue, p. 115. 
142 After Virtue, p. 107. 
143 After Virtue, p. 118. 
144 After Virtue, p. 118. .., . . . 
145 MacIntyre credits Ronald Dworkm WIth thIS mSIght. After Virtue, pp. 118-119. 
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evaluate those reasons. It is to be unwilling to influence another except by reasons 
which that other he or she judges to be good. '147 We have come to a point where it is 
possible to present MacIntyre's project in the very simple opposition of moral 
accountability to moral inarticulacy. In a moral universe, persons are always entitled 
to request of another, an account of another's actions. To provide such an account is 
to treat the other as an end rather than a means to be manipulated or coerced. 
4.3. Conclusion: Moral Inarticulacy 
In a critical essay on MacIntyre's work, philosopher Charles Taylor defines and 
develops the notion of moral inarticulacy. 148 'Inarticulacy' seems to best characterise 
the current situation where manipulative or coercive means of order become more 
plausible as we become increasingly unable to give a rational public account for our 
moral commitments and actions. Taylor's development of this term offers a way to 
understand the importance of MacIntyre's critique of the Enlightenment as well as 
new insights into an appropriate response. 
According to Taylor, the failure of Enlightenment rationality is closely related to 
the Enlightenment's inability to reconcile freedom with rationality. Freedom is 
defined as self-determination and choice. Rationality, understood substantively, 
undermines freedom because it is concerned to articulate a concrete form of the moral 
life that is prior to the agent's choice. Given the commitment to self-determination, 
rationality must be defined as procedural rather than as substantive. Taylor describes 
these two versions of reason, stating: 
[R]eason is no longer defined substantively, in terms of a vision of cosmic order, 
but formally, in terms of the procedures that thought ought to follow, and especially 
those involved in fitting means to ends, instrumental reason; the hegemony of 
reason is consequently defined, and now means not ordering our lives according to 
the vision of order, but rather controlling desires by the canons of instrumental 
146 After Virtue, p. 71. 
147 After Virtue, p. 23. 
148 Charles Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', in eds. John Horton & Susan Mendus, After MacIntyre 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 16-43. For a more complete acco~t of inarticulacy se~, 'The 
Ethics of Inarticulacy', in Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Un~vers~ty Press, 1989), pp. 53-90. Also The Ethics of Authenticity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Umverslty Press, 1991), pp. 12-23. 
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reason. Freedom consequently takes on a new meaning, and entails breaking loose 
from any external authorities in order to be governed solely by ones' own reasoning 
procedures. And the source of obligation is no longer a cosmic order without, but 
rather my own status as sovereign reasoning being, which demands that I achieve 
rational control. 149 
Like MacIntyre, Taylor thinks that the flawed Enlightenment project has left 
contemporary moral philosophy hopelessly muddled in its understanding of the 
relationship of freedom to rationality. Unlike MacIntyre however, Taylor does not 
think that the focus on individual freedom and autonomy is a project that 'should 
never have been commenced in the first place. '150 The problem with the 
Enlightenment project is that it adopted a view of reason that viewed all moral 
authority or an external shape of the moral life as 'profoundly repugnant' because 
they pre-empted a freedom defined as autonomy. Reason, in this view, would only 
be the instrument of the autonomous subject and never a rational framework which 
could make moral claims on the self. Taylor explains the attractiveness of the 
instrumental idea of reason, stating: 
To be guided by reason now means to direct one's action according to plans or 
standards which one has constructed following the canons of rational procedure, for 
instance to be proceeding according to clear calculations, or to be obeying a law one 
has prescribed to oneself according to the demands of reasons. Rational direction is 
therefore seen as synonymous with freedom understood as self-direction, direction 
according to orders constructed by the subject, as against those which the subject is 
supposed to find in nature. 151 
A substantive ethic is too comprehensive and hierarchic to be compatible with 
freedom. Moreover, it offers no 'critical distance' by which agents may stand outside 
the moral system in order to criticise and revise it. A substantive ethic was viewed as 
essentially conservative, and so bypassed and downgraded any autonomous self-
direction. 152 Modernity could find no way to reconcile freedom with substantive 
rationality. 
While modernity has made much of the distinction between the right and the 
good, Taylor thinks it more important to focus on the dependence of the right on the 
good. He states: 'It is not just: do you determine the right from the good or the good 
from the right? Rather, it is something like: do you recognize a hierarchic order in 
149 Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', p. 19. 
ISO After Virtue, p. 118. 
lSI Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', p. 26. ,. , . 
152 Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', p. 26. Taylor later refers to Habermas VIew that an ethIC of the good 
must inevitably forfeit universality, and hence a critical standpoint towards any and all cultural forms.' 
p.34. 
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goods?' 153 Coherent moral systems cannot but advance some authoritative account of 
goods hierarchically ordered. This is clearly evident in the disagreement between 
utilitarians and deontologists over which system is better, more adequate, and true. 
Once the idea of goods ordered to a higher good was rejected, the utilitarian 
philosophers shifted the teleological locus from the good to tangible, de facto goods. 
F or this move they were met with Kant's criticism that they failed to attend to the 
'hierarchy of motives' and so tended to collapse moral judgements into prudential 
judgements. For Kant, it appears, some procedural ethics were better than others. 
But then we must ask, 'Better by what external, objective standard?' And this 
question suggests a critical incoherence in Kant's thought. 
Taylor argues that the coherence of Kant's criticism depends upon an 
inarticulated hierarchy. Kant's 'good' is that man qua rational moral agent 'is of 
infinitely higher worth than anything else in the universe. '154 Man has an essence and 
this essence makes it possible to say that there are things that one ought never do to 
another human being (like lying) no matter how beneficial the consequences. 
However, the argument that there are such things as categorical imperatives that 
cannot be negotiated away depends, Taylor argues, on an implicit or explicit appeal to 
'the logic of "nature", "te1os" and "the good.'" 155 Modernity cannot finally offer a 
coherent justification of its commitments to some rules over others or some practices 
over others unless and until it is committed some substantive account of the good. 
However, the more modernity accepts a view of reason that is disengaged and context 
free, the more 'practical reasoning comes to appear impossible.' Then, Taylor states, 
'You cannot prove that man is a rational life, or rational agency, or the image of God, 
the way you show the kinetic theory of heat or the inverse square law. The gains of 
practical reason are all within a certain grasp of the good. '156 
Taylor argues that modem philosophy's refusal to acknowledge its dependence 
on some substantive account of the good produces a kind of 'shyness, to the point of 
inarticulacy about these goods. n57 Ironically, the result of this 'self-willed 
inarticulacy about the good,' makes it impossible to rationally defend the notion of 
free and rational agency, which Taylor says is 'one of the most important, formative 
153 Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', p. 27. 
154 Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', p. 28. 
155 Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', p. 28. 
156 Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', p. 36. 
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transcendent goods of our civilization. '158 In order to overcome this problem, Taylor 
insists that modernity must 'liberate itself from these ill-conceived inhibitions, so that 
we can once again talk intelligibly about goods.' 159 This impasse confronts us with 
the crucial question as to whether we are to go down the Nietzschean path of 
irrationality or, whether something like a postmodern Aristotelianism can be 
vindicated. 160 In the following chapter, I shall consider MacIntyre's constructive 
account of an Aristotelian/Thomistic rationality as the way to overcome the problem 
of moral inarticulacy. 
157 Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', p. 35. 
158 Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', p. 36. 
159 Taylor, 'Justice After Virtue', p. 42. 
160 After Virtue, p. 118. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TELEOLOGY, TRADITION AND RATIONALITY 
In the previous chapter I considered MacIntyre's narrative of modem moral 
philosophy's path from its claim of having secured a rational foundation for morality 
to the falsification of this claim expressed in emotivism. If, as MacIntyre argues, 
emotivism is the sign of the Nietzschean triumph, we must ask, what, if anything, can 
be done about this moral situation? In the introduction to a recently published 
MacIntyre reader, Kelvin Knight offers a response to this question. 
[T]he most evident characteristic of Alasdair MacIntyre's work is its 
provocativeness. MacIntyre's critique of 'the Enlightenment project' may be well 
known but his own Aristotelian project is not. This is unfortunate because ... The 
full significance of MacIntyre's demolition job in After Virtue is only 
comprehensible in the light of his construction, in subsequent essays, of the 
premises of an alternative. 1 
MacIntyre's critical philosophy is not fully understood unless we consider his positive 
alternative. This Aristotelian alternative has not had the kind of impact that, 
according to Knight, it deserves. 
One reason why MacIntyre's alternative account to modem inarticulacy has not 
had wide-spread purchase may be found in the conclusion of After Virtue. There 
MacIntyre seems to say that his Aristotelian alternative is not possible except in 
monastic-like communities. This alternative is presented by MacIntyre as he draws 
an analogy between the present situation with that of the Christian church in the fifth-
century where 
men and women of good will turned aside from the task of shoring up the Roman 
imperium and ceased to identify the continuation of civility and moral community 
with the maintenance of that imperium. What they set themselves to achieve ... was 
the construction of new forms of community within which the moral life could be 
sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the coming ages of 
barbarism and darkness.2 
1 Kelvin Knight, in ed. Kelvin Knight, The MacIntyre Reader (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1999), p. 1. 
2 After Virtue, p. 263. 
As with the church of the 'dark ages', modems need another St. Benedict to teach us 
how to construct 'local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual 
and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us.' 
It must be noted, however, that this appeal to a new St. Benedict has been widely 
cited though largely ignored. This may tell us something of why MacIntyre's positive 
Aristotelian alternative has not achieved the kind of attention Knight thinks it merits. 
MacIntyre's closes his putatively historicist argument with a solution which has at its 
centre an ahistorical community. This is clearly problematic coming from one who 
criticises modem claims of universality because it proposes a morality 'which is no 
particular society's morality' and so, is 'found nowhere. '3 If MacIntyre's constructive 
morality turns out also to be a morality 'found nowhere', central aspects of argument 
would by threatened with falsification. 
MacIntyre's apparent advocacy of withdrawal into sectarian communities has been 
an unnecessary distraction from considering the merits of his constructive philosophy. 
In the introduction to Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre states that the 
aim of his constructive work is to say 'what makes it rational to act in one way rather 
than another and what makes it rational to advance and defend one conception of 
practical rationality rather than another.'4 I shall argue that, according to MacIntyre, a 
rational account of morality involves the closely related and overlapping concepts of 
teleology and tradition. Though each concept is individually discussed, they are 
intelligible only in their relationship to each other. Hence my discussion of teleology 
and tradition remains incomplete until the two concepts are brought together in the 
final section on moral progress. Let us first consider the place of teleology in 
MacIntyre's understanding of moral rationality. 
1. The Teleological Shape of Rationality 
MacIntyre states that 'the predicaments of contemporary philosophy, whether 
analytic or deconstructive, are best understood as arising as a long-term consequence 
of the rejection of Aristotelian and Thomistic teleology at the threshold of the modem 
world. '5 The cause of modernity's moral disorder is its misunderstanding of 
3 After Virtue, pp. 265-266. . . 
4 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: UmversIty of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988), p. ix. (Hereafter: Whose Justice?) 
5 First Principles, Final Ends, p. 58. 
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teleology. Edward Oakes, in an essay on MacIntyre's moral philosophy, explains the 
central role of teleology in MacIntyre's thought: 
That word 'teleological' is the key to MacIntyre's solution, the loss of which is the 
cause of the catastrophe described in his science-fiction parable. Teleology is the 
study of final causes, goals, purposes, and aims: a style of explanation that saturates 
Aristotle's philosophy. After the combined impact of Newton and Darwin, 
however, this type of explanation seems mostly quaint - and once Aristotle's 
science seemed quaint, his ethics soon followed: when Newton demonstrated how 
motion can be better explained as resulting from the outcome of mechanical laws, 
and when Darwin posited natural selection as the 'mechanism' for explaining an 
organ's functionality, the use of teleology in ethics was doomed. This is perhaps the 
greatest category mistake ever made in the history ofphilosophy.6 
The mistake was to think that moral agents and actions were subject to laws that were 
analogous to the laws of time, mass and motion, and when such a conception of moral 
law proved untenable, the mistake was compounded by a wrong conclusion. That is, 
if moral laws are not analogous to the rationality of the physical sciences, then 
morality must not be rational. This faulty conclusion leads to the view that moral 
judgements are reducible to personal preferences. The pervasiveness of this view is 
evident in the weight given to public opinion polls. Oakes notes that 'surveying 
public opinion about moral issues is so important for liberalism, since the act of 
surveying confirms the thesis that moral issues boil down simply to opinions.'7 
MacIntyre argues that moral norms may be understood as something other than 
scientific laws without relegating them to the realm of mere opinion. The teleological 
framework serves a crucial function in this task. According to MacIntyre, the cause 
of this present moral disorder is that 
there is no over-all shape to the moral life but only a set of apparently arbitrary 
principles inherited from a variety of sources. In such circumstances the need for a 
public criterion for use in settling moral and evaluative disagreements and conflicts 
becomes ever more urgent and ever more difficult to meet. 8 
For MacIntyre, the most explicit account of the teleological framework is in 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle divides moral reasoning into 
three parts. The first part is man in his present, disordered state. A crucial antecedent 
of ethical reflection is the view that the world is somehow morally disordered. The 
first task of ethics is then to establish agreement on the nature and cause of this 
disorder. We need look no further than the first nine chapters of After Virtue for 
6 Edward Oakes, 'The Achievement of Alasdair MacIntyre', First Things 65 (Aug.lSept., 1996), p. 25. 
7 Oakes, 'The Achievement of Alasdair MacIntyre', p. 25. 
8 A Short History of Ethics, p. 243. 
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paradigmatic example of the use of history and philosophy to advance a certain 
account of disorder. Moreover, the many articles and debates which After Virtue has 
ignited further illustrates the difficulty of establishing agreement on the antecedent 
disorder as well as the importance of dialectical engagement if such an agreement is 
to be secured. The second aspect of the teleological structure is the moral vision 
which considers the notions of human essences, purposes and meaning in giving an 
essentially incomplete account of human potentiality and right order. Having 
considered the antecedent disorder and the vision of right order, the third feature of 
rational teleological reasoning is the proper work of ethics, which MacIntyre says is 
'the science which is to enable men to understand how they make the transition from 
the former state to the latter. ' 9 Rational moral reflection articulates the importance of 
choices and actions in an agent's intentional move from disorder toward the 
teleological good(s). 
MacIntyre's claim is not merely that teleological reasoning is one way to 
rationalise moral discussion, but that moral deliberation is rational only insofar as it is 
teleological. 10 This assertion is supported with two closely related discussions, the 
first which considers the importance of the teleological framework for rendering 
unintelligible actions intelligible, and the second which considers the teleological 
form of the narratives which all moral reflection finally depends upon. We first 
consider the notion of an intelligible action. 
1.1. Intelligibility and Teleology 
MacIntyre begins by asking how we render our actions intelligible to ourselves and 
to others. An intelligible action, he notes, is one that flows 'intelligibly from a human 
agent's intentions, motives, passions and purposes.' A person acting intelligibly is 
able to respond adequately to the command, 'Explain yourself.' If an act is 
intelligible, an agent will be able to give an adequate account of that act to others. 
This is why, MacIntyre states, 'it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an 
intelligible account.' 11 Moral inarticulacy is a sure sign that human beings do not 
possess a natural ability to explain themselves to others or defend the authority of 
9 After Virtue, p. 52. ... 
10 Specifically, this assertion means that rational moral del.Iberanon ~ust.necessanly address the three 
features of the teleological framework, the nature of our dIsorder, a lIfe nghtly ordered, and the means 
by which one moves from disorder to order. 
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their moral judgements. Emotivism is destructive because it deprives persons of the 
ability to understand their moral commitments which are embodied in particular 
actions and to render these commitments and actions intelligible to others. 12 
Consequently, we find ourselves unable to say why our actions are rational and why it 
would be rational for others to act in similar ways. 13 
While the notion of an intelligible action may be elusive, the notion of an 
unintelligible action is not. 'Unintelligible actions,' writes MacIntyre, 'are failed 
candidates for the status of intelligible action. '14 These are actions without adequate 
explanations. MacIntyre offers the following example of an unintelligible action 
striving for intelligibility: 
I am standing waiting for a bus and the young man standing next to me suddenly 
says: 'The name of the common wild duck is Histrionicus histrionicus histrionicus.' 
There is no problem as to the meaning of the sentence he uttered: the problem is, 
how to answer the question, what was he doing in uttering it?15 
So long as the peculiar action is without an explanation, it remains unintelligible to 
others. Intelligibility would be achieved if the man were to explain that he had 
mistakenly thought he was speaking to the same librarian to whom he had previously 
asked for the Latin name of the common duck. Or the man might say that he suffered 
from shyness and was instructed by his therapist to engage strangers in small talk. 'In 
each case,' says MacIntyre, 'the act of utterance become intelligible by finding a 
place in a narrative. '16 The narrative explains the point of the action by showing its 
relationship within a rational sequence. 
MacIntyre develops his understanding of an unintelligible action in a survey of 
the two modem errors of determinism and unencumbered freedom. Consider how 
determinism undermines intelligible action. MacIntyre is careful not to launch an 
argument against determinism that damages the central importance of historical 
antecedents, the first feature of the teleological framework. 17 Determinism's error is 
not in its aim to identify antecedent grounds of human action. Its error is in its 
II After Virtue, p. 209. 
12 First Principles, Final Ends, p. 61. 
13 After Virtue, p. 275. 
14 After Virtue, p. 209. 
15 After Virtue, p. 210. 
16 After Virtue, p. 210. 
17 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'The Antecedents of Action', in Against the Self-Images of the Age (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), pp. 204-205. 
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understanding of causes of action which leaves little space for moral accountability 
and agency. In the essay 'The Antecedents of Action', MacIntyre writes: 
If actions are the determined outcome of prior events, and presumably of prior 
physiological events, it has seemed difficult to draw a distinct line between an 
action and a mere reflex, and certainly difficult to draw the kind of distinction 
which would lead us to impute responsibility in one case and not in the other. 18 
For determinism, to rationalise human action is to render it predictable. This aim 
tends to reduce and finally destroy the notion of a free human agent. Once rationality 
comes to mean a kind of mechanical predictability, there is little space left for agency 
or accountability. 
MacIntyre argues against determinism while also acknowledging the 
importance of the antecedents of action. To do this he must invoke the distinction 
between necessary and sufficient causes. 19 A necessary cause is without exception, 
repeatable and uniform.20 Under this description, a caused human action admits no 
space for moral freedom. Conversely, when antecedents are sufficient causes, they 
are like a 'lever' that is likely to produce a predictable behaviour without making the 
behaviour necessary.21 For example, while we might say that the combination of oil 
and rain 'caused' the car to skid off the road, we mean that the accident was 
probable, even predictable, but not inevitable. The overarching question is whether or 
not the notion of freedom can be reconciled with the notion of rationality or whether 
these notions are somehow mutually exclusive. On the one hand, if we argue that 
human behaviour follows rationally predictable patterns, there will be little or no 
room for moral responsibility. On the other hand, if we assert that human beings are 
radically free, defined by no prior essence or external telos, there is little or no room 
for the notion of rationality. 
MacIntyre takes up the task of reconciling freedom with rationality by 
demonstrating how the distinction between actions having causes versus actions 
having antecedents is crucial for passing moral judgement. I shall develop this 
distinction in terms of how we distinguish between the actions of the thief, the 
alcoholic and the tuberculosis patient. Ifhuman action is no more than a complex 
mechanical reflex or unexplained happening, neither the criminal, alcoholic nor the 
18 MacIntyre, 'The Antecedents of Action', p. 195. 
19 After Virtue, p. 204. 
20 MacIntyre, 'The Antecedents of Action', p. 200. 
21 MacIntyre, 'The Antecedents of Action', pp. 195 ff. 
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diseased are morally culpable. All three are, in both the medical and philosophical 
senses of the word, patients. Yet legal and moral distinctions between these three 
cases are made with little difficulty. Tuberculosis patients are not sent to prison or 
subjected to fines even though their condition causes social hardship. While 
alcoholism may manifest disease-like symptoms, alcoholics who drive under the 
influence are morally and legally culpable. While thieves may have a history that 
conduces to a life of crime, they are generally considered perpetrators rather than 
victims. The key question these cases raise is, 'What, if anything, makes me 
responsible?,22 If determinism accurately accounts for human action, then we can no 
more assign blame to the thief than we can to the victim of tuberculosis. 23 
Determinism offers a rigidly rational explanation of action that denies the agent the 
necessity and the ability to be morally accountable. Let us now consider the 
antithetical problem of unencumbered freedom. 
MacIntyre argues that the kind of radical freedom, which is central to Sartre's 
literary and philosophical writings, finally undermines the notion of an intelligible 
action. For Sartre, the self is whatever the self chooses to be. Any sense in which 
one's life is predetermined by antecedents or essences is inauthentic and so teleology 
and tradition undermine freedom. It also follows that the narrative framework distorts 
authentic freedom because actions 'do not have narrative form, since they do not have 
any form at all. '24 In the end, choice rather than meaning is the defining feature of an 
authentic human life. 25 The problem is that this understanding of freedom finally 
deprives the self of intelligibility because it denies that the self is a character 'upon a 
stage which it did not design, as part of an action which did not originate with the 
self. '26 MacIntyre derides this view of the self as being in a category of things that 
include 'unicorns, glass mountains, and squared circles.' It is a view of freedom that 
must deny that 'moral agents who actually exist are all living at some particular time 
and place, situated in some highly specific type of social role and situation, itself 
embedded to greater or lesser degree in some tradition or some confluence of 
22 MacIntyre, 'The Antecedents of Action', p. 209. 
23 MacIntyre, 'The Antecedents of Action', p. 207. . 
24 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Can One Be Unintelligible to Oneself?', in eds. Christopher McKnIght and 
Mercel Stchedroff, Philosophy in its Variety: Essays in Honour of Francois Bordet (Belfast: Queens 
University, 1987), p. 25. 
25 After Virtue, p. 214. 
26 After Virtue, p. 213. 
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traditions.'27 The actions of the self defined by this understanding of radical freedom 
need not be nor can they be, morally accountable without denying the authenticity of 
that self. 
An unintelligible action is one that lacks accountability. An intelligible action 
is then an accountable action. MacIntyre hints at the importance of narrative for 
accountability in his close association of intelligible actions with accountability, 
writing: 
The intelligibility of actions is therefore closely linked to the accountability of 
agents. That of which an agent cannot give a certain kind of account, whether in 
explanation or in justification - and since the account has to specify the agent's 
reasons and thus make those reasons available for evaluation as better or worse 
reasons, one and the same kind of account is required for both purposes - must be 
unintelligible as an action both to her or herself and to others.28 
For MacIntyre, accountability is not centred in the assigning of moral praise and 
blame to particular deeds. His concern is much less with moral opprobrium and much 
more with accountability as the positive skill of joining explanations to actions. 
Actions may be accountable because they are the 'deeds of those who have words.'29 
This notion of a positive skill does not of course assuage the ill-feelings that the term 
accountability evokes. Nevertheless, accountability seems to be a stubborn feature of 
the moral life, even with those who, in theory, reject such moral responsibility. 
For example, consider how someone might commend the philosophy of 
Richard Rorty to another. Rorty's philosophy, MacIntyre notes, rejects the notion of 
'a unified, even if complex, ultimate and final true account of the order of things in 
nature and human history. '30 This view denies the kind of teleological reasoning that 
MacIntyre maintains is essential for accountability. How then would a Rorty 
sympathiser give an account of the merits of Rorty's work? Would he not need to say 
that Rorty's philosophy ought be taken seriously because he represents philosophical 
progress? If these claims are not implicit in the advocacy of Rorty's philosophy, one 
would have no reason to pay heed to the invitation to engage this philosophy. If the 
advocate is indeed claiming that Rorty represents an advance in thinking, the claim is 
27 Moral Rationality, Tradition, and Aristotle, p. 454. 
28 MacIntyre, 'Can One Be Unintelligible to Oneself?', p. 24. 
29 After Virtue, p. 211. 
30 First Principles, Final Ends, pp. 29-30. 
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only intelligible insofar as one can say from where the advance comes and to where it 
is pointed.3! 
As indicated in the introduction, I do not take up the question of progress until 
the third section. My concern here is rather to illustrate MacIntyre's claim that as 
accountability is a stubborn feature of human relations, the teleological structure is a 
stubborn feature of human rationality. We may, with Rorty, deny the possibility of 
ultimate truth-claims. However, the Rorty disciple will presume that his denial is real 
progress in knowing and a better understanding of the world. The predicament is 
how one can sustain the claim that they have achieved a better understanding or have 
made progress when they deny the very teleological framework within which these 
claims are intelligible.32 How can one speak of progress unless or until one identifies 
the goal by which such progress is measured?33 
MacIntyre asserts that moral accountability is unavoidable and that the key 
aspect of every account is some implicit or explicit teleological appeal. Even those 
who reject teleology in theory must always lapse into 'something like a teleological 
understanding of their own activities. '34 The unavoidable character of teleological 
reasoning becomes ever more obvious as we tum to consider the relationship of 
narrative to moral accountability. 
1.2. The Teleological Structure of Narrative 
Wayne Meeks observes that narrative is for MacIntyre not merely 'a help for moral 
teaching ... it is essential to proper moral reasoning. '35 For MacIntyre, as I argue 
above, the intelligibility of an action largely depends upon an agent's ability to give 
an account of her actions.36 This account invariably takes a narrative form that 
addresses antecedents, aims and the concerns of practical rationality in moving toward 
these aims. 'The intelligibility of an action,' MacIntyre asserts, 'derives ultimately 
from narrative continuities in the agent's life. The form of our understanding of 
intelligibility is therefore narrative form. '37 The teleological shape of these narratives 
3! Whose Justice?, pp. 385-387. 
32 First Principles, Final Ends, p. 58. 
33 Three Rival Versions, p. 149. 
34 First Principles, Final Ends, p. 55. 
35 Wayne Meeks, The Origins o/Christian Morality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 189. 
36 MacIntyre, 'Can One Be Unintelligible to Oneself?', p. 24. 
37 MacIntyre, 'Can One Be Unintelligible to Oneself?', pp. 24-25. 
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is indisputable. Actions make sense because they are embedded in a narratable story 
that shows how these actions cohere (or fail to cohere) with an agent's past and 
movement toward the fulfilment of potentiality. Both determinism and 
unencumbered freedom fail because they deny agents the ability to narrate this kind of 
teleological account. That is, in isolating one or another feature of an action (i.e. 
antecedents or volition), they deny some aspect of the teleological framework and 
deprive an action of its place within that sequence or web of human transactions by 
which the action becomes accountable. 
MacIntyre asserts that a rational moral account is essentially narrative. L. 
Gregory Jones supports this assertion as he notes that for MacIntyre, 'because 
narrative and action are mutually complicate, "man is in his actions and practice, as 
well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal."'38 In support of this close 
relationship of rationality to narrative MacIntyre first refers to Bruno Bettelheim's 
argument that children who grow up without the right kind of fairy tales become 
incapable of interpreting their historical experience. 39 Children who are deprived of 
the right kinds of story are deprived of that narrative framework whereby their 
questions that concerning inter alia personal identity, their relationship to others, and 
meaning cannot be answered.40 To deprive children of the right kind of stories, 
MacIntyre concludes, leaves them 'unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in 
their words. '41 Another support of narrative rationality is the dependence of moral 
theories on stories. The question which is always asked of any theory is, says 
MacIntyre, 'what type of enacted narrative would be the embodiment, in the actions 
and transactions of actual social life, of this particular theory?'42 Until we know how 
a theory is practically embodied, we do not have an adequate grasp of the theory 
itself. This account of an embodied theory is not another theory but a narrative. This 
is true of all theories, even theories that deny the importance of teleology. MacIntyre 
writes: 
38 L Gregory Jones, Transformed Judgment: Toward a Trinitarian Account of the Moral Life (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 36. Jones, quoting MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 
216. 39 Bruno Bettelheim, The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976). 
40 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative And The Philosophy Of Science', 
The Monist, 60 (October, 1977), p. 457. 
41 After Virtue, p. 216. 
42 Three Rival Versions, p. 80. 
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But when teleology was rejected, and Aristotelian conceptions of first principles 
along with it, human beings engaged in enquiry did not stop telling stories of this 
kind. They could no longer understand their own activities in Aristotelian terms at 
the level of theory, but for a very long time they proved unable, for whatever 
reason, to discard that form of narrative which is the counterpart to the theory which 
they had discarded.43 
Theories always seek a narrative because we are essentially historical beings. As 
such, moral theory is always striving for a narrative form and is understood to be 
incomplete until it is embodied in a narrative. Narrative is the appropriate and 
necessary form of reasoning for beings who are simultaneously bodies and souls and 
whose existence is characterised by thought and action. As historical beings, we soon 
recognise that we begin in the middle of things. Thus the initiating question of our 
moral inquiry is 'What is going on here?' Because there are rival answers to this 
question, our answers must be subject to dialectical testing. 'Dialectic', MacIntyre 
asserts, 'is the instrument of enquiry which is still in via. '44 
The importance of the question of what is going on and the possible answers may 
be illustrated with a common experience. Those who come into a film after it has 
begun commonly ask the question 'What is going on here?' The question expresses 
the desire to make sense of the unfolding action. In order to know what is going on, 
they need to have enough of the story retold so to establish the context, identify the 
characters, and explain the meaning of past and present events and actions. This 
account renders the complexity of characters, context, and plot intelligible by giving a 
coherent account of their roles and relationships. 
When, in our historical lives, we begin in the middle, it is imperative that we too 
know what is going on; we need to know how the parts fit into the whole story. As 
MacIntyre puts it, 
We always move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set of 
narrative histories, histories both of the individuals concerned and of the settings in 
which they act and suffer. It is now becoming clear that we render the actions of 
others intelligible in this way because action itselfhas a basically historical 
character. It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we 
understand our own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of 
narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others.45 
To say that ethics is essentially historical means that the intelligibility of our lives 
depends upon being able to know what story we are a part of and what role we play. 
43 First Principles, Final Ends, p. 58. 
44 Three Rival Versions, p. 88. 
45 After Virtue, pp. 211-212 (my emphasis). 
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The late Gillian Rose eloquently stated how the narrative structure relates to our 
evaluative judgements. 
[I]t is the beginning and the end which give authority to the way, and meaning to 
being lost - especially to any conceivable relishing of being lost. If the beginning 
and the end were abolished, so that all were (divine) middle - Milte ist iiberall - we 
would not achieve joyful erring; nor pure virtue, 'without resistance'; we would be 
left helpless in the total domination of the maze, every point equally beginning and 
ending. We encounter not pure freedom but pure authority and become its complete 
victim.46 
Without the teleological structure, we risk being dominated by the totalitarian present. 
Without a beginning or end there is no notion of life as a way or a story that unfolds. 
When there is no way, we cannot tell from where we have fallen or to where we must 
rise. The moral world is somehow levelled so that even temptation ceases to be 
tempting, and straying is drained of its excitement. While the notion of ends, goals, 
essences and purposes will always be put to pernicious uses, there does not seem to be 
any escape from this teleological structure. 
Our ability to live together in moral rather than manipulative communities 
depends upon sustaining the theory and practices of moral accountability. I have 
considered MacIntyre's argument for the teleological shape of these narrative 
accounts. MacIntyre summarises this crucial relationship between moral reflection 
and narrative: 
If a human life is understood as a progress through harms and dangers, moral and 
physical, which someone may encounter and overcome in better and worse ways 
and with a greater or lesser measure of success, the virtues will find their place as 
those qualities the possession and exercise of which generally tend to success in this 
enterprise and the vices likewise as qualities which likewise tend to failure. Each 
human life will then embody a story whose shape and form will depend upon what 
is counted as a harm and danger, and upon how success and failure, progress and its 
opposite, are understood and evaluated.47 
Our evaluative judgements are dependent on the teleological structure in narratives. 
Lacking the right kind of stories, we find ourselves morally inarticulate, being unable 
to rationally advance or defend our moral commitments, and so increasingly forced to 
resort to nonmoral and nonrational forms of order. Much more shall be said about 
moral judgement when I consider the notion of progress in the third section. 
Presently, we move from the discussion of teleological form to MacIntyre's account 
of tradition which supplies the teleological framework with its content. 
46 Gillian Rose, 'The Diremption of Spirit', in eds. Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick, Shadow of 
Sfi!'it: postmodernism and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 54-55. 
4 After Virtue, p. 144. 
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2. Tradition as Authority and Argument 
Analogous to modernism's understanding of teleology, tradition has also tended to 
be judged as irrational. Against this view, MacIntyre effectively argues for the 
restoration of the concept of tradition to intellectual respectability. Like his argument 
for the unavoidable nature of teleological reasoning, tradition also has an inescapable 
quality which reflects our human identity as historical and social characters. 'What I 
am, therefore,' MacIntyre writes, 'is in key part what I inherit, a specific past that is 
present to some degree in my present. I find myself part of a history and that is 
generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the 
bearers of a tradition. '48 Having said this we must quickly attend to MacIntyre's 
distinction between a tradition in good order versus one in disorder. Briefly put, a 
tradition in good order is able to sustain moral order without coercion and 
manipulation by means of moral commitment to the goods of that tradition. 
A moral tradition in good order exercises a moral authority which is 
nonauthoritarian. This is because the authority of a tradition is not merely asserted 
but continually subject to dialectical testing. MacIntyre observes that a tradition is in 
large part known by the kinds of arguments that that tradition has sustained and by 
which that tradition has been shaped. A tradition, MacIntyre states, is 'an historically 
extended, socially embodied argument. .. about the goods which constitute that 
tradition. '49 The moral authority of a tradition in good order is not an unquestioned 
authority. Indeed, one of the main functions of a tradition is to generate and sustain 
certain kinds of intramural arguments. The history of a tradition is a narrative about 
the 'conflict of interpretations of that tradition, a conflict which itselfhas a history 
susceptible to rival interpretations. '50 
For example, in MacIntyre's account of the 'craft tradition', there is a complex 
interplay between authority and critical questions and judgements. 51 Traditions are 
not static. Rather they develop in the middle ground between authority and 
questioning. Within a craft, this interplay offers' a kind of ability to recognize in the 
past what is and what is not a guide to the future which is at the core of any 
adequately embodied tradition. A craft in good order has to be embodied in a 
48 After Virtue, p. 221 (my emphasis). 
49 After Virtue, p. 222. . ' . ., 
50 MacIntyre, 'EpistemologIcal Cnses, Narrahve and SCIence, p. 460. 
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tradition in good order. And to be adequately initiated into a craft is to be adequately 
initiated into a tradition. '52 The rationality of a craft tradition is evident in its ability 
to initiate others into that craft. Those who are adequately initiated are not merely 
introduced into the craft's authoritative assertions. They must acquire that skill of 
critical judgement which is necessary in applying the authoritative tradition to new 
problems that may arise. 
Unless authority stands in a tensed relationship with ongoing dialectical criticism, 
it suffers from the disorders of either dogmatism or scepticism. Dogmatism is 
authority divorced from argument while scepticism results from criticism divorced 
from authority. A tradition of inquiry in good order sustains the tension between 
authority and criticism. The following section offers a more detailed account of the 
complex relationship between authority and argument. The first part considers 
MacIntyre's theoretical account of authority and argument in a tradition, and the 
second part attends to his account of Galileo as the model of the positive function of 
dialectical disagreement in the development of a tradition. 
2.1. The Relationship of Authority to Argument 
The intelligibility of any doctrine, truth-claim or argument depends upon 
some explicit or implicit tradition. Every assertion has a particular history. This view 
is central to MacIntyre's claim, made near the end of Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality, that either 'we have to begin speaking as protagonists of one contending 
party' or our moral inquiries must 'fall silent. '53 In our inquiries as in our lives, we 
are advocates of particular authoritative truth-claims, which derive from some 
particular historical perspective. MacIntyre states: 
It is central to my argument that the practice of the moral life by plain persons 
always presupposes the truth of some particular theoretical standpoint and that, 
when confronted by rival claims to her or his moral allegiance, the plain person's 
reflective practical choices will implicitly at least be a choice between theoretical 
standpoints. 54 
For MacIntyre, a tradition in good order functions between the stability of authority 
and the testing functions of dialectical argumentation. 
51 I discuss the 'craft tradition' in much more detail below. 
52 After Virtue, p. 128. 
53 Whose Justice?, p. 401. 
54 MacIntyre, 'Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy' , pp. 16-17. 
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According to Stephen Holmes, MacIntyre's commitment to authority is a 
license for 'conformist bigotry. '55 Holmes concludes that MacIntyre has fully moved 
into the camp of political conservatism. Against this judgement, the sociologist Peter 
McMylor notes that one of MacIntyre's aims is to restore the notion of tradition by 
distinguishing it from certain conservative conceptions of tradition. To do this, 
McMylor argues that MacIntyre first exposed liberalism's error in rejecting all 
tradition as false authority. The upshot of this rejection was to have 'left the concept 
(of tradition) to be taken over by conservatism, starting with Burke, who made a 
positive virtue of the implicit liberal contrast between reason and tradition. '56 To 
define what he takes to be an acceptable understanding of tradition, MacIntyre 
contrasts the understanding of tradition in Cardinal John Henry Newman with that of 
Edmund Burke. 
For MacIntyre, Burke's advocacy of an uncritical acceptance of tradition was 
a license to allow conservative political prejudices to go unchallenged. 57 As such, 
Burke's notion of tradition was a barricade against the kind of critical questioning 
needed for authentic moral and social transformation. Burke left the status quo 
unchallenged with a notion of tradition as 'a set of epistemological defences which 
enable it to avoid being put in question. '58 Authority within a tradition in good order 
sustains rather than subdues dialectical questioning. For Burke the mark of tradition 
was fixity and stability. Conversely, Newman regarded tradition as a positive force 
for historical development. For Newman, the supposed conflict between progressives 
and traditionalists fails to recognise how progress is impossible apart from tradition. 
MacIntyre is referring particularly to Newman's notion of development within the 
Christian theological tradition. In Newman's An Essay on the Development of 
Christian Doctrine and his Apologia Pro Vita Sua, tradition is not fixed but 
developing by means of dialectical testing. 
55 Stephen Holmes, 'MacIntyre: The Antiliberal Catechism', in The Anatomy of Antiliberalism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 88. 
56 Peter McMylor, Alasdair MacIntyre: Critic of Modernity (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 159. 
57 Whose Justice?, pp. 217-219 and 228-230. MacIntyre states that Blackstone's Commentaries on 
the Laws of England are representative of a Burkean preservation of English prejudice and an argument 
for the status quo. He states, 'Blackstone was, of course, the legal counterpart of Burke. In the 
Reflections on the Revolution in France Blackstone is praised as the latest ~ a line o~ succes.sion from 
Coke. And, like Burke, what Blackstone provides is an account of the donunant EnglIsh SOCIal 
structures according to which the justification of those structures is internal to them. The standards by 
which established practice is to be judged are, with minimal qualification, the standards already 
embodied in established practice.' Whose Justice?, p. 229. See also After Virtue, p. 221. 
58 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative And Science', p. 461. 
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In his Apologia, Newman responded to Charles Kingsley's criticism of his 
move to Roman Catholicism with an autobiographical account of the development of 
his life. MacIntyre sees in Newman the kind of appreciation for development and 
dialectics that is absent in Burke. Furthermore, this acceptance of development by 
means of dialectical argument explains the whole development of the church's 
doctrine. This is particularly evident in the church's use of philosophical and 
theological resources in the fourth-century debate about the nature of God and the 
doctrine of the Trinity.59 Arguments, rather than bald assertions, were needed to 
advance the doctrinal development that finally led to creedal agreement. J aroslav 
Pelikan captures this distinction between a fixed and developing tradition well when 
he says, 'Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the 
living. '60 A tradition in good order understands itselfby its account of that historical 
continuity which runs through the continual development of that tradition. 
In spite of MacIntyre's efforts to define tradition in relationship to 
development, Stephen Holmes argues that MacIntyre is finally trapped by his 
reverence for authority. Holmes claims that MacIntyre's 'authority-friendly and 
obedience-encouraging perspective,' blinds him to the benefits of conflicts in liberal 
societies. To come to this conclusion, Holmes must acknowledge then ignore 
MacIntyre's claim that moral authority is necessary to preserve us from 'the vexation 
of ephemeral and mercurial preferences. '61 Rather than taking seriously the 
importance of this function of tradition, Holmes sets out to disclose MacIntyre's real 
agenda: 'Incontrovertibility is what he [MacIntyre] seeks. '62 
Knight presents a more positive view of MacIntyre's understanding of tradition 
when he observes: 
The most absurd consequence of MacIntyre's critics' misconstrual of his 
substantive social theory in terms of his metatheory must be the occasional claim 
that he is a political conservative ... This is not a conservative conception of politics. 
On the contrary, it is a revolutionary conception.63 
59 Whose Justice?, p. 362. 
60 laroslav Pelikan, The Melody of Theology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 252. 
61 Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. 95. 
62 Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. 95. 
63 Knight, The MacIntyre Reader, pp. 20-21. 
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In truth, MacIntyre's virtuous selfis literally unmanageable. That is, the virtuous life, 
as MacIntyre understands it, is often times socially disruptive.64 Knight states: 
MacIntyre's politics may now, to an extent, be described in terms of resistance. The 
idea of a politics of resistance is familiar to many Nietzscheans. For them, it 
involves resistance to domination of one's will by others and asserting oneself in the 
agon that is society. For MacIntyre it involves something else. What is to be 
resisted is injustice.65 
Appreciation for moral authority is disruptive because it continually asks, 'To 
what higher authority, if any, may someone appeal against the verdict of whomsoever 
it is that locally has the power to impose authority?,66 MacIntyre provides a historical 
narrative of this understanding of a socially subversive tradition in his consideration 
of the conflict between Frederick II with Pope Gregory IX over the limits of ecclesial 
and secular authority. In one sense, it matters very little to MacIntyre's argument 
whether, with Nietzsche, one sides with Frederick II, or with Aquinas, one sides with 
the Pope. MacIntyre's point is that we cannot launch and rationally defend any kind 
of criticism unless it be embedded in some authoritative account. Authority is 
essential for argumentation. To stress the dialectical function of authority, a central 
feature of authority is that it has been 'rationally justified as the best thus far. '67 The 
conditional 'thus far' means that the authority in a tradition shapes that tradition 
without being insulated from further questions and challenges from within and 
without. 
Holmes neglects the dialectical tension in MacIntyre's notion of authority 
when he claims that MacIntyre is in search of an authority that 'can provide an 
absolute guide, can rescue the individual from the chaos in his soul and the anxiety 
about difficult decision.' At bottom MacIntyre does not trust that human beings are 
capable of rationally ordering their lives together and so 'authority alone' is required 
to 'lift mankind's spiritual burden.' 68 Aiming at a notion of authority which is 
'capable of settling all disputes and resolving all doubts' finally leads MacIntyre 
down a path from secular reason to religion which he understands to be an irrational 
and arbitrary authority. This openness to religion is taken as a sign that MacIntyre has 
64 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Sophrosune: How a Virtue Can Become Socially Disruptive,' in Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy XIII (1988), pp. 1-11 and Natural Law As Subversive: The Case of Aquinas, 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 26 (Winter, 1996), pp. 62-83. 
65 Knight, The MacIntyre Reader, p. 23. ., . 
66 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Natural Law as SubversIve, p. 61 (my emphasIs). 
67 Three Rival Versions, p. 64. 
68 Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. 94. 
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despaired of his ability to justify rationally a particular account of 'man's true end' or 
what makes a 'good man.'69 Hence in Holmes' view, MacIntyre's choice of religion 
places him in the same category as the liberals he criticises. He must commit himself 
to some tradition and some authority without rational justification. What matters is 
not rational argument but choice. 
Holmes' argument is anachronistic. His notion of 'reason' as a universal 
guide and his disparagement of the authority of tradition disregards Macintyre's 
account of the Enlightenment's failure to reconcile its claims of freedom with the 
notion of a rational world. Because he does not recognise this crucial impasse, he 
cannot appreciate Macintyre's attempt to show how authority and argumentation 
coexist within a tradition. He misses MacIntyre's argument that authority is 
necessary in order to identify those ends by which progress and decline are 
recognised. It is within this structure that dialectics is the essential method whereby a 
tradition progresses from disorder to order. In the following section, I attend to 
Macintyre's argument that a tradition in good order is able to hold authority and 
argument in dialectical tension. 
2.2. The Deconstructive Function of Tradition 
According to Macintyre, a living tradition is 'an historically extended, socially 
embodied argument. .. about the goods which constitute that tradition. '70 The sign of a 
tradition in good order is a kind of co-operative, dialectical conversation that results 
in 'the formulation, elaboration, rational justification, and criticism of accounts of 
practical rationality and justice' .71 Clearly, Macintyre sees that the role of authority in 
a tradition in good order sustains rather than silences argument, by directing such 
arguments toward fruitful development. It is therefore puzzling that Holmes should 
attribute an unquestioned conservatism to Macintyre's conception of tradition in view 
of Macintyre's appreciation for the central importance of dialectical testing. Indeed, 
once we consider the nature and function of this testing, it becomes clear that 
Macintyre recognises that Nietzsche's notion of genealogy has a crucial, albeit 
provisional, function within an ordered tradition. Macintyre's commitment to 
historicism means that truth-claims are advocated by historical characters in historical 
69 Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. 102. 
70 After Virtue, p. 222. 
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contexts; no authoritative assertion can claim immunity from deconstruction. 
Deconstruction is always possible because a tradition fixes philosophical theories 
within a history of practices and institutions. MacIntyre states: 
Every such form of enquiry begins in and from some condition of pure historical 
contingency, from the beliefs, institutions, and practices of some particular 
community which constitute a given. Within such a community authority will have 
been conferred upon certain texts and certain voices. Bards, priests, prophets, 
kings, and, on occasion, fools and jesters will all be heard.72 
By the careful examination of these concrete embodiments of theory, one is able to 
examine and criticise the claims made within that tradition. MacIntyre's notion of a 
tradition roundly rejects any claim to epistemological immunity. It asserts that the 
vindication or falsification of truth-claims will be de facto and not de jure. 73 
MacIntyre's claim that genealogy has an important function within his notion of 
tradition merits further consideration. MacIntyre notes that for Nietzsche: 
[T]he task of the genealogist more generally was to write the history of those social 
and psychological formations in which the will to power is distorted into and 
concealed by the will to truth and the specific task of the genealogist of morality 
was to trace both socially and conceptually how rancor and resentment on the part 
of the inferior destroyed the aristocratic nobility of archaic heroes and substituted a 
priestly set of values in which a concern for purity and impurity provided a disguise 
for malice and hate.74 
The genealogist is able to chart the development of truth-claims because they are 
necessarily embodied in actions and institutions.75 The dialectical and adversarial task 
of the genealogist is to displace a false history with a more accurate account of how a 
tradition has, by its own standards, failed to achieve the goods of that tradition. When 
a tradition identifies its canonical texts and its central tasks, it does not thereby escape 
71 Whose Justice?, p. 350. 
72 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'The Privatization of the Good: An Inaugural Lecture', Review of Politics 52 
~ 1990), pp. 354-355. 
3 Paul J. Griffiths develops this distinction in a critical essay on Schubert Ogden's process theology. 
Griffiths argues that the de jure epistemological claim is to be rejected for two reasons. First, it is often 
and perhaps always self-refuting as it proposes epistemic tests that it cannot itself satisfy. Second, 
Griffiths states 'that the quest for epistemic principles is motivated, in large part, by a desire to fix 
belief about some matter independently of deciding its truth. This is why the epistemically desirable 
property specified by an epistemic principle ~~ould neither ~ssume ~e ~th o~ th.e cla~ to which it is 
applied nor be among that claim's truth condItIons. The pomt of epIstemIc prmcIples ... IS to make a de 
jure rather than a de facto decision possible', Paul J. Griffiths, 'How Epistemology Matters to 
Theology', Journal of Religion 79 (1999), p. 6. 
74 Three Rival Versions, p. 40. 
75 Maurice Cowling, writing in The New Criterion, states that MacIntyre's emphasis on the 
inseparability of theory from practice reflects the continued influence of Marx on his moral philosophy. 
Maurice Cowling, 'Alasdair MacIntyre, Religion and the University', The New Criterion 13 (Feb., 
1994), p. 40. 
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criticism. Rather such identification of authority makes the deconstructive task, at 
least on the face of things, that much easier. 
Consider a more difficult deconstruction in MacIntyre's account of liberalism. 
MacIntyre notes that, 'Nietzsche pilloried what he took to be the false claims to 
objectivity of those who had rejected the teleology of their predecessors and boasted 
of their own value-neutrality.' 76 The claims to obj ectivity and neutrality concealed 
the truth that these were the claims of advocates and not aloof observers. Liberalism 
failed to displace tradition with universal principles of reason because it could only 
advance its argument by recognising itself as a tradition. Once fixed as a tradition, 
the genealogist is able to write a subversive history which exposes the incoherence in 
liberalism.77 MacIntyre's deconstruction joins the philosophical claims advanced 
within the liberal tradition to particular authoritative texts, persons, practices and 
institutions of that tradition. Even when advancing timeless truths one must always 
stake out these claims in a 'time-bound' manner. 78 
To say that the notion of a tradition is inescapable is to say that ideas always have 
historically embodied consequences. MacIntyre states, 'There is no standing ground, 
no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of advancing, evaluating, 
accepting, and rej ecting reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some 
particular tradition. '79 The task of the rival genealogist is to show that the historical 
predicates of a moral or intellectual tradition are very different from its assertions. 
However, to focus only on deconstruction is to miss the point of MacIntyre's 
argument. When he claims that tradition is an inescapable reality, he is claiming that 
both falsification and vindication of truth-claims becomes possible. When our 
assertions withstand the possibility of 'rational defeat', they may be said to be 
'rationally vindicated' thus far. For this reason, a tradition in good order will render 
itself 'maximally vulnerable to refutation from its own point of view. '80 This takes 
place when a tradition identifies its canonical texts, its defining tenets and 
authoritative teachers. 
MacIntyre is most persuasive in his advocacy of the genealogical task in his 
performance of this task in his Gifford Lectures. There he offers an imaginative 
76 Three Rival Versions, p. 40. 
77 Whose Justice?, p. 349. 
78 j,.? 9 Whose ustlce., p. . 
79 Whose Justice?, p. 350. 
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account of the dialectical conflict between the three rival traditions that he dubs 
'Tradition', 'Genealogy' and 'Encyclopaedia'. Calling into question the kind of 
scientific objectivity which the lectures seem to call for, MacIntyre makes his 
commitment to the Thomistic Christian tradition, and his intent to argue for its 
rational superiority over its modem and postmodern rivals clear from the start. To 
make good on this claim, he first tethers each tradition to a nineteenth-century text 
that he takes to be an authoritative voice within that tradition. MacIntyre's chosen 
text for 'Tradition' is Pope Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris, the Enlightenment text is the 
ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and the Genealogist's canonical 
authority is Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals. 
Deconstruction of every philosophy is possible because there is no philosophical 
position that is not embodied in some tradition. The most tangible sign of a tradition 
is the book or books that are taken to be an authoritative account of the given position. 
Once each philosophical position is linked to a particular text, MacIntyre is able to 
demonstrate how these positions must be seen as philosophic rivals. Moreover, in 
making this linkage, MacIntyre, on the one hand, acts as a Nietzschean genealogist 
who denies enyclopaedists' claims to neutrality, objectivity and universality. On the 
other hand, MacIntyre opposes the genealogists' notion of truth claims which, 
according to Nietzsche, are nothing more than 'illusions which we have forgotten are 
illusions, worn-out metaphors now impotent to stir the senses, coins which have lost 
their faces and are considered now as metal rather than currency.8! This practice of 
affixing authoritative texts to rival positions follows naturally from MacIntyre's 
notion of the rationality of tradition. It reflects the view that every tradition authorises 
certain voices, texts, or persons who are the public advocates of that tradition, even if 
these authorities are not explicitly acknowledged. A tradition that refuses to own up 
to its authorities is then forced to accept the genealogist's selection of its authoritative 
text. In this way, MacIntyre links philosophical positions with a particular history in 
order to render these positions vulnerable to refutation or, for that matter, vindication. 
No position should wish to claim immunity from dialectical argument because it is 
only in such testing that the authority of that position is established. Refutation and 
vindication come by one and the same dialectical method. 
80 MacIntyre, 'Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble?' p. 78. 
8! MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, p. 35, quoting Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense'. 
(No further bibliographical details are given.) 
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Three reasons support this assertion. First, rival moral traditions develop and 
work within particular contexts in which they have identified certain practical 
questions about morality and justice as problems to be solved. By identifying certain 
problems as disorders, a tradition either carries its enquiries forward or is stymied by 
the irresolvability of the problem.82 The resolution or failure to resolve problems are 
occasions for 'the rational criticism and for further rational development' of moral 
theories and concepts. 83 Second, rival theories often converge on the same practical 
problem, while proposing rival and incompatible solutions. Such an occasion affords 
the opportunity to judge one tradition's solutions against those of others. Third, 
philosophical theories persist long after they are formally refuted. 84 However, once 
these theories are connected to historical traditions, their path to perishing or 
flourishing can be rationally charted.85 When a tradition meets with a concrete 
historical problem, one of three courses will transpire. The tradition may resolve its 
problem with its present resources, it may be transformed through the discovery of 
outside resources, or it may perish. Once more, MacIntyre does not merely offer a 
theory of testing; rather, he places his discussion within a narrative. Let us further 
consider the function of argument in MacIntyre's narrative account of Galileo. 
2.3. The Positive Function of Argument 
Arguments play important roles in MacIntyre's moral philosophy. On the one 
hand, interminable arguments are a sign of modernity's moral fragmentation. On the 
other hand, dialectical disagreements are the means by which progress is achieved 
within a moral tradition. This latter point is hardly self-evident, as arguments seem 
more divisive than constructive. Hence MacIntyre makes his case for the positive 
function of argument by explaining how Galileo' s conflict with the church was the 
means of positive development within this tradition. Accepting MacIntyre's version 
means rejecting the account of Galileo found in textbooks and encyclopaedia articles. 
These mythic accounts view Galileo as a rational, enlightened scientist, who 
overcame a superstitious cosmology entrenched in a mindless tradition. For example, 
82 Whose Justice?, pp. 326-327. 
83 Whose Justice?, p. 390. 
84 Whose Justice?, p. 335. , 
85 For example, MacIntyre writes that Thucydides' History o/the Pe/oponnesian War reflects the bel,lef 
'that history can be instructive. It exhibits the downfall of Athens through the misdeeds of the Atheman 
democracy.' A Short History of Ethics, p. 130. 
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in a popular computer encyclopaedia, one article states that, 'In the history of culture, 
Galileo stands as a symbol of the battle against authority for freedom ofinquiry.,86 
The view that Galileo displaced medieval metaphysics and theology with the 
scientific method reflects two misconceptions of tradition. Galileo did not initiate a 
paradigm shift in displacing one tradition with another. Rather, he extended a 
tradition of scientific inquiry that had met with intractable problems. MacIntyre's 
story of Galileo is about the Western theological tradition's hard-fought discovery of 
new resources to overcome an intramural challenge from the emerging authority of 
SCIence. 
According to MacIntyre, the discoveries of Galileo did not spell defeat for the 
medieval scholastic tradition so much as they spurred the transformation of that 
tradition.87 
It was in one way a victory and not a defeat for the Aristotelian conception of 
enquiry when it proved vulnerable to Galileo's dialectical arguments against it. 
And it is a mark of all established genuinely Aristotelian modes of enquiry that they 
too are open to defeat; that is, what had been taken to be adequate fonnulations of a 
set of necessary, apodictic judgements, functioning as first principles, may always 
tum out to be false, in the light afforded by the failure by its own Aristotelian 
standards of what had been hitherto taken to be a warranted body of theory. And 
lesser partial failures of this kind are landmarks in the history of every science.88 
MacIntyre explains that within every philosophical framework, questions arise that 
cause' a systematic breakdown of enquiry.' What explains such a breakdown? 
Evidence that was once thought to support certain conclusions 'turns out to have been 
equally susceptible of rival interpretations. ,89 Now faced with a 'multiplicity of 
possible interpretations' , one moves beyond this impasse by imaginatively 
considering these rival interpretations.90 The medieval tradition, which three centuries 
earlier was modified by the influx of Aristotelian ideas, would, in the sixteenth 
century, have its dependence on Aristotelian ideas challenged by new findings in 
scientific inquiry. Ironically, the foundation for the autonomy of the sciences, which 
so challenged the scholastic philosophers and theologians, was laid in the thirteenth-
century struggle between Aquinas and Augustinian theology. 
86 'Galileo', Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia, CD-ROM. Microsoft Corporation, 1996. 
87 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative And Science', p. 460. 
88 First Principles, Final Ends, pp. 39-40. 
89 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative And Science', p. 453. 
90 Three Rival Versions, p. 120. 
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Galileo's discoveries initiated the revamping of medieval cosmology. It is 
Important not to overlook the fact that his work was supported by the advocates of the 
cosmology he called into question. Such questions would not have been raised had 
Galileo not been a member of a tradition that recognised the importance of astronomy 
for philosophical and theological inquiry. The Christian theological tradition viewed 
the world as cosmos and not chaos. It was thus a reasonable expectation that rational 
sciences would not finally disagree with scripture. Rather science would finally 
cohere with and clarify theological truth--claims. This confidence was cast into 
confusion by Galileo's discovery that pitted theological authority against scientific 
authority. Furthennore, the crisis was complicated by the threats that these questions 
posed to the institutional power of the Church and to Aristotelian philosophers at the 
University at Pisa. The goods of inquiry directly challenge the goods of institutional 
security. In this context, it is regrettable, but not surprising, that these challenges 
were met by coercive threats. 
Galileo is exemplary of the positive function of dialectical testing. As his 
work questioned the tradition's authority, it led to the development rather than the 
disintegration of the Western theological tradition. The heretic and inquisitor suggest 
two erroneous alternatives to positive, dialectical development. As the story of 
Galileo indicates, progress within a tradition is uneven and punctuated by errors. A 
certain ambiguity surrounds those characters and events that are on the frontiers of a 
tradition's development. At this point in a tradition's development, ambiguity 
requires restrained debate rather than clarity at any cost. The heretic rejects the 
authentic authority of a tradition in his effort to offer a too easy resolution to the 
ambiguity. The inquisitor attempts to sustain the tradition's authority by suppressing 
debate with dogmatic assertions backed by coercive power. That heretic and 
inquisitor are recurring types within society is a sign of the difficulty and utter 
necessity that a tradition sustain habits and practices of dialectical testing. It was, 
after all, Galileo' s achievement that he disclosed the false authority of misapplied 
philosophy and theology by means of the authentic authority of scientific discovery. 
However, it would be naIve to argue that dialectical method alone ensures the 
order of a tradition. In MacIntyre's account, shrill and intenninable arguments 
characterise the modem disorder. A tradition in good order must then be capable of 
discriminating between fruitful and fruitless arguments. Put differently, a tradition in 
good order must be capable of rationally distinguishing between progress and decline. 
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In the following section, I consider MacIntyre's notion of progress as a crucial 
element in his argument for a rational morality. Simply put, a tradition in good 
rational order is able to account for its notion of progress while a tradition in disorder 
is rendered inarticulate. 
3. Progress and Rationality 
3.1. Progress and Rational Evaluation 
Progress is the capstone of the previous discussions of rationality, teleology and 
tradition. That is, an intelligible account of progress depends upon a tradition's 
teleological account of how paradise was lost, its vision of paradise regained and the 
means by which one progresses from the former state to the latter. Progress is an 
essential component of morality. We cannot say why it is rational to act in one way 
rather than in another without referring to progress. This point was made by G.K. 
Chesterton who saw that modem doubt undermines any notion of progress. 
Nobody has any business to use the word 'progress' unless he has a definite creed 
and a cast-iron code of morals ... For progress by its very name indicates a 
direction; and the moment we are in the least doubtful about the direction, we 
become in the same degree doubtful about the progress. Never perhaps since the 
beginning of the world has there been an age that had less right to use the word 
'progress' than we.91 
For MacIntyre a creed expresses the teleological shape of rationality and is embodied 
in the practices and commitments of a tradition. 
The notion of progress is a mirror reflection of deconstruction. The genealogist 
discloses the path from present truth-claims to their origin in the past. Progress is 
concerned to map out the path from present truth-claims to their future fulfilment. 
These claims, once made, are then subj ect to retrospective scrutiny by which they are 
either vindicated or falsified. 92 MacIntyre argues that truth-claims, abstracted from 
their teleological framework, are deprived of 'the only context by reference to which 
they can be made fully intelligible and rationally defensible. '93 Within the teleological 
structure, an assertion specifies 'what course of action will .. . as a matter offact lead 
91 G.K. Chesterton, Heretics (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), p. 62. 
92 Whose Justice?, p. 357. 
93 First Principles, Final Ends, pp. 60-61. 
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toward a man's true end ... Moral sentences are thus used within this framework to 
make claims which are true or false. '94 
Progress is essential for the big questions of 'man's true end' as well as for 
questions concerned with practical action. Hence how one thinks about small-scale 
practical decisions is analogous to the way we think about the large-scale 
philosophical concerns. For this reason, the practical syllogism offers an insight into 
our moral reflection on the grand moral issues of identity, community and meaning. 95 
It does this by showing how we would answer the simple question, 'Why did you so 
act?' To give an adequate answer to this question would mean to cite 'the relevant 
practical syllogism and the relevant piece of deliberation.' 96 When an agent asks 
'What am I to do?', he or she must decide which course of action is better and which 
is worse. To speak of better and worse courses of action requires that we specify our 
standard of measure. The practical syllogism is a deductive argument that specifies 
the reasons why one has chosen one course over its alternatives.97 It is a form of 
deliberation (prohairesis) that 'moves to a beginning, an arche, with a view to the 
construction of an argument which concludes with an end product. '98 This form of 
deliberation identifies the ends which are the standard by which one gives hierarchical 
ranking to lesser and greater goods. In this way the syllogism identifies why it is 
rational to act in one way rather than another. 
Unremarkably, the practical syllogism has a major and minor premise, and a 
conclusion. The major premise declares the good that is achieved by acting or lost by 
the failure to act. The minor premise takes into account one's particular identity and 
circumstances, and identifies the appropriate means to achieve the named good.99 The 
conclusion is a rationally justifiable action. MacIntyre contends that this form of 
reasoning is essential to the way we think about practical action and our ultimate 
good. 
Herein lies the modem problem of inarticulacy. Modernity is troubled by an 
epistemological scepticism about the possibility of naming ultimate goods. Hence 
modem moral deliberation proceeds without any kind of teleological account. 
94 After Virtue, p. 53 (my emphasis). 
95 Whose Justice?, p. 129. 
96 Whose Justice?, p. 131. 
97 1'? 24 Whose ustlce., p. . 
98 Whose Justice?, p. 132. 
99 Whose Justice?, pp. 131-132. 
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Because Descartes failed to secure an epistemological starting point in the doubts of 
the self, we have concluded that moral knowledge-if there is such knowledge-is 
unattainable. 'A radical sceptic', says MacIntyre, 'is an epistemologist with entirely 
negative findings.' 100 This scepticism undermines our ability to speak authoritatively 
about 'certain determinate, fixed and unalterable ends.' Deprived of an account of 
ends, we cannot say why our actions and life are 'well or badly directed', or how we 
may progress in our actions and life. 101 Without this account of progress, evaluative 
jUdgements are rationally indefensible. 
For MacIntyre, the rational moral evaluation of one's actions and life depends 
upon how we progress or fail to progress towards our true end(s). This is what 
MacIntyre calls the retrospective theory of falsification: 
When from time to time, the plain person retrospectively examines what her or his 
life amounts to as a whole, often enough with a view to choice between alternative 
futures, characteristically what she or he is in effect asking is, 'To what conception 
of my overall good have I so far committed myself?' 102 
Rational moral evaluation depends upon shared commitment to some concrete 
account of the overall good. Modernity's failure to own up to a creed reflects an 
inability to commit itself to certain ends and goods. Hence modernity is deprived of 
the language of progress and the evaluative judgements that depend on this progress. 
Taking his cue from Plato, MacIntyre argues that the crafts offer a way to think 
through the relationship of evaluative judgements and commitment to certain ends. 
He beings by defining a craft, stating: 
Every craft is informed by some conception of a finally perfected work which 
serves as the shared telos of that craft. And what are actually produced as the best 
judgements or actions or objects so far are judged so because they stand in some 
determinate relationship to that telos, which furnishes them with their final cause. 
So it is within forms of intellectual enquiry ... which issue at any particular stage in 
their history in types of judgement and activity which are rationally justified as the 
best thus far. 103 
100 First Principles, Final Ends, p. 12. 
101 First Principles, Final Ends, p. 7. 
102 MacIntyre, 'Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy', p. 8 (my emphasis). 
103 Three Rival Versions, p. 64. MacIntyre contrasts his notion of rational norms with the Marxist view 
that 'an historical and sociological understanding of moral concepts and precepts as articulated within 
practices was incompatible with an appeal to objective standards of goodness, rightness and virtue, 
standards independent of the interests and attitudes of those engaged in such practices ... But here once 
again there is a false antithesis. What the objectivity of moral and other evaluative standar~s amounts 
to is to be understood only from within the context of and in terms of the structure of certam types of 
historically developed practice, in which the initial interests of those engaged in such practices are 
transformed through their activities into an interest in conforming to the standards of excellence 
required by those practices, so that the goods internal to them may be achieved.' 'The Theses on 
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A craft is a co-operative practice that aims toward 'goods internal to that form of 
activity.' These goods 'are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards 
of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. ' \04 By 
looking at a craft, we come to understand how the teleological framework and the 
authority of a tradition are necessary for a craft and, by analogy, for the moral life. 
By considering the structure of such practices as those of a fishing boat, the string 
quartet or the crafting of furniture, we better understand how rational moral 
judgements are made and sustained and how these judgements advance the co-
operative activity of the craft. The two main features of a craft are its capacity to 
make rational evaluative judgements, and its capacity to sustain a program of 
education that rationally initiates outsiders into the craft. 
3.2. Evaluation and Education in the Craft Tradition 
Evaluative judgements articulate how one progresses toward some good in a craft. 
These judgements are crucial because a craft intends to transform raw material into 
finished products. This transformation can go wrong in many different ways. Critical 
evaluations recognise that there are better and worse finished products, and better and 
worse ways to produce finished product. 105 Hence the evaluative judgements of a craft 
in good order are intelligible and defensible insofar as they preserve the excellence of 
that craft both in its means and ends. 
A craft in good order must overcome a certain kind of deception. This deception is 
due to the gap between 'what it really is good to do and what only seems good ... but is 
not in fact so.' \06 What seems to be good may lead to the frustration of one's end, or 
what may seem to be utter frustration may be necessary to achieve a craft's end. To 
use a biblical illustration, those in a craft are continually confronted with the kind of 
temptation presented in Jesus' parable of the wise and foolish builder. While building 
on sand is seductive, the wise builder, in taking the long view, endures the temporary 
Feuerbach: A Road Not Taken', in eds. Carol C. Gould, and Robert S. Cohen, Artefacts, 
Representations and Social Practice (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p. 289. 
104 After Virtue, p. 187. 
105 Three Rival Versions, p. 136. 
106 Three Rival Versions, p. 61. 
76 
frustration that comes with building on a firm foundation. 107 For MacIntyre, 
evaluative judgements are necessary in order to resist the lure of short-term 
effectiveness. These judgements express how one's commitment to long-term 
excellence is embodied. 
This means that a craft for MacIntyre 'is never only to catch fish, or to produce 
beef or milk, or to build houses. It is to do so in a manner consonant with the 
excellencies of the craft, so that not only is there a good product, but the craftsperson 
is perfected through and in her or his activity. n08 The critical distinction is between a 
craft as an embodied commitment to excellence versus a craft understood as an 
activity which can be fully explained by the calculations of an external and 
quantifiable 'bottom line.' The tension between the goods of excellence and the desire 
for effectiveness is an enduring tension within every craft. Because a craft is a co-
operative activity ordered to a standard of excellence, the education of the apprentice 
must aim both at the cultivation of skills and of character. A craft in good order not 
only transforms raw material into products, it also transforms 'raw' apprentices into 
finished masters. A craft is the techne or skill that transforms an ergon (work) 
towards its appropriate telos. Likewise, in a rational education, 'the apprentice learns 
what it is about him or herself that has to be transformed, that is, what vices need to 
be eradicated, what intellectual and moral virtues need to be cultivated. '109 Education 
is the means of transformation. 'Education,' writes MacIntyre, 'is first of all an 
initiation into the practices within which dialectical and confessional interrogation and 
self-interrogation are institutionalized. '110 
The assertion that education is the means of transformation is deceptively 
simple as it confronts us once more with the paradox of the Meno. That is, the 
apprentice is able to make progress only by means of a certain kind of education. 
However, to embark on this course of education requires that the apprentice already 
be committed to the moral and intellectual virtues upon which learning depends. I 
can only be virtuous if I am educated. However, I can only be educated if I already 
possess certain intellectual and moral virtues. In a craft, the transformation of 
107 Matthew 4:27ff. 
108 MacIntyre, 'A Partial Response To My Critics', in eds. John Horton & Susan Mendus, After 
MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 
284. 
109 Three Rival Versions, p. 62. 
110 Three Rival Versions, p. 201. 
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apprentices depends upon a commitment to goods and practices that they are not yet 
able to recognise as goods. The resolution of this paradox is found in the relationship 
of apprentice to master. The virtues that the apprentice does not possess, are 
possessed by the master. The master's commitment to the apprentice allows the 
apprentice to 'live off the virtues of the master. Michael Polanyi describes how this 
relationship works, stating: 
To learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your master because you 
trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyse and account in detail 
for its effectiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the 
presence of his example, the apprentice picks up the rules of the art, including those 
which are not explicitly known by the master himself. These hidden rules can be 
assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the 
imitation of another.' III 
The apprentice learns through trust, and trust requires submission to the authority of 
the master. The introduction of such terms as trust and submission reflects just how 
'post-critical' is the craft analogy. Hence it is necessary to further justify this craft 
analogy. 
MacIntyre spells out the necessity of trust in his account of how one becomes a 
skilled reader within the Augustinian community. In the community of readers the 
relationship between apprentice and master is crucial. MacIntyre maintains that this 
relationship involves two things: 
a teacher and an obedient trust that what the teacher, interpreting the text, declares 
to be good reasons for transforming oneself into a different kind of person - and 
thus a different kind of reader - will tum out to be genuinely good reasons in the 
light afforded by that understanding of the texts which becomes available only to 
the transformed self. The intending reader has to have inculcated into him or 
herself certain attitudes and dispositions, certain virtues, before he or she can know 
why these are to be accounted virtues ... And this reordering requires obedient trust, 
not only in the authority of this particular teacher, but in that of the whole tradition 
of interpretative commentary into which that teacher had had earlier him or herself 
to be initiated through his or her reordering and conversion. I 12 
The rationality of a craft depends on the ability to trust. To have trust at the centre of 
one's notion of rationality requires, notes Lesslie Newbigin, something like Martin 
Buber's distinction between the relationships of I IThou versus lilt. Newbigin argues 
that when the'!, is reduced to an 'it', relationships are conducted according to 
rational calculation and control. 'Good' is whatever is effective. Newbigin states, 'I 
analyze and dissect. I formulate hypotheses. I force the world to answer the 
III Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 53. 
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questions I put to it. I am sovereign.'113 Conversely, the rationality of the I-thou is a 
different sort that, though it is built on trust, does not require the abolition of reason. 
Newbigin states that trust involves 'a rational person making rational judgements and 
drawing rational conclusions from data.' 114 Reason does not aim at masterful 
autonomy but at a relationship of trust. 
The appeal to trust, obedience and submission cannot, however, be divorced from 
dialectical testing. No authority is worthy of trust ifit is also insulated from criticism. 
Trust is the result not the absence of criticism. It is not irrational dependence on 
authority; it is a rational dependence on that authority which is necessary for moral 
and intellectual progress. This relationship between trust and criticism becomes more 
clear as I tum to consider how Thomas Aquinas laid the foundation for trusting the 
authority of the Christian tradition by means of dialectical testing of this authority. 
Testing is the means by which one progresses in trusting. 
3.3. Thomas Aquinas and the Dialectical Transformation of a Tradition 
Aquinas' achievement can only be understood in its historical context. The 
universities of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries confronted an intellectual challenge 
to the Augustinian acceptance of the authority of divine revelation. This crisis was 
initiated by the introduction of Aristotelian texts into the medieval university by 
Islamic and Jewish scholars. These texts and their interpretations challenged the 
Augustinian framework which was predicated on the necessity of divine revelation for 
knowledge. 
A verroes' and Maimonides' understanding of the role of the philosopher 
challenged foundational Augustinian assumptions. The philosopher's task was to 
reconcile philosophical truths with the authoritative assertions of his religious 
tradition. 115 Philosophy was both subordinate to and distinct from theology in its 
methods of inquiry and willingness to challenge revealed authority. Theologians were 
entrusted with writing commentaries on sacred texts that were judged according to 
their correspondence with accepted authority and by standards of internal 
112 Three Rival Versions, pp. 82-83. 
113 Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 
1989), p. 60. 
114 N ewbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, p. 61. 
115 Three Rival Versions, p. 106. 
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consistency.116 By contrast, the philosopher was licensed to pursue speculative 
inquiry in the expectation that all truth-claims could be harmonised within the 
theological framework. This limited autonomy of philosophy, granted to the Islamic 
and Jewish philosophers, proved to be unacceptable to medieval Augustinians. As we 
will see, this was not because Augustinianism did not value philosophy or dialectical 
inquiry. It was rather that the new knowledge depended on a philosophical 
framework which threatened to displace the theological framework. Aquinas' 
achievement was to show how Aristotle could be read in a way that advanced rather 
than compromised the commitment to theology. 
In view of the influence ofneoplatonic philosophy on Augustinian theology, the 
suspicion of philosophy by the medieval Augustinians was ironic. Indeed, MacIntyre 
explains the conflict at the University of Paris not as a conflict of theology with 
philosophy. It was rather a clash between seemingly incommensurable and 
incompatible philosophies. 117 Aristotelian philosophy confronted the Augustinian 
theologians with a critical choice. They could accept Aristotelian philosophy into the 
curriculum and thereby subject the curriculum to radical incoherence, or they could 
forcefully keep Aristotelian influence out of the university. According to MacIntyre, 
resorting to force would cause the Augustinians to deny certain of their central 
intellectual commitments. Within the Augustinian framework, rational vindication 
takes place on two fronts. As a tradition of inquiry, it must 'progress in the solution 
of its own problems', while rival traditions of inquiry must finally' exhibit 
incoherence or resourcelessness. '118 Aristotelian philosophy seemed to tum the tables 
on the Augustinians by calling into question such doctrines as the eternity of matter, 
the corruption of the will and especially the possibility of knowledge apart from 
revelation. Aristotelianism successfully challenged Augustinian theological views 
without exhibiting the kind of incoherence which Augustinianism predicated to its 
rivals. As such, the Augustinians could not claim that they had rationally defeated 
Aristotelian philosophy. The alternative of including a philosophy in the curriculum 
that questioned key theological doctrines and advanced a seemingly incompatible 
epistemology would have introduced a radical incoherence into the curriculum. The 
116 Three Rival Versions, p. 106. 
117 Three Rival Versions, p. 107. 
118 Three Rival Versions, p. 102. 
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depth of this division is evident in how each system addressed the paradox of the 
Meno. 
The question at the heart of this paradox is how one gains the requisite 
knowledge and virtues which are necessary to progress in learning. To be virtuous 
one must be educated and yet to become educated one must already possess certain 
intellectual and moral virtues that one does not already possess. Aristotle's solution 
was to posit a natural human potentiality which resided in the intellect. The 
Augustinian solution depended upon the active intervention of God. 119 Where 
Aristotle predicated to the human mind rational adequacy, radical blindness of the 
intellect and bondage of the will characterised Augustinian anthropology.120 For 
Aristotle, truth depended solely on 'the relationship of the mind to its objects', while 
for Augustinians truth came by means of 'the relationship of finite objects to that 
truth which is God.' 121 The central disagreement between philosophy and theology 
turned on how one understood the relationship between divine and human knowledge. 
The Augustinian conception of knowledge was expressed in Hugh of St. 
Victor's belief that 'the whole perceptible world is indeed as if a book written by the 
finger of God.' 122 Knowledge of God's world depended upon the proper reading of 
God's Word. Knowledge was not gained through a natural skill but was dependent on 
a pure heart and converted will. As such, when theology met with contradictory 
philosophical truths, the Augustinians did not see these conflicts as occasions for 
dialectical debate to convince the mind. Rather, they demanded authoritative 
preaching to convert the heart. Not unlike Plato's forceful exclusion of the dramatic 
poets from the Republic, the church's condemnations of Aristotelian philosophy in 
1277 were a tacit admission that the Augustinians did not possess the conceptual 
resources to engage the claims of Aristotelian philosophy. For the Augustinians, 
fruitful arguments were not possible 'unless and until the word of the scriptural 
preacher is heard as authoritative.' 123 Rejecting the authority of scripture was an error 
119 Three Rival Versions, pp. 109-110. 
120 MacIntyre states, 'The intellect and the desires do not naturally move towards that good which is at 
once the foundation for knowledge and that from which lesser goods flow. The will which directs them 
is initially perverse and needs a kind of redirection which will enable it to trust obediently in a teacher 
who will guide the mind towards the discovery both of its own resources and of what lies outside the 
mind, both in nature and in God.' Three Rival Versions, p. 84. 
121 Three Rival Versions, p. 110. 
122 Three Rival Versions, p. 94. MacIntyre, quoting Hugh of St. Victor, De tribus diebus ii. (No further 
bibliographical details are given.) 
123 Three Rival Versions, p. 100. 
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rooted in the corruption of the will. As such, this kind of error required repentance, 
not argumentation. 124 
Nonetheless, the Augustinian tradition valued the benefits of dialectical 
argument. In fact, MacIntyre notes the development of 'three different and originally 
independent strands in the intellectual development of the Augustinian tradition. n25 
The first was Augustine's formulation of quaestiones. By posing questions first to 
scripture, and later to doctrinal assertions, inquiry came to be understood 'as 
consisting in the sequential posing of a series of related quaestiones. '126 Dialectic is 
the second form of testing which reaches its high point in Boethius' De topicis 
differentiis. Unlike demonstration, dialectical inquiry is exploratory. Beginning with 
agreed upon premises one attempts to advance these agreements toward more 
speculative conclusions. The essential characteristic of dialectics is its 'incomplete 
and provisional character,' and a concept of conclusions being 'always open to 
further challenge.' 127 Distinctiones is the third form of argumentative inquiry. Here, 
the Augustinians practiced an analytical mode of reading, not only of secular texts but 
of scripture as well. 
It seems that the Augustinians should have appreciated Aquinas' project as 
they were well aware of the promises and danger in their own mode of inquiry. As 
MacIntyre states, 'When the heterogeneity of the philosophical sources inherited from 
the ancient world and the multiplication of questiones and distinctiones are 
juxtaposed, the large possibilities of radical intellectual dissension even within the 
constraints imposed by an Augustinian framework become clear. '128 The possibilities 
of fragmentation did not stop the Augustinians from recognising the positive function 
of dialectical testing. This is most clearly illustrated in the life of Peter Abelard. 
MacIntyre points to Bernard ofClairvaux's confrontation with Abelard as a paradigm 
example of dialectical inquiry serving theological authority. Abelard's career was, of 
course, dogged by accusations of heresy. It was therefore crucial to discern whether 
these accusations were authentic or due to envy and petty quarrelsomeness. The 
difficulty of working through these accusations was evident in the proceedings of the 
council of Soissons (1121), where Abelard, though not formally condemned, was 
124 Three Rival Versions, p. 111. 
125 Three Rival Versions, p. 88. 
126 Three Rival Versions, p. 88. 
127 Three Rival Versions, p. 89. 
82 
nevertheless required to publicly recite the Athanasian Creed and forced to burn his 
work on the Trinity. 129 
Although Abelard was not found guilty of heresy, MacIntyre takes it as a sign 
of a tradition in good order that Abelard was yet condemned for the error of pride. 130 
Though this kind of condemnation of one's thoughts and writings offends modem 
sensibilities, MacIntyre argues that it recognises the relationship of morality to 
intellectual error and how both may be corrected through this kind of dialectical 
confrontation. Abelard's failure was moral not intellectual. He was guilty of a kind 
of pride that, if left unchecked, would undermine the theological enterprise. Hence 
his vice required repentance. Abelard's condemnation reflected positively on the 
Augustinian tradition because it institutionally embodied the insight that the life of 
inquiry is moral and intellectual. Both intellectual skills and moral commitments 
must be tested. 131 Dialectical testing was necessary because Abelard, as a professor in 
the Christian tradition, needed to be trusted. He was not only entrusted faithfully to 
profess the deposit of the tradition before his hearers. As professor of a tradition 
which values doctrinal development, he was charged to dwell on the frontiers of that 
development. For one as gifted as Abelard, trust and testing could not but conflict. 
Because persons such as Abelard inhabit what MacIntyre calls 'boundary 
situations,' they cannot avoid incurring the suspicion of others. 132 A developing 
tradition in good order requires critical suspicion in order to sustain that trust which I 
have argued is particularly crucial for the cultivation of intellectual apprentices. As 
evident in the life of Abelard, those who question a tradition are never themselves 
immune from being questioned. Such testing is necessary because both development 
and heresy dwell on the boundaries of a tradition. A tradition in good order must 
maintain the tension between trusting and testing accepted authority. In the end, 
Abelard, through these struggles, was able to articulate how Platonism could serve 
128 Three Rival Versions, p. 89. 
129 Frederick Copleston, S.1., Medieval Philosophy, Volume II of A History of Philosophy (New York: 
Doubleday, 1993), pp. 148-150. 
130 Three Rival Versions, p. 91. MacIntyre's positive account of this moral judgement is reflected in the 
observation that within the Augustinian tradition, some people may be judged as morally unfit to read 
certain texts. He writes: 'The concept of having to be a certain sort of person, morally or theologically, 
in order to read a book aright-with the implication that perhaps if one is not that sort of person, then 
the book should be withheld from one-is alien to the assumption of liberal modernity that every 
rational adult should be free to and is able to read every book.' Three Rival Versions, p. 133. 
131 Three Rival Versions, p. 92. 
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Christian theology. 133 Even considering the unfairness of some of the accusations, 
MacIntyre notes that Abelard, in submitting to Bernard's condemnation, 'did as much 
as anyone to clarify the relationship of dialectic to authority.' 134 
Why then did the Augustinian tradition oppose the work of Aquinas with such 
intense theological and institutional resistance? MacIntyre's answer presents us with 
an unwieldy amount of historical and philosophical material. It is, therefore, 
imperative that I limit the discussion to MacIntyre's account of what Aquinas 
achieved and how he achieved it. What Aquinas achieved was to have defined the 
relationship of authorities to authority and thereby defined what I shall call the 
'spheres of competency' .135 As noted, the Aristotelian texts created problems for 
Augustinian theology. At the heart of the problem for the Augustinians was the 
inability to see how Augustinian theology could embrace Aristotelianism while 
maintaining their epistemological commitment to divine revelation. The commitment 
to divine illumination, notes MacIntyre, was the cause of 'imminent, even if 
unrecognized, epistemological crises. '136 This crisis can be unpacked as follows. If 
the medieval university curriculum failed to include the Aristotelian corpus, it would 
have been a tacit admission that Augustinian theology was incapable of situating 
Aristotelian philosophy within its framework. It could not then subordinate this form 
of theology to the goals of theology. To do this would have led to the progressive 
irrelevance of theology in matters of science and philosophy. Alternatively, if 
Aristotle was included in the curriculum, students would have faced two incompatible 
epistemologies which would have produced 'incoherence in the structures of teaching 
and knowledge. '137 
Aquinas's achievement is to have offered a third way between irrelevance and 
incoherence. To begin with, Aquinas recognised that the nature of the conflict was 
over the relationship of the particular to the universal. For Augustine, the formal 
cause of the particulars was God's creating mind. For Aristotle, the human mind was 
competent to know the particulars without appealing to the mind of God. What 
mattered was correct observation and categorisation of the natural relationships 
133 Three Rival Versions, p. 89. 
134 Three Rival Versions, p. 89. 
135 Cf. MacIntyre, 'Natural Law as Subversive', p. 72. 
136 Three Rival Versions, p. 123. 
137 Three Rival Versions, p. 109. 
84 
between the particulars. 138 The fundamental question pertained to what unaided 
human reason could know. Augustinian theology was committed to the thesis that 
apart from revelation, no philosophy or rival theology could adequately vindicate its 
claims or flourish in the long run. 139 It presumed that any system of knowledge which 
conflicted with divine revelation must necessarily suffer from some fatal incoherence. 
However, Aristotelianism was a comprehensive system whose increasing influence 
seemed to defy this assertion. The success of Aristotelianism called the dependence 
of knowledge on the theological framework into question. This created an intellectual 
and institutional crisis for the Augustinian tradition. 
As Aristotelian philosophy gained influence, theology was forced to purchase 
its authority either through isolation from the academic debate140 or through 
institutional force. 141 Two instances illustrate the inadequacy in these responses. First, 
Bonaventure's Eastertide lectures (1273) condemned the emerging Aristotelianism in 
the Paris faculty without offering 'arguments at the level of philosophy, even though 
the positions which he criticized were philosophical positions. ' Where arguments 
were given, they were only' arguments from his own Augustinian theological point of 
view.' 142 Second, Steven Tempier's later condemnations of 1277 reflected the view 
that, 'rational debate with consistent Aristotelians was no longer considered 
possible ... Hence the conflict between established Augustinians and rising 
Aristotelians within the University of Paris could not but have appeared to many ... as 
in principle irresolvable.' This conclusion led to the attempt to resolve conflict by 
means of power. Once the possibility of rational progress breaks down, MacIntyre 
states that 'human relationships are perforce relationships of will and power.' 143 
The willingness to resort to force was an admission that Augustinianism had 
failed by its own standard. Augustinian theology claimed to be an all-encompassing 
system of explanation, but failed to situate Aristotelian philosophy within this system. 
Aquinas rescued theology by showing how Aristotelian philosophy was 
simultaneously the source of the problem and the resource for overcoming this 
problem. This remedy depended on Aquinas developing a way to reconcile the two 
138 Three Rival Versions, p. 124. 
139 Three Rival Versions, p. 10I. 
140 Three Rival Versions, p. 156. 
141 MacIntyre states that Aquinas was defeated by 'the power of the institutionalized curriculum.' 
Three Rival Versions, p. lSI. 
142 Three Rival Versions, p. 112. 
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seemingly incompatible theories of knowledge as natural and revealed while avoiding 
Siger of Brabant's error of positing multiple truths. l44 Aquinas therefore sought to 
construct a synthesis of the two frameworks into a coherent account of the 
relationship between the secular and sacred, the temporal and the eternal, the natural 
and the supernatural that maintained each sphere's particular competency. 145 This 
required that Aquinas articulate a unifying framework whereby the natural world was 
understood to be on a continuum with the supernatural world. 146 Aquinas achieved his 
aim by arguing, says MacIntyre, that 'the sequences of final, formal, efficient, and 
material causality, always refers us back to a unified first cause from which flows all 
that is good and all that is true in what we encounter. ' 
The sequential relationship of causes to final cause means that the integrity of 
causes and cause must be maintained. Though the hierarchy of causes is obvious, the 
higher does not exist without the lower. In this hierarchical scheme, human 
knowledge may 'move initially from what is evident to any plain person's unclouded 
moral apprehension to what is evident only or at least much more clearly to the 
sapientes' .147 This view is, of course, crucial for understanding how we move from 
human to divine knowledge. We ought not miss the important fact that this 
hierarchical understanding gives direction, if not divine sanction, to the faith in the 
moral and intellectual progress of persons by means of education. Moreover, 
Aquinas' hierarchical view necessarily distinguishes between the boundaries of the 
secular and sacred, between the body and soul, and between reality as unfolding in 
time versus reality at the fulfilment of time. 148 Aquinas defines the various spheres of 
reality and relates them in the hierarchical order without allowing the lower to be 
assimilated and absorbed by the higher. While remaining in the Augustinian 
teleological framework, Aquinas saw how the two epistemologies could be 
143 Relativism, Power, And Philosophy, p. 396. 
144 Three Rival Versions, pp. 112-113. 
145 MacIntyre's notion of a synthesis is open to misunderstanding as it suggests that Aquinas stood in a 
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synthesised in a way that preserved the competency of each sphere and its importance 
for human knowing. 
Accepting these spheres of competency committed Christendom to the ongoing 
project of reconciling two legitimate sources of knowledge. Where conflict arose 
between natural knowledge and supernatural revelation, the task of theological and 
philosophical inquiry would be to determine which sphere could rightfully claim 
epistemological privilege. 149 These conflicts could never be adjudicated in advance. 
Hence institutional means had to be provided to sustain protracted dialectical debate. 
The paradoxical problem was that these disagreements, which needed institutional 
support, also threatened these same institutions with the possibility of social and 
philosophical fragmentation. This threat to the institution finally defeated Aquinas at 
least in the short run. 150 Given the institutional threat of Aquinas' project, neither his 
defeat nor the subsequent condemnations of Thomistic philosophy ought be 
surprising. The surprise is that 'Aquinas was nonetheless repeatedly revived and 
invoked after that initial rehabilitation which led to his canonization. '151 The reason 
for this rehabilitation was that condemning Thomistic philosophy did not magically 
resolve the epistemological crisis. It rather set the medieval church on the way to 
increasing irrelevance. To avoid this fate, the church had to accept Aquinas' spheres 
of competency. 
In the essay, 'Natural Law as Subversive: The Case of Aquinas', MacIntyre 
shows how Aquinas was simultaneously subversive of and necessary for the survival 
of Christendom. MacIntyre notes the conflict of Thomistic philosophy with the 
theologically sanctioned social reforms of Louis IX (1214-1270). The conflict was 
over Louis' extensive reforms of common life which philosophically were attacks on 
the moral competency of plain persons. These reforms included the banishment of 
heresy, along with, 'the public sins of blasphemy, fornication, games of chance, and 
drunkenness. '152 Chess was forbidden, the manufacturing of dice became a criminal 
offence and taverns were restricted to travellers. MacIntyre notes: 'The king's project 
... was a remarkably successful attempt, to develop royal control, both legally and 
149 Galileo's conflict with the church, as discussed above, is the paradigm example of this kind of 
debate. 
150 Three Rival Versions, p. 151. 
151 Three Rival Versions, p. 151. 
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administratively, over the whole life of the French people.' 153 Though successful, the 
reforms were judged to be overweening because they ignored the moral competency 
of plain persons, who, according to Aquinas' 'are the source of a ruler's authority to 
make laws,'154 and shifted their moral responsibility to the court's lawyers, 
bureaucratic administrators and professional specialists. 155 The irony is, though Louis 
believed himself to be the pious servant of God's revelation, he turns out to be usurper 
not unlike Frederick II who refused to acknowledge the limits of state power for the 
very different reason that secular rulers were not obligated to give 'the church 
obedience in its own sphere.' 156 
Another, radically different example of the importance of the spheres of 
competency has to do with Aquinas' more positive appreciation of the body over 
against his Augustinian contemporaries. Aquinas' synthesis was offensive to 
Augustinian sensibilities because it questioned the Augustinian understanding of the 
relationship between the soul and the body. Augustinian theology had found it 
difficult to give a positive account of the body, while Aquinas had little difficulty 
reconciling soul with body. MacIntyre states that for Aquinas 
a human being is not a soul plus a body but a body which has a soul. Human 
experience is bodily experience, and the soul knows and knows about singulars only 
on the basis of that experience as mediated by imagination - itself a bodily 
phenomenon - and structured in terms of form by intellect. The human mind is thus 
not self-sufficient, on Aquinas' view; it is rather ... 'radically incomplete' ... 
incomplete without that encounter with the objects of sense from which it moves to 
the actuality of knowledge. 157 
Aquinas did not view the soul as 'only incidentally related to the body' nor was the 
body 'an embarrassment' .158 The body had its own integrity and so played an 
indispensable role in human knowing. The functions of the mind simply could not be 
divorced from the reality of the body. Because body and soul were different though 
related, eternal truths could be known through corporeal experience. 159 By bridging 
the gulf between body and soul, theological truth-claims became capable of 
demonstration. The sciences could substantiate theological truth-claims and, 
correspondingly, theological truth-claims divorced from the sciences were 
153MacIntyre, 'Natural Law as Subversive', p. 69. 
154MacIntyre, 'Natural Law as Subversive', p. 69. 
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epistemologically defective. By recognising how the spheres of competency could be 
integrated into an overall hierarchical system, it was possible to see how 'the 
movement towards a finally perfected science' is analogous to 'the movement of 
creatures from and to God' .160 
The spheres of competency applied to the relationship of body to soul not only 
rescued Augustinian theology from certain epistemological frustration, it also rescued 
the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia from 'permanent dissatisfaction. '161 Aquinas 
cites Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics, first approving of Aristotle's notion of 
appropriate human ends, then arguing that the ends of wealth, honour, pleasure, the 
virtues, and power, were ultimately deficient. Aristotle's account of temporal 
happiness was not false; it simply did not go far enough. It failed to reconcile belief 
in a perfected happiness with the obvious imperfections of this life. Thus MacIntyre 
notes that Aquinas invokes Aristotle against Aristotle in demonstrating why the 
frustration of perfection in the natural world requires a supernatural account of 
ultimate happiness. 162 Conversely, because the scientific study of the natural world 
had its own competency, Aristotle's attentiveness to the natural world could be a 
'prologue' to sacred theology, hence the conclusion that the natural world both 
illumined and needed the illumination of Christian theology. 163 
Admittedly, my discussion of the spheres of competency in medieval politics, 
epistemology and views of the soul and body is incomplete. However the discussion 
shows how Aquinas used Aristotelian philosophy to criticise the misguided notion of 
theological authority in a way that advanced rather than undermined this authority. 
Having discussed what Aquinas achieved, it is crucial to consider how Aquinas' 
inquiry brought about this theological progress. Mark Schwehn suggests that the 
central feature of MacIntyre's Three Rival Versions is Aquinas' critical and 
sympathetic reading of Aristotle. It is a mode of reading that ironically has its origin 
in Augustinian hermeneutics. 164 Consider again MacIntyre's suggestive section on the 
Augustinian craft of reading where he identifies three features of Augustinian 
hermeneutics. First, the reader of scripture recognises a singular unity of the Bible 
that runs through the accounts of creation, fall, exodus, law, redemption, and the 
160 Three Rival Versions, p. 124 (my emphasis). 
161 Three Rival Versions, p. 138. 
162 Three Rival Versions, p. 137. 
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eschaton. These past and future events are not isolated episodes: they are a 
continuous narrative which casts an interpretative arc over the whole of human 
history. The second mode is when the reader of scripture understands himself to be 
an active participant in the biblical narrative. Augustine's Confessions are the 
paradigmatic example of rendering a life intelligible by placing it within the 
framework of scripture. 165 As Augustine recounts fragmented episodes of immorality 
or his study of Manichean philosophy, he sees them as constituting an uneven though 
coherent prologue which inexorably lead to his conversion. 
The third mode, which is most important for present purposes, is the reading 
of secular texts within the framework of scripture. Peter Brown documents 
Augustine's practice of detaching secular texts from their contexts in order to make 
'them available for Christian purposes, either in ways more generally of benefit to 
mankind or with special reference to specifically Christian ends. ,166 The second book 
of Augustine's On Christian Doctrine contains a chapter entitled, 'Whatever Has 
Been Rightly Said By The Heathen, We Must Appropriate To Our Uses.' Augustine's 
practice of reading was capable of discovering and condemning errors without failing 
to discern those truths that deserved to be praised, borrowed and imitated. Augustine 
admitted a natural capacity for created intellects to rightly discover and articulate 
truths that were not revealed in scripture. 167 Augustine saw these nontheological 
sources as real wealth to be plundered for the theological task. 168 Likewise, Aquinas 
instructed theologians to take from the pagan, Jewish or Islamic authors, as the 'unjust 
possessors' of all that is true and useful for Christian theology. If, as I suggested 
above, Aquinas' 'synthesis' was really the exercise of an Augustinian practice of 
reading, what explains the intensity of the condemnations? To answer this, I must 
return to the discussion of the nature of the disagreement between Aristotelianism and 
Augustinian theology. 
Although Augustine read the pagan philosophers with a certain non-polemical 
interest, he also taught that 'all understanding requires illumination' (De Civitate Dei 
164 Mark R. Schwehn, 'Alasdair MacIntyre's University', p. 53. 
165 Three Rival Versions, p. 83. 
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University of California Press, 1969), pp. 259-269. 
167 Three Rival Versions, p. 125. 
168 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill 
Educational Publishing, 1958), Bk. 2, Ch. 40, p. 75. 
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x, 2).169 The intellect in the state of nature was distorted by the fall, and in need of the 
kind of illumination offered only by grace, redemption and revelation. However, the 
success of Aristotelian inquiry seemed to contradict this assertion and so exposed 'an 
apparent contradiction at the heart of the Augustinian account of knowledge. '170 As 
Aristotelian philosophy disclosed this epistemological weakness, the Augustinians 
could not help but to be suspicious of Thomas' careful reading of the Aristotelian 
corpus. As the 1277 condemnations suggest, Aquinas read with such care that he was 
thought to have betrayed Christian theology for paganism or Islam. 
The suspicion bears positive witness to the success of Aquinas' ability to read 
in a way that made other disparate voices authentic dialectical partners. MacIntyre 
observes that Aquinas' aim was to read in such a way as to draw from others the 
'strongest arguments for and against each particular answer.' 171 The suspicion that 
Aquinas had rendered the Christian dogmatic tradition vulnerable to counter-
arguments was not off the mark. Aquinas' critics could not see the relationship 
between progress and becoming 'maximally vulnerable to refutation. '172 Dialectical 
vulnerability seemed rather to be the path of destruction. Perhaps one of Aquinas' 
greatest achievements was in showing that the path to rational vindication must first 
accept the risk of suffering rational defeat. 173 
3.4. Conclusion 
Let us reconsider Kelvin Knight's claim that '[t]he full significance of MacIntyre's 
demolition job in After Virtue is only comprehensible in the light of his construction, 
in subsequent essays, of the premises of an alternative. n74 In this chapter I have 
discussed the two pivotal features of MacIntyre's constructive account of rationality, 
namely the teleological framework and the rationality of tradition. Furthermore I 
have addressed MacIntyre's claim that a rightly ordered teleological framework and a 
tradition are capable of overcoming the problem of moral inarticulacy because we are 
now able to speak rationally of moral progress toward some single end. 175 This end or 
169 Three Rival Versions, p. 100. 
170 Three Rival Versions, pp. 100-101. 
171 Three Rival Versions, p. 124. 
172 MacIntyre, 'Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble?' p. 78. 
173 MacIntyre, 'Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble?' p. 78. 
174 Kelvin Knight, in the introduction to, ed. Kelvin Knight, The MacIntyre Reader (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p. 1. 
175 After Virtue, p. 144. 
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telos makes it possible to rationally distinguish between better and worse ways of 
living and the difference between virtues and vices. This discussion of ends and 
rational choice leads us to niggling questions about the specifics of MacIntyre's 
account. Certainly MacIntyre's suggestively rich historical accounts and 
philosophical commentary layout a compelling case for narrative and tradition as 
essential features of rationality. In spite of the density of his historical and 
philosophical narrative, we are never told how one rationally choose between the 
various competing and incompatible stories and histories which he discusses. There 
is a disquieting incompleteness in MacIntyre's work. 
The theologian Oliver O'Donovan argues that what is still missing from 
MacIntyre's writings is an account of the 'unified go 0 d-for-man, . Without this 
single telos, we cannot rationally judge between the competing goods presented in 
competing stories. In the end MacIntyre leaves us, says O'Donovan, with a form of 
'cultural relativism which cannot choose between alternative traditions ... MacIntyre 
cannot break with the modernity which he repudiates. ,176 MacIntyre's account of 
rational choice based in narratives and traditions now looks suspiciously like 
Kierkegaard's radical choice; a notion of choice that MacIntyre roundly criticises. In 
the essay 'Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification', MacIntyre addresses the charge 
that he does not get beyond cultural relativism by considering the problem of 
perspectivism. He defines the perspectivist position as follows: 'if there is a 
multiplicity of rival traditions, each with its own characteristic modes of rational 
justification internal to it, then that very fact entails that no one tradition can offer 
those outside it good reasons for excluding the theses of its rivals. '177 Moral norms 
may be rationally defended only 'within and from the standpoint of some system.' 178 
The question is how one rationally chooses between competing and mutually 
excluding traditions. 179 This question pushes MacIntyre to articulate a 
'nonperspectival' account oftruth!80 MacIntyre recognises the seriousness of the 
question as he admits that 'everything turns on whether or not the claims of one 
176 Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 
1986), p. 222. 
177 Whose Justice?, p. 352. 
178 MacIntyre, 'Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble?' p.72. 
179 Whose Justice?, p. 144. 
180 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'How Can We Learn What Veri/atis Splendor Has To Teach?', The Thomist 58 
(1994), p. 188. 
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large-scale, theoretical standpoint can or cannot be vindicated against its rivals.' 181 To 
see how this may be done MacIntyre considers the radical discrepancies between 
Confucian, Thomistic and utilitarian justifications of divorce. 182 While the Confucian 
account of divorce admits such reasons as barrenness, jealousy, illness and gossip, 
these grounds would be unacceptable to a Thomist or a utilitarian. How then does a 
historically situated being decide which of these points of view is the 'best'? It would 
appear that MacIntyre has posed a question he cannot answer because of his assertion 
that 'there are indeed no standards or criteria of rational evaluation in any area ... that 
are theory-independent and inquiry-independent, neutral between rival theoretical 
standpoints, whether philosophical, natural scientific, moral, or whatever, and 
available therefore to intelligent persons of any point of view.' 183 
While MacIntyre's critics charge MacIntyre with cultural relativism, he 
effectively argues that relativism is not possible because it is a self-refuting 
philosophical position. The argument is straight-forward: once one embraces a 
perspective one ceases to be a perspectivist. Said another way, MacIntyre argues that 
there are no real inhabitants of a culture who would say that their norms and 
conceptions of the human good have merely local significance and local authority. 
Anthropologists, historians and philosophers may at times be relativists, but those 
about whom they write never are. 184 Relativism, if it is possible all, is possible only 
for those who observe others living and not for those whose are engaged in matters of 
practical rationality. Relativism can be thought and theorised about; it cannot be lived 
because the brute facts of our bodily existence refute relativism. 185 That is, any time 
we think, speak or act, we are advancing or accepting concrete claims about reality. 
And because we are social beings, we express our conclusions and commitments in 
political ways. MacIntyre observes that 'every political and social order embodies ... 
and gives expression to some particular conception of the human good.' 186 Moreover, 
because perspectives are political, they are bound to clash with other perspectives, at 
181 MacIntyre, 'Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble?' p.73. 
182 Aladair MacIntyre, 'Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification', in ed. Luke Gormally, Moral Truth 
Moral Tradition: Essays in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe (Dublin: Four Courts 
Press, 1994), pp. 2-3. 
183 MacIntyre, 'Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble?' p. 78. 
184 MacIntyre, 'Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good', in ed. Kelvin Knight, The MacIntyre 
Reader (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), p. 246. 
185 MacIntyre, 'Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification', p. 12. 
186 MacIntyre, 'Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good' , p. 247. 
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which point, those within each perspective understand themselves to be advancing 
particular truth--claims which are superior to those of their rivals: 
[I]f the claims made from the rival and contending points of view are not claims to 
truth, the adherents of the different standpoints in contention will not be able to 
understand the central claims of their own particular standpoint as logically 
incompatible with the claims of those rivals.,)87 
Actions are always expressions ofbeliefs. 188 The embodied beliefs of 
perspectivists refute perspectivism because their truth--claims do not 'remain locally 
limited and constrained.' 189 Moral commitments always find political expression. 190 
When, in the social and political world, perspectivists meet rival truth--claims, they 
must either give into the demands of their rivals or cease to claim that all perspectives 
are equal. Clearly, to act in one way rather than another is to say that there are 
'better' and 'worse' ways to act. Although MacIntyre argues that cultural relativism 
is a philosophically self-defeating position, he does not finally provide an adequate 
account of how one rationally choose between competing traditions. This means that 
MacIntyre's constructive moral philosophy suffers from a critical incompleteness that 
threatens his whole project. Insofar as Macintyre has yet to make clear the criteria by 
which one might rationally choose between rival traditions or communities of virtue, 
we are left to guess where his moral philosophy is most faithfully embodied. 
In the view of the theologian John Milbank, the incompleteness in MacIntyre's 
work reflects 'an air of non --commitment [which] hovers over MacIntyre's work. n91 
Taking this criticism from the realm of philosophy to practical rationality, Edward 
Oakes notices this non--commitment in MacIntyre's refusal to addresses such divisive 
and important disputes as capital punishment, abortion, or just war. Oakes suggest 
that MacIntyre's work still suffers from the kind of practical impoverishment for 
which he faults the Enlightenment. 192 Maurice Cowling, in an essay putatively aimed 
187 MacIntyre, 'Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification', p. 13. 
188 After Virtue, p. 61. 
189 MacIntyre, 'Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification', p. 21. . ..' 
190 MacIntyre writes, 'Aristotle's insistence that the virtues fmd therr place not Just m the hfe of the 
individual, but in the life of the city and that the individual is indeed intelligible only as a politikon 
zoon. ' After Virtue, p. 150. 
191 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 
329. 
192 Oakes 'The Achievement of Alasdair MacIntyre', p. 24. A similar criticism is levelled by L. 
Gregory jones in Transformed Judgment, pp. 59-61. See also L. Gregory Jones, 'Alasdair MacIntyre 
n Narrative, Community, and the Moral Life', Modern Theology, 4,1987, No 1, pp. 52-69. Jones 
~rgues that, for all ofMa~In~e's emphasis.on particularity and historicity, he remains 'obscure' 
because he fails to commIt hImself to a partlcular moral content. 
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at explaining MacIntyre's project, still finds it necessary to express the acerbic 
jUdgement that MacIntyre 'is scarcely less successful now than he was in the 1950s 
and 1960s in integrating virtue and practice ... The challenge to integrate virtue and 
practice is both ambitious and laughable. n93 These criticisms of MacIntyre's practical 
rationality are particularly troubling in view of MacIntyre's judgement that it is 
a decisive refutation of a moral philosophy to show that moral agency on its own 
account of the matter could never be socially embodied; and it also follows that we 
have not yet fully understood the claims of any moral philosophy until we have 
spelled out what its social embodiment would be.194 
According to the philosopher Jeffery Stout, as MacIntyre only fills 'the role of 
Jeremiah to contemporary society' , contrary to the Knight, MacIntyre offers no 
positive alternative to his predictions of destruction. 195 Insofar as this criticism is 
accurate, we must conclude that MacIntyre's attempt to 'advance and defend one 
conception of practical rationality rather than another,' is incomplete, and threatened 
by falsification. 196 Therefore, in the following chapter, I shall discuss further the 
nature and implications of this impasse in MacIntyre's thought. 
193 Maurice Cowling, 'Alasdair MacIntyre, Religion and the University', The New Criterion 13 (Feb., 
1994), p. 32-4l. 
194 Whose Justice?, p. 23. 
195 Stout, Ethics After Babel, p. xii. 
196 Whose Justice?, p. ix. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRAGEDY, RATIONALITY AND THEOLOGY 
According to MacIntyre, an adequately rational morality allows one to say, 
'what makes it rational to act in one way rather than another and what makes it 
rational to advance and defend one conception of practical rationality rather than 
another. '1 Rational moral reflection takes place with a teleological framework and 
beginning with the foundation of a particular historical tradition. To be rational is to 
be morally accountable, which means, in essence, to be able to justify one's actions as 
the means of progressing toward the te/os of one's life. According to MacIntyre's 
critics, the fundamental flaw in MacIntyre's account of rationality is his inability to 
specify just the teleological good or goods as understood within a specific tradition 
the rational human being ought aim toward. MacIntyre does not clarify how one 
would rationally choose between competing teleological systems. This criticism is 
particularly damaging to MacIntyre's constructive philosophy in view of his assertion 
that 'everything turns on whether or not the claims of one large-scale, theoretical 
standpoint can or cannot be vindicated against its rivals'.2 Ifit is not possible to 
rationally choose between rival moral systems, then MacIntyre offers no alternative to 
the moral disorder he has so effectively diagnosed. 
MacIntyre's constructive account of rationality is a pivotal concern for this thesis, 
and so, it is necessary to attend to the inadequacies of this account. I shall do this by 
discussing the problems that the tragic dilemma poses to MacIntyre's understanding 
of moral rationality. The tragic dilemma confronts the agent with a choice between 
two incommensurate and incompatible goods while depriving the agent of a singe 
rational standard by which he is able to distinguish between better and the worse 
alternative. The tragic situation confronts the agent with too many irreconcilable 
I J'?' Whose ustlce., p. IX. 
2 MacIntyre, 'Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble?' p. 73. 
rationalities and so forces the agent to make a non-rational choice between these 
competing rationalities. As this choice between incompatible rationalities is closely 
related to the choice between incompatible traditions, how MacIntyre treats the 
former problem indicates much about how he treats the latter problem. I argue that 
MacIntyre's solution to the tragic dilemma takes him along a path that leads to 
theism. 
This conclusion puts me in the position to consider the two-fold relationship of 
theology to MacIntyre's writings. After first discussing the path that MacIntyre takes 
to accepting the theological foundation of his account of rationality, I then turn to 
theological ethics and discuss how MacIntyre's work functions within a Christian 
ethical system. To develop this latter point, I consider the writings of Stanley 
Hauerwas, who, perhaps more than any other writer in Christian ethics, has applied 
MacIntyre's philosophy to Christian ethics.3 To get to this point I must now take up 
the challenge of tragedy to MacIntyre's notion of rationality. 
1. From Tragedy to Theology 
What is at stake if moral disagreements defy rational resolution? According to 
MacIntyre this means that our moral disagreements 'can only be resolved by means of 
nonrational persuasion.,4 MacIntyre's emotivist characters embody, in general terms, 
three common forms of nonrational persuasion. These are the short-term cost and 
benefit calculation of the rich aesthete, the subtle manipulation of the therapist and 
the coercion of the state and corporate bureaucrat. The promise of a rational morality 
is that differences may be resolved by a kind of conversation that delays or even 
displaces the need for nonrational means of persuasion. The tragic dilemma calls this 
promise into question by facing a moral agent with the necessity to make a choice for 
which there is no rational criterion to discern the better choice. As there is no single 
scheme of rational justification, the agent must simply choose between these rival 
gods or rival goods. If MacIntyre admits that this is the nature of the tragic choice, he 
is forced into a philosophical position very much like the liberalism he rejects. 
3 Hauerwas' work merits much greater attention than I give it in this chapter. However this 'short 
shrift' is warranted because Hauerwas serves a transitional role. That is, in applying MacIntyre's work 
to a general Christian ethic, Hauerwas serves as a prolegomenon for applying MacIntyre's work in a 
distinctively Lutheran context. 
4 Whose Justice?, p. 86. 
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The importance of this challenge to MacIntyre's notion of rationality is evident in 
his critical distinction between the goods of excellence and the goods of effectiveness 
- a distinction he develops in his discussion of the Greek agon or athletic contest. 
MacIntyre states that the agon 
is a formal rule-governed contest, and the rules are designed to allow each 
contestant a fair opportunity to exhibit his excellence in activity of some particular 
kind. Under the conditions of a fair rule-governed contest the contender who excels 
will also be the contender who wins and receives the prizes.s 
When the agon is in good order there is no gap between playing by the rules and 
winning. Effectiveness in winning is the direct result of excellence in skill and 
compliance with the patterns of the game. The problem is that games are never so 
rationally ordered. The relationship between excellence and effectiveness becomes 
complicated by indeterminacy, so that one may achieve excellence while losing to the 
lucky or to cheats. 
For this reason we must be able to judge the context as good no matter what its 
outcome. How the contest is played is more important than how it turns out. One 
may be effective and win, while denying or diminishing the goods internal to the 
game. Those who claim that there is no arguing with success may only maintain this 
view by blurring the distinction between effectiveness and excellence. The distinction 
between effectiveness and excellence means that moral deliberation takes into account 
means and results. For MacIntyre, the Greek rhetoricians exemplify the collapse of 
this distinction, as in the interest of rhetorical effectiveness, they disregarded the 
excellence of rationality and truthfulness. 6 
By the devices of rhetoric ... individuals bring it about that one kind of action rather 
than another is performed. Since such rhetoric must ... exclude from its scope any 
rational evaluation of ends or of rival conceptions of justice, it follows that the 
fundamental connection which a skilled rhetorician has to establish between himself 
and his audience has to be nonrational. He cannot offer his audience any rationally 
defensible account of the ends which, on his view, he and they ought, if they are 
rational, to pursue.7 
The antecedent of action is not rational deliberation but the elicitation of sympathetic 
feelings. In the absence of arguments, the rhetorician calls forth appealing or 
appalling images. Effective rhetoric depends not on the rational appeal but rather on 
the intensity of dread or desire. 
S Whose Justice?, p. 27. 
6 Whose Justice?, pp. 5 Off. 
7 Whose Justice?, p. 67. 
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The distinction between effectiveness and excellence explains Plato's rejection of 
sophists, rhetoricians, and the dramatic poets from his ideal polis. Advocates of 
effectiveness claim 'the goods of effectiveness are bound to prevail over those of 
excellence and the goods of excellence will be prized only insofar as those who prize 
the goods of effectiveness permit them to be. '8 Principles are only valued so long as 
they do not infringe on pragmatic goals. Sophists and tyrants join utilitarians, 
positivists, and pragmatists in their belief that normative moral standards are nothing 
but shrewdly disguised preferences. 
Conversely, Plato offers a defence of human excellence that explains why it is 
both rational and beneficial (in the long run) to always subordinate the goods of 
effectiveness to those of excellence.9 Unless the city can be governed by a moral 
standard that is above the wants of citizens, it will be held hostage to the anarchic 
desires of the populace or the will of the powerful. 10 To subject the standard of 
excellence to desire threatens the ultimately threatens the peace of the city with 
unresolved conflict that may tum into civil war. II Plato's suspicion of conflict is 
evident in the cautious way that he introduces dialectical argument into the 
educational curriculum. This caution is necessary to protect the young from exposure 
to effective arguments that 'refute many men and are refuted by many', that 
manipulate the young into 'profound disbelief of what they formerly believed.' When 
cynicism is the end result of an educational practice that makes truth out to be nothing 
more than opinions supported by effective rhetoric, the activity of philosophy 
becomes the obj ect 'of slander among the rest of men. '12 
According to MacIntyre, Thucydides' notion of justice exemplifies this kind of 
cynical appeal to effectiveness. Political order for Thucydides does not reflect the 
rational pattern of the cosmos but rather expresses the will of the powerful: \3 
[T]here is and can be only that justice which the strong find it in their own interest 
to uphold ... When those with the power to do so think it is in their interest to 
overthrow the existing form of government within their own polis, they take to civil 
war. When members of the same political faction have the power and the desire to 
outbid rival leaders, they take to factional strife. It is unsurprising that Hobbes 
8 Whose Justice?, pp. 74-75. 
9 Whose Justice?, p. 69. 
10 j,'? 74 Whose ustlce., p. . 
II Whose Justice?, p. 253. 
12 Plato, The Republic (539c). Quoted in Gilbert Meilaender, The Theory and Practice of Virtue (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 56-57. (Hereafter: Theory and Practice of 
Virtue.) 
13 Whose Justice?, p. 13. 
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should have concluded from his reading of Thucydides that either justice has to be 
imposed by power or there will be no justice. 14 
When accepted standards of excellence are diminished, the manipulative and coercive 
measures of power fill the political void. 15 Everything turns on whether or not a 
standard of excellence is able to gainsay the appeal of the goods of effectiveness. 
Tragedy is a critical concern for Plato because it calls into question the goods of 
excellence and threatens to place the polis under the standard of effectiveness. 
The tragic choice between two incompatible goods presents a challenge to the 
belief in a rational order of excellence. Put bluntly, to be 'damned if you do and 
damned if you don't' undermines the notion of a well-ordered moral cosmos, leaving 
excellence without a moral foundation. This leaves us with the conflicted world 
depicted in the Sophoclean tragedies. The Oresteia pits tribal values against urban 
values, while allegiance to the family in Antigone is opposed by allegiance to the 
state. The Baeehae pits the Appollonian reason against Dionysian passion, and the 
Phi/oetetes, the good of success against the good of moral virtue. 16 If an agent is 
rational by one standard and irrational by another, what mattersfinally is not the 
rationality that guides one's choices but that one choose one or the other version of 
rationality. 
Fergus Kerr, in 'Moral Theology after MacIntyre: Ethics, Tragedy and 
Thomism,' considers why tragedy so profoundly challenges MacIntyre's argument for 
rationality, observing: 
By introducing moral dilemmas in the sense of rationally irresolvable conflicts of 
goods and goals, MacIntyre rejects the ancient thesis of the unity of the virtues and 
thereby subverts the Thomistic Aristotelianism which he envisages as the only way 
out of the liberal-individualist ethics ofmodemity.17 
Kerr begins by recalling MacIntyre's view of tragedy in After Virtue where he argues 
that it is possible for human agents to be truly confronted by 'rival and contingently 
incompatible goods that make incompatible claims' .18 Because both claims are good 
and incompatible, MacIntyre's position in After Virtue rejects the view of a 
harmonious cosmos where every good fits into a hierarchical order and every evil is 
14 1..? 65 Whose Justice. , p. . 
15 1..? 84 Whose Justice. , p. . 
16 Whose Justice?, p. 99. 
17 Kerr, 'Moral Theology after MacIntyre', p. 35-36. 
18 After Virtue, p. 223. 
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due to human error or evil. MacIntyre explains his rejection of the unity of the virtues 
sayIng: 
It has often been suggested ... that either we can admit the existence of rival and 
contingently incompatible goods which make incompatible claims to our practical 
allegiance or we can believe in some determinate conception of the good life for 
man, but that these are mutually exclusive alternatives. No one can consistently 
hold both these views. What this contention is blind to is that there may be better or 
worse ways for individuals to live through the tragic confrontation of good with 
good. And that to know what the good life for man is may require knowing what 
are the better and what are the worse ways of living in and through such situations. 19 
MacIntyre's attempt to diminish the moral importance of the tragic dilemma fails. 
As Kerr rightly points out, MacIntyre's admission of incompatible goods forces him 
to accept a position that is similar to the pluralism which he rejects. Kerr cites Isaiah 
Berlin who argues that where we meet a variety of human goods, and recognise the 
truth that these goods cannot be reconciled in a single moral order, we must either 
accept pluralism or force the reconciliation by imposing a 'totalitarian straitj acket' .20 
MacIntyre's account of rationality is seriously challenged by the problem of tragedy. 
If tragedy is a real rather than perceived conflict, MacIntyre is forced to concede that 
the universe is at bottom morally pluralistic. The alternative view, which MacIntyre 
thought did not treat moral dilemmas seriously, is to say that tragedy is an apparent 
and always resolvable conflict. In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre 
acknowledges that accepting the unity of the good forced him to change his mind 
about the nature of tragedy. Moving toward a position of moral realism, MacIntyre 
begins to argue that unless the universe is ordered to a single rational standard, 
morality ceases to be rational. As there cannot contradictory truths, there can be no 
absolute conflict between incompatible goods.21 
MacIntyre's resists the unity of the virtues because it leads him to a theistic 
position which would merely exchange the irrationality of pluralism for the 
irrationality of religious dogmatism.22 MacIntyre continued to resist theism by 
claiming that tragedy arises 'from the inadequacies of reason, not from the character 
of moral reality.'23 That is to say, with adequate human reason (rather than divine 
illumination) moral conflicts could be resolved.24 In spite of these protests against 
19 After Virtue, p. 223-224. 
20 Kerr, 'Moral Theology after MacIntyre', pp. 37-38. 
21 Whose Justice?, p. 142. 
22 Cf. Kerr, 'Moral Theology after MacIntyre', pp. 40--41. (After Virtue, pp. 142-143). 
23 Whose Justice?, p. 142. 
24 Kerr, 'Moral Theology after MacIntyre', p. 43. 
101 
theism, Kerr recognises that MacIntyre's notion of rationality is closely related to 
theology: 
Aristotle turns out to be not so blind after all. The moral philosopher now sees more 
deeply than the playwright. Without taking us through whatever arguments have led to 
this change of mind, MacIntyre now clearly believes that further reflection in moral 
philosophy will show that the Sophoclean moral dilemmas (conflicts of good with good) 
depend on some mistaken judgment or flaw in the protagonist's character, just as 
Aristotle said. It looks ... as if MacIntyre's deepening commitment to Christian theology 
brought him to see ... that no theological account of human life can tolerate the possibility 
of moral conflicts that owe nothing to the human agent's sinfulness.25 
In reflecting further on the relationship between rationality and tragedy, we come to 
see how MacIntyre's thinking follows along the path to theism. 
1.1. Tragedy as an Epistemological Crisis 
I shall argue that by introducing tragedy into the discussion of rationality, 
MacIntyre poses a philosophical problem that finally requires a theological solution. 
To arrive at this conclusion, I must introduce the related problem of, what MacIntyre 
calls, the 'epistemological crisis'. In the essay, 'Epistemological Crises, Dramatic 
Narrative and the Philosophy of Science,' MacIntyre introduces the epistemological 
crisis with the following examples.26 A man is made redundant at a time when he 
believes himself to be highly valued by his employers and colleagues. A woman falls 
out of love and wonders how she could have previously been so mistaken about the 
one-time object of her affections. In both examples, the rupture between what seems 
to be and what is shows how evidence, once thought to have pointed unambiguously 
in one direction, turns out to be 'susceptible to rival interpretations. '27 Those caught 
in an epistemological crisis are deprived of the information they need to make rational 
practical decisions. The sure sign of an epistemological crisis is the inability to 
answer the question, 'What is going on here?,28 
In a brief but suggestive commentary on Hamlet, Macintyre explains why this 
question is at the heart of epistemological crisis. MacIntyre first asserts that as 
Hamlet was unable to distinguish between what 'seems' to be and what 'is', he could 
not discern who he could and could not trust. Trust is the first casualty of Hamlet's 
25 Kerr, 'Moral Theology after MacIntyre', pp. 41-42. 
26 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', pp. 453-472. 
27 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', p. 453. 
28 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', p. 454. 
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epistemological crisis.29 Thomas Fitzgerald explains this relationship between 
epistemological doubt and the failure of trust when he claims that '[a]serious shift has 
occurred in knowing and believing in the ways we see, take in, think about, and affinn 
the world.' The more we are unsure about the nature of the world and the conditions 
under which we live, the more we must live with the chronic fear of being deceived. 
In being unable to know whom to trust, we must live with the suspicion that all 
appearances and promises really 'conceal a drive for control beneath their seeming 
beneficence. '30 
Hamlet's epistemological crisis results from his being confronted by a variety of 
interpretations and being unable to know story or storyteller is to be believed. 
Hamlet arrives back from Wittenberg with too many schemata available for interpreting 
the events at Elsinore of which already he is a part. There is the revenge schema of the 
Norse sagas; there is the renaissance courtier's schema; there is a Machiavellian schema 
about competition for power. But he not only has the problem of which schema to apply; 
he also has the other ordinary agents' problem: whom now to believe? His mother? 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstem? His father's ghost? Until he has adopted some schema he 
does not know what to treat as evidence; until he knows what to treat as evidence he 
cannot tell which schema to adopt. Trapped in this epistemological circularity the general 
form of his problem is: 'what is going on hereT 31 
Hamlet's crisis is analogous to the questions of interpretation that confront those who 
produce and perform the play. Central to both the character of Hamlet and the 
performance of the play is the need to answer such questions as 'What is going on in 
Hamlet?', or 'How ought the narrative of these events to be constructed?,32 The play 
not only poses the question, but it offers an account of the unsavoury prospects when 
an epistemological crisis goes unresolved. 
Unable to know what is going on, Hamlet's life is pitched between paralysis 
and violence. The paralysis finds expression in Hamlet's tortured contemplation of 
suicide where he observes how 'enterprises of great pith and moment', when subject 
to fruitless deliberation, 'lose the name of action. '33 The violence is variously 
embodied in Hamlet's cruel treatment of Ophelia, the calculation ofRosencrantz and 
Guildenstem's deaths, the killing of Ophelia's father, and Hamlet's violent end. 
Finally, the failure to resolve the crisis means that the play's end is not the fulfilment 
of the telos but merely the cessation of action. The question is whether such a crisis 
29 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', pp. 453 & 458. . 
30 Thomas Fitzgerald, 'The Future of Belief, First Things 63 (May, 1996), p. 24 (my emphaSIS). 
31 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', p. 454. 
32 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', p. 455. 
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had an alternative, rational resolution. MacIntyre argues that resolution would depend 
on the construction of a new narrative that enables the agent 'to understand both how 
he or she could intelligibly have held his or her original beliefs and how he or she 
could have been so drastically misled by them. '34 Hamlet's solution lies in his ability 
to narrate the episodic events of his father's murder and his mother's hasty remarriage 
into a coherent account. 35 Even then, it is not certain that resolving the 
epistemological crisis would have preserved Hamlet from insanity. 
An adequate solution to an epistemological crisis must come by means of 
dialectical deliberation and not by obedience to revealed truth. Revealed truth is not 
rational truth because it 'always ends rather than resolves the conflict. '36 Truly 
adequate resolutions 'must themselves in tum come to be put in question at any 
time ... intelligibility and rationality may always themselves be put in question.' As 
revelation is either believed or disbelieved, it is not open to further dialectical testing. 
Revelation is thus synonymous with the kind of irrational dogmatism that claims 'that 
now we possess the truth or now we are fully rational. '37 We cannot understand this 
resistance to revelation without considering MacIntyre's erstwhile rejection of 
Christianity. He claims that this rejection was not due to the success of sceptical 
objections to Christian truth--claims. Rather, both Christianity's dogmatism and 
modem scepticism presented themselves as rationally invulnerable to dialectical 
testing. They were forms of special knowledge which allowed them to claim a kind 
of immunity from testing. MacIntyre argues that Christianity's attempt to maintain a 
'logical invulnerability' to scepticism finally renders its truth--claims empty.38 
Unfalsifiable truth--claims need not be defeated so much as they must be ignored.39 
33 Hamlet, Act II, Scene i. 
34 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', p. 455. In later writings, MacIntyre 
replaces the language of construction with that of discovery, stating: 'This contempo~ary universe of 
discourse thus has no place within it for any conception of fmal ends, of ends to be dIscovered rather 
than decided upon or invented, and that is to say that it has no place for the type of telos or fInis which 
provides the activity of a particular kind of being with a goal to which it must order its purposes or fail 
to achieve its own specific perfection in its activity.' First Principles, Final Ends, pp. 6-7 (my 
emphasis). 
35 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', p. 461. 
36 After Virtue, p. 143. 
37 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', p. 455. 
38 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Is Understanding Religion Compatible With Believing?' in eds. Ann Loades 
and Loyal D. Rue, Contemporary Classics in Philosophy of Religion (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1991), 
p.572. . ~9 Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur, The ReligiOUS Significance of Atheism (New York: ColumbIa 
University Press, 1969), p. 11. 
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Interestingly, MacIntyre's attempt to use this argument in an exchange with the 
Christian ethicist Paul Ramsey simply failed. MacIntyre argued that 'belief in the 
unconditional requirements of morality was originally rooted in a religious view of 
the world' evident in 'Sophocles as a religious writer, just as much as the author of 
Deuteronomy.' Sounding very modem, MacIntyre chided Ramsey for his implausible 
view that the 'ultimate warrant' of morality should be founded on 'what the Lord of 
heaven and earth is believed to have been doing and to be doing. '40 MacIntyre does 
admit that the ability to say what is going on requires some kind of teleological 
framework though, in his mind, an adequate teleology did not depend on God's 
existence. This denial presented MacIntyre with a difficulty. In rejecting Ramsey's 
view that what is going on has everything to do with what God is doing and in 
rejecting a utilitarian conception of teleology, it remained an open question of what 
telos MacIntyre would say is an adequate telos. 
MacIntyre alludes to this problem when he notes that at the time when Christianity 
'came to look like arbitrariness'41 he became increasingly aware of a problem in his 
own philosophy.42 While asserting that religion could not be the foundation for a 
rational ethic, he could not see how he would 'provide the kind of warrant that ethics 
needs. '43 The practical result of this impasse was that MacIntyre found it 'relatively 
easy' to say what he was against, but could not say 'what, if anything, [he] was for. '44 
As MacIntyre admits to being unable to say what telos a rational human being would 
choose, his developing notion of a teleological rationality is threatened and the 
epistemological crisis remains insoluble. The following section considers MacIntyre's 
return to the problem of the tragic dilemma in his consideration of Sophocles' 
Phi/oetetes where, in his failure to resolve the epistemological crisis, his 
understanding of rationality is nudged closer to theism. 
1.2. Revelation as a Rational Resolution 
The Phi/oetetes begins with the Athenian archer, Philoctetes, having been abandoned 
by his fellow Greeks on the barren island of Lemnos. Going on to Troy, the Athenians 
40 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'A Rejoinder to a Rejoinder', in eds. H. Tristram Engelhardt and Daniel 
Callahan, Knowledge, Value and Belie/(Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: The Hastings Center, 1977), p. 75. 
41 MacIntyre, 'Nietzsche or Aristotle', p. 141. 
42 MacIntyre, 'Nietzsche or Aristotle', p. 140. 
43 MacIntyre, 'A Rejoinder to a Rejoinder', p. 77. 
44 MacIntyre, Marxism and Christianity, p. xxiii. 
105 
continue to be frustrated in their military campaign until the seer, Helenus, declares that 
success depends upon the procurement ofPhiloctetes' magical bow and arrows. The 
duty to secure this magical bow falls to the young Neoptolemus. At this point, 
Neoptolemus is not given a simple duty; he is confronted by two incompatible though 
necessary demands. The bow must be obtained for the good of victory. However, there 
seems no alternative but to seize the bow through stealth and deceit. To be effective, 
Neoptolemus must forsake excellence.45 Victory is incompatible with honour. 
The dilemma is temporarily resolved when Odysseus convinces Neoptolemus to act 
in accord with the good of effectiveness (victory) over the good of excellence 
(honouring Philoctetes' rightful possession of the bow). Odysseus' speech appeals to the 
competitive virtues that aim at excelling and winning.46 Along with this, Neoptolemus is 
reminded of his duty to honour and obey his superiors and of the practical threat of the 
charge of sedition. Finally, Odysseus appeals to the authority of the gods - Hermes, the 
god of ruses, Nike, the god of victory, and Athena the guardian of Athens - who 
sanction the use of unjust means to obtain the bow for good ends. 
Persuaded by Odysseus, Neoptolemus successfully deceives Philoctetes and secures 
his weapons. The impact ofPhiloctetes' suffering upon Neoptolemus, along with the 
revelation that the bow was the reward from Neoptolemus' father, Hercules, for 
Philoctetes' archery skills, effects a change of mind (metanoia) in Neoptolemus. The 
lure of the effective good of victory fails to distract Neoptolemus from his commitment 
to the excellence of honour as he remains consistent with his declaration that 'he would 
prefer to lose, having acquitted himself finely, than to win, having been bad in so 
doing. '47 Still, it is no small matter that to act honourably requires Neoptolemus to tum 
from the victory desired by his city and superiors. Now caught between these 
conflicting demands, Neoptolemus voices the depths of his epistemological crisis as he 
asks, 'What am 1 to do?'48 The conflicting goods of victory and honour impale 
Neoptolemus on the horns of a dilemma. This leads to moral paralysis as 
Neoptolemus laments, 'I can't decide ... All this weighs on me, 1 can't think. '49 The 
standards of the polis, military practice, and justice are insufficient guides of his 
45 Whose Justice?, p. 60. 
46 Whose Justice?, pp. 24 & 60. 
47 T'? 61 Whose Justice. , p. . 
48 Whose Justice?, p. 62. 
49 Sophocles, Phi/octetes, trans. Robert W. Corrigan (New York: Dell, 1970), pp. 206-207. (Hereafter: 
Phi/octetes.) 
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actions. There is no rational resolution to this crisis as the objective appeals to tradition, 
social relationships, and insight fail to provide a hierarchical ranking of these competing 
claims.50 
Neoptolemus' moral perplexity and paralysis renders him vulnerable to 
arguments for effective action. Where there is no appeal to a rational moral order, no 
reasons can be given to forego the immediate good for the long-term good. 
Moreover, MacIntyre notes that in the Iliad, the nature of the universe is that 'nobody 
both wins and remains a winner. In the long run we are all going to be defeated, and 
the prospect of ignominious death or slavery awaits everyone. '51 In the case of 
Neoptolemus' perplexity and in the Iliad's view of reality, no compelling reasons can 
be offered to forego the short-term advantage for the sake of a higher order of 
excellence. Where such despair of the standard of excellence obtains, the inescapable 
conclusion is that 'There is no appeal beyond the realities of power' and justice is 
'entirely at the service of effectiveness. '52 This theme of effectiveness over excellence 
is a recurring theme in Sophocles. MacIntyre notes that in Oedipus Tyrannus, 
Sophocles attacks the Periclean and Athenian hubris for its violent and 'impious 
confidence in the effectiveness of the skilful use of power. '53 When Sophocles wrote 
the Phi/oetetes in 409 BeE, Athenian democracy was recovering from military defeat, 
revolution, and the rule of the 0ligarchs. 54 MacIntyre writes, 'It was thus opportune 
and urgently necessary to raise again the questions of what justice within a political 
community is, of what justice toward those external to the community is, and the 
relationship of both to the expedient and the advantageous. '55 The Phi/oetetes 
considers the question of whether justice has universal purchase or whether it may be 
set aside in favour of the goods of victory. 56 
Neoptolemus is confronted by two sets of necessary demands: the demands of 
duty (deon), based in the standard of excellence, and the demands of success, which 
make it necessary (dei) to set aside the demands of excellence. When confronted by 
50 Whose Justice?, pp. 63-64. 
51 Whose Justice?, p. 66. 
52 Whose Justice?, p. 66. 
53 Whose Justice?, p. 58. MacIntyre argues that in the absence of a single, objective moral standard, 
'there is nothing to distinguish genuinely rational moral or evaluative disagreements from any other 
clash of conflicting desires, preferences, and wills.' Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Community, Law and the 
Idiom and Rhetoric Of Rights' , Listening 26 (1991), p. 97. 
54 Whose Justice?, pp. 58-59. 
55 J.? 59 Whose ustlce., p. . 
56 J.? 60 Whose ustlce., p. . 
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personal desire57 or the possibility of political power,58 the standard of excellence is 
too easily dismissed. Odysseus' intent was to urge Neoptolemus to choose effective 
action over excellence. However, in concluding that he cannot achieve good results 
through deceitful means, Neoptolemus defies Odysseus' orders and returns the bow to 
Philoctetes, saying, 'But if a lie is the only way to succeed, let me fail, sir, and stay 
honest.' Odysseus responds, saying 'And at your age I was the same. Slow with 
words, quick with action. But now I have experience, and I realize that in life it is not 
action that counts. Words are what matter; words have the power. '59 The moral 
importance of words is their power to persuade.60 
Plato took seriously the power of nonrational persuasion when he forcefully 
excluded the poets from his Republic. This forced exclusion was a tacit admission 
that, at least in the short term, Plato could not sustain rational arguments against the 
advocates of effectiveness. MacIntyre argues that Plato did not distrusted the power of 
rational argument, but rather recognised that where sophists and tyrants gain power, 
they deny 'the kind of learning ... about the nature of the common good that can issue 
in socially transformative action. '61 This undermining of rational education would 
eventuate in long-term disaster, which is evident in the moral opprobrium now 
associated with the words 'sophistry' and 'tyranny'. Two examples of disaster 
resulting from rhetorical appeal are those of Alcibiades, who, as an Athenian general, 
persuaded the Athenians to embark on the Sicilian expedition that ended in 
catastrophe, and of the unjust Athenian verdict against Socrates.62 
Beyond these warnings against the appeal to short-term effectiveness, 
MacIntyre offers positive arguments for the goods of excellence. The standard of 
excellence, he states, expresses the' order of the universe within which alone human 
justice finds point, purpose, and justification. '63 Near the end of the play, as 
Odysseus' pragmatic argument nearly prevails, Hercules intervenes, declaring, 
'Justice follows man through life and into death. Whether he lives or dies, justice 
remains, right is eternal, duty must be done.,64 The divine revelation declares that, 
57 Whose Justice?, p. 74. 
58 J'? 65 Whose ustlce., p. . 
59 Philoctetes, pp. 179-180. 
60 J'? 86 Whose ustlce., p. . 
61 MacIntyre, 'Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good', p. 251. 
62 J'? 67 Whose ustlce., p. . 
63 Whose Justice?, p. 62. 
64 Philoctetes, p. 224. 
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against all appearances, the cosmos is indeed ordered to justice and not to power. 
Sophocles' solution of divine revelation is unacceptable to MacIntyre. MacIntyre 
cites Karl Reinhardt, who states that 'The plot requires, not an arbitrary disentangling 
by the intrusion of the supernatural, but the discovery of a standard for action which 
merely human resources have been unable to supply. '65 For Sophocles, resolution 
requires revelation. This view is expressed in Neoptolemus' reflection on Philoctetes' 
suffering, as he says, 'I believe without question his sufferings have a meaning. 
There must be a purpose, an end we do not yet see, because only a higher power can 
see it. '66 Philoctetes too must anchor his desire for justice in his belief 'that heaven 
cares. '67 In the end, the happy reconciliation is expressed by Philoctetes who states, 
'no regrets, no blame - send me where the great power of my destiny wills, where the 
resolve of my friends, and the all-conquering spirit of my master, Hercules, carry me. 
He has decided. Now it must be done. '68 
MacIntyre remains unconvinced by this happy theological denouement. It is 
not a resolution but a divine intrusion: 'a response, but not an answer.' In this 
reconciliation 
at the ad hoc bidding of Hercules: nothing is learned or could be learned within this 
framework about how more generally the rival claims of the justice of effectiveness and 
of the justice of desert are to be evaluated. That those claims can only be rightly 
evaluated within a theological framework is indeed part of what Sophocles says to his 
fellow citizens. And perhaps what he meant them - and us - to learn is that there is no 
way of addressing these claims generally, but we always have to wait upon the voice of 
some divine being.69 
The divine intervention is an unnecessary intrusion because philosophical inquiry is 
quite capable of resolving such tragic conflicts.70 As proof of this assertion, 
MacIntyre offers four philosophical alternatives (Augustinianism, Aristotelianism, 
Thomism, and Humean philosophy) which are capable of sustaining rational 
judgements.71 
MacIntyre's conclusion is problematic. Ifhe has listed four discrete solutions to 
the epistemological crisis, he has not offered a rational framework to decide which is 
65 Whose Justice?, p. 62. MacIntyre, ~uoting Karl Reinhardt, Sophocles, trans. H. and D. Harvey 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 3r . ed., 1979). 
66 Philoctetes, p. 183 (my emphasis). 
67 Philoctetes, p. 210. 
68 Philoctetes, p. 224. 
69 Whose Justice?, p. 63. 
70 Whose Justice?, p. 63. 
71 Whose Justice?, p. 401. 
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the best of these solutions. It now appears that MacIntyre confronts us with a decision 
which is tantamount to the Kierkegaardian radical choice which he roundly criticised. 
Rather than admitting this, MacIntyre warns that either 'we have to begin speaking as 
protagonists of one contending party' or we must 'fall silent. n2 This warning is not a 
solution but an admission of defeat. However, it is not an ultimate defeat if we 
reconceive MacIntyre's claim, and see that he does not offer four alternatives but two. 
That is, the solutions available to us are either Hume's scepticism73 or the teleological 
theism of MacIntyre's Aristotle, Aquinas, and Augustinian synthesis. As my previous 
chapter already considered this synthesis, I need only consider MacIntyre's argument 
against Hume's tradition oriented though anti-theistic philosophy. 
It is odd that MacIntyre should hold Hume up as a representative of sound 
philosophy when, in the essay on the 'epistemological crisis' MacIntyre cites Hume's 
troubled mediation on doubt: 
For I have already shown ... that the understanding, when it acts alone, and 
according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the 
lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common 
life ... The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human 
reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all 
belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely 
than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, 
and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger 
must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence? I am 
confronted with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most 
deplorable condition imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest darkness and utterly 
depriv'd of the use of every member and faculty.74 
Hume's advocacy of custom and tradition was not a solution to the problems of 
scepticism so much as they allowed him to ignore the force of this scepticism. 
However, if we take Hume's scepticism more seriously than he took it himself, we are 
constrained to admit that the alternative to scepticism is grounding morality on a 
theological foundation. 75 
MacIntyre's chief concern is to answer how we come to view human life as 
purposeful once the teleological framework was discredited by the natural sciences. 
Whereas progress in the natural sciences required the exclusion of teleological 
72 Whose Justice?, p. 401. 
73 The opposition of Hume' s sceptical atheism to the theism of MacIntyre's synthesis ~oes not deny 
their similar understanding of and appreciation for tradition as a source of social coheSIOn. Cf. Garry 
Wills, Saint Augustine (New York: LipperNiking, 1999), pp. 120-121. 
74 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', p. 462, quoting David Hume, A Treatise 
of Human Nature Bk. I, iv, vii, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), pp. 267-269. 
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pUrposes in explaining the mechanics of the natural world, it is a mistake to conclude 
that this exclusion applies equally to ethics. He notes that 'the error of modem 
conceptions of the natural sciences lies not in the aspiration to completeness in respect 
of their various subject matters, but in the belief that the natural order can be wholly 
understood in terms that exclude teleological causation. n6 Modem moral philosophy 
believed itself to have initiated a Copernican revolution where human rather than 
divine purpose was at the centre of any rational moral explanation. Diminishing the 
importance of divine purpose did not, however, elevate the importance of human 
purpose. It rather initiated sceptical doubts about the notion of life as purposeful in 
any sense. 77 Macintyre claims that in 
the dominant modem view of the natural sciences, applications of the concept of 
human purpose themselves now appear to be disturbing and superstitious intrusions 
into the non-teleological order of nature, of very much the same kind as 
applications of the concept of divine purpose - whether in claims about miracles or 
more generally about divine providence -appeared to Hume. It is a Thomistic 
contention that an adequate conception of nature as, among other things, a 
teleological order would provide a framework within which neither of these would 
appear anomalous. 78 
The rejection of divine purpose turns out to undermine the notion of a human 
purpose. Apart from a theistic foundation, it becomes increasingly implausible to 
think of humanity as sharing in a common journey or story of progress toward a goal. 
Rather, because there are many journeys and stories, there are many goals and many 
moralities by which progress toward these goals is evaluated. Hence the notion of 
moral consensus must become increasingly implausible because consensus reflects 
agreement about how this or that story or journey is our story or our journey. 
MacIntyre argues that the notion of human purpose and meaning is defensible only if 
the universe itself is teleologically ordered, and the only type of teleologically 
ordered universe in which we have good reason to believe is a theistic universe. 
Hence the moral progress of the plain person towards her or his ultimate good is 
always a matter of more than morality. And the enacted narrative of that progress 
will only become fully intelligible when it is understood not only in terms of 
metaphysics but in an adequate theological light, when, that is, the particularities of 
that narrative are understood to embody what is said about sin and about grace in 
the Ia-Ilae of the Summa as well as what is said about law and the virtues. The 
75 MacIntyre, 'Faith, Scepticism and Personal Identity', p. 99. 
76 Macintyre, 'Faith, Scepticism and Personal Identity', p. 99. 
77 MacIntyre states that 'once the notion of essential human purpose or function disappears from 
morality, it begins to appear implausible to treat moral judgments as factual statements.' After Virtue, 
p.59. 
78 MacIntyre, 'Faith, Scepticism and Personal Identity', p. 99. 
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moral progress of the plain person is always the beginnings of a pilgrim's 
progress.79 
MacIntyre no longer thinks that obedience to divine revelation is necessarily a 
slavish reverence for rules. Rather, divine commands that are rightly understood 
express what a fully rational human being would accept. Hence what God commands 
is what we already knew or could have known for ourselves as required for our 
good. What God asks of us, both in the Old Law and in its reaffirmation by Jesus 
Christ, is what, if we were adequately rational, we would ask of ourselves. God's 
commands are to be and do what will restore us to our freedom and the Church's 
teaching concerning the divine commands has the same aim and content. 80 
The move to theism is a natural progression rather than a radical interruption. 
Catholicism is not for MacIntyre a repUdiation of his moral philosophy but its 
fulfilment. This is why he can say: 
What I now believe philosophically I came to believe very largely before I 
reacknowledged the truth of Catholic Christianity. And I was only able to respond to the 
teachings of the Church because I had already learned from Aristotelianism both the 
nature of the mistakes involved in my earlier rejection of Christianity, and how to 
understand aright the relation of philosophical argument to theological inquiry. My 
philosophy, like that of many other Aristotelians, is theistic; but it is as secular in its 
content as any other.81 
While MacIntyre claims to be a theistic 'secular' philosopher, he asserts that the 
secular realm has its own discrete competency while admitting that the separation of 
the secular from the sacred must result in philosophical and moral frustration. 82 
MacIntyre enlists Nietzsche who writes as a reluctant witness to the connection 
between teleological purpose and theism when he states, 'I fear we are not getting rid 
of God, because we still believe in grammar. '83 MacIntyre elaborates on this 
admission, stating: 
What Nietzsche meant by belief in grammar was belief that the structure of language 
somehow mirrors and presupposes belief in an order of things, in virtue of which one 
mode of conceptualizing reality can be more adequate to that reality than another. To rid 
oneself of such a belief would be instead to treat purely linguistic meanings as a set of 
context-free structures, available for expressing an indefinitely large number of 
alternative conceptualizations, none more adequate than any other, because there is no 
underlying reality in relation to which adequacy could be measured. It was Nietzsche's 
insight that so long as reference to such a reality is still presupposed, belief in God is 
covertly present. And in so asserting Nietzsche simply inverted the Augustinian 
79 MacIntyre, 'Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy' ,p. 19. 
80 MacIntyre, 'How Can We Learn What Veritatis Splendor Has to Teach?', p. 177. 
81 MacIntyre, 'Nietzsche or Aristotle', p. 152. 
82 MacIntyre, 'How Can We Learn What Veritatis Splendor Has to Teach?" p. 194. 
83 Three Rival Versions, p. 98. MacIntyre, quoting Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols. (No further 
bibliographical details are given.) 
112 
standpoint: without God there is no genuine objectivity of interpretation or 
conceptualization.84 
Nietzsche's error was to think that God's death was a permanent feature of the 
modem world. Contrariwise, MacIntyre's alternative to Nietzsche is that, so long as 
philosophy continues to believe in a rational and purposeful universe, it will be drawn 
back to a teleological conception of morality and eventually to its theological 
foundation. 
Consider the answers to an interview that attempts to draw MacIntyre out 
regarding the place of religion in his life: 
Kinesis: So how would you depict your religious faith? 
MacIntyre: I am Roman Catholic. Period. 
Kinesis: In a traditional and orthodox sense? 
MacIntyre: There is no other sense. I believe what I am taught to believe by God, through 
the Church. And when God speaks, there is nothing to do but obey or disobey.85 
While we may be satisfied with MacIntyre's conversion, there is something troubling 
about this conversation. MacIntyre qua converted philosopher has nothing more to 
say about obedience. Certainly the Christian ethicist would want to claim that there is 
much more that needs to be said if obedience is to be rendered intelligible to 
Christians and accountable to the world. Indeed, the Christian ethicist would want to 
say that MacIntyre's work has helped Christian ethics say much more about 
obedience and to say it much more persuasively. Hauerwas and Pinches explain that 
MacIntyre's rediscovery 'of the importance of Christian theology both intellectually 
and confessionally' follows coherently from his concern for 'traditioned inquiry' that 
sustains a coherent, rational discourse about the good life for humans. '86 
MacIntyre's reticence in clarifying his position suggests that Christian ethics is 
'after MacIntyre.' By this assertion I mean, MacIntyre's moral inquiry brought about 
a change of mind regarding the rationality of obedience to the divine word. If, 
however, the philosopher has nothing more to say about obedience - and certainly 
more needs to be said - then the task of saying more falls to the theological ethicist. 
In contending that the Christian ethical reflection is 'after MacIntyre' , I mean that 
MacIntyre's critical account of the Enlightenment and his constructive understanding 
of moral rationality provide a foundation from which contemporary Christian ethics 
84 Three Rival Versions, p. 98. 
85 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Kinesis Interview with Professor Alasdair MacIntyre', [Interviewed by Thomas 
D. Peterson], Kinesis: Graduate Journal in Philosophy 20 (1994), pp. 43-44. 
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can begin. This brings me to the second part of my consideration of the theological 
implications of MacIntyre philosophy where I turn to Stanley Hauerwas who has most 
clearly demonstrated the significance of MacIntyre's philosophy for Christian moral 
reflection 
2. The Rationality of Christian Ethics 
2.1. Why Christian Ethics Escapes the Epistemological Crisis 
The Methodist theologian Stanley Hauerwas both draws from and extends 
MacIntyre's moral philosophy.87 Hauerwas' dependence on MacIntyre's work is 
explicitly acknowledged in his praise of the impact of MacIntyre's writings. 
Hauerwas states that, 'No one perhaps has been more important to our work than 
Alasdair MacIntyre. He has taught us through his writings ways to think that we are 
only beginning to appreciate. '88 According to Hauerwas, the success of MacIntyre's 
argument has cleared an intellectual space for' a fruitful appreciation of the positive 
significance of the church with regard to both methodological and social ethical 
questions. '89 I shall primarily focus on Hauerwas' development of MacIntyre's 
argument that Christian ethics need not suffer from modernity's moral inarticulacy 
because the church possesses the moral resources to escape modernity's 
epistemological crisis. 
First a word about what Hauerwas' confrontational style of writing says about his 
view of the church for which he claims to be writing. In explaining his rhetorical 
strategy, Hauerwas cites a passage by Flannery O'Connor, in which she states: 
When you can assume that your audience holds the same beliefs you do, you can 
relax a little and use some more normal means of talking to it; when you have to 
assume that it does not then you have to make your vision apparent by shock - to 
86 Hauerwas and Pinches, Among the Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modem 
Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), p. 91. 
87 Brad 1. Kallenberg, 'Positioning MacIntyre Within Christian Ethics', in eds. Nancey Murphy, Brad 
1. Kallenberg & Mark Thiessen Nation, Virtues And Practices In The Christian Tradition: Christian 
Ethics After MacIntyre (Harrisburg, P A: Trinity Press International, 1997), ?. 61. 
88 Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, Christians Among the Vi~tues,. p. 11. 
89 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom (Notre Dame IN: Umversity of Notre Dame Press, 
1983), pp. xxiv-v. (Hereafter: The Peaceable Kingdom.) 
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the hard of hearing you shout, and for the almost-blind, you draw large and startling 
figures.90 
On the one hand, Hauerwas claims that the church possess the resources to overcome 
the modem epistemological crisis. On the other hand, as the O'Connor quotation 
reflects, Hauerwas' thinks that the church in North America suffers from the same 
disorders that afflict secular culture. Hauerwas therefore sees it as his task to point 
out in 'large and startling figures' the problems that would frustrate the realisation of 
this potential in the church. 
According to Hauerwas, Christian ethics need not suffer from the modem 
epistemological crisis because it needs no epistemological justification. Hauerwas 
writes, 'I do not have an epistemology ... 1 can only say that ecclesiology is all 1 
have. '91 Christian ethics begins with the practical problems and questions of the 
historical community of the church and not with the attempt to secure theoretical 
epistemological foundations. 92 'All we have is the church,' Hauerwas states. 'That 
such is the case is no deficiency since that is all we have ever had or could ever 
want. '93 Hauerwas' ethics begin with the historical tradition, the ongoing practices 
and the canonical narrative of the ecclesial community. The task of Christian ethics is 
to spell out the implications of the Christian story for one's character and for our life 
together in the story-shaped community. 'The growth of character,' Hauerwas states, 
'is a correlative of our being initiated into a determinative story. '94 Hauerwas rejects 
the criticism that his is a romantic view of the church. He insists that the church is not 
a fiction but 'a body constituted by disciplines' which are founded on the confession 
that God has acted in the world through Jesus ChriSt.95 As the incarnation is a 
historical reality, the church that claims to be the body of Christ must be anchored in 
the realities of history. As the founding story of the church is centred in the 
90 Stanley Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures; Freeing the Bible from Captivity to America 
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1993), p. 9. Hauerwas quoting Flannery O'Connor. No further 
bibliographic details are given. . .., . 
91 Stanley Hauerwas, 'Failure of Communication or A Case ofUncomprehendmg Femmlsm ,Scottish 
Journal of Theology 50 (1997), p. 230. 
92 Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom: How the Church is to Behave if Freedom, Justice, and a 
Christian Nation are Bad Ideas (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1991), pp. 31-32. 
93 Stanley Hauerwas, In Good Company: The Church As Polis (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1995), p. 33. 
94 Stanley Hauerwas, 'The Self As Story: Religion and ~~rality from the Agent's P~rspe:t~ve', The 
Journal of ReligiOUS Ethics 1 (1973), p. 71. See also Wtlham P. Bro~, Charact~r. In CrzSIS: A Fresh 
Approach to the Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament (Grand RapIds, MI: WIlham B. Eerdmans, 
1996), pp. 17-19. 
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incarnation and resurrection of Jesus, the church cannot be fully explained by its 
historical existence. It is a community that is also shaped by its hopeful look forward 
to a history that is yet to unfold. 
This focus on the church as a story-centred, historical community is not intended, 
however, to evade epistemological questions. Richard Hays, in his consideration of 
Hauerwas' use of scripture, states that, 'Hauerwas insists that the epistemological 
issue is real and crucial', though it is understood in a way peculiar to the church.96 
Hauerwas spells out how he understands the church's concern for epistemology by 
first quoting St. Athanasius who writes: 
F or the searching and right understanding of the Scriptures there is need of a good 
life and pure soul, and for Christian virtue to guide the mind to grasp, so far as 
human nature can, the truth concerning God the Word. One cannot possibly 
understand the teaching of the saints unless one has a pure mind and is trying to 
imitate their life. Anyone who wants to look at sunlight naturally wipes his eye 
clean first, in order to make at any rate some approximation to the purity of that on 
which he looks; and a person wishing to see a city or country goes to the place in 
order to do so. Similarly, anyone who wishes to understand the mind of the sacred 
writers must first cleanse his own life, and approach the saints by copying their 
deeds.97 
Knowing is important in Hauerwas' moral theory. However, this knowing does not 
come through theory or speculation but depends on the disciplined cultivation of the 
intellectual and moral virtues. That is, knowing depends upon the moral and spiritual 
character of the one who aspires to know. It is a kind of knowledge that is not 
universally available to all persons. Rather, it requires that the ecc1esial community is 
capable of the kind of moral and intellectual education by which one submits to the 
canonical authority of scripture and embodies its story in her life. Only then is the 
church 'capable of hearing the story of God we find in the Scripture and living in a 
manner that is faithful to that story. '98 
For Hauerwas then, the epistemological crisis is overcome not by theories of 
knowledge but by participation in the liturgy, hearing preaching, and the dialectical 
engagements of confession and casuistry. Moral inarticulacy does not signal the 
breakdown of a theory but of the kind of authentic moral authority that is necessary 
95 Stanley Hauerwas, 'What Could It Mean For the Church to be Christ's Body: A Question Without a 
Clear Answer', Scottish Journal of Theology 48 (1995), p. 13. 
96 Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation (San 
Francisco, CA: Harper, 1996), p. 255. 
97 Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p. 36, quoting St. Athanasius, The Incarnation of the Word of 
God (New York: Macmillan, 1946), p. 96. (See also Unleashing the Scriptures, p. 37.) 
98 A Community of Character, p. 1. 
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for sustaining character. As stated, Hauerwas claims that the church need not suffer 
from this inarticulacy because it is capable of sustaining its moral authority. One such 
source of moral authority is the exemplary lives of the saints which are held up for 
• • . 99 Imitatlon. Because the church is able to point to such models of living, it does not 
face a crisis of not being able to say what to and what not to do. Rather, the problem 
for the church is in not knowing 'how we are to do it.' To overcome this crisis, the 
church does not require a theory of knowledge but must sustain its moral practices 
and cultivate its moral skill through 'watching and following. '100 Knowing and 
understanding are not dependent on an epistemological theory nor come by direct 
divine revelation. Rather, the Christian life is cultivated and formed by the 
attentiveness to the Christian story. 
Hauerwas claims that Christian ethics has a peculiar way of addressing the moral 
concerns of identity and meaning. Consider the close relationship between the way in 
which Hauerwas and MacIntyre frame these crucial issues. Concerning meaning, 
MacIntyre states that Hamlet's epistemological crisis was caused by his inability to 
answer the question, 'what is going on here?'101 Similarly, Hauerwas says that the 
first question of Christian ethics is not 'What should we do' but rather 'what is going 
on?' 102 Regarding identity, MacIntyre states, 'I cannot answer the question, What 
ought I to do? until I have answered the question, Who am 1?'103 Similarly, Hauerwas 
states that 'the question "What ought I to be?" precedes the question "What ought I to 
do?'" 104 For both, it is only possible to speak of identity and meaning in relationship to 
others within the moral community. 
According to Hauerwas, the individual is intelligible only as one who is in a 
vertical relationship with God and in a horizontal relationship with the neighbour. 
Against this view of the related self, the modem self s ideal is to be unencumbered by 
such communal commitments. Having no place for virtue, this version of freedom is 
responsible for creating victims. Autonomy destroys its worshippers because it 
separates the self from that community which is necessary for the cultivation of the 
99 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures, p. 37. Hauerwas writes, 'For the Christian seeks neither 
autonomy nor independence, but rather to be faithful to the way that manifests the conviction that we 
belong to another. Thus Christians learn to describe their lives as a gift rather than an achievement.' A 
Community of Character, p.130. 
100 A Community of Character, p. 131. 
101 MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Narrative and Science', p. 454. 
102 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 102. 
103 A Short History of Ethics, p. 187. 
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selfs potential. Hamlet was 'unencumbered' by commitments and went mad. 
Neoptolemus was paralysed by his inability to discern where to place his allegiances. 
Against the ideal of the unencumbered self, Christian ethics aims at the creation and 
sustaining of a community of trust. The hope of such a communal life depends upon 
the moral authority of the canonical narrative shaping the moral community. As 
narrative and community are at the heart and centre ofHauerwas' ethic, let us 
consider each of these themes in tum. 
2.2. Scripture as Narrative 
Christian moral deliberation begins with stories and an authoritative history. 
Richard Hays states that Hauerwas' view of the Christian life as an unfolding 
narrative 'discourages any attempt to formulate a systematic ethic. n05 Rather than 
attempting to identify an abstract theoretical moral foundation, Christian ethics begins 
with the canonical narrative of scripture and its traditions of interpretation and 
application. This starting point alters the way we understand how truth-claims are 
advanced within the church. Hauerwas writes: 
The truthfulness of Christian convictions, therefore, is not dependent on being able 
to generate a theory of truth that a priori renders all other accounts false, or that 
promises to demonstrate that underlying the differences between people is a deeper 
and more profound common morality. Rather the truthfulness of Christian 
convictions resides in their power to form a people sufficient to acknowledge the 
divided character of the world!06 
Christian ethics is a practical response to the concrete disorder of a divided, fallen 
world. A central feature of this response is to give reasons why Christians think there 
is an alternative story to the story of this fallen and divided world. The first order of 
business for Christian ethics is to posit its alternative story of creation, redemption, 
and eschaton, then ask how this story shapes a Christian's conduct. 
The canonical story is the teleological framework within which moral reasoning 
takes place. This story offers an authoritative account of the nature of our disorder, a 
vision of life rightly ordered, and the means by which we progress from disorder to 
order. The canonical story is that authoritative point of reference for question 
regarding a Christian's identity and the meaning of one's actions. Within the story, 
one's moral judgements work in analogous ways to literary judgements about the 
104 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 116. 
105 The Moral Vision a/the New Testament, p. 258. 
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identity of characters and the meaning of events in the story. The canonical story 
speaks of plot, setting, characters, and relationships, so that one may say what is going 
on and what ought to be going on. Hauerwas claims that the scriptural narrative is 
able to answer epistemological questions in ways that theories have failed to do. 
Hauerwas accepts MacIntyre's view that the fundamental epistemological question is 
'What is going on here?', and claims that the biblical story provides a sufficient, 
though not exhaustive, answer to this question. 107 
Like MacIntyre, Hauerwas sees in narrative moral deliberation a way to avoid 
the pitfalls of abstraction. Yet, unlike MacIntyre, Hauerwas speaks specifically of the 
scripture as the canonical story and the church as the moral community. In 
Hauerwas' ecclesial ethic, there is an implicit critique of the abstraction that 
characterises and threatens to undermine MacIntyre's writings. In a sense, Hauerwas 
rescues MacIntyre's ethics from the threat of abstraction by giving his narrative 
theory a Christian content and placing it within the ecclesial context. \08 In a chapter 
entitled 'On Beginning in the Middle,' he refers to MacIntyre's insight that human 
action 'has a basically historical character.' Human actions and persons are 
intelligible in the same way that actions and persons within a story come to be known. 
The functions of plot, setting, genre and character are analogous to the way we think 
about moral selves and meaningful actions in life. That is to say, once characters and 
actions are abstracted from the story, they become unintelligible. 109 Hence there can 
be no Christian moral reflection that does not begin in the middle of that story of 
God's relationship to the creation and to his creatures. In Hauerwas' view, 
liberalism's unencumbered and autonomous self is not so free as it is fragmented 
because it is character without a story. 110 
Although Hauerwas' ethics accepts the authority of the scriptural story, it 
cannot be simply dismissed as an uncritical or 'deficient science.' He points to the 
theologies of Karl Barth and Aquinas, 'Scripture is the place from which one mounts 
arguments.' For Barth, it is 'the Word of God' and for Thomas, it is 'the propositional 
form of the principles to which sacred doctrine must attend and return in order to 
106 A Community of Character, p. 93. 
107 The Peaceable Kingdom. pp. 17-19. 
108 Kallenberg , 'Positioning MacIntyre Within Christian Ethics', p. 61. 
\09 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 62. 
110 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 263. 
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exercise its scientific character. n11 The tenn 'science' means, in this context, that 
knowledge of 'the way things are.' 112 And within scripture, the way things are begins 
with a God who creates, redeems, and sustains his church. Hauerwas insists that the 
beliefs and practices of the church simply are unintelligible if the God of the Nicene 
Creed does not exist. Our human deficiencies of will and intellect mean that 'the 
existence of a First Truth is not self-evident to us.' 113 We do not know how things 
really are. We suffer from an epistemological crisis that impossibly confuses what 
seems to be with what is. Hence it was imperative 'that the Creator himself come into 
the world in the flesh and be known through himself.'114 Scripture is the authoritative 
source of God's self-revelation which initiates and sustains Christian moral inquiry. 
This starting point presents a conflict for Hauerwas' Christian ethics. How can a 
Christian ethic gain relevance in a world that accepts neither scripture nor the God of 
the Nicene Creed? One answer that Hauerwas vehemently rejects is 
accommodation ism or the purchase of public influence with the abandonment of the 
church's central truth-claims. Forsaking this alternative, Hauerwas has been wrongly 
excoriated for advocating sectarianism. 11s For Hauerwas, MacIntyre's rationality of 
tradition offers a third alternative between accommodation and sectarianism. If 
MacIntyre's argument is correct, the notion of a tradition-independent rationality or 
ethic is a fiction. Hence as Hauerwas asserts, every ethic is a 'qualified' ethic. 
Summarising Hauerwas' notion of a qualified ethic, Nancey Murphy writes: 
Hauerwas has argued that Christians will get nowhere attempting to influence 
public debate on issues like abortion if they limit themselves to the language of 
secular society. Instead, they ought to make their arguments - in public - in the 
language of their own tradition. Hauerwas has been much criticized for this 
'sectarian'move. However, MacIntyre's analysis of the nature of moral reasoning 
makes it clear that Hauerwas' s strategy is in no way sectarian (or at least, no more 
111 Stanley Hauerwas, 'Which God? Whose Morality?', (unpublished, 1994), p. 5, n.13. 
112 Hauerwas, 'Which God? Whose Morality?', p. 6. 
113 Stanley Hauerwas, 'Murdochian Muddles: Can We Get Through Them If God Does Not Exist?', In 
Good Company: The Church As Polis (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), p. 
163. 114 Hauerwas is quoting from Aquinas' commentary on the Gospel of John. Hauerwas, 'Which God? 
Whose Morality?" p. 5. 
115 James Gustafson call Hauerwas a 'sectarian, fideistic, tribalist'. Cf. 'The Sectarian Temptation: 
Reflections on Theology, the Church, and the University', Proceedings of the Catholic Theological 
Society 40 (1985), pp. 83-94. However, the Lutheran theologian R~bert. J~nson ,does no~ ~~ that, 
Hauerwas deserves the sectarian appellation. If anything, Hauerwas ethIC IS an Augustmiamsm WIth a 
vengeance.' For example, Jenson notes that when Hauerwas considers what it means to the modem 
university that that we are creatures of a gracio~s G~d, ,it leads h~ to.th~ conclusion,that, 'God turns 
out to be the condition for the success of the umversity s-any umversity s- undertakmg! Robert W. 
Jenson, 'The Hauerwas Project', Modern Theology 8 (1992), p. 287. 
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so than anyone else's). All moral reasoning, ifit is to be cogent, must draw upon 
the resources of some tradition, without which one lacks the virtues necessary for 
having a moral outlook. Public discourse in terms of 'rights' is just as particular as 
Christian discourse; social contract theory places its own story of an original state 
and the development of society alongside that of Genesis. No rational argument has 
been advanced for why the Enlightenment traditions should be privileged over all 
others. I 16 
The denial of the tradition-<iependent starting point is what Bernard Williams calls 
the midair stance. 117 This criticism of midair ethics is crucial to Hauerwas' 
assessment of what has gone wrong in moral theology. Midair ethics is the failed 
attempt to discover a philosophical 'high ground' whereby it is ensured that moral 
judgements will be true and just without regard to any particular point of view. 118 The 
attractiveness of this view is that it promises the possibility of moral consensus apart 
from religious commitment. It assumes that if we can clearly identify and accept 'the 
categorical imperative, the ideal observer, universalizability, or ... the original 
position,' rational moral agreement then becomes possible. The only possibility for 
such an agreement is if rational moral judgements are those which are true 'from 
anyone's point of view' .119 Only from the universal point of view can we hope that 
moral judgements will be preserved from the arbitrary, subjective and relative. 
In many ways, Hauerwas' rejection of midair ethics approximates to MacIntyre's 
critique of Enlightenment ethics and need not be rehearsed. The one aspect of his 
critique that is crucial to Christian theology is what Hauerwas calls the modem 
'fascination with rules. '120 While rules may adequately articulate the theorems of 
Euclidean geometry, the fixed planetary orbits in the Copernican system or the laws 
of mass and motion in Newtonian physics, they do not have the same force and 
function in ethics. Rules in the natural sciences do not need to refer to personal 
beliefs or historical perspectives to be intelligible. Moral rules, as I noted, must have 
their place within the moral narrative. Hauerwas questions the importance of rules 
because they falsely offer 
116 Nancey Murphy, 'Using MacIntyre's Method in Christian Ethics', in. e~s. Nanc.e~ Murph~, .Brad 1. 
Kallenberg & Mark Thiessen Nation, Virtues And Practices In The Chrzstzan Tradition: Chrzstzan 
Ethics After MacIntyre (Harrisburg, P A: Trinity Press International, 1997), p. 44. 
117 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 17. 
118 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 17. . ' . 
119 Stanley Hauerwas and David Burrell, 'From Sy~tem to Story: An AlternatIve Pattern fo~ RatlOnahty 
in Ethics', in eds. H. Tristram Engelhardt and DanIel Callahan, Knowledge, Value and BebeJ (New 
York: The Hastings Center, 1977), p. 162. 
120 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 19. 
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the impersonal justification of our moral behavior. Rules give the appearance of ensuring 
the objectivity we otherwise find lacking in our individual decisions and judgments. 
Accordingly, moral reasoning attempts to justify any particular judgment by appeal to a 
more universal rule or principle to which any rational creature must adhere. Thus 
morality is thought to acquire the unbiased quality associated, mistakenly perhaps, with 
legal process and therefore to secure the objectivity necessary for moral agreement. 121 
Moral rules, if truly rational, would negotiate 'safe agreements between autonomous 
individuals who have nothing in common.' Where there is no common story or 
confession, it is not surprising to Hauerwas that lawyers rather than priests become 
the interpreters of the moral world. 122 This modem fixation with rules is clearly 
evident in what is called 'applied' or 'quandary' ethics. 
Applied ethics is the application of some established universal principle, such as 
love or justice, to particularly cases. The more difficult cases of applied ethics 
constitute quandary ethics. Hauerwas proposes the outrageous quandary: 
[W]hat do you do about the fat person stuck in the mouth of the cave with the water 
rising on the inside threatening to drown the four companions left in the cave? Can 
you use the dynamite that has been conveniently found to blow the fat one out of the 
hole in order to save the four inside.123 
The aim of such an exercise is to discern the relevant principles to guide action in this 
tragic (or comic) situation. For Hauerwas, the interesting point is not solving the 
moral puzzle but with the inordinate attention in modem ethics given to thinking 
about ethical quandaries. One reason for the focus on quandaries is that these hard 
cases test the universal applicability of moral principles. A moral principle that can 
justify the killing of one innocent person to save several others may be used to justify 
the killing of the innocent in other cases. For example, consider some of the supposed 
universal maxims invoked in medical ethics: 'competent persons have a right to 
determine their own fate,' 'the physician should respect the wishes of the patient,' 
'relieve pain,' 'thou shalt not kill,' 'give no deadly poison, even if requested.' The 
assumption is that these maxims are universal and so can be applied to all relevant 
cases. Hauerwas counters that such maxims are only intelligible within some 
historical and cultural settings in which they are accepted as authoritative. When 
121 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 19. 
122 Stanley Hauerwas, 'Abortion Theologically Understood', in eds. Nancey Murphy, Brad 1. 
Kallenberg & Mark Thiessen Nation, Virtues And Practices In The Christian Tradition: Christian 
Ethics After MacIntyre (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997), p. 227. Hauerwas also 
observes that in the history of Roman Catholic moral theology, the neglect of virtue lent itself to an 
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increasingly 'came to look more like lawyers than theologians.' The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 51. 
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removed from this context, the very rules that were to be the hedge against ethical 
caprice can be interpreted and applied in almost any arbitrary fashion. 124 
Consider the fifth commandment's prohibition against killing. On the face of 
things, the prohibition seems to be an intelligible maxim needing no further reference 
to any tradition of interpretation or application. In fact, this command is fraught with 
ambiguity. Traditionally, the command is not interpreted as a prohibition against all 
killing, but rather of murder. The command reads, 'You should not murder.' This 
rendering is only slightly more clear in describing what kind of killing is proscribed. 
The rule, abstracted from a history of interpretation and application, does not tell us 
what acts ought to be categorised as murder. Hauerwas writes: 
[T]he word 'murder' means neither 'wrongful homicide' nor 'killing of the 
innocent' but rather a homicide that is neither justified nor excused nor mitigated. It 
is therefore a philosophical mistake to ask what is wrong with murder. If we rightly 
understand the grammar of the word murder, we understand that the only issue is 
whether this or that killing is a case of murder. 125 
To know when an action is murder depends upon 'the tradition in which one has been 
trained.' 126 There is not a single moral tradition that justifies 'murder'. There are 
however, many different ways that moral traditions have described and defined what 
murder is and when the rule against it applies. 
Hauerwas' suspicion of rules leads him to raise doubts about the religious effort 
to ground a morality in the second table of the Decalogue. The command to honour 
authority, as well as the prohibitions against murder, adultery, stealing, slander and 
coveting, are not universal obligations. They are 'shorthand reminders' of the 
meaning of actions done by agents who have a particular historical identity.127 As 
Hauerwas writes, 
The Decalogue is part of the covenant of God with Israel. Divorced from that 
covenant it makes no sense. God does indeed command obedience, but our God is 
the God who 'brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage' 
(Deut. 5:6). Because of this action the demand 'You shall have no other god before 
me' can be made. So too, the commands not to kill, not to commit adultery, and not 
to steal necessarily make sense only within the particularity of the story of God's 
123 Hauerwas, In Good Company: The Church As Polis (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1995), p. 170. 
124 Hauerwas, In Good Company, pp. 171, 173-174. 
125 Hauerwas, In Good Company, pp. 176-177. 
126 Hauerwas, In Good Company, p. 176. 
127 Hauerwas, 'The Self As Story', p. 74. 
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dealing with Israel. .. For the Bible is fundamentally a story of a people's journey 
with their God. 128 
The Decalogue is not a universal moral guide but an economical outline of a life in a 
purposeful relationship with God and others. As Michael Foster notes in Mystery and 
Philosophy, 'The Ten Commandments differ from moral laws as Kant conceived 
them in that (i) they are not given to all men, but to the chosen people, (ii) they are 
given because they are the chosen people, i.e. on the basis of the covenant relation. '129 
Were the point of scripture to guide moral decisions, it would need to be a much 
larger compendium of rules and principles. Because biblical ethics is less concerned 
'about making decisions' and more concerned with the formation of a certain kind of 
character, it is not focused on rules but on describing reality. 130 
Because ethics is first and foremost concerned with description of reality, stories 
rather than rules have pride of place in Christian ethics. Hauerwas thus works out the 
opposition between the Christian narrative and the Enlightenment's language of rights 
and universal principles in his various considerations of the highly charged 
controversy over abortion. Hauerwas argues that we do not conclude that abortion is 
wrong because it violates some basic principle such as 'life is sacred,' or 'it is wrong 
to take life directly.' His disagreement with this appeal to principle is not a rejection 
of the principle. Rather, he observes that the many appeals to the 'right to life' simply 
have not brought about fruitful progress in the abortion debate. 131 The reason for this 
is that these universal rights are, in fact, cultural and judicial agreements. The 
principle of 'right to life' does not create moral agreement. It expresses perhaps, an 
agreement that has been achieved by other means. As Lesslie Newbigin points out, 
'Asserting a right where there is no such basis would be like writing a check on a 
nonexistent banle' 132 
Hauerwas' most trenchant critique of rights language is in his discussions of the 
United States' Supreme Court decisions of Roe v. Wade and 'Casey.'133 When the 
U.S. Supreme Court invoked the universal right to privacy in Roe v. Wade, it 
disregarded abortion legislation and local political agreements in all fifty states. Its 
128 The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 23-24. 
129 Michael B. Foster, Mystery and Philosophy (London: SCM Press, 1957), p. 72. 
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rationale for this dismissal of local political agreements and compromises was the 
discovery of the universal right of privacy in the U.S. Constitution. Hauerwas cites 
Federal Court of Appeals judge, John T. Noonan, who comments on Justice 
Blackmun's majority opinion: 
!o invalidate the state abortion statutes it was necessary for [Blackmun] not only to 
Ignore the unborn child but to recognize a liberty anterior to the state in the carrier of the 
child. The invocation of liberty which was the very heart of his opinion was the 
invocation of a standard superior to enacted law. His radical use of 'higher law' was only 
disguised by his claim that something in the Constitution supplied the standard by which 
the state laws on abortion were invalid. The ultimate basis of his decision was nothing in 
the Constitution but rather his readings of the natural law liberties of an individual. 134 
Noonan concludes that there is no legal 'basis' for Roe v. Wade. It is rather a 
groundless legal judgment based upon an implausible interpretation of an ill-defined 
principle that was then arbitrarily applied. It was an exercise of raw judicial power, 
thinly disguised by the moral and civic authority of the Supreme Court. 
In Casey, the right to privacy first discovered in Roe was reaffirmed and 
intensified. This is evident in the majority opinion which states, 'At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life. '135 Liberty is not the fruit of truth; it is its 
creator. The selfwho creates this liberty is left alone to define its own existence apart 
from its relationship with God or others. This theory of personal liberty is finally 
'divorced from any substantive commitments about what kind of people we are or 
should be.' 136 So divorced, the appeals to a higher law or the heart of liberty do not 
point to a substantive agreements but are made for their emotive effectiveness. As 
such, these appeals may be called on to justify almost anything, moral or immoral. 137 
133 The full title of this case is Planned Parenthood Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Robert 
P. Casey. 
134 Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p. 219, quoting John Noonan, A Private Choice: Abortion in 
America in the Seventies (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 2-3. 
135 Hauerwas, 'Preaching As Though We Had Enemies', p. 48. 
136 A Community of Character, p. 220. 
137 Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p. 216 Hauerwas quotes MacIntyre who states, 'the central 
preoccupation of both ancient and medieval communities was characteristically: how may men together 
realize the true human good? The central preoccupation of modem men is and has been 
characteristically: how may we prevent men interfering with each other as each of us goes about our 
own concerns? The classical view begins with the community of the polis and with the individual 
viewed as having no moral identity apart from the communities of kinship and citizenship; the modem 
view begins with the concept of a collection of individuals and the problem of how ou~ of an~ by 
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Principles.' The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and .Gu~delines for the Protection of Hu"!an 
Subjects of Research, I (Washington, D.C.: DHEW PublIcation No. (OS) 78-0013, 1978), artIcle 10, 
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Hauerwas argues that an appeal to law requires a more elaborate description. Of 
course, asserting the priority of description over moral rules or principles is not in 
itself a solution. Hauerwas recognises that descriptions possess a double-edged 
power to either disguise or disclose reality. Justice Noonan offers this example of the 
power of description for disguising the reality of abortion, writing: 
If all that has happened may fairly be described as 'termination of a pregnancy' with 
'fetal wastage' the outcome, abortion may be accepted without break with the larger 
moral culture. If, however, such a description is a mask, if the life of an unborn 
child is being taken, it is difficult to reconcile the acceptance of abortion with the 
overarching prohibition against the taking of life. 138 
The point is that how we see a moral concern largely depends upon what we say about 
it. This assertion disagrees with Iris Murdoch's view that 'we develop language in the 
context of looking.' Hauerwas thinks it is closer to the truth to say 'that we can only 
see what we have been trained to see through learning to say.' 139 Agreement on moral 
rules depends upon the power of our descriptions. 
Moral descriptions overcome the problem of moral inarticulacy. Compelling 
reasons against abortion are founded on a certain description of 'what human beings 
are and ... what human beings should do for one another.' 140 Under this description, 
Christian ethics cannot relegate abortion to conscience and choice. 141 This would be to 
deny the truth that selves are always in relationship to God and others. Because the 
act of abortion denies the relatedness of the self, Hauerwas writes that 
the first question is not, Is abortion right or wrong? or, Is this abortion right or 
wrong? Rather, the first question is, Why do Christians call abortion abortion? 
And with the first question goes a second, Why do Christians think that abortion is 
a morally problematic term? To call abortion by that name is already a moral 
achievement. 142 
Abortion, rightly understood, is a word that is meant to express moral revulsion at an 
act of violence. It is a word that teaches us to reject the exclusion ofa member of the 
human community from the community's care and protection for the sake of 
convenience. Christian ethics' opposition to abortion depends on its ability to 
describe reality in a certain way. This means that we must understand the human self 
138 A Community a/Character, p. 218. 
139 Hauerwas, In Good Company, p. 156. (Hauerwas credits Wittgenstein for this insight.) 
140 John Noonan, cited by Hauerwas in A Community a/Character, p. 213. 
141 A Community a/Character, p. 218. Hauerwas refers to Francis Canavan, 'The Dilemma of Liberal 
Pluralism', The Human Life Review 5 (1979), p. 7. 
14~ Hauerwas, 'Abortion Theologically Understood', p. 228. 
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as a creature in relation with the Creator. In describing the other as a related creature, 
abortion becomes unthinkable because that life 'is not ours to take. '143 
When Christians abandon their discrete descriptive task, they commit themselves 
to failure. Hauerwas states: 
It is my contention that Christian opposition to abortion on demand has failed because, by 
attempting to meet the moral challenge within the limits of public polity, we have failed 
to exhibit our deepest convictions that make our rejection of abortion intelligible. We 
have failed then in our first political task because we accepted uncritically an account of 
'the moral question of abortion' determined by a politics foreign to the polity appropriate 
to Christian convictions. We have not understood, as Christians, how easily we have 
presumed that the presuppositions of our 'liberal' cultural ethos are 'Christian.' As a 
result, our temptation has been to blame the intractability of the abortion controversy on 
what appears to us as the moral blindness or immorality of pro-abortionists. We fail to 
see how much of the problem lies in the way we share with the pro-abortion advocates 
the moral presumptions of our culture. 144 
It is incoherent to accept the culture's understanding of individualism and freedom 
while opposing the abortion policy which is built on these notions. 145 Apart from the 
Christian description of the reality of the self in relationship to God and others, 
opposition to abortion must appear to be irrational. 
Hauerwas thinks it wise for Christians to accept Richard Rorty's argument that 
moral judgements have never been grounded in universal theories. According to 
Rorty, truth-claims that appeal to 'the nature of truth' must now be seen to be as 
unconvincing as claims that appeal to 'the nature of man' or 'the nature of God' .146 If 
Rorty is correct, the desire for relevance that led the church to couch its morality in 
universal terms is now as irrelevant as its appeal to the will of God. Furthermore, had 
the church steadfastly grounded its moral appeal in the revelation of God, it would 
have been coherent even if it was thought to be wrong. The attempt to ground a 
Christian morality in universals has left Christian ethics looking incoherent and 
irrelevant. The alternative is to centre ethics in the Christian moral vision. 
The Christian moral vision cannot be articulated by rules. Rules may, with 
certain clarity, prohibit abortion. However, to reduce Christian ethics to prohibitions 
would distort Christian ethics. It would reduce ethics to decisions to either obey or 
disobey. Such a focus on rules would miss one of the primary goals of Christian 
ethics which is to shape Christians to embody their moral commitments in acts of 
143 A Community o/Character, pp. 222 & 225. 
144 A Community o/Character, pp. 212-213. 
145 A Community o/Character, pp. 160-161. 
146 Hauerwas, After Christendom, pp. 31-32 & 74-76. 
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mercy towards others.147 The focus of Christian morality is not on prohibitions or 
decisions. The primary aim is to transform persons to be capable of freely sacrificing 
for others. How is it that people come to sacrifice freely for others? This comes by 
means of the Christian story where sacrifice is the norm of divine and human action. 148 
Christian moral norms reflect what is described as normal in the Christian story. This 
is why Hauerwas states: 
We cannot account for our moral life solely by the decisions we make; we also need 
the narrative that forms us to have one kind of character rather than another. .. As 
our stories, however, they will determine what kind of moral considerations - that 
is, what reasons -will count at all. 149 
Narratives, rather than rules or decisions, are at the centre of the Christian moral 
vision. This does not only mean that Christian ethics is shaped by the scriptural story. 
It also means that Christians become morally accountable by telling stories. Hence an 
important aspect of moral training is cultivating the skill of description. 
A corollary to Hauerwas' commitment to narrative is attention to the importance 
of description in the Christian understanding of the moral life. The moral power of 
description is considered by Hauerwas (along with David Burrell) in the essay 'Self-
Deception and Autobiography: Reflections on Speer's Inside the Third Reich'. 150 In 
Speer's life, description was a powerful two-edged sword. It was the instrument by 
which Speer disguised the reality of what he was doing and who he was becoming. 
This gets at the heart of what Hauerwas means by the word sin. Sin, Hauerwas states, 
is a 'positive attempt to overreach our power as creatures ... its fundamental form is 
self-deception. 151 Speer's self-deception was a kind of wilful epistemological crisis, 
in which he protected his fragile 'webs of illusion' by skilfully confusing and denying 
his true identity and the true meaning of his actions. The other edge of the sword is 
that Speer's autobiography, as an instrument of disclosing the truth, allowed Speer to 
147 Hauerwas applauds the Rev. Jerry Falwell's efforts to provide single, pregnant women with the 
resources to allow them to bring the unborn baby to full term. This kind of embodied ethic undermines 
the pervasive cynicism that the church is willing to make 'all sorts of ethical pronouncements but 
seems unwilling to sacrifice its own resources to back up those pronouncements.' Stanley Hauerwas 
and William Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 
1989),p.71. 
148 The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 42 & 43. 
149 Hauerwas and Burrell, 'From System To Story', p. 166. 
150 Stanley Hauerwas and David B. Burrell, 'Self-Deception and Autobiography: ~eflec.tions on 
Speer's Inside the Third Reich " in Truthfulness and Tragedy (Notre Dame, IN: UmversIty of Notre 
Dame Press, 1973 ), pp. 82-100. 
151 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 46. 
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find his way back from his self-deception. 152 Hauerwas' intention is to show the 
powerful function of description in Speer's life in first disguising and then disclosing 
the truth. 
It is important to see Speer as a different character from Hannah Arendt's 
depiction of Adolf Eichmann in The Banality of Evil. Speer's complicity with evil 
was more complex and demanded a more sophisticated narrative to sustain his self-
deception. Hauerwas notes that if Speer had been 'a dedicated and committed Nazi ... 
his actions would be intelligible.' 153 Because Speer does not fit this description, his 
seduction to evil is all the more interesting as a case study. Speer was rather a well-
schooled intellectual and a humane and loving father. Clearly he was tom between 
his intellectual and moral loyalties and his inexplicable loyalty to Hitler in the role of 
'Hitler's architect'. Although he was dedicated to many of Hitler's programs, Speer 
did not accept Hitler's other advisors and was 'repulsed at Hitler's crude 
propaganda. '154 How then could he justify his own complicity in the inhuman 
treatment of other human beings? The question plagues Speer as he states: 
What preys on my mind nowadays has little to do with the standards of Nuremberg 
nor the figures on lives I saved or might have saved for in either case I was moving 
within the system. What disturbs me more is that I failed to read the physiognomy 
of the regime mirrored in the faces of those prisoners - the regime whose existence 
I was so obsessively trying to prolong during those weeks and months. I did not see 
any moral ground outside the system where I should have taken my stand and 
sometimes I ask myself who this young man really was, this young man who has 
now become so alien to me, who walked through the workshops of the Linz 
steelworks or descended into the caverns of the Central Works twenty-five years 
ago. 155 
The decisive moment in sustaining his self-deception came when Speer was warned 
by a friend to avoid Auschwitz. Speer recalls purposely refusing to ask for a further 
explanation, recognising that this description would have been impossible to reconcile 
with his political commitments. Reflecting on the meaning of his self-deception, 
Speer states: 
For from that moment on, I was inescapably contaminated morally; from fear of 
discovering something which might have made me tum from my course. I had 
closed my eyes. This deliberate blindness outweighs whatever good I may have 
done or tried to do in the last period of the war. Those activities shrink to nothing in 
152 Hauerwas and Burell, 'Self-Deception and Autobiography', p. 82. 
153 Hauerwas and Burell, 'Self-Deception and Autobiography', p. 90. 
154 Hauerwas and Burell, 'Self-Deception and Autobiography', p. 90. 
ISS Hauerwas and Burell, 'Self-Deception and Autobiography', p. 90, quoting Albert Speer, Inside the 
Third Reich (New York: Avon Books, 1970), p. 480. 
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the face of it. Because I failed at that time, I still feel to this day responsible for 
Auschwitz in the wholly personal sense. 156 
Speer's self-deception owed itself to his ability to avert his moral gaze from evil. He 
had been assimilated into a system that, in not admitting self~riticism, did not allow 
those within the system to 'step back' from themselves. This leads us to ask how 
self-deception might be overcome? The answer is that one must learn to see 
differently. One must somehow be introduced into the 'appropriate disciplines' that 
teach one to see by the light of an alternative story. 157 On the matter of moral sight, 
Hauerwas quotes David Hamed: 
Seeing is never simply a reaction to what passes before our eyes; it is a matter of 
how well the eye is trained and provisioned to discern the richness and the terror, 
beauty and banality of the worlds outside and within the self. Decisions are shaped 
by vision, and the ways that we see are a function of our' character,' of the history 
and habits of the self, and ultimately of the stories that we have heard and with 
which we identify ourselves. 158 
So long as Speer remained a functional 'character' within the uncritical Nazi story, he 
would neither need nor would was he able to construct a critical re-description of his 
actions. In the absence of an alternative story, self-deception would be exposed by 
the shattering of the Nazi story. The moral importance of Speer's life is not 
understood until we recognise the moral power of story and description. 
Narrative and description are central features of the Christian moral vision. They 
provide that place of self~riticism needed for the moral life. However, Hauerwas 
cautions us not to think that narrative is sufficient in itself for moral life. Narratives 
and descriptions were instrumentally powerful in Speer's life because they were 
connected to the concrete moral culture of a political community. Narratives cannot 
be divorced from concrete communities. The biblical story addresses Christians as 
auditors of the story and as characters within the story. As auditors and actors, the 
Christian story can never be considered apart from the Christian's place in the 
ecclesial community. The narrative quality of Christian ethics means, for Hauerwas, 
that it is an ethic that is falsified if it is not embodied. Hence the church is every bit 
as important to Hauerwas' ethic as the polis was to Aristotle's ethic. 159 Let us now 
156 Hauerwas and Burell, 'Self-Deception and Autobiography', p. 91, quoting Speer, p. 481. 
157 Hauerwas and Burell, 'Self-Deception and Autobiography', pp. 95-96. 
158 Hauerwas and Burell, 'Self-Deception and Autobiography', p. 83, quoting David Harned, Faith and 
Virtue (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1973), pp. 29-30. 
159The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 119. 
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consider Hauerwas' understanding of the church as a moral polis or community of 
character. 
2.3. The Community of Character 
If the church intends to embody the Christian story in concrete deeds and practices, 
it will need the moral resources to be a counter-cultural community. 160 Thus, the 
function of moral discipline in the church is to train persons to live together within the 
Christian community and to live in opposition to the culture. This means that church 
and culture will be in conflict over their respective definitions of the self. Opposing 
the view of the unencumbered self of individualism, the Christian self is defined by its 
vertical and horizontal relationships. The notion of moral discipline within the church 
is a corollary to this view of the self. Morality merely expresses how one embodies 
these vertical and horizontal relationships. 
Because the Christian self is always a self in relationship, there is no authentic 
Christian life that is outside the church. 161 This view is necessarily offensive to 
individualist sensibilities. The reason for this, as MacIntyre notes, is that 
There is in the dominant moral culture of our particular time and place a widespread 
and influential conception of human beings as individuals who initially confront a 
range of possible objects of rational desire, a range of goods, among which each of 
them has to make her or his own choices, and which each individual has to rank 
(sic) order for her or himself, in accordance with her or his set of preferences. 162 
The modem self's identity is not as one who is a related character in a story but as one 
who makes isolated and individual choices. As such, this selfwill define freedom as 
detachment 'from oppressive claims of tradition and community. '163 A culture shaped 
by individualism cannot but resist the conception of the self as a disciple, as one who 
is defined by her commitment to a discipline. Such discipline is tantamount to self-
mutilation. To this negative vision of discipline, the Christian moral vision responds: 
'By cutting back our attachments and commitments, the self shrinks rather than 
grows. So an important gift the church gives us is a far richer range of options, 
commitments, duties, and troubles than we would have if left to our own devices. '164 
160 Hauerwas and Willimon, Resident Aliens, pp. 15-19. 
161 Stanley Hauerwas, 'The Gesture of a Truthful Story', in Christian Existence Today (Durham, NC: 
The Labyrinth Press, 1988), p. 102. 
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The self enters into the commitments and community in order not to be left alone. To 
be left alone is in a sense to be 'free' of others. Yet, if the self cannot grow in the 
virtues apart from others in community, this freedom turns out to enslave the self to 
the vices of self-centeredness and ultimately to loneliness. Hauerwas' church is a 
counter-cultural community that stands foursquare against the distorting freedom of 
individualism. Put another way, the church intends to cultivate 'resident aliens': 
characters who are capable of simultaneously participating in culture while taking a 
critical stance against culture. 
Hauerwas contends that a crucial challenge faces Christian ethics in the modem 
function of the Bible in North American churches. Simply put, until Christians learn 
to read the Bible correctly, there is little hope for an effective Christian ethics. 
Reading scripture wrongly has done untold damage to the church as a community of 
character. Reading scripture rightly holds out great promise as a means of restoring 
the church as a community of character. Hauerwas begins to define this task by 
referring to Kierkegaard's judgement that reading scripture is harmful to the life of 
the church. Hauerwas acclaims Kierkegaard a hero because, 'in fear and trembling, 
[he] had the courage to forbid people to read the Bible.' 165 This is a message with 
contemporary relevance. Hauerwas observes: 
No task is more important than for the Church to take the Bible out of the hands of 
individual Christians in North America. Let us no longer give the Bible to all 
children when they enter the third grade or whenever their assumed rise to Christian 
maturity is marked, such as eighth-grade commencements. Let us rather tell them 
and their parents that they are possessed by habits far too corrupt for them to be 
encouraged to read the Bible on their own. 166 
When scripture is read in an undisciplined manner, it is the source of self-deception. 
For Hauerwas, individualism has infected the ecc1esial community and corrupted the 
disciplined reading of the Bible. Individualism has so distorted North American 
Christians that now the church as a community of character is reduced to a voluntary 
organisation of like-minded, friendly people. 
The church exists in a buyer's or consumer's market, so any suggestion that in order 
to be a member of a church you must be transformed by opening your life to certain 
kinds of discipline is almost impossible to maintain ... The called church has become 
165 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures, p. 17. 
166 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures, p. 15. 
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the voluntary church, whose primary characteristic is that the congregation is 
friendly. 167 
In MacIntyre's terms, the church of H auerw as , description has abandoned the internal 
goods embodied in its disciplined spiritual and moral practices for the external goods 
of organisational well-being and superficial harmony. This distortion of the church is 
reflected in and caused by the distorted reading of the Bible. 
An individualist reading of scripture turns the Bible into either a dead book or a 
dangerous book. 168 The Bible becomes a dead book when the private self is the final 
arbiter of its interpretation and application. In this way, the Bible fails to function as 
that place to stand by which we are able to criticise our lives. Hauerwas insists that 
the 'hope of reclaiming the church as a disciplined body of disciples' requires that the 
church 'recover the discipline of the body that at least offers an alternative to the 
endemic individualism and rationalism of modernity.' 169 When the Bible is read 
wrongly, it becomes an echo of the self rather than a dialectical voice that challenges 
the self s deceptions. It is only a small step from the Bible as a dead echo of the self 
to the Bible as dangerous tool of self-deception. Having lost the moral authority to 
censure evil, the Bible may now be called on to sanction evil. 
Individualism has a corrosive effect on the reading of scripture in the church. 
Aided by the view that the Bible enjoys a unique 'epistemic status' 170 that allows the 
individual an unambiguously clear understanding of the Bible, scriptural 
interpretation is abstracted from tradition and the community, and given over to the 
individual reader. When the individual is the final authority of biblical interpretation 
there is no need for education in the disciplined community and cultivation of the 
intellectual and moral virtues needed to sustain dialectical arguments to advance this 
tradition. When the church is no longer responsible for the interpretation of scripture 
or the cultivation of readers, its reason for being is called into question. In short, the 
church becomes superfluous. Hauerwas makes clear that it is not his intention to call 
into question the claim of scripture as being the revelation and record of God's saving 
intention for the world. His task is to call into question the view that any 'person of 
167 Stanley Hauerwas, 'Discipleship as a Craft, Church as a Disciplined Community', in The Christian 
Century 108 (Oct. 1991), p. 881. 
168 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 98. 
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common sense possesses the ability to understand the Scripture without further aid.' 171 
Were the meaning of scripture immediately apparent to all people of common sense, 
we would naturally be adequate to the task of reading scripture. However the fact 
that we speak of the synoptic problem or that we catechise children in the right 
reading of scripture are signs that we possess no such natural skill. Hence Hauerwas' 
conclusion that 
the New Testament is hardly self-interpreting. We have, after all, four Gospels, 
each with its own particular emphasis. These differences are not necessarily 
incompatible, but neither is their interrelation clear. They must be interpreted, and 
that requires not only careful historical research, but, even more, our willingness to 
be morally formed in a manner appropriate to the claims of those texts. Indeed, the 
diversity of Scripture is at the heart of the Christian life insofar as it requires that we 
be a community, a church, capable of allowing these differing texts be read amongst 
us with authority.172 
This view of scripture raises the problem of how the Bible claims to be 
authoritative in the church when it is subject to multiple interpretations and 
applications. How does the ambiguity of scripture square with the claim that scripture 
is authoritative? For Hauerwas, the authority of scripture relates to its function in 
forming Christian character. When Christians are rightly formed, they read scripture 
rightly. And Christians are rightly formed by means of reading scripture rightly. 
Confronted again by the paradox of the Meno, we discover that Hauerwas offers a 
similar resolution to MacIntyre's. That is, in any craft or practice, one can only be 
transformed by means of membership in the disciplined community. This is why 
Hauerwas states that 'The church is crucial for Christian epistemology. We would not 
know enough to be moral without the colony.n73 We know scripture to be true 
because it fulfils its moral function in the community. It forms Christians by forming 
them to be right readers of the canonical text. 
In his treatment of scripture as a source for ethics, Jeffery Siker notes that 
Hauerwas's hermeneutic, like his notion of biblical authority, points directly to the 
life and role of the Christian community as indispensable to how one goes about 
interpreting Scripture ... For Hauerwas, church (Christian community) is 
inseparable from the process of interpretation and in fact is itself a living 
hermeneutic. 174 
171 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures, p. 31. 
172 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 70. 
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F or better or worse, Hauerwas' church is in its sum and substance a moral 
community. It is not merely analogous to the polis; it replaces the polis. Hence 
everything depends upon the moral formation of Christians. Hauerwas' commitment 
to moral formation leads him to see the church as a dialectical community. The 
church is thus sustained by an 'extended argument over time about the significance of 
that story and how best to understand it.' 175 Dialectical practices are crucial because 
'truth can only be known through struggle.' 176 Commitment to dialectical argument 
can only be sustained by a commitment to a community that deals with others in 
patience and trust rather than in 'coercion and falsehood."77 The authority of 
scripture depends upon the church being the kind of community that poses questions 
to and is questioned by the canonical authority. Within the church, the two practices 
designed to advance this dialectical conversation are individual confession and 
casuistry. 
For Hauerwas, the church must institutionalise certain dialectical practices. This 
commitment to argument reflects MacIntyre's view that such dialectical practices are 
essential for sustaining accountability within a community and between rival 
communities. MacIntyre identifies the university lecture and the practice of auricular 
confession as model dialectical practices. Although the abuse of the confessional is 
well-documented, MacIntyre also recognises its positive potential for the noncoercive 
education of community members. Confession is noncoercive precisely because it 
offers an institutionally acceptable means for persons to undergo the kind of 
'interrogations through which accountability is realized.' 178 Confession is an 
occasion whereby one's skills in seeing reality are tested by a proven 'master'. It is 
practice that allows the morally unskilled to become skilled in learning how to apply 
the teachings of the church to one's experience. Accepting this positive view of 
confession allows for the kind of confrontation of self-deception that, as I noted, was 
so absent in the case of Speer. For this reason, Hauerwas writes, 
We must be trained to see ourselves as sinners, for it is not self-evident. Indeed, 
our sin is so fundamental that we must be taught to recognize it; we cannot perceive 
its radical nature so long as we remain formed by it. Sin is not some universal 
tendency of humankind to be inhumane or immoral, though sin may involve 
inhumanity and immorality. Weare not sinful because we participate in some 
175 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 107. 
176 A Community o/Character, p. 85. 
177 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 102-103. 
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general human condition, but because we deceive ourselves about the nature of 
reality and so would crucify the very one who calls us to God's kingdom.179 
Confession is personal though not 'private' in the modem understanding of the 
tenn. In this practice, the importance of the individual in community is 
acknowledged even as individualism is rejected. When confession is in good order, it 
is a communal practice for cultivating selves by non-coercive means. Interrogation is 
not the aim of confession. The model must be more like the conversations between 
master and apprentice. Hauerwas is keenly aware of how church practices become 
defonned when they become rules rather than practices. Thus, if confession is not to 
be misunderstood as a heteronomous moral imposition, it must be closely linked to 
baptism and the promise of reconciliation. 
Confession cannot be the imposition of power over individual consciences nor 
can it promote a romantic notion of reconciliation. The question is how a practice that 
teaches Christians to 'learn to name their sins' relates to the satisfaction of our natural 
desire for peace and reconciliation. 180 Hauerwas responds by noting that confession 
allows one to 'place myself as a creature of a gracious God', albeit one whose natural 
tendency leans toward 'infidelity and rebellion. '181 Our desire for peace is subverted 
by our tendency to be unfaithful. Confession frees us from having to 'deny our past, 
or tell ourselves false stories, as now we can accept what we have been without the 
knowledge of our sin destroying us.' 182 As a dialectical practice, confession aims to 
confront and criticise. Yet confession must do more: it must culminate in absolution. 
The absolution assures us that to be confronted by the truth does not destroy the self. 
Rather, it is an instrument of reconciling the self to the vertical and horizontal 
relationships that are essential for human flourishing. 
Another dialectical practice that Hauerwas attempts to rescue for his Protestant 
readership is that of casuistry. Casuistry, like confession, has a history of abuse that 
tends to mask its positive function within the ecclesial community. 183 Hauerwas 
179 The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 30-31. 
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. s of cases began with a strong affirmation of Christian ideals; but as the cases became more 
sene k d . th ·d plex the loftiness and rigor of those ideals faded into the bac groun ... CasUlstry, ey sal, 
~~;ense~ "cheap grace" by showing Christians how to evade the imperative call of their Lord "to sell 
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intends to recover the practice of casuistry by showing this positive function in 
sustaining the life of the Christian community. This task requires that he show why 
casuistry is not synonymous with legalism. Hauerwas defines casuistry as follows: 
What I mean by casuistry, then, is not just the attempt to adjudicate difficult cases 
of conscience within a system of moral principles, but is the process by which a 
tradition tests whether its practices are consistent (that is, truthful) or inconsistent in 
the light of its basic habits and convictions or whether these convictions require new 
practices and behavior. 184 
Casuistry serves two positive benefits within the ecclesial community. First, it is 
a way in which the church remains attentive to the founding narrative of the Christian 
community. The church address particular acts, problems and decisions by 
remembering the story of salvation and arguing over its application in particular 
instances. Second, as casuistry sets aside regular occasions for disagreement within 
an institution, this practice acknowledges the positive function of disagreement for 
moral progress. Moreover, as these occasions allow for open disagreement about how 
a community is ordered, those within an institution will be less apt to resort to 
coercive or manipulative measures. Casuistry is essential to the Christian moral life 
because it is an important way that Christians eschew the modem notion of absolute 
autonomy and attempt to be faithful to 'the conviction that we belong to another.' 185 
This call to be faithful does not, however, exclude the indeterminacy that comes of 
Christian freedom and so requires that the body of Christ continually find ways to 
sustain its unity 'from generation to generation.' 186 This unity is not achieved by 
articulating and asserting moral rules but by the continued remembrance of the story 
of God's intervention and salvation and its application to the present life of the 
church. Casuistry can only be appreciated as a positive occasion of disagreement 
when this form of moral deliberation is centred in the act of remembering the 
canonical story that promises peace in times of conflict. With this promise, the 
church may be confident in its belief that openness to internal and external 
disagreement is essential for achieving reconciliation. 
all and come follow Him.'" The Abuse o/Casuistry: A History 0/ Moral Reasoning (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1988), p. 238. 
184 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 120. 
185 A Community o/Character, p. 130. 
186 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 107. 
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Hauerwas' church, not unlike MacIntyre's university, is to be a place of 
restrained intramural conflict. 187 Although the general shape of the church's life is 
outlined in the story of salvation, there is much that remains to be 'hammered out'. In 
the early church, debates waged over a Christian's service in the military, to what 
extent Christians should c(H)perate with pagans, whether it was permissible to make 
civil vows, or how one ought act in times of persecution. 188 These questions had great 
potential for division and so the church had to be capable of having significant 
disagreement that would not result in schism. 189 This view of the church would no 
doubt surprise many who view conflict as incompatible with the well-ordered peace 
of the community. Contrary to this perception, Hauerwas' view is that the absence of 
dialectical conflict is responsible for disorder in the ecc1esial community. Failing to 
render ourselves vulnerable to dialectical challenge means that we will not know the 
implications of our participation in the story of Jesus. It is in struggle that we 
discover the relevance of our commitments. 
Openness to dialectical testing reflects a trust in the promise of reconciliation 
within and without the church. Because the church is committed to a story that 
promises transcendent peace, it is capable of risking temporal peace and temporary 
defeat as it remains 'open to challenge from sources outside the Christian 
community.' 190 The practice of casuistry within the church cultivates openness to 
testing and criticism from those outside the church. Having cultivated the skill of 
dialectical conversation within the church, Christians are readied to engage in 
dialectical conversation with the world, in the hope that they may learn from the 
world. Hauerwas' example of this residual benefit of outreach is how the church has 
learned more about its own commitment to non-violence because these non-violent 
traditions have questioned the church's own use of violence in the past. Through this 
kind of criticism, the church is compelled to reconsider the implications of its 
teachings and commitments. 
The church's beliefs become intelligible through dialectical struggle. The 
commitment to those practices that test belief is utterly crucial for an institution that 
values its tradition. Whenever the church has failed to render itself vulnerable to 
187 cr. Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Reconceiving the University and the Lecture', Three Rival Versions, pp. 
216-236. 
188 Hauerwas, In Good Company, p. 179. 
189 Hauerwas, In Good Company, p. 175. 
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testing, its common life becomes 'nothing more than the unreflective following of a 
tradition of conduct in which we have been brought up. '191 Once more, Hauerwas 
defines his emphasis on dialectical struggle by diminishing the emphasis on moral 
rules. The church cannot foster a view of obedience as unquestioned following of 
commands and customs. As MacIntyre's account of taboo rules suggests that 
unquestioned adherence easily leads to unquestioned disregard for rules. Although 
moral rules are indispensable for the life of any community, the morality of a 
community cannot be reduced to moral rules. Hauerwas argues that moral rules are 
only intelligible insofar as they are embedded in a shared understanding of the 
internal good of the community. Once these rules are connected to a shared 
commitment to the good of the community, they may now serve two functions. 
According to MacIntyre: 
The first would be a set of precepts enjoining the virtues, those dispositions without 
the exercise of which the good cannot be achieved, more particularly if the good is a 
form of life which includes as an essential part the exercise of the virtues. The 
second would be a set of precepts prohibiting those actions destructive of those 
human relationships which are necessary to a community in which and for which 
the good is to be achieved and for which the virtues are to be practiced. Both sets of 
precepts derive their point, purpose, and justification from the telos, but in two very 
different ways. To violate the second type of precept is to commit an act 
sufficiently intolerable to exclude oneself from that community in which alone one 
can hope to achieve the good. Thus the absolute prohibition of certain specifiable 
kinds of actions finds a necessary place within a certain type of teleological 
framework. 192 
Moral rules are indispensable because they concisely define the commitments of the 
church community. However, the intelligibility of any rule depends upon 
understanding its relationship to the te/os of the community. When the relationship 
between a prohibition and one's positive commitments is unclear, moral rules become 
unintelligible. That is, one cannot give rational reasons for obedience, nor are there 
good reasons to be offered against disobedience. Emphatically, it is only by means of 
dialectical testing that Christians come to appreciate how moral rules are signs of the 
positive participation in the good of the community of character. 
190 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 120. 
191 Gilbert Meilaender, Faith and Faithfulness: Basic Themes in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991) p. 3, quoting Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and 
Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1962) p. 61. . . , . 
192 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 118-119, quotIng Alasdarr MacIntyre, Theology, Ethics, 
and the Ethics of Medicine and Health Care', Journal o/Medicine and Philosophy 4 (1979), p. 437. 
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The teleological structure that renders moral rules intelligible presents us with 
a new difficulty of reconciling the notion of freedom with the view that there is a 
rational, objective, teleological shape to the Christian life. This brief inquiry into 
moral freedom should not be side-tracked by Hauerwas' frequent criticisms of the 
modem notion of freedom. When he argues that obedience is not tantamount to 
enslavement to rules or that the church must not be uncritical of its tradition and 
commitments, he is arguing for a certain kind of freedom in the Christian life. It is 
because freedom and self-determination are essential aspects of the Christian life that 
we need the dialectical practices to continually call our exercise of freedom into 
question. How then can freedom be reconciled with form? 
Like MacIntyre, Hauerwas appeals to the craft analogy to show how freedom 
is not incompatible with a teleological form. Freedom is not merely a freedom/rom 
form, duties, commitments and the like. Freedom is a freedom/or participation in a 
certain form of life. The apprentice aspires to participate in the craft as a master. In 
order to achieve this freedom, certain virtues and skills must be cultivated. The 
Christian version of freedom is similar. However, unlike a craft, participation in the 
Christian life is not always clear. Hence if one asks what is the form according to 
which Christians are cultivated, Hauerwas' answer is to point to the Christian cultus. 
As worship ritualises the Christian story, the shape of the liturgy is the clearest 
expression of the teleological shape of the Christian life, and so is an important way to 
think about the shape of Christian ethics. 'Because the Christian story is an enacted 
story,' Hauerwas writes, 'liturgy is probably a much more important resource than 
are doctrines or creeds for helping us to hear, tell, and live the story of God. '193 In 
worship, the Christian is a hearer and doer of the story. To perform the liturgy is to 
articulate and enact the story of God's intervention and salvation in ritual action. By 
understanding worship as enactment or performance, Hauerwas draws an important 
connection with ethics. What is the moral life but the practical performance of one's 
role in the story of God's salvation? Because there is a close relationship between 
worship and morality, Hauerwas argues that the ritual enactment of the liturgy is a 
critical aid to Christian ethical reflection. 
Worship is not an arbitrary assemblage ofsomeone's private desires, likes or 
will. The liturgy is rather the ritual expression of the church's standard of excellence. 
193 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 26. 
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Worship ought not seek to be pragmatically effective. Because 'good' worship best 
expresses the trajectory of the Christian story, it also best expresses the moral shape 
of the Christian life. Hauerwas spells out the implications of the relationship between 
worship and ethics in his seminary course entitled 'Teaching Christian Ethics as 
Worship'. The course is structured in the following way. 
Worship and Life 
Gathering and Greeting 
Confession and Sin: Race, Class, Gender 
Scripture and Proclamation: Virtues and the Ministry 
Baptism: Marriage, Sex, and the Family 
Offering, Sacrifice, and Eucharist: Economic Justice, War, and Peace 
Sending Forth 194 
Describing the relationship of ethics to worship, Hauerwas writes: 
any account of truthfulness as well as the rationality of theological convictions 
cannot be considered apart from worship. Through worship, we not only come to 
know God, but we are changed by our knowledge of God, morally and also 
rationally. Once theology is liturgically shaped, we may hope to recover theology 
as a tradition-determined craft in contradiction to the ahistorical accounts of truth 
and rationality so characteristic ofmodemity.195 
Christian ethics, like Christian worship, begins in the name of the triune God. By 
asserting this, Hauerwas not only rejects midair ethics, but also an ethic that begins 
'from below' in search of general anthropological insights. In an act of self-
evaluation, Hauerwas recognises that in aiming at intelligibility, he had not 
sufficiently attended to his own insistence on the theological starting point of 
Christian ethics: 
In spite of everything I was trying to do to sustain the integrity of Christian speech, 
despite my repeated attempts to reclaim the Christian qualifier for how we think about the 
character of the Christian life, when all is said and done I may have done nothing more 
than reproduced Durkheim, albeit with an ecclesiological twist. 196 
194 The course is discussed in the essay, 'Teaching Christian Ethics as Worship', in, In Good Company, 
pp. 153-168. Meilaender criticises the linkage of worship with ethic~ because it confus~s th~ ~roper 
work of the church with the proper work of academic theology. Mellaender does not think It IS the task 
of the academic to teach students to 'live the life of praise more faithfully.' He states that such a course 
'sounds fme until we begin to consider that his calling is precisely to teach his students to think more 
clearly and precisely about Christian theology and ethics. In noting this we need not suppose t~at . 
thought should be divorced from practice, as if a "mer~" acade~c exercise ~ere wh~t we had m mmd. 
But Jesus did command us to learn to love God also WIth the mmd - that too IS part, If only part, of a 
life of praise. ' 'Keeping Company', review of Stanley Hauerwas, In Good Company: The Church as 
Polis (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), First Things 66 (Oct., 1996), p. 52. 
195 Hauerwas, In Good Company. p. 156. 
196 Hauerwas, 'Which God? Whose Morality?', pp. 1-2. 
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The attempt to render Christian belief intelligible by linking it with 'insights' into 
universal human experience is a failed apologetic strategy.197 Such moral insights, 
once divorced from the worship of God, are 'empty.' 198 The apologetic strategy fails 
because it presumes that there is a moral kernel that is intelligible apart from the 
attendant theological claims. 199 Apologetics ignores the importance of the Christian 
community when it views the self as a rational individual who is naturally adequate to 
comprehend Christian truth-claims. Hauerwas counters this view by insisting that 
Christian worship and ethics are practices that make sense only if the Christian is 
defined by his or her vertical and horizontal relationships.20o 
Two aspects of Hauerwas' assertion reveal why his ethic is centred in the 
ecc1esial community. The first has to do with the Christian life as a practice. 
Hauerwas argues that participation in any practice does not come naturally; it requires 
the cultivation of the right kinds of habits and disciplines. Reflecting MacIntyre's 
account of the apprentice's dependence on the master, Hauerwas says that the 
Christian life 'requires that one be in contact with those ethical aristocrats who are 
good at living the Christian faith. '201 Elsewhere he states 'To learn to be "moral" 
therefore necessarily requires a guide. '202 Participation in the moral and liturgical life 
presumes that one is horizontally related to a moral, worshipping community. 
As this ecc1esial community begins its activity by invoking the name of the triune 
God, it defines the self s dependence in terms of the vertical relationship with God. 
This vertical dependence is a corollary to the doctrines of creation ex nihilo and the 
incarnation. The cosmos is a creation and not an emanation. Therefore there is no 
necessary harmony between deity, creature, and creation. As a creation, made out of 
nothing, the cosmos is utterly contingent upon the gracious initiative of God. 203 This 
accent on dependency is reflected in Hauerwas' assertion that Aquinas' so-called 
proofs for God's existence are unintelligible apart from the incarnation. Hauerwas 
197 Hauerwas, 'Which God? Whose Morality?', pp. 6-7. 
198 Hauerwas, 'Murdochian Muddles', p. 158. 
199 A Community o/Character, p. 89. 
200 Hauerwas, 'Which God? Whose Morality?', p. 2, n. 5. 
201 Hauerwas and Willimon, Resident Aliens, p. 102. 
202 A Community o/Character, p. 270, n.8. 
203 Hauerwas, 'Murdochian Muddles', p. 163-4. Hauerwas also cites David Burrell, Freedom and 
Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre. Dame ~ress, 19~3), p, 9, who 
'tes 'It is the freedom of divinity to act, in creating and in revealmg, whIch constItutes the nub of the 
wn , d l' fth' 
tI' n of creator which both Maimonides and Aquinas consider to be the e Iverance 0 e sCrIptures. no 0 d' th th 
A d 'f that freedom means primarily that the act of creating is a spontaneous an graCIOUS one, en e n I th' ' th b ,. God who so creates is fulfilling no natural need and has no mg to gam ere y. 
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first notes that Aquinas aimed at demonstration, and that any demonstration must be 
appropriate to its object. This means the only appropriate demonstration of God's 
existence could be Jesus Christ as God incarnate.204 Citing Aquinas' commentary on 
St. John's Gospel, Hauerwas writes that as 'creatures were not sufficient to lead to a 
knowledge of the Creator ... it was necessary that the Creator himself come into the 
world in the flesh, and be known through himself. '205 Because 'creatures were not 
sufficient', the incarnate Creator also established the church to continue with this 
ministry. 
Once we recognise that Hauerwas' is an ecclesial ethic, we must soon ask what 
church best embodies his view of the church. I suggest that this question accents a 
weakness in Hauerwas' work. At the beginning of this section I conj ectured that 
Hauerwas rescues MacIntyre's ethics from falsifying abstraction by giving 
MacIntyre's tradition and teleology a Christian content and by applying his work to 
the ecclesial context. For as important as this move is, Richard Hays still thinks that 
Hauerwas' writings suffer from a certain abstraction. It turns out that Hauerwas' 
ecclesial community is as difficult to find as MacIntyre's Benedictine community. 
Hays notes that Hauerwas' advocacy of an ecclesial ethic is fraught with ambiguity. 
The reason for this is Hauerwas' admission that, being a Methodist 'of doubtful 
theological background' with strong affections for the Roman Catholic and 
Anabaptist traditions, he is best described as a 'high-church Mennonite' .206 Treating 
this designation with more seriousness than does Hauerwas, it is a clue to a serious 
problem of which Hauerwas himself is at least partly aware when he says: 
Perhaps the reason I stress so strongly the significance of the church for social 
ethics is that I am currently not disciplined by, nor do I feel the ambiguity of, any 
concrete church. Such a position could be deeply irresponsible, as it invites 
intellectual dishonesty ... .1 find I must think and write not only for the church that 
does exist but for the church that should exist if we were courageous and faithful. ,207 
Even with this explanation about the church to which Hauerwas writes, there remains 
a troubling ambiguity in his view of the church that causes at least two problems that I 
will mention but not discuss in detail. First, Hauerwas seems not to take seriously the 
profound divisions within the Christian church. Hence he never discusses the 
practical problem of discerning the marks of the 'true' church. Those who would take 
204 Hauerwas, 'Which God? Whose Morality?', p. 4. 
205 Hauerwas, 'Which God? Whose Morality?', p. 6. 
206 Hays, The Moral Vision o/the New Testament, pp. 264-265. 
143 
him seriously need to know which church best embodies Hauerwas' vision. Since the 
church as a community of character is essential to Hauerwas' ethics, it is desirable 
that he should distinguish the authentic from the failed moral communities. Second, 
if, as Hauerwas claims, scripture can only be read in a concrete community, and as 
there is no community committed to the high-church Mennonite position with which 
he identifies himself, Hauerwas 'himself should be incapable of interpreting Scripture 
rightly. '208 
Answering these criticisms seems urgent if, as Hauerwas claims, 'the 
intelligibility and truthfulness of Christian convictions reside in their practical force. ' 
Quite apart from the problems ofHauerwas' radical pragmatism, the intelligibility and 
truthfulness of Hauerwas' ethics depends upon his ability to identify a concrete 
church. Hays states that 'Hauerwas' hermeneutical position comes unraveled in the 
midst of the pragmatic task that he deems essential for the intelligibility of Christian 
ethics. The New Testament falls mute, muzzled by the unfaithful church. '209 These 
criticisms ought not diminish the positive contribution of Hauerwas in appropriating 
MacIntyre's work for Christian ethics. Hays acknowledges this in stating that 
Hauerwas' work 'bears eloquent witness to the power of the New Testament stories 
for forming the church. '2\0 Rather, these criticisms direct us to the next step in the 
argument. 
Thus far I have argued that MacIntyre provides a correct account of our moral 
problem in that emotivism has left us morally inarticulate. MacIntyre's positive 
response is to offer an important though finally insufficient account of moral 
rationality that is centred in the moral community and the canonical narrative. 
Hauerwas' importance is that he has applied these positive and negative arguments to 
his understanding of Christian ethics, so that we are able to see the church as a moral 
polis and the Bible as its moral narrative. However, both MacIntyre and Hauerwas 
suffer from the same problem of abstraction. What MacIntyre and Hauerwas have 
done is to put me in a position to move from abstraction and apply their writings to 
the problem of ethics for North American Lutheranism. I will do this in two steps. In 
the following chapter, I consider the work of the Lutheran theologian Gilbert 
207 A Community 0/ Character, p. 6. 
208 Hays, The Moral Vision a/the New Testament, p. 265. 
209 Hays, The Moral Vision a/the New Testament, p. 265. 
210 Hays, The Moral Vision a/the New Testament, p. 266. 
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Meilaender, as a rebuttal to MacIntyre's claim that 'rational' and 'Lutheran' are 
incompatible terms. After this, in the final chapter, I shall argue that, in the light of 
MacIntyre's critical account of emotivism and moral inarticulacy, a Lutheran ethic is 
necessary, and that it is necessary for Lutheran ethics to attend to MacIntyre's 
constructive account of the teleological framework of moral rationality. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SIMULTANEITIES IN GILBERT MEILAENDER 's ETHICS 
In the previous chapter I considered Stanley Hauerwas' appropriation of 
MacIntyre's moral philosophy for his ecc1esial ethics. Two important conclusions 
emerged from that discussion. First, Hauerwas demonstrates a certain unproblematic 
ease in applying MacIntyre's work on character, community and narrative to the 
ecc1esial context. Second, by understanding the church as MacIntyre's community of 
virtue and the story of scripture as that overarching teleological narrative, Hauerwas 
rescues MacIntyre's work from falsifying abstractness. In this chapter, I shall, at 
once, build on Hauerwas' appropriation of MacIntyre's ethic for Christian ethics 
while also arguing that a certain distance must be kept between a Lutheran ethic and 
Hauerwas' understanding of Christian ethics. 1 Consider further this second point. 
Hauerwas demonstrates the importance of both MacIntyre's critical and 
constructive writings for Christian ethics. However, in accepting MacIntyre as a 
source for Christian ethics, Lutheranism is confronted with a two-fold problematic. 
Simply put, the problem is, if MacIntyre's understanding of our present moral crisis is 
accurate, a rational Lutheran ethic seems to be utterly necessary. The problem is that 
MacIntyre seems to argue that such a rational ethic is not possible for the Lutheran 
theological tradition. This problematic of the possibility and necessity of a Lutheran 
ethic is addressed in this and the following chapters. In treating the possibility of a 
rational Lutheran ethic, the first section of this chapter briefly considers MacIntyre's 
reasons for calling the possibility of a rational Reformation ethic into question. I 
conclude that MacIntyre is finally wrong in his dismissal of a rational Reformation 
ethic, though he is not fully wrong in pointing out certain problems within 
Reformation ethics. Accordingly, I shall argue that a rational Lutheran ethic is 
theoretically possible while acknowledging that the Lutheran theological tradition's 
struggle with two forms of irrationality - antinomianism and dogmatism - is the sign 
of a certain disorder within the Lutheran tradition. 
In this chapter I shall argue that Lutheranism is a theological tradition which is 
capable of overcoming these errors. I do this in the second section of this chapter by 
attending to the ethics of the Lutheran theologian Gilbert Meilaender. Meilaender has 
not only shown how rational ethical reflection is compatible with Lutheran 
theological commitments but has done so in a way that resolves the Maclntyrean 
problematic, namely that Meilaender's ethics is directed toward and applicable to an 
existing church rather than being the ethic of an ahistorical community. However 
before I make this case for a positive Lutheran ethic, it is necessary to consider and 
respond to MacIntyre's more general criticism of Reformation ethics. 
1. From Reformation to Emotivism? 
MacIntyre's criticism of Reformation ethics is more a sweeping judgement than a 
developed argument. Nevertheless, his criticisms effectively call into question the 
claim that Reformation theology has the moral resources to overcome modem moral 
inarticulacy. 2 How MacIntyre comes to his conclusions may be outlined as follows. 
The modem world is confronted by a choice between Nietzsche and 
Aristotle/Aquinas. To reject the latter alternative is to accept the former. There is no 
third way. 3 Because Luther's ethics 'could not be further away from Aristotle' ,4 
Lutheranism, by default, suffers the errors of Nietzsche an irrationality. Similarly, 
MacIntyre points out how Luther's calling Aristotle 'The buffoon who mislead the 
Church', and his Ethics, 'the worst of all books', cuts this theological tradition off 
from the Thomistic moral resources that make rational moral reflection possible. 5 
MacIntyre further explains that it is 'not just that Aquinas' Christian 
Aristotelianism and Luther's Christian fideism are based on alternative and competing 
metaphysical schemes, it is also the case that they are providing an analysis of and 
I In his criticism of Meilaender's Lutheran two-fold understanding of the Christian life and the 
Lutheran emphasis on justification, Hauerwas articulates why the distance between his and Lutheran 
ethics must be maintained. Cf. Character And The Christian Life, p. xxix. .. 
2 MacIntyre's only systematic treatment of Luther is found in his A Short History O/EthICS, publIshed 
in 1966. In subsequent works, though the references to Luther are sparse, they are always critical and 
written to have aphoristic force. 
3 After Virtue, p. 118. 
4 A Short History 0/ Ethics, p. 122. 
5 After Virtue, p. 165. 
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insight into different moral vocabularies. '6 The ethics of Aquinas and Luther are 
radically incommensurate. Luther's intention is to make sense of 'the experience of 
an individual who is alone before God. n This focus leads Luther to treat the 
experience of death, rather than the experience of living, as the defining feature of 
human existence. Ethics aims at dying well rather than living well. In death, the self 
is stripped 'of all social attributes,' and is naked and alone before God. What matters 
is God's ahistoricaljudgement of the whole self, and not human action. By contrast, 
Thomistic/Aristotelian ethics emphasises the historical and communal life rather than 
the individual at the point of death. This difference, combined with the Lutheran 
distrust of reason, warrants MacIntyre's doubts about the possibility of a rational 
Lutheran ethic. 
Richard Mouw, arguing from the Calvinist perspective, considers MacIntyre's 
rejection of Protestant ethics to be based on a misreading ofhistory.8 The source of 
this error is the influence of Jacques Maritain's Three Reformers: Luther - Descartes 
- Rousseau9 on MacIntyre's perception of Protestant ethics. In summary, Maritain 
argues that Luther is in a category with Descartes and Rousseau in being responsible 
for a definition of the modem disordered self. Simply put, Maritain sees Luther as 
one of the key sources of emotivism. 
The Lutheran Refonnation, Maritain wrote, brought about 'the Advent of the Self.' 
Luther's 'swollen consciousness of the self led him to celebrate the 'individual 
will, cut off from the universal body of Christ ... [standing] solitary and naked 
before God and Christ in order to ensure its justification and salvation by its trust.' 10 
This view of the self is reflected in, inter alia, Kant's 'shrivelled up' autonomous self, 
and the Nietzschean attempt 'to jump beyond good and evil.' II Beginning with 
Luther, the emergence of the emotivist selfruns through two Lutherans, Kant and 
Kierkegaard, then reaches its nadir in the erstwhile Lutheran, Nietzsche. The 
inescapable conclusion is that Protestantism 'is part of the problem; it does not figure 
into MacIntyre's solution.' 12 
6 A Short History of Ethics, p. 125. 
7 A Short History of Ethics, p. 125. 
8 Richard Mouw, The God Who Commands (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 
fJ;:~ues Maritain, Three Reformers: Luther - Descartes - Rousseau (New York: Scribner, 1955). 
10 Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 56, quoting Maritain, Three Reformers, pp. 18 & 35. 
II Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 57. 
12 Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 58. 
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According to MacIntyre, The Reformation fostered three conceptual errors of 
secular ethics. These errors are that moral rules are unconditional in their demands 
and lack any rational justification, the moral agent is sovereign over his or her 
choices, and secular authority and power are can be justified apart from any appeal to 
the sacred. 13 These concepts correspond to the Reformation teaching that where God 
commands reason becomes unnecessary, that moral agents are best understood as 
autonomous, 'unroled' selves before God, and that this autonomy is further extended 
to the secular economic and political realm. In this view, Luther's only success is that 
he cleared the way for the emergence of the Enlightenment with all its errors by 
cutting off the branch of tradition upon which the Western world was sitting. The 
testimony of Luther's 'success' is the unhindered expansion of secularism and the 
corresponding marginalisation of theology. 14 
MacIntyre criticises Reformation theology for its failure to support moral 
assertions with rational justification. This leads MacIntyre to assert that as Reformed 
ethics, which implicates Lutheran ethics, seems to advocate a form of moral 
irrationality, it must be seen as a predecessor to emotivism. Mouw counters that 
MacIntyre's conclusion can only be sustained by being inattentive to the actual theory 
and practice of the Reformers. In one sense MacIntyre is correct to notice that within 
Reformed theology commands are to be obeyed and not argued. This is not a leap to 
the irrational but an attempt to take seriously the implications of an anthropology that 
views the self as a sinner who is incapable of or radically hampered from hearing and 
acting upon God's commands. It is not that rational justification of these commands 
is not possible. It is rather that sinners, not unlike MacIntyre's depiction of the 
excluded sophists and poets in Plato's view, are, to an important degree, unwilling to 
consider such rational arguments. Furthermore, for sinners, any residual knowledge 
of God's commands has an accusatory function so that the self qua sinner shrinks 
\3 A Short History of Ethics, p. 126-127. Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 63. 
14 The historian Robert Nisbet expresses a view similar to MacIntyre's he asserts, 'The line from the 
Lutheran revolt to later, secular-political revolutions .. .is clear, continuous, and vital.' For Nisbet, 
Luther's preoccupation w.ith 'indivi.dual faith a~d conscienc.e,' his. onslaught ag~inst th~ ~h~c~'~ 
authority and his theologIcal assertIOn of equalIty of status m Christ betrayed hIm as a nihIlIstIC 
revolutionary. Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in Western Thoug~t 
(New York: Washington Square Press, 1982~, p. 112. Mouw re~ponds to these charges by concedm~. 
that' [I]t might be possible to argue that whIle the Refo~ers ~Id not mean t~ set the. secular authontles 
free to pursue their own devices, they nonetheless made ~t ~~sIer for other thinkers SImpl~ to absolve 
civil rulers and economic agents from a sense of responSIbIlIty to anyone but themselves. Mouw, The 
God Who Commands, pp. 65-66. 
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from the commands which it barely understands. IS To say that the fallen self will not 
recognise good reasons for morality is not the same as saying there are no good 
reasons in support of morality. It is merely to acknowledge that the reasons the sinful 
self would count as good are opposed to God and the reasons that support the will of 
God seem to oppose to the fallen self. In MacIntyre's terms, Reformation theology 
understands God and human beings as coming from radically incommensurate 
perspectives. 
The question is whether or not God's commands must always seem irrational to 
sinners. According to MacIntyre's critique, given the Reformation's anthropology, 
obedience cannot be rationally vindicated by appealing to natural reason or desire. 
Therefore the demand for obedience must always seem to be 'criterionless' and 
'arbitrary' .16 These commands are Occamist in that 'they have no further rationale or 
justification than that they are the injunctions of God.' 17 According to Mouw, 
MacIntyre is wrong in his conclusion that appealing to God's command is arbitrary. 
The mistake is that MacIntyre does not take seriously how sin has created an 
epistemological gap so that the rationality of these divine commands is notfully 
apprehended by sinners. Whereas MacIntyre concludes that reason, for Reformation 
thinkers, is rejected, Mouw argues that within Reformation theology reason is only 
suspected. Which description of the Reformation is correct depends on whether 
Mouw is able to fit God's commands into MacIntyre's three-part teleological scheme. 
The Reformation's doctrine of sin may be viewed as a systematic consideration of 
that 'untutored', 'discrepant and discordant' state which, MacIntyre argues, is the 
disorder that initiates ethical reflection. The problem is that the Reformation notion 
of sin predicates an ignorance and impotence to the self that seems to undermine the 
other two aspects of the teleological scheme. Luther's view of the fallen self as 
ignorant means that this self is unable to know and desire 'human-nature-as-it-
could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos. ,18 Luther's view of the fallen self as impotent 
means that this self does not have the means to act in such a way as to make moral 
progress. This self depends solely on the means of grace. For Luther, good works are 
unnecessary for salvation because, as MacIntyre notes, 'none of our works are in any 
IS Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 60. 
16 After Virtue, p. 39. 
17 Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 59, quoting MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, p. 121. 
18 After Virtue, p. 53. 
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way good. They are all the product of sinful desire. ' Works are unnecessary because 
our transfonnation depends not on our deeds but on the 'hope for grace that we may 
be justified and forgiven' .19 In the end, 'what matters is not the action done or left 
undone, but the faith which moved the agent. '20 
F or MacIntyre, Luther's error is that he 'dismissed all pagan teaching as the devil' s 
work and sought to find in the Bible an all-sufficient guide. '21 Luther seems to have 
little need for rational argumentation or, for that matter, moral education. Philosophy 
was unnecessary because moral rules required 'no further rationale or justification 
than that they are the injunctions of God. '22 The moral life was reducible to obedience 
to 'the arbitrary fiats of a cosmic despot. '23 While moral behaviour is part of the 
Christian life, it does not in any way depend upon ethical reflection for intelligibility 
or accountability. Good reasons are reasons grasped by faith. The one thing needful 
is the conversion of the soul and not the transfonnation of actions. The moral self 
needs a preacher, not a philosopher; a point of conversion, not a continued practice; 
faith and not reason. What matters is inner faith and not external actions or 
arguments. MacIntyre sees this move to the inner self as the bridge between 
Protestant theology and emotivism. 
For Protestants, morality is mainly concerned with the inner will of the individual 
rather than concrete actions within a tradition and community. What matters is the 
will to act and not the action itself.24 In its discordant fallen state, human will is 
incapable of being transfonned by rational reasons or by habituated action. It must be 
moved by inner faith and not reasoned with. Given this view, it is difficult to know 
how one would distinguish between the reasons that faith gives and the reasons that 
emotivism gives. Both see actions as the result of the selfs inner motivation which 
19 A Short History of Ethics, p. 123. 
20 A Short History of Ethics, p. 122. Similarly, Hauerwas argues that the Refonnation's focus on 
justification is too centred in the individual (Cf. In Good Company, p.62). Meilaende~ co~ters with 
the assertion that Hauerwas is wrong in his view that 'the association of the RefonnatIon wIth 
presumptions of justification by fai~ through grac.e as.a center of the Gospel w~s a profound mistake,.' 
and that the Refonnation's fonnulatIon of theologIcal Issues around the alternatIves of gra~e and law IS 
'distinctly a side issue.' Rather than a side issue, Meilaender asserts that grace must remam central to 
any Christian account of the transfonnation of the self. 'Keeping Company', First Things 66 (Oct., 
1996), pp. 54 and 56. 
21 After Virtue, p. 167. 
22 A Short History of Ethics, pp. 121-122. 
23 A Short History of Ethics, p. 123. 
24 Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 63. 
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exercises moral sovereignty in its moral choices.25 Mouw states that in MacIntyre's 
account, 'it is but a short step from "Here I stand ... God helping me" of the 
Reformation to the unqualified "Here I stand" of the emotivist self. 26 
MacIntyre does not see how these two declarations are utterly incompatible. The 
former theological declaration cannot possibly be the predecessor of the latter denial 
of theology's central truth. Mouw writes that MacIntyre's account ignores 'the 
importance of the divine gaze. ' 
Once the individual self is seen as standing inescapably before the face of God, the 
apparent similarities between Reformation thought and the conceptions of 
modernity seem quite superficial. Is Nietzsche Luther-without-God? In a sense, 
perhaps, yes. But one strains for analogies: Is a corpse nothing but a human without 
a heartbeat?27 
MacIntyre fails to understand the Reformation's fallen self, and the theological 
suspicion of the reasoning powers of this self. The'!, of the Reformation can only be 
said to stand alone, unencumbered and isolated, if the existence of God is irrelevant. 
Said another way, the self of the Reformation is unintelligible unless it is first defined 
in vertical relationship to God whose commands orient the self toward God and 
toward others in horizontal roles of responsibility. Calvin's view is that one who 
'exempts himself from all judgements and wishes to rule in such a tyrannical fashion 
that he regards his own whim as law .. .is utterly abhorrent not only to a sense of piety 
but also of humanity. '28 This view is hardly compatible with Nietzsche's selfwho is 
the author of 'new tables of what is good' .29 
The Kierkegaard scholar C. Stephen Evans makes a similar criticism of 
MacIntyre's misreading ofKierkegaard's 'radical choice' presented in Either/Or. 
MacIntyre argues that Kierkegaard provides no objective way to decide between the 
aesthetic and ethical modes of life. Rather, one's view of life begins with an 
irrational, radical choice. Evans counters that Kierkegaard 
does not wish to show that Christianity is reasonable or that it is no more 
unreasonable than any other commitment. Rather he wants to show that 
Christianity is most definitely unreasonable, when analyzed from the perspective of 
a person who lacks faith or 'the condition' ... The really decisive episte~ological 
point being made by Climacus concerns what I should term the perspecttval nature 
25 Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 63. See also A Short History of Ethics, pp. 126-127. 
26 Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 66. 
27 Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 74. 
28 Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 74. Cf. Calvin's Institutes, II, II, 10 
29 After Virtue p. 114. 
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of human reason. Human reason is not a neutral arbiter of religious truth, but 
always expresses the character of the reasoner.30 
Whereas MacIntyre sees Kierkegaard as the predecessor to emotivism, Evans argues 
that Kierkegaard anticipates MacIntyre's view of the rationality of tradition. 
Similarly, Mouw argues that rather than Protestant theology paving the way to 
secularism, it resisted this move by calling into question the medieval understanding 
of natural law. 
On this version of the story, the Reformers saw the dangers of this unwarranted 
optimism about the capabilities of unregenerate reason. They sensed the coming 
onslaught against revelation from those who would attempt to grant complete 
autonomy to the natural mind ... The Reformers sensed that the medieval church had 
prepared the way for a cultural capitulation to secularism by granting legitimacy to 
natural reason, functioning apart from the acceptance of divine revelation. So they 
sought to join the issue at the most crucial point: the choice must be made between 
reason operating independently of revealed truth and reason captivated and 
transformed by divine grace.3l 
Reason, for the Reformers, could never be understood as sufficient once abstracted 
from the Christian tradition and revelation.32 
MacIntyre's account of the path from the Reformation to emotivism is defective as 
it does not sufficiently take into account the importance of the Fall for Reformation 
theology. Mouw seems to argue that, within Protestant theology, reason can be 
trusted only if it is first treated with suspicion. This Protestant suspicion of reason 
appears to MacIntyre to lead to Nietzschean irrationality because he fails to appreciate 
the tension in the Protestant account of reason. Because reason is capable of good and 
evil, a rational understanding of reason and rationality must be simultaneously able to 
trust reason and to treat it with suspicion. MacIntyre's error is that he does not see 
that this simultaneity is at the heart and centre of any Reformation ethic. This notion 
of simultaneity is central to understanding Gilbert Meilaender's Lutheran ethic, to 
which we now turn. 
2. Simultaneities and Furious Opposites 
My intent is not to treat the whole corpus ofMeilaender's writings, but to spell out 
the rationality of a Lutheran ethic in terms of certain defining simultaneities in 
30 C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments 
(Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 176-178. 
3l Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 67. 
32 Mouw, The God Who Commands, p. 69. 
153 
Meilaender's work.33 Meilaender, perhaps more than any other contemporary 
Lutheran theologian, has considered the 'tensed' relationship between Lutheran ethics 
and theology which requires that we learn to think in terms of simultaneities. In a 
dense passage, Meilaender defines the function of ethics in a fallen world with 
divided selves, where a gulf now exists between an action's aim and its result: 
No amount of ethical reflection can heal this rift in our nature. From that 
predicament we will have to look for a deliverance greater than ethics can offer. 
Here and now, however, in our broken world, we do better to take the aim of an act 
as our guiding light in describing and evaluating the act - and then evaluate the 
motive in light of this aim. This is better because moral reflection is not primarily a 
tool for fixing guilt and responsibility (in which case motive would come to the 
fore). It is, first and foremost, one of the ways in which we train ourselves and 
others to see the world rightly. 34 
Given the divided self in a broken world, ethics can do no more than serve a modest 
role in the theological task. To say that the task of ethics is modest does not mean 
that it is somehow irrational or that it is part of the path to emotivism. It is rather an 
attempt to define a more realistic role for ethical reflection in a divided, fragmented 
world where motive is divided from results and where our best intended actions have 
unintended consequences. It is not good news that matters tum out differently than 
agents intended. However, within a Lutheran theology, there are good reasons why 
the point of Lutheran ethics ought not be to affix blame ( or praise), but to learn to see 
the world rightly. But, in order to maintain this distance between the self and action, 
Lutheran theology maintains a distance between what I do and who I am. The 
question is whether it can preserve this distinction between the self and its actions 
without falling into the error of moral inarticulacy. That is the crucial task of 
maintaining the tension of simultaneity. 
Simultaneities grow out of the division between the body and soul, the view of the 
self as simu/ justus et peccator (simultaneously righteous and sinner), and a view of 
the Christian self and the Christian life as somehow finished and somehow 
incomplete. We see the world rightly only when we see it by these defining tensions. 
MacIntyre rightly raises the question of whether or not such theological commitments 
33 The limits of this thesis require that I neglect what I take to be Meilaender's most important work on 
friendship and the preferential loves. See, for example, Friendship: A Study In Theological Ethics 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 'When Harry and Sally Read the 
Nicomachean Ethics: Friendship between Men and Women', in ed. Leroy Butler, The Changing Face 
of Friendship (Notre Dame, IN: University o~No~e Dame Press, 1994), pp.183-:-196. 
34 Gilbert Meilaender, The Limits of Love (UmversIty Park, PA: The Pennsylvama State Press, 1987), p. 
92. (Hereafter: The Limits of Love.) 
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are capable of the kind of rational morality that is able to sustain the ecclesial 
community in these times of moral catastrophe. In order to see how Meilaender's 
ethic responds to MacIntyre's challenge, it is important to consider how Meilaender 
confronts certain MacIntyrean problems. 
According to Meilaender, MacIntyre's philosophy is not incompatible with 
Meilaender's theology. For example, he expresses appreciation for MacIntyre's 
critique of the Enlightenment and his positive tum towards an ethic of virtue. 
However, it is important to note the ways that Meilaender qualifies his acceptance of 
this critique. In the following passage, Meilaender seems to agree fully with 
MacIntyre's analysis of our moral fragmentation as he writes: 
[F]or MacIntyre we are not caught in some awkwardly intermediate stage. The 
barbarians are already in control! Ours is a world in which the moral life has no 
agreed-upon basis or structure. We imagine that we must find moral standards 
which can meet with universal acceptance even while we tend (in our subjectivist 
hearts) to believe that moral arguments can never be settled. We call loudly for a 
more meaningful public life to sustain our individual pursuits, but what we really 
care about - and will sacrifice for - are private goals and purposes. Ours is, in 
short, a badly fragmented society?5 
Whereas MacIntyre calls for immediate and radical action, Meilaender is less sure 
that the present transitional stage necessarily points toward further decline. While 
MacIntyre's analysis has certain purchase within academia, Meilaender states that it 
misses the 'partial bits of evidence for a resurgent ability of Christians to shape the 
moral life of our society. '36 
Meilaender relativises MacIntyre's assessment of modernity by referring to the 
moral fragmentation that characterised economic life in eleventh and twelfth century 
Europe. Citing historian Francis Oakley, Meilaender points to a time in Europe when 
the church was incapable of curbing the practice of usury or of ensuring just wages 
and prices.37 In spite of this apparent social fragmentation, there emerged the 
medieval university and the order of medieval society. And this should stand as a 
caution to those who presume to chart the decline and fall of any culture. Meilaender 
also suggests that such caution is warranted today, especially when we consider the 
surprising emergence of Christendom after the fall of Rome in the ensuing 'dark 
ages' . 
35 Faith and Faithfulness, p.7. 
36 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 8. 
37 Faith and Faithfulness. pp. 8-9. Cf. Francis Oakley, The Medieval Experience (New York: 
Scribner, 1974), pp. 97f. 
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Perhaps we are now in a position to 'trump' Alasdair MacIntyre's suggestion that 
we await a new 8t. Benedict. It may be that, especially in this time and place, we 
await a new 8t. Augustine! If this raises the stakes to a still more imposing level, it 
may nevertheless be a useful way to think about what Christian ethics needs at the 
present time. For we need more than a way to carve out a distinctively Christian 
life amidst the ruins of a surrounding civilization; we need also some way to 
maintain contact with all that is good in that civilization, to understand that if it is 
often vicious (in the technical, moral sense), its vice is, at least sometimes, 
'splendid. ,38 
Rather than withdrawal into MacIntyre's communities of virtue, Meilaender 
advocates continued contact between the church and the post-Christian culture. The 
virtue of hope which characterise St. Augustine's approach to the dying world of his 
time is markedly absent from MacIntyre's account of our present moral situation. 
Augustine refused to give into resignation by vigilantly seeking 'to make sense of his 
world, to find in it what meaning he could, to praise it wherever possible - but not to 
let the Christian life be definitively shaped by it. '39 To abandon hope would be to 
abandon the mission of the church to the world, either by retreating from the world or 
by an acquiescent accommodation to the world.40 Though Augustine lived at a time 
when the 'the moral and intellectual foundations' of his world 'appeared to have been 
shattered, he clung doggedly to a faith that. .. the secular effort of mankind had not 
been wholly in vain; and he was determined not to resign himself, like so many of his 
contemporaries, to the cult of futility. ,41 
The church must always seek common cause with the culture but must not seek 
to forge a commonwealth with the world. Whatever peace the church makes with 
culture is always provisional and uneasy.42 Forgetting the nature of this peace, the 
church is tempted to resolve the tension by withdrawing from or accommodating 
culture. The alternative is for the church to see the world rightly and so to affirm the 
good that remains even in those vices that reflect a certain kind of splendour. 
Augustine's approach to the world is missing in MacIntyre's writings, being 
particularly evident in his rejection of the possibility that aspects of individualism, 
capitalism and liberalism may offer partial solutions to current moral problems.43 
38 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 32. 
39 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 33 
40 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 7. 
41 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 33. Meilaender quoting Charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity and 
Classical Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 318. 
42 The Limits o/Love, pp. 131-132. . . 
43 See for example, Michael Novak's positive reading of Pope John Paul II's encychcal Centeslmus 
Annu;, in The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit o/Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1993), pp. 106-
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MacIntyre thus makes the mistake of prematurely resolving a necessary tension by 
advocating a form of sectarian withdrawal. 
While Meilaender is obviously not dependent on MacIntyre's work, he readily 
admits that Christian ethics has benefited from MacIntyre's notion of the rationality of 
a tradition. This account has made it easier for Christian ethicists to admit that their 
work is finally intelligible and plausible from within the Christian tradition. 
Meilaender makes this claim when he notes that ethics 'is and ought to be a 
theological discipline'.44 Consider his the introduction to his Bioethics: A Primer for 
Christians: 
I write as a Christian for other Christians who want to think about these issues. 
Anyone is, of course, welcome to 'listen in' and consider what the world looks like 
from this angle of vision, but the discussion is not aimed at 'anyone.' It is aimed at 
those who name as Lord the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob - and who believe 
that this Lord lived as one of us in Jesus of Nazareth. The two testaments of 
Christian Scripture bear witness to this God and authoritatively (even if often 
ambivalently) shape the vision of Christians when they turn to the contemporary 
concerns ofbioethics. It is obvious, of course, as a matter of empirical fact, that not 
all Christians agree with the judgements I make in this book. But when I attempt 
here to write Christian ethics, I do not mean that I have taken a survey of the 
opinions of Christians or written a history of their views. Rather, I have tried to say 
what we Christians ought to say in order to be faithful to the truth that has claimed 
us in Jesus.45 
Meilaender recognises that the authority of his arguments regarding what ought and 
ought not to be done in the field ofbioethics rests in the Christian tradition. These 
arguments, however, need not be unintelligible to outsiders even as he expects that, in 
reflecting on his recent visits to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, his 
arguments may not be persuasive. The twofold importance of Christian ethical 
reflection is that it is, on the one hand, one of the important ways that Christian 
commitments are rendered intelligible to those within the tradition, while, on the other 
hand, offers ways for Christians to engage those outside the tradition in dialectical 
conversation. 
While Meilaender's work has benefited in a general way from the impact of 
MacIntyre's writings, unlike Hauerwas' ethics, MacIntyre's work cannot be 
143. Also Richard John Neuhaus, Doing Well and Doing Good: The Challenge to the Christian 
Capitalist (New York: Doubleday, 1992). Also Stephen ~olmes offers a politic~l cri~que of Macintyre's 
antiliberalism in, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambndge, MA: Harvard UruversIty Press, 1993), pp. 
xi-xv & 88-120. 
44 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 7. 
45 Gilbert Meilaender, Bioethies: A Primer for Christians (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans. 
1996), pp. x-xi (my emphasis). 
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superimposed upon Meilaender's ethics. Simply put, it cannot because grace is a 
central accent in Meilaender's ethics. Consider how this understanding of grace is 
evident in Meilaender's critique of recent moves that disparage individualism for the 
sake of community. 
[T]he Christian community does not sustain itself or its way of life. The community 
does not play the decisive role in shaping the life of its children - a truth which 
receives eloquent witness when it hands those children as infants over to God in 
baptism with the prayer that their hearts may be created anew and that from such a 
heart the virtues of faith, hope, and love may flOW.46 
The sacramental practices of the church are opposed to any idolisation of human 
activity whether under the name of individualism or community. An ecclesial 
community that initiates its members through the sacramental act of baptism reminds 
itself that the identity and meaning of the baptised do not fully or finally depend upon 
the practices of that community. Community is perhaps more, but never less, than a 
gift which has been graciously bestowed. 
A central problem for a grace centred ethic is how to take human action seriously, 
but not too seriously. The task of Christian ethics is to think about what it means to 
act in a way that is faithful to God's prior acts. Because the Lutheran understanding 
of grace does not treat human action as of first importance, Christian ethics will 
exhibit a certain nonchalance about the ultimate significance of human action. This 
nonchalance is reflected in the reply of Paul Ramsey (Meilaender's 'doctor father') to 
MacIntyre's claim that Christianity is insufficiently rational. Before launching his 
reply to MacIntyre's assertion, Ramsey states that as a theological ethicist he would 
'approach grappling with MacIntyre's essay with a certain divine nonchalance about 
the outcome. '47 He then points out that the reason for the influence of theology on 
medical ethics in the past was not that the church aimed to give a universally 
compelling bioethics. It was rather that this influence grew out of the need of 
Christians to think about medical issues in relationship to their faith commitments. 
In later writings, MacIntyre himself offers a good description of Ramsey's point. 
It is therefore unsurprising that distinctively philosophical questions about morality 
are often enough nowadays explicitly posed by ordinary plain persons who have 
discovered that they need to learn, if they aspire to be rational, how to argue their 
way through these apparently problematic situations.48 
46 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 17. 
47Paul Ramsey, 'Kant's Moral Theology or A Religious Ethics?' in eds. H. Tristram Engelhardt and 
Daniel Callahan, Knowledge, Value and Belief (Hastings, NY: The Hastings Center, 1977), p. 45. 
48 MacIntyre, 'Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble?', p. 67. 
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Ramsey argues that the influence of Christian thinking on medical issues had its 
origin in the questions of plain Christians who sought guidance in reconciling these 
issues with their faith. It did not reflect any intention by the church to exercise 
influence on those outside the church. Any outside influence was a collateral benefit 
that accrued to the church as it sought merely to remain faithful. Ramsey countered 
MacIntyre's expectation that Christian ethics would become increasingly irrelevant by 
asserting that, so long as there were Christians concerned with medical ethics, there 
would be a rational Christian ethic. Ramsey presumed the rationality of a tradition 
long before Macintyre gave the phenomenon a name. 
Meilaender reflects the same kind of theological nonchalance in his unwillingness 
to enter into what now appears to be the mostly fruitless debate over the question of 
incommensurability. His argument is uncomplicated. Presuming that language is at 
the heart of culture, the fact that languages can be translated with greater or lesser 
degree of accuracy, means that differences between cultures or traditions may also be 
bridged with various degrees of success: 
No doubt the richness and texture of a way of life cannot be understood fully or 
transmitted successfully through appeal only to such common moral concerns, even 
as it may be true that no language can be translated without loss. But there is at 
least some common moral ground available to people in quite different social 
circumstances, just as translation of languages is possible, and this common ground 
cannot simply be absorbed by Christian vision. It retains a certain independence. 
F or there is more to being human than can be accounted for by our immersion in 
any way of life, and our experience is not fully circumscribed by the language we 
speak.49 
Because the complexity of experience does not put human language about this 
experience beyond translation, we may admit that incommensurability is real without 
concluding that it is radical. Hence, the theologian like the linguist is committed to 
finding common ground with those outside of the Christian tradition. On the one hand 
then, theology will see that the doctrine of sin means that something like 
incommensurability characterises all human relationships, while, on the other hand, 
the doctrines of creation (nature) and redemption (grace) provide a theoretical 
foundation in support of this effort. 
Characteristically, Meilaender defines his ethical position by holding 
conflicting realities in tension. This manner of thinking through ethical questions is 
evident in his account of the relationship of Christian theology to politics. Modem 
49 Faith and Faithfulness, p.12. 
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politics is characterised by two conflicting views of the state represented by Isaiah 
Berlin's liberalism and Michael Walzer's communitarianism. Liberal theory's 
emphasis on individualism sees the state as a night-watchman whose primary task is 
to 'establish boundaries that control conflicts of interests among citizens.' According 
to Michael Oakeshott, this view sees politics as 'a second-rate form of activity ... at 
once corrupting to the soul and fatiguing to the mind, the activity either of those who 
cannot live without the illusion of affairs or those so fearful of being ruled by others 
that they will pay away their lives to prevent it. '50 Politics is a necessary evil. Walzer 
argues that the state must be instrumental in turning persons from 'competitors' to 
'colleagues and comrades'.51 Walzer's collective state depends on a certain amount of 
'repression and self-discipline', which is justified as necessary if the state is to supply 
an intimate home for its citizens. 52 
By maintaining the tension between the doctrines of creation and redemption 
on the one hand, and the doctrine of sin on the other, Meilaender sees a third way 
between individualism and communitarianism. Creation and redemption mean that 
commonality between persons is real and co-operative endeavours are possible. 
Taking into account the reality of sin, one can neither accept Berlin's view that what 
we most need is the freedom to be left alone nor Walzer's view that the state should 
be entrusted with the necessary power to sponsor the co-operative activities that 
virtue requires. Neither states nor individuals have the moral resources to overcome 
sin. Both are subject to their own forms of corruption. On the one hand, Berlin fails 
to see that 'we need cooperative endeavor to flourish as human beings'. 53 Walzer's 
trust in the fraternal state's ability to make a home for its citizens, on the other hand, 
is an ersatz intimacy that too readily depends on force and coercion to overcome the 
real divisions between persons.54 
The ideal politics lies somewhere between the views of Walzer and Berlin. To 
be moral, one can neither be coerced by state control nor separated from the 
50 The Limits 0/ Love, pp. 134-135. Michael Oakeshott, in the Introduction to Hobbes's Leviathan 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), p. lxiv. 
51 The Limits o/Love, p. 134. Michael Walzer, Radical Principles: Reflections on an Unreconstructed 
Democrat (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 294. 
52 The Limits o/Love, p. 138. 
53 The Limits o/Love, p. 136. . 
54 The Limits o/Love, p. 138. Meilaender's criticism of Walzer's political comm~mty refl.e~ts the 
Augustinian argument that peace with Rome was to be pur~ued out of a pragmatIc recogmtIon. o~ 
common interest rather than necessitated by a moral commItment to the common weal. The Limits of 
Love, pp. 131-132. 
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commitments of true community. For this reason, Meilaender argues that the 
traditional family is the kind of mediating institution that functions between the free 
individual and the fraternal state. The polis therefore must be rightly related to the 
oikos (home). In Chalcedonian language, the oikos must never be confused with nor 
separated from the polis. The political (pace Walzer) ought not to attempt to displace 
or marginalise the family. Neither can the family be disassociated from the political 
because it depends upon the political to protect the social space in which the family 
flourishes. In recognising the tension between Walzer and Berlin's state, Meilaender 
seeks a third alternative that simultaneously address the concerns of the individual and 
community. In focusing on the institution of the family, Meilaender diminishes the 
importance of centralised political power by showing how the political goods of 
community and individual self-reliance are advanced in this non-political institution. 
Meilaender's attentiveness to tension reflects a theological method that 
recognises the critical importance of seeing matters from more than one angle of 
vision. Consider how he presents the views of death and dying in E.B. White's 
Charlotte's Web, Felix Salten's Bambi, and C.S. Lewis' The Last Battle. Meilaender 
observes that White's spider interprets death as serving an Aristotelian purpose while 
Salten's deer accepts death with a sense of Stoic detachment from the world. In 
contrast to both of these views, the children in Lewis' story are given a more complex 
account of their deaths than either an Aristotelian or Stoic view admits. Meilaender 
states: 
What The Last Battle offers is a story that legitimizes and invites our attachment to 
this world, accepts even the pain such attachment may bring, and does not pretend 
that the death which ends all such attachment is not dreadful. It pictures for us 
creatures whose hearts are quite rightly tied to particular places and persons, who 
are finite and who must reckon with the passing of time, but creatures who also are 
made to desire something more.55 
Although the Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions of death are attractive, they cannot 
capture the Christian truth of the creature's dual membership as one who is in but not 
of the world. As selves who are body and soul, we experience attachment to the 
particulars of finite existence while simultaneously being creatures whose ultimate 
aim is to transcend the finite limits of creation. An adequate account of death requires 
a dichotomous interpretation of one's life in and beyond this world. This means that 
55 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 158. 
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'We can never therefore say only one thing about our aging and dying. '56 It must be 
both end and beginning, a kind of death that is a birth. 
Meilaender's methodological focus on the simultaneities of human experience 
resists the temptation to be clear about human identity by means of distorting 
reductions: 
It is always possible to try to reduce our nature to either its material or its spiritual 
dimension, but such reductionisms cannot capture the complexity that is a human 
person. We are embodied persons and personalized bodies - and to understand 
human nature in this way is the task of Christian thought. 57 
It is important here to consider the possibility that Meilaender's simultaneities lead to 
moral inarticulacy. Meilaender recognises that the Lutheran tradition does in fact 
suffer from a kind of troubling inarticulacy which is most clearly evident in the 
difficulty Lutheran theology has in reconciling normative rules and Christian 
freedom. It is a problem that too often leads to the erroneous conclusion that 
'Christian freedom is allergic to norms that bind in every time and place.' When an 
ethic wilfully fails to articulate moral norms, notes Meilaender, it is doomed to the 
insignificant role of an 'echo' of whatever' academic culture teaches us to say about 
morali ty. ' 58 
Given Meilaender's recognition of the Lutheran problem of moral inarticulacy, it 
is necessary to demonstrate how he escapes inarticulacy and still remains Lutheran. 
Rather than making a theoretical defence of this method, Meilaender refers to the 
historical examples of dichotomous reflection on the nature of the Trinity and the 
person of Christ, which have resulted not in inarticulacy but, creedal affirmations. 59 
Right thinking about the Trinity and Christo logy resists simplification. One cannot 
say only one thing about the person of Jesus Christ and remain orthodox. Failing to 
hold certain simultaneities together in tension in our descriptions of the person of 
Christ results not in clarity but heresy. To call certain views heretical is not to say 
that they are without any truth but that a choice has been made as to what truth is 
accented and what truth is neglected. Heresy results from the abstraction of a single 
item from a complex, and offering this clear and plausible fragment as the whole 
truth. While the heretic seems to see more clearly than his orthodox counterparts, his 
56 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 159 (my emphasis). 
57 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 41. 
58 Gilbert Meilaender, Review of eds. Karen 1. Bloomquist and John R. Stumme, The Promise of 
Lutheran Ethics (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1998), in Dialog 38 (Spring, 1999), p. 136. 
59 Faith and Faithfulness, pp. 45-47. 
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clarity of vision owes itself to the reduction of the full reality of the Godhead or of the 
person of Christ. The simplifications are distortions that eventually impoverish 
theological reflection. 
Moreover, Meilaender has little patience for muddled theological thinking that too 
readily accepts paradox and ambiguity as a substitute for intellectual rigour. In his 
review of Oliver O'Donovan's, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering The Roots 
Of Political Theology, Meilaender shows why simultaneities are capable of sustaining 
a rational account of progress. He does this in his consideration of O'Donovan's 
unusual phrase, 'the doctrine of the two' .60 The doctrine of the two attempts to 
capture the essence of the simultaneous citizenship that Christians claim in the earthly 
and heavenly societies. As the church recognised how certain political tensions were 
introduced into the world by Christ's crucifixion and resurrection, it needed a way to 
be in but not of the world. In the patristic period, the tension between church and 
state was understood as the 'struggle between two societies'; in the medieval period 
as 'a vision of a single society with two foci of authority'; and by Luther as 'a 
distinction between an inner self and its external roles in society.' Meilaender, 
summarising O'Donovan's argument, states: 
The core of the idea of Christendom is that each of the two authorities-which we 
can here call simply the Church and the state-is to render service to the other 
'predicated on the difference and the balance of their roles.' The state serves the 
Church by making possible its mission; the Church serves the state by instructing it 
in what it means to be a 'humble state. ,61 
The doctrine of the two is the theoretical foundation for limiting state power. This 
complex doctrine did not confuse Christians about their dual membership; rather it 
offered a way to affirm simultaneously the benefits of the secular state without 
abandoning the duty to judge and so limit the state. 
Christians were taught to appreciate the state's task of sustaining a social peace 
that proved beneficial for the Church's mission, while simultaneously keeping a 
watchful eye for the exercise of state power aimed at subverting this mission. This 
complexity allowed the church to trust that the state could do some things well so 
long as the state's will to power was held in check. Trust in the state required that the 
60 Oliver, O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering The Roots Of Political Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
61 Gilbert Meilaender, 'Recovering Christendom', review of Oliver O'Donovan, The Desire o/the 
Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
First Things 77 (Nov., 1997), p.39. 
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church maintain a healthy suspicion of the state. Hence the church needed a 
conceptual way to say more than one thing about its relationship to the state but not at 
the cost of saying nothing of importance about this relationship. The doctrine of the 
two means that Christians may neither withdraw from society to the sectarian margins 
nor can they pledge undivided fealty to the state. 
This conceptual complexity has been crucial in how the church views the state's 
use of coercive force. The church recognises that the use of force may be a tragic 
necessity. To admit this, however, is dangerous because it increases the potential for 
the abuse of state power. Hence it has been imperative that Christian ethics makes a 
distinction between the force that is necessary to maintain order against violence and 
that coercion which is the tool of oppressive regimes. The doctrine of the two 
circumscribed state power in a way that allowed the church to encourage the state to 
discharge its God-given duties while simultaneously reminding the state that its duty 
to use force was God-given and so limited. 
For Meilaender, a theological method that purposefully gets stalled in paradox 
undermines the pedagogical aim to move from vagueness to clarity. Meilaender sees 
that the Lutheran simultaneities achieve a clarity of moral vision in a way that is 
similar to how Chesterton views the function of paradox. 62 
'He that will lose his life, the same shall save it,' is not a piece of mysticism for 
saints and heroes. It is a piece of everyday advice ... A soldier surrounded by 
enemies, if he is to cut his way out, needs to combine a strong desire for living with 
a strange carelessness about dying. He must not merely cling to life, for then he 
will be a coward, and will not escape. He must not merely wait for death, for then 
he will be a suicide, and will not escape. He must seek his life in a spirit of furious 
indifference to it; he must desire life like water and yet drink death like wine. No 
philosopher, I fancy, has ever expressed this romantic riddle with adequate 
lucidity ... But Christianity has done more: it has marked the limits of it in the awful 
graves of the suicide and the hero, showing the distance between him who dies for 
the sake of living and him who dies for the sake of dying ... And now I began to find 
that this duplex passion was the Christian key to ethics everywhere ... Here, again in 
short, Christianity got over the difficulty of combining furious opposites, by 
keeping them both, and keeping them both furious.63 
62 It is ironic that we should appeal to the writings of a prolific apologist for Roman Catholicism to 
describe an ethic that we are claiming is somehow discretely Lutheran. The reference suggests that the 
differences between Lutheran and Roman Catholic ethics, though real, does not go all the way down. 
This point is taken up in Meilaender's consideration of the papal encyclical, Veritatis Splendor. Cf. 
Gilbert Meilaender, 'Grace, Justification through Faith, and Sin', in eds. Reinhard Hutter and Theodor 
Dieter, Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics: Protestants Engage Pope John Paul II's Moral Encyclicals 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 60-83. 
63 G.K. Chesterton, 'The Paradoxes of Christianity', in Orthodoxy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1986), pp. 297-298 (my emphasis). 
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The combining of furious opposites does not lead to the muddle of moral inarticulacy. 
It is a habit of thinking that is crucial for an adequate ethical reflection that must 
differentiate between the moral worth of actions which are similar in appearance and 
result. The virtue of sacrifice must be distinguished from the vice of suicide. Paradox 
is a way of seeing matters from more than one point of view. This does not result in 
seeing less clearly, but rather gives to moral reflection the equivalence of the depth 
perception that comes of seeing an object with two eyes. 
By maintaining furious opposites in moral reflection, moral vision is deepened 
rather than obscured. The focus on simultaneities, exemplified in Meilaender's work, 
is a central characteristic of a rational Lutheran ethic. I shall argue this point by first 
considering how Meilaender's body/soul duality shapes his understanding of certain 
bioethical issues and then considering the moral implications of his anthropology 
which views the self as simultaneously righteous and sinner. 
3. The Self as Body and Soul 
We do not know how to act unless we know who we are. For Meilaender, the 
human person is positively defined by its status 'before God ... beside each other. .. 
[and] over the co-creation. '64 Defined negatively, the fallen self is suspicious of God, 
alienated from others, and has an existence which is marked by the pains of labour 
and labour pains.65 Human beings must always and simultaneously be described as 
fearfully and wonderfully made on the one hand, and deeply flawed and fallen on the 
other. There can be no moral account that considers our present state or our 
potentiality except as dichotomous beings who are body and soul, created though 
fallen, whose life is lived before God and before others. Though fallen, we are 
creatures who are yet capable of hearing God's divine address of judgment and grace 
and so may rightly hope to live in harmony with God, in community with others and 
in attentive responsibility towards the natural world. We are also always capable of 
rejecting these defining characteristics of our vertical and horizontal relationships. 
This understanding of the self is starkly contrasted with the self in ancient 
paganism. Meilaender writes that the Genesis account moved 'away from the 
mother-goddess, from a religious attitude which could not clearly distinguish between 
64 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 35. 
65 Genesis 3:8-19. 
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God, humanity, and the natural world, and which experienced union of human and 
divine through the cycles of nature or the fecund powers of generation. '66 Defining 
human nature as a three-fold relationship was a way of preserving the unity and the 
diversity between God, human selves, and the natural world. The error of pagan unity 
was its inability to account for the differentiation between creation and creator or 
between the higher and lower creatures. Mary Midgley points out that the Genesis 
account places the human race at the centre of creation by defining human beings as 
necessarily in relationship to divine aims and order. As such, creation is designed for 
human purposes but not merely for human purposes. Midgley writes, 'Non-human 
beings count in this picture as having their own special value. Redwoods and 
pythons, frogs, moles and albatrosses are not failed humans or early try-outs for 
humans or tools put there to advance human development. '67 An adequate account of 
the self is never only about the self. The self is defined by a potentially hannonious 
relationship with a distinctly other God, other humans and other natural world. 
The conception of the self as defined by the dichotomous tension between the 
material and spiritual is central to Meilaender's writings in bioethical issues. He 
makes clear that it is his intent to spell out what it means that human creatures are 
simultaneously dust and spirit.68 Because the human self is an embodied spirit and an 
inspirited body, we must use Chalcedonian language in order 'to manage both 
perspectives simultaneously, distinguishing the two without separating them, holding 
them together without merging them. '69 The difficulty of holding these furious 
opposites together is evident in recent bioethical confusion over the definition and 
scope of personhood. 
Meilaender notes a recent transfonnation of the conception of the 'person' within 
bioethics and in culture. Fonnerly, a person was synonymous with a human being-
the living offspring of human parents. Two crucial characteristics emerged from this 
definition: a person was not property and was therefore accorded the protection of 
society.70 Meilaender's inclusive definition of personhood is the minority view in 
66 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 37. 
67 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 39. Meilaender quoting Mary Midgley, Evolution as Religion (London: 
Methuen, 1985), p. 69. 
68 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 41. 
69 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 159 (my emphasis). 
70 The distinction between persons and property is increasingly clouded in a number of different areas. 
D · rce courts are now asked to decide the 'ownership' of donated gametes which were intended for IVO ··thh ld th d' . f future use in artificial insemination. Presently, Umted States law WI 0 S e eSlgnatlOn 0 
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bioethics. For example, H. Tristram Engelhardt argues that personhood is a status 
accorded not to those who have biological life but to those who are self-conscious 
and capable of rational and free choice. 71 Personhood is not synonymous with 
biological existence but with a quality of existence measured by mental capabilities 
and control. 72 Expressing these new and narrowing definitions of personhood, albeit 
in a less nuanced way, Mary Anne Warren claims that we may still admit that the 
foetus is of human stock while also asserting that it has 'no more right to life than a 
newborn guppy. '73 Warren's views indicate a shift in our culture's conception of 
personhood. It is important to spell out the reason for these changes in our perception 
of human identity and the potential implications of such a shift. 
In a chapter aptly entitled 'How Bioethics Lost the Body: Personhood', 
Meilaender argues that at the heart of the changing view of the self is a flawed 
understanding of the human body. The increasing unwillingness to accord the status 
of personhood to every embodied human being, regardless of his or her mental 
functioning, is a sign of a failed understanding of the 'moral significance of our 
bodies' .74 The claim is ironic: Bioethics has 'lost touch with the natural history of 
bodily life. '75 This 'strange upshot' reflects the moral incoherence that runs through 
current bioethical reflection. The incoherence is first evidenced in a shift in our moral 
language. Meilaender is troubled by what he sees as a callous use of 'quality control' 
language in describing both the unborn and the elderly. Interestingly, he does not 
argue that quality control language is too materialistic but that it fails to take seriously 
the natural material history of the body. Ifwe take seriously that whole history of the 
body, we recognise how dependency characterises both the beginning and end of this 
personhood from foetuses. Others advocate a position that could strip certain handicapped neonates 
and elderly of their personhood status. The question such a social policy raises is, 'Ifnot persons, then 
who or what are these beings?' The most obvious answer is that their legal status is that of property. 
This argument over the distinction between person and property is, in many significant ways, 
analogous to the Dred Scott Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1858. Scott, who was enslaved 
after having enjoyed a time of freedom, pleaded that a citizen of a free territory could not be subjected 
again to slavery. In responding to this assertion, the Supreme Court majority's decision was not nearly 
as important as the obiter dicta of Chief Justice Taney. Taney asserted that, as Scott had formerl~ been 
a slave, his status was that of chattel. Now stripped of the status of person, Scott had no legal clann to 
the rights of citizenship. 
71 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 42. 
72 Gilbert Meilaender, Body, Soul, and Bioethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1995), p. 44. 
73 Bioethics: A Primer for Christians, p. 32. Meilaender quoting Mary Ann Warren, 'On the Moral and 
Legal Status of Abortion', The Monist 57 (1973). (Pagination not given.) 
74 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 37. 
75 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 50. 
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history. Yet, when we speak of the quality of one's life, we presume that quality 
equals autonomy while dependence equals a deficit of quality. Against this trend, 
Meilaender argues that quality control language is indicative of the modem failure to 
hold together the furious opposites of body and soul and neglecting the material 
reality of persons who are embodied spirits. 
Christian theology has sustained an ongoing, dialectical argument about the 
significance of the body.76 This is evident in the speculative theology that came out of 
the early church fathers' consideration of the Neoplatonic rejections of the body over 
against the doctrines of creation and the resurrection. That theological speculation 
provides a rich resource for thinking about the relationship of the body to personal 
identity. St. Augustine's view, that the human being is terra animata (animated earth) 
is contrasted by Meilaender with Origen's Platonism, which understood the 'real' 
body to be a changeless form (eidos). The changing, historically contingent body 
was, for Origen, nothing but a poor copy of the eternal form. Against Origen's view, 
Aquinas argued that the soul does not rise to a disembodied state. Rather, the 
resurrection is a celestial completion of the terrestrial history. Christ's resurrection is 
a harbinger of the hope of a radical transformation of the body that preserves it from 
corruption and deformity. Although this transformation is radical, it does not 
constitute a radical discontinuity in the selfs identity. The selfis never defined solely 
as a historical being or by an event outside of history. Analogous to the gospel's 
narration of Christ's life, death, and resurrection as a single story, the resurrection of 
the Christian is the culmination of a single, though complex, biography. Although the 
resurrection transforms the body, this transformation does not nullify or detract from 
the importance of our terrestrial life, even when the body is subjected to corruption, 
disease, and dependency. These are episodes in the natural history of embodied souls. 
Denying this history distorts human identity.77 
The modem tendency to drive a wedge between the unborn, failing or diseased 
body and the status of personhood is a denial of the natural history of the body. It is a 
dangerous cleaving of human identity from biological life so that a living human body 
is not synonymous with a person who is protected under the law. Personhood is an 
76 Cf. Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection a/the Body in Western Christianity, 200- J 336 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Throughout her book Bynum shows ho:v the 
exceptionally tedious theologi~a.l debates about the place of the body relate to the most unportant 
questions concerning the defmltIon of the self. 
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achieved status, gained by those who function at a certain (and undetennined) level of 
control. This functional view of the selfwas forcefully articulated already in Joseph 
Fletcher's 1972 publication 'Indicators ofHumanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man. q8 
Two years after this publication, Meilaender points out, Fletcher stated that the 
primary indicator of personhood was cortical function. Without cortical function, 
Fletcher writes, 'the person is non-existent. .. to be dead "humanly" speaking is to be 
ex---cerebral, no matter how long the body remains alive. '79 
Modem notions of personhood are sustained by divorcing 'the person from the 
life of the body. '80 It is ironic how an age that is often depicted as materialistic and 
mechanistic so readily divorces body from soul and denies the natural trajectory of the 
body. The close relationship between autonomy and independence on the one hand, 
and quality of life on the other, can only be sustained by ignoring the dependency 
which characterises our entrance into and exit from this world. Meilaender states: 
'How wrong we would be to suppose that ours is a materialistic age when everything 
we hold central to our person is separated from the animated earth that is the body. '81 
How do we speak of an autonomous, unencumbered self whose history begins as a 
zygote and potentially may end in an irreversible coma? To be human is to spend a 
significant share of one's life in bodily dependence on others. We view our bodily 
dependence as a curse, notes Leon Kass, when we begin to believe that we 'deserve to 
be gods. '82 
The denial of the natural history of the body is a denial of the narrative quality of 
human existence. Once personhood is divorced from its bodily history, we tend to 
evaluate the body by how it fulfils some or another function. Meilaender states: 
To point to some moment in this history as the moment in which we are most truly 
ourselves, the vantage point from which the rest of our life is to be judged - a 
moment at which, presumably, we have personhood, and not just another of the 
many moments in which we are persons - is to suppose that we can somehow 
extricate ourselves from the body's natural history, can see ourselves whole. It is 
77 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 42. 
78 Joseph Fletcher, publication 'Indicators of Hurnanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man', The Hastings 
Center Report 4 (Dec., 1974), pp. 4-7. Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 44. 
79 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 44. 
80 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 46. 
81 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 50... . 
82 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 57. Mellaender quotmg Leon Kass, Towards a More Natural SClence 
(New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 293. 
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even, perhaps, to suppose that in such a moment we are rather like God, no longer 
having our personal presence in the body. 83 
Christian theology defines the self in relationships to God and others. This relational 
view of identity shapes the way Christians think about the relative goodness of 
autonomy and the relative badness of suffering. 84 Simply put, the relational self is 
never divorced from others even when it is dependent on others. In this view of life 
such states as being better or worse, richer or poorer, sick and healthy, are not 
sufficient reasons for breaking those relationships which define who one is. The 
Christian story shapes the way Christians judge autonomy as well as suffering. In this 
story, suffering is simultaneously an evil to be overcome and an occasion for much 
good. Within this story, the suffering that reduces us to dependency is the occasion 
for participation in the giving and receiving of mercy. The current understanding of 
autonomy and suffering is wrong because it fails to recognise the good in that 
sacrificial love which Christians claim is central to the meaning of life's story.85 
In the story of mercy, dependency plays an important role: hence to speak and act 
as if the dependent person has no role to play and so is better off dead, is a denial of 
the Christian story. Because mercy is given and received, it requires agents and 
patients. Reducing the self s identity to its performance capabilities not only denies 
the reality of the fact that as bodies we oscillate between dependence and 
independence, but also puts an idolatrous value on human performance and devalues 
human suffering. Bluntly put, this denial of the good of dependence is a lie. As 
Meilaender states, 'We are dependent beings, and to think otherwise - to make 
independence our project, however sincerely - is to live a lie, to fly in the face of 
reality. '86 Human identity can never be measured by human performance, even when 
we function at our peak.87 To accept the lie of the functional self is to abandon the 
only rational case against Fletcher's increasingly plausible view that' Apart from 
cortical functioning, "the person is non-existent. "'88 
83 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 49. 
84 Bioethics: A Primer for Christians, p. 58. 
85 Reinhold Niebuhr makes this point in contrasting the tragic and Christian understanding of suffering. 
He writes, 'Christianity is a religion which transcends tragedy. Tears, wi~ d~ath, a.re s:vallowed up i.n 
victory. The cross is not tragic but the res?lution of~ag~dy. Here suffermg IS carned mto the.v~ry lIfe 
of God and overcome. It becomes the baSIS of salvatlOn. Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Chrlstzan 
Interpretation of History, pp. 155-156. 
86 Bioethics: A Primer for Christians, p. 59. 
87 Bodv. Soul, and Bioethics, p. 42. 
88 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 44. 
170 
The irony of the functional definition of identity is that it finally undennines the 
very autonomy it intended to preserve. Autonomy is the right of persons. This means 
that the loss of personhood results in the loss of autonomy. For the sake of autonomy, 
we slacken the connection between personhood and the natural history of the body. 
This, in tum, undennines the very notion of personhood upon which the claims of 
autonomy depend. This ironic connection needs to be spelled out further. Prompted 
by advances in body-sustaining technologies, the main bioethical concern has been to 
give patients control of the medical treatment they receive at the end of their lives. To 
gain this control, patients needed a language by which they could assert 'their 
independence over against the medical establishment. They needed to be able to have 
ways of refusing treatment as protection against 'overly zealous ... medical 
caregivers. '89 The language of patient autonomy was designed to give the patient 
control over his or her dying.90 
However the effort to preserve patient autonomy was undennined by an emerging 
functional definition of personhood within the medical community. Once personhood 
was no longer synonymous with a living body, personhood had to be discerned 
according to one's capabilities. Furthennore, because many persons lose their 
person-defining mental functions some time before their biological life ends, it is 
imperative to detennine the point at which bodies cease to be persons.91 The 
similarity between recalling the status of personhood at the end of life and the 
bestowing the status of personhood at the beginning of life should not be missed. 
Both ascriptions require a clear articulation of those criteria by which we decide who 
is protected by this status of personhood. Given the moral inarticulacy that 
characterises the present milieu, one may doubt that we are capable of articulating and 
defending any such criteria. 
The question of personhood is urgent and practical. This is especially clear in 
view of the growing importance of the notions of 'futile' and 'useless' medical care. 
This notion of futility is not easily defined and so requires an analogy. Meilaender's 
analogy is to drawing water with a leaky sieve. The action is futile because it does 
89 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 45. . . 
90 The popularity of living wills is a sign of how valued autonomy and control m dymg have become. 
Meilaender notes that 'within a month after the Supreme Court's Cruzan decision, one hundred 
thousand people contacted the Society for the Right to Die, seeking information about living wills', 
Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 55-56. 
91 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 45. 
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not and cannot achieve its goal no matter how many times the action is performed. 92 
To recognise an action as futile requires that we know the telos of that action. Unless 
we know that the point of our action is to fill the bucket, we do not know that the 
leaky sieve ensures the futility of this action. In order to judge medical care to be 
futile we must know what the point of that care is. Within the Christian story, futility 
is not judged merely by the effect of the action on the autonomous patient (which is 
itself an ironic locution). The act of care-giving is never futile even if is does not 
forestall death. The standard by which Christians judge the worth of an act is not by 
the achieved and measurable ends but by the active participation in the story of 
mercy. Care is therefore never futile even when it is costly or eventuates in death. 
Care cannot therefore depend upon determining the personhood of the patient by 
calculating costs and benefits or by an arbitrary 'quality of life' measurement. Care is 
not given as a calculation. It rather is an embodied commitment to the needy because 
they are in need. Commitments of this sort neither require nor admit any further 
justification for care. As this angle of vision is pushed to the margins, a critical task 
of Christian ethics will be to rightly discern the personhood of those who are 
dependent and near death. 
Meilaender considers two categories of persons who are most at risk: the 
comatose patient and the patient in a persistent vegetative state (PVS).93 To 
understand how we care for such persons, Meilaender makes the distinction between 
the quantitative versus qualitative standards of assessment. In the case of the 
comatose patient, the judgement that medical treatment is futile is quantitative as it 
judges that no amount of medical care is capable of significantly delaying physical 
death. 94 This quantitative judgement is decisively contrasted with the qualitative 
judgements that lead to the withdrawal of care from PVS patients. 
Meilaender considers the case of Karen Ann Quinlan who had been in a 
persistent vegetative state for ten years. When medical care was withdrawn, the 
reasons cited were not that Quinlan's biological functions had failed but that no 
92 Body, Soul, and Bioethies, p. 45. Meilaender cites Lawrence 1. Schneidennan, Nancy S. Jecker, and 
Albert R. Jonsen, 'Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications', Annals of Internal Medicine 
113 (June 15, 1990), p. 950. 
93 Body, Soul, and Bioethies, p. 46. . 
94 Meilaender, Body, Soul, and Bioethies, p. 47. Meilaender states 'the cough, gag, and swallow~g 
flexes of the comatose are impaired, he or she is susceptible to respiratory infections and has a hfe ~~an usually limited to "weeks or months.'" Meilaender cites Ronald E. Cranford, 'The Persistent 
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amount of medical care could restore her to an ill-defined quality of life. There is a 
cold, impersonal quality that characterises the language used to describe PVS patients. 
Meilaender notes this linguistic tum in recent discussions of 'futility' in medical care. 
For example, one recent definition of futility states, 'the patient has no right to be 
sustained in a state in which he or she has no purpose other than mere vegetative 
survival; the physician has no obligation to offer this option or services to achieve 
it. '95 The conversation that was once concerned with the care of the dying is turning 
more toward determining who among the dying have the right to be care for. In a 
strange twist of logical consistency, the discussion that was initiated by concern for 
the rights of patients to refuse medical treatment has been transformed into a concern 
for the rights of the medical establishment to refuse treatment to patients.96 This 
change owes itself to the reduction of persons to their functional capacities and 
indicates how radically at odds is the modem medical ethos with the story of Christian 
mercy. In Meilaender's view, current bioethical practices train us to de-personalise 
suffering in a way that makes it easier to wash our hands of caring for the suffering. 
This decline ofbioethics reflects an epistemological crisis. Our culture is 
increasingly incapable of discerning human identity. Our definition of persons is 
becoming increasingly narrow. While Meilaender does not imagine that Christian 
ethics will be able to stem this tide in the general culture, it is important that the 
church continue to train Christians to view personhood in radically expansive terms. 
Much depends upon the church's ability to resist modem trends that wish to use a 
quality control test to discern who qualifies for membership in the human community. 
Meilaender offers an alternative view, stating: 
To be a member of our community, with a claim for care equal to yours or mine, 
however, an individual need not possess these capacities. To 'qualify' for 
membership he need only be begotten of human parents. Those who never had or 
who have now lost certain distinctive human capacities should not be described as 
non-persons; rather, they are simply the weakest and least advantaged members of 
the human community. Like us, such a person is someone who has a history. Each 
of our personal histories begins with very limited capacities and may end in the 
same way. Personhood is not a thing we possess only at some moments in that 
hr h . 97 history; we are persons t oug out It. 
Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight)', Hastings Center Report 18 
(Feb.IMarch, 1988), p. 28. . .. , . 
95 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 53. Mellaender quotIng SchneIderman, Jecker and Jonsen, MedIcal 
Futility', p.952. 
96 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 52. 
97 Bioethics: A Primer for Christians, p. 33. 
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The leading edge of this narrowing definition of personhood is 'quality control' 
language. This kind of language is not only used in the evaluation of PVS patients, 
but also common in discussions of reproductive technology. Debates over abortion are 
also debates about 'the meaning and moral importance of personhood. '98 
The larger issue in the abortion debate is how we shall now understand 
personhood.99 This is particularly evident in Meilaender' consideration of Judith 
Jarvis Thomson's argument in favour of abortion, 'The Unconscious Violinist', where 
she claims to recognise the personhood of the foetus while arguing for an abridgement 
of the rights of the foetus. Consider Meilaender's summary of this somewhat 
influential parable. 
There is a famous violinist suffering from a fatal ailment, and you alone have the 
right type of blood to help him. One night the Society of Music Lovers kidnaps you 
and plugs the violinist's circulatory system into yours. In this way the violinist can 
(for the amount of time needed to save his life) live off your system. Your kidneys 
can be used to extract poisons from his system as well as from yours. You wake up 
in the morning and find yourself in bed with the unconscious violinist, his system 
plugged into yours. And the question is whether it would be morally wrong for you 
or anyone else to unplug you, when such action would certainly mean the death of 
the violinist. 100 
While we are told that the foetus is granted the full status of person, the parable 
subtly nudges us to view the foetus' dependence on the mother as that of a parasite. 
Let us, for argument sake, accept Thomson's claim that her parable treats the 
foetus as person. When she then re-conceives the relationship of pregnancy from 
the most intimate biological bond between two persons to the relationship of a 
parasite to its host, we cannot but conclude that Thomson is moving us toward a 
radical transformation of personhood. Once the language of parasites has taken 
hold, expelling the foetus qua person/parasite has no more moral weight than any 
other medical procedure aimed at restoring health to the patient. 101 It is no advance 
in the abortion argument to have gained the status of personhood for the foetus 
while permitting this kind of treatment of persons. 
98 Body Soul, and Bioethics, p. 75. 
99 Meil~ender notes that abortion is defended either on the basis of 'personhood arguments' or 'bodily 
support' arguments. The fIrst justifIes abortion up until the foetus has become a person with rights. 
The second argument claims that irrespective of foetal rights, a woman can never be c~m?el1ed to carry 
a pregnancy to term. Cf. Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 73. For present purposes, we lImIt our 
discussion to the personhood argument. 
100 The Limits of Love, p. 50. Cf. Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 1 (1971), pp. 47-66. 
101 The Limits of Love, p. 56. 
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Frederica Mathewes-Green discussion of Eileen McDonagh's, Breaking the 
Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent, we see how McDonagh takes 
Thomson's argument one step beyond. \02 McDonagh also accepts the personhood 
of the foetus as human while arguing that abortion may still be justified by seeing 
the foetus as an unwelcome intruder. \03 Once more, we are to imagine that a captor 
has, without consent, invaded a body that is now held hostage. 
For months on end, he wreaks havoc with your circulation and respiration, saps 
your strength, causes nausea, vomiting and internal swelling. And all the while, you 
are helpless to resist, or so it seems. Actually, you have the power to defend 
yourself, to repel this intruder with deadly force. But how? Simply, get an 
abortion. 104 
How then can the use of force or even the death of the innocent be justified? 
McDonagh argues that the use of force takes seriously the personhood of the foetus as 
it makes the foetus responsible for its actions. The foetus is emphatically not' a 
helpless newborn baby.' It is an intruder who 'takes the bodies and liberties of others 
to meet its physical needs. '\05 
The question arises as to whether the conception is really against the will of 
the woman if sexual intercourse was voluntary. McDonagh responds by asking 
whether a female jogger, running alone through a public park, is entitled to use lethal 
force in order to protect herself from a would-be attacker. Is she still entitled to use 
lethal force even when it was her unwise decision to run alone at night that put her in 
harm's way? What matters, says McDonagh, is not how the jogger came to be a 
potential victim, but whether she is legally entitled to use lethal force to protect 
herself from unlawful intrusion. The argument and comparison are legally sound but 
morally questionable. The right is clearly in conflict with the good. McDonagh does 
not deny the human identity of either thugs or foetuses. Rather, she merely argues 
that an essential feature of human personhood is to take responsibility for one's 
actions. If the foetus as a responsible person is guilty of violating the body of another, 
it may be repelled with lethal force. The success of McDonagh's project to preserve 
abortion and personhood demands that the foetus be made into a criminal. 
102 Eileen McDonagh, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). . , .. 
103 Frederica Mathewes-Green, 'Abortion as Self-Defense: The Latest Spm , The Human Life ReView 
13 (Fall, 1997), pp. 85-91. 
104 Mathewes-Green, 'Abortion as Self-Defense', p. 90. 
105 Mathewes-Green, 'Abortion as Self-Defense', p. 90. 
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As McDonagh's is dismissive of the natural biological bond of mother to foetus 
in making the mother an enemy of the unborn, her 'solution', argues Mathewes-
Green, 'defies human experience and sparkles with cruelty' . 106 This callousness 
toward another dependent person is a troubling trend, Meilaender notes, in the way 
we understand all dependent relationships.l07 According to Leon Kass, this trend is 
evident in and advanced by the language we use to describe procreation: 
Ancient Israel, impressed with the phenomenon of transmission of life from the 
father to son, used a word we translate as 'begetting' or 'siring.' The Greeks, 
impressed with the springing forth of new life in the cyclical processes of 
generation and decay, called it genesis, from the root meaning 'to come into 
being.' ... The premodern Christian English-speaking world, impressed with the 
world as given by a Creator, used the term 'pro-creation.' We, impressed with the 
machine and the gross national product (our own work of creation), employ a 
metaphor of the factory, 're-production.' 108 
While 'procreation' attempts to capture a mystery of divine and human c~peration, 
'reproduction' conjures up images of human mastery and promethian freedom to 
reshape the world according to human will. 109 
Meilaender further discusses the distinction between procreation and 
reproduction in his critique of John Robertson's Children oj Choice. 110 Robertson 
rightly presumes that 'reproductive experience' is a matter that touches the heart of 
human identity and meaning. However, Meilaender argues, Robertson's commitment 
to autonomous choice finally results in an incoherent account of identity and meaning. 
Autonomy is essential to that freedom which allows one to exercise 'quality control' 
over the foetus. It is the means by which parents are protected says Robertson, 
'against the risk of handicapped children.' Parents must either be given the power to 
control the outcome of a pregnancy or, Robertson avers, couples will not 'start or 
continue a pregnancy. 'i11 Identity and meaning are defined in terms of the control that 
parents exercise over their offspring. Because Robertson is cognisant of the dangers 
of such control of a human being over another, he attempts to apply external limits on 
reproductive autonomy. The problem is, Meilaender argues, that once Robertson 
reduced meaning and identity to the private expression of the human will, there 
106 Mathewes-Green, 'Abortion as Self-Defense', p. 90. 
107 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 80. 
108 Bioethics: A Primer for Christians, p. 11. Kass, Towards a More Natural Science, p. 48. 
109 Bioethics: A Primer for Christians, p. 12. 
110 John A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
III BQ{~v, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 71. 
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remains no moral foundation for such limits. Such limits are unaccountable and 
arbitrary. 112 
Taking his cue from O'Donovan, Meilaender criticises the view that ties 
identity and meaning to choice and control by introducing the distinction between 
begetting and making. His argument is that while both result in the birth of a child, 
begetting is not the same act as making. I \3 There is a difference, as Aristotle argues, 
between praxis (doing) and poesis (making).114 Were our moral focus narrowed to 
only consider the finished product, making a child would be indistinguishable from 
begetting a child. However, acts are not merely judged by their effects or 
consequences. Acts must be defined and judged in themselves. 115 To do this, 
Meilaender considers the relationship of lovemaking to marriage. 116 In linking the 
passion of lovemaking with the birth of children it becomes clear that procreation is 
not merely a cool, deliberate act of the rational will. This would not adequately attend 
to the passion of love-making and its desire for communal relationship. Within the 
bond of marriage, children are the fruit of physical passion and the meeting of two 
bodies. 'Rather than being an exercise in self-definition or self-replication,' 
Meilaender writes, 'procreation, as the fruition of coitus, should teach us that the act 
of love is not simply a personal project undertaken for our own fulfillment.' 117 
Reproduction is an expression of the human will. Procreation is embedded in both the 
passion of love-making and in the 'for better or worse' commitment of lovers. It is 
an act that comes closest to the union of body and soul. Passion and commitment take 
us beyond the reaches of human will and are best expressed in the language of gift 
and mystery. 
Christians act to embody their commitment to the Christian moral vision 
rather than to the dictates of pragmatic calculation. Hence the aim of Meilaender' s 
bioethical writings is to explain why it is crucial that the church be capable of 
eschewing medical techniques 'even if they would achieve results that might be, on 
the whole, desirable.' 118 Given the lures of health and the control of the body that 
come with technological advances, the notion of resisting these advances for the sake 
112 Body, Soul, and Bioethies, p. 67. 
113 Body, Soul, and Bioethies, p. 77. 
114 Cf. Nieomaehean Ethics, 6.2-5. 
115 Body, Soul, and Bioethies, p. 78. 
116 Body, Soul, and Bioethies, p. 77. 
117 Body, Soul, and Bioethies, p. 79. 
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of a moral vision is quixotic. In MacIntyre's terms, Meilaender's advocacy of the 
goods of excellence will always seem ineffective and unattractive when compared to 
the goods of effectiveness. This vision of excellence finally depends upon holding 
both body and soul together in a duplex tension. Whatever may be said in favour of 
such a vision, it hardly seems to offer sufficient reasons to decline the opportunity to 
be more intelligent or healthier. But then such a vision is only plausible if, as in the 
Christian story, it is rational to conclude that it is too high a price to pay to gain the 
whole bodily world at the expense of one's soul. Ifmoral commitment must be 
reduced to terms of calculation, the worth of the soul is of incalculably greater worth 
than the goods of the body. This conclusion is not a rejection of the body. It is rather 
reflects an anthropology of selves who 'are embodied persons and personalized 
bodies' and a recognition that 'to understand human nature in this way is the task of 
Christian thought.' 119 
Meilaender's bioethical writings make clear just how crucial are questions of 
anthropology and human nature to the way we see these issues and conduct our lives. 
The same is true ofMeilaender's consideration of the simultaneities that define and 
shape human identity. In the following section we tum to consider Meilaender's 
account of the theologically defined selfwho is simultaneously righteous and a sinner 
(simul justus et peccator) and whose life must be defined as simultaneously an 
unfolding journey of becoming and as a living out of the fixed identity imputed by the 
verdict of justification. 
4. Saints and Sinners - Journey and Dialogue 
The identity of the self in Lutheran theology is two-sided. Meilaender writes, 'If 
the human being is a strangely two-sided creature, a finite embodied person who is, 
nonetheless, made to rest in the eternal God, we should expect that there may be many 
occasions when we are perplexed about our moral responsibilities. '120 This perplexity 
is at the heart of the Lutheran difficulty with articulating the importance of human 
action and ethical reflection. Consider the tensed relationship between Luther's 
theology of sola gratia and the Aristotelian notion that one becomes good by the 
118 Body, Soul, and Bioethics, p. 83. 
119 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 41. 
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habituation of good deeds. It is not that Luther rejects the importance of good habits 
and moral works. It is rather that such human activity is not the first thing that needs 
to be said about the human self and its actions. Because the self defined before God 
(coram deo) is of greater importance, Lutheran theology is first concerned to speak to 
the questions of the status of the self rather than its actions. So what human beings 
need first and foremost is not moral reflection 'but a word that touches transforms , , 
and liberates the heart.' 121 
The first question of theology concerns the status of the self. One may assert this 
without making the mistake of saying it is all that needs to be said about the self. The 
open question is whether Lutheranism, given its commitment to this understanding of 
grace, is capable of saying anything beyond the absolution. Is it possible to sustain a 
coherent moral discourse? Were Lutherans to view the self solely in terms of its status 
before God, Lutheran moral discourse would only articulate the clear, decisive verdict 
of grace that overturns the judgment of condemnation. That is to say, once 
Lutheranism speaks of the self s status before God, there is little more to say about the 
self s behaviour before men. This means that an ethical emphasis on the slow moral 
progress toward the Ie/os of a human life would only distract us from the verdict of 
grace that changes the status of the condemned sinner. Of the many problems this 
view creates for moral reflection perhaps the most damaging is how dangerously close 
it comes to abstracting the soul from bodily experience and thus failing to hold the 
two together in the tension of simultaneity. 
In our quotidian experience, the neglect of the simultaneous understanding of the 
self leads to incoherences. The confident claim that one is the object of God's 
unequivocal, all-sufficient grace does not, after all, preclude worrying about where 
one's children 'go to school, about their playmates and peers, about the ways they use 
their free time, about the television shows they watch. '122 Certainly Lutheran 
theology's emphasis on the all-sufficiency of grace does not mean that there is no 
need for moral reflection on the many aspects of our historical existence where we 
purposefully set out to shape moral character. We must be able to hold both human 
and divine agency in dialectical tension, or admit that this all-sufficient grace is 
strangely irrelevant to the particulars of historical existence. 
120 The Limits of Love, p. 32. 
121 The Limits of Love, p. 33. 
122 The Limits of Love, p. 35. 
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The problem is that God's eternal verdict and human experience are not easily 
reconciled. This problematic does not mean that God's decisive verdict renders our 
moral concerns irrelevant. Such a conclusion is 'foolhardy.' 123 Parents do not reduce 
the discipline of their children to reminding them of God's verdict on their lives. 
They rather take concrete steps to shape their children's behaviour, as they attend to 
their habits, make sure of the quality of their education, and direct their friendships. 
The gospel does not grant a kind of diplomatic immunity from the exigencies of 
history. Luther's harsh rejection of Aristotle aside, we cannot rationally deal with 
practical questions without becoming Aristotelians in how we think about what we 
will do. 124 Meilaender's accounts of the self as saint and sinner, and of the Christian 
life as journey and dialogue, offer hopeful ways of reconciling the Lutheran emphasis 
on God's gracious activity with a virtue ethic that emphasises human action. 
Luther's account of human identity emphasises being rather than doing. Personal 
identity is less a matter of performance and much more a matter of status. Good 
deeds are done because the identity of the self is 'good' and not to make the self 
'good'. The ruling analogy is that a good tree cannot but produce good fruit. Hence 
good deeds reflect good identity; they do not achieve good identity. As such, the 
Lutheran emphasis on grace must meet profound conflict with MacIntyre's 
understanding of morality. The disagreement is not over the descriptions of moral 
disorder, nor is it over the teleological vision. The most profound disagreement is 
over the means by which disordered human beings move toward their proper end. To 
put a finer point on this disagreement over means, the question is whether human 
beings move towards this telos or are moved by a radical and immediate verdict. 
Under this description of grace, there is no room for a selfbeing transformed by 
means of the habituation of good actions. The means of grace therefore must exclude 
ethics as a means of transformation. Human action is inconsequential in view of 
divine action. 125 
Meilaender argues against this stark juxtaposition of the two views by first noting 
the language of the Psalms which simultaneously speak of human and divine 
righteousness. If we ask how sinners come to be welcomed into God's presence, 
123 The Limits of Love, p. 36. 
124 'Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods', p. 4. 
125 Admittedly, this discussion of how one becomes 'good' is irrelevant in a moral milieu where there 
seems to be little agreement on the content of the good. 
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Meilaender notes at least two different responses in the Psalms: goodness is a human 
achievement, and goodness is an imputed righteousness. For example, Psalm 26:3 
predicates a goodness to the selfbecause, 'I have walked in my integrity' while Psalm 
65:4 states, 'Blessed is he whom thou dost choose and bring near, to dwell in thy 
courts.' This ambiguity in the Psalms is contrasted with Luther's account of Romans 
5 :6, where St. Paul asserts that the confidence to stand in the judgment is due to 
Christ's having died for the ungodly. Meilaender is not attempting to playoff the Old 
Testament against the New. Rather, he argues that we must 'come to terms with two 
seemingly different understandings of human righteousness. 'i26 To this end 
Meilaender considers one of Luther's polemical writings, 'Against Latomus' . 127 
In 1521, Luther responded to the condemnation of his views by the theologians 
from Louvain. In his response, Luther develops the anthropological insight that the 
Christian self is simul justus et peccator. How one understands this phrase depends 
largely upon the various ways that the et functions in Luther's account. In the first 
sense, et means that the self is 'entirely saint and entirely sinner - and both at the 
same time.' 128 The self is entirely 'in Christ', and so is entirely pleasing to God. The 
self outside of Christ is entirely sinful. There is no ambiguous transitional stage 
between being 'in Christ' or being outside of Christ. Judgement is clear and distinct 
when we speak of status rather than behaviour. This theological assertion may be 
morally confusing. In this scheme, it is possible for Luther to argue that good deeds 
outside of Christ only seem good. Reality before God leads us to a different judgment 
of human deeds. From the God' s-eye view human deeds that promise but do not 
achieve the good of eternal life are not finally judged as good but as futile. The 
promise of morality is finally deceptive, a deception that is evident in the human 
hypocrisy and despair that attends those most concerned with morality. Similar, 
though much more problematic, is the corollary that the evil deeds of the Christian are 
not counted as sin because they are the deeds of a righteous self. Justification then 
undermines the notion of a rational moral judgement. 
Luther's theology of grace seems to produce an incoherent moral theology. 
Meilaender offers an alternative conclusion when he notes that Luther's view reflects 
126 Theory and Practice of Virtue, pp. 103-104. . 
127 Martin Luther, 'Against Latomus', in ed. Helmut T. Lehmann and trans. George Lmdbeck, Luthers 
Works 32 (Philadelphia, PA: Muhlenberg Press, 1958) pp. 133-260. 
128 Theory and Practice of Virtue, p. 106. 
181 
a vigilant concern 'not to isolate the deed from the person, to evaluate not individual 
slices of behavior but the total self.' 129 In this sense, human identity is determined by 
being and not doing. Identity is a fixed status and so does not admit the language of 
transformation or performance. Said another way, because righteousness is locative 
and one is or is not 'in Christ', there can be no ambiguity about the status of the self. 
Hence the historical selfwhose life is an unfolding narrative of moral development 
seems to have no place in Lutheran theology. Identity is rather determined by an 
ahistorical verdict which alters the status of the self at a mathematical point. This 
verdict is analogous to the proclamation of amnesty granted to Vietnam era resisters. 
While the proclamation changed their legal status, it effected no change in character, 
nor was it predicated on some change in behaviour. The verdict changed the status of 
persons from criminals to citizens. 
Luther's moral theology never strays far from the changed status of the self, coram 
deo. However, this concern for the status of the self did not hinder him from passing 
many moral judgements on individual and political behaviour. These judgements 
reflect a very different understanding of the et in the simul justus et peccator. 
Whereas action in the former sense is distanced and separated from identity, now 
action is very much a part of the way that the true self is known and shaped. Now the 
self is understood as being partly saint and partly sinner. We are no longer dealing 
with the unified, harmonious self of the decisive verdict but a selfwho is 
characterised by a divisive quarrel or civil war. Under this description, the Christian 
life must employ the language of slow transformation and deformation - of progress 
and its opposite. The struggle between saint and sinner is now focused less on being 
and more on doing. This distinction becomes clearer when we consider the nature of 
SIn. 
When we consider the sins of pride and sloth, we will better see how and why the 
Christian's life must be understood as a moral struggle. Pride, Meilaender argues, 
intends to live as if there were no limits to one's will that should not be challenged 
and transcended. It neglects human dependency and vulnerability as it refuses to 
accept the critical importance of human bonds. Pride rather concludes 'that the inner 
meaning of history is simply the process of human self-determination.' 130 It is 
129 Theory and Practice of Virtue, pp. 106--107. 
130 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 60. 
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expressed in Augustine's description of Satan who 'refused to be subject to his creator 
and in his arrogance supposed that he wielded power as his own private possession 
and rejoiced in that power.))31 The mark of pride is competitive restlessness. There is 
no room for contentment or gratitude because 'pride gets no pleasure out of having 
something, only out of having more of it than the next. '132 
Pride resists or rejects moral limits. This view reflects the Kantian notion of the 
selfwho is the final judge of those moral maxims that are counted as universal law. 
Meilaender states that this view 
has encouraged us to think that our glory lies in being free and autonomous, 
obeying no law except that which we legislate for ourselves in accordance with the 
universal requirements of reason - has encouraged us, in short, to develop a moral 
theory for beings who are all freedom and no finitude. Not without reason did Iris 
Murdoch write that 'Kant's man had already received a glorious incarnation nearly 
a century earlier in the work of Milton: his proper name is Lucifer.' \33 
The fundamental error of pride is a view of the self as isolated from God and others. 
It is a self that must be capable of its own moral transformation apart from 
communion with God or community with others. 
Pride is not the only way that sinners cut themselves off from others. Sloth takes 
a different route to the same end. Pride seeks freedom from all limits while sloth 
seeks inordinate security in many limits. Pride is restless and competitive while sloth 
desires safety from a fearful, fallen world. For pride, the possibilities of human 
transformation know no limits. For sloth, any transformation threatens fearful 
change. The self is fragmented by this oscillation between pride and sloth. The 
sinner boldly rebels against God's command by rushing to action in pulling the fruit 
from the tree, then cowers in shame and blame when called on to account for this 
action. Sin steals the forbidden fruit from God then willingly shares it with the other. 
In the end, though pride and sloth are embodied in very different actions, they come 
to the same end of loneliness and boredom. It cannot be otherwise because pride and 
sloth oppose love and trust. 134 Pride cannot love or trust those whom it intends to 
master; sloth cannot love or trust those whom it suspects as having intentions of 
mastery. 
131 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 60. Meilaender quoting Augustine, The City of God, XI, l3. 
132 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 62. Meilaender quotes C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: 
Macmillan, 1960), p. 95. 
133 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 93. Meilaender quotes Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (New 
York, Schocken Books, 1971), p. 80. 
134 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 61. 
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In pride we seek to make everything and everyone else subject to our will- a world 
in which the swollen ego is secure because alone. In sloth, the self is equally alone, 
unable to delight in anything outside itself. 'The solitary self to which pride is 
devoted in its final stages is that one in the same time the bored self.' 135 
The doctrine of the self as simul justus et peccator commits Lutheran theology 
to a complex understanding of moral reflection and evaluation. 'To say that we are 
sinners,' Meilaender states, 'does not, then, mean that we love nothing outside 
ourselves, nor does it mean that we fail entirely in love for God. It means that our 
loves are poor and divided, "a mingled yam, good and ill together.'" 136 The 
disordered self as peccator is characterised by an interminable quarrel. The ordered 
self as justus names the self as integrated. Lutheran theology wishes to speak of 
realities that are somehow real now and somehow yet to be attained in the future. 
This 'now and not yet' description of the divided self means that we can never just 
say one thing about human identity or moral agency. 
Lutheran moral theology must find a coherent way to speak of the self as 
simultaneously divided and united. Meilaender points us to Luther who was able to 
speak of the self in both senses, even within the same context. Luther states: 
You will therefore judge yourselves one way in accordance with the severity of 
God's judgment, and another in accordance with the kindness of his mercy. Do not 
separate these two perspectives in this life. According to one, all your works are 
polluted and unclean on account of that part of you which is God's adversary; 
according to the other, you are genuinely pure and righteous. 137 
Luther can speak of 'that part' which is in opposition to God, without denying that 
God judges whole persons and not isolated deeds. He is able to say that in baptism 
the power of sin is fully removed, even ifhe must also admit that the substance of sin 
remains. 'Day by day', Luther states, 'the substance is removed so that it may be 
utterly destroyed.' 138 In using the phrase, 'day by day', Meilaender points out, Luther 
speaks of the gradual development and progress in the moral life. This requires a 
changing of metaphors from the judicial to the medical. Whereas a verdict is passed 
on the whole person, once and for all, the medical metaphor captures the idea of grace 
as an infused gift with progressive healing. Luther writes, 'Everything is forgiven 
through grace, but as yet not everything is healed through the gift ... To be sure, for 
135 Faith and Faithfolness, p. 61. Meilaender quoting William F. May, A Catalogue of Sins (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), p. 201. 
136 Faith and Faithfolness, p. 63. Meilaender.quoting Sh~espeare, Al~'s W,ell That End:s Well. 
137 Theo1}' and Practice of Virtue, p. 108. Mellaender quotmg Luther, Agamst Latomus , p. 213. 
138 Theory and Practice of Virtue, p. 109. 
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grace there is no sin, because the whole person pleases; yet for the gift there is sin, 
which it purges away and overcomes. '139 
A Lutheran ethic must clearly identify those spheres of moral discourse where the 
self is characterised by the unity of a clear and decisive verdict and where it is 
appropriate to speak of the divided selfwho requires moral transformation. The 
defining problem for Lutheran ethics is to discern when it is appropriate to speak of 
being and when to speak of becoming. This problem means that the moral life must 
be understood in terms of the two paradigmatic metaphors of life as journey and life 
as dialogue. The second metaphor of dialogue requires further explanation. 
Meilaender uses the term dialogue rather than the more familiar term 'verdict' 
because the Christian lives between two verdicts: the law and the gospel. Each of 
these verdicts makes a totalising claim about the selfwho is object of its judgement. 
The law always accuses (lex semper accusat); the gospel bestows unconditional 
pardon. Each of these verdicts treats the self as an indivisible whole. Human identity 
is not established or known through the selfs deeds but by either the judgement of 
God's law or that of the gospel. In the end, the selfis rendered an utter unity in the 
judgement of salvation or damnation. While the decisive verdict is central to 
Lutheran theology, it is not all that needs to be said. The verdict treats the self as fully 
passive. Yet there are times when Christians are addressed as agents. This distinction 
leads to the conclusion that, in certain situations, it will be important to divorce 
actions from identity. At these times, the ruling metaphor is that of the verdict. In 
other circumstances, when it is necessary to join actions to identity, the ruling 
metaphor must be life as journey. Let us consider further this journey metaphor. 
Historical selves are on a journey that is a moral quest. The self is a pilgrim who 
progresses (or fails to progress) along an uneven path toward the telos which is union 
with God. Under the dialogue description, one is either in or outside o/Christ. This 
metaphor admits no language of nearness or farness from God, for a verdict is 
decisive rather than a matter of degrees. However, under the description of the 
journey metaphor, the self may be said to be quantitatively distant from God. We 
must be able to speak of the self as once disordered and now moving toward its 
appropriate telos. If, as it appears, Luther has little difficulty in speaking of human 
139 Theory and Practice a/Virtue, pp. 111-112. 
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identity in both ways, Meilaender asks, 'Why then all the shouting?' 140 What explains 
the conflict between Latomus and Luther? The answer concerns the relative weight 
each system gives to the dialogue versus journey metaphors. Latomus judged that 
Luther's division between self and action was dismissive of the importance of moral 
virtue and habits and so imperilled the moral task within Christian theology. If God's 
verdict is rendered irrespective of what one does, and if this verdict is determinative 
of one's eternal fate, human action is reduced to ultimate insignificance. 
Luther's response was that that inordinate focus on good works ironically 
subverts the moral life. To focus on human behaviour leads to either the vices of 
hypocrisy or those of despair. Luther's account of these unintended consequences 
unfolds as follows. Once we fail to see ourselves as God sees us, that is 'in Christ', 
grace has been cheapened. The historical experience of one who is continually 
uncertain of her status before God is 'coldness in love, slackness in praise, and 
lukewarmness in gratitude.' 141 Hypocrisy or despair imperils the moral life because 
each vice too closely associates moral achievement with human identity. The 
hypocrite wrongly imagines that good deeds make a good person, while the 
despairing wrongly conclude that bad deeds signify an irredeemable self. For Luther, 
the divine verdict does not render human action irrelevant so much as it relativises the 
importance of moral achievement and its absence. It is not that actions mean nothing; 
rather, Luther argues, actions have less significance than Latomus would admit. 
Luther must somehow say that action is significant without admitting that human 
agency is ultimate. 
Luther is threatened by incoherence, for it is not at all clear when he addresses 
the self as helpless or as being morally responsible. In the hands of the manipUlative, 
this seemingly arbitrary and shifting standard may become a useful tool for 
controlling others. Hence more must be said about how one knows what form of 
address is appropriate. Meilaender notes that Luther simultaneously stressed the 
absolute need for the divine verdict of forgiveness, while also calling for 
improvements in the moral habits and education of the young. 142 We need not charge 
Luther with incoherence so much as perhaps to suggest that he is a crypto-Thomist. 
In order for Luther to address moral concerns, he must become guilty of a felicitous 
140 Theory and Practice o/Virtue, p. 112.. . " , 
141 Theon' and Practice o/Virtue, p. 113. Mellaender quotmg Luther, Agamst Latomus , p. 240. 
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inconsistency and smuggle in the moral philosophy that he explicitly renounces. 
While Mei I aender , s position is closer to this second explanation, he does not think 
that the charge of incoherence should be dismissed out of hand. For this reason, 
Meilaender seriously considers Gerald Strauss' critique of Luther in the work, 
Luther's House of Learning. 143 
Strauss argues that the Lutheran educational project failed precisely because the 
theology of grace could not be reconciled with an educational project that aimed to 
cultivate Christian character: 144 'Tom between their trust in the molding power of 
education and their admission that the alteration of men's nature was a task beyond 
human strength, [the Lutheran reformers] strove for success in their endeavors while 
conceding the likelihood of defeat. '145 According to Strauss, Lutheranism failed to 
reconcile its doctrine of grace, which accented the insufficiency of human effort, with 
its acceptance of the importance of 'habits long continued' }46 The doctrine of grace 
replaces the need for moral transformation while human agency is swallowed up by 
God's will. Strauss argues that these doctrinal commitments cannot theoretically 
coexist with an educational project that is inescapably dedicated to the rational 
transformation of the selfby means of disciplined practice. Education requires the 
cultivation of virtues. Yet the theological first principles of Lutheranism left no 
theoretical space for the cultivation of these virtues, which doomed Lutheran 
education to failure. 
The fundamental Lutheran problem was to reconcile God's agency with human 
responsibility.147 Luther attempted to justify education by arguing that it gave the 
Holy Spirit occasion to transform selves because education impressed God's word on 
the hearts of students. The explanation fails because it does not reconcile the call to 
commit strenuous effort to moral formation with the claim that such formation was 
ultimately impotent or, perhaps, harmful for one's salvation. The incoherence 
143 Gerald Strauss, Luther's House of Learning: Indoctrination of the Young in the German 
Reformation (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). . . 
144 My concern here is with the philosophical implications rather than the hlstoncal accur~cy o.f 
Strauss' thesis. It is not at all clear that the Reformation's educational program actually faIled m the 
way that Strauss describes. C~tique~ of Strauss' historical m~thodology and conclusions incl~de Ja~es 
M. Kittelson, 'Success and FaIlures m the German ReformatIon: The Report from Strasbourg ,ArchlV 
fur Reformationsgeschicte 73 (1982), pp. 153-175, and Scott H. Hendrix, 'Luther's Impact on the 
Sixteenth Century', The Sixteenth Century Journal 16 (1985), pp. 3-14. 
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ensured that moral education would only receive a half-hearted commitment. 
Strauss' analysis echoes Latomus' view that Lutheranism, in its pure form, gives no 
serious place to the 'small disciplined steps by which virtue struggles to root out vice 
from the Christian life.' 148 
Strauss does demonstrate that the dialogue metaphor is not all there is to be said 
about the Christian life. In MacIntyre's understanding, the sign of an irrational moral 
theory is its inability to sustain an educational project that effectively initiates others 
into the life of the community. However, Strauss and MacIntyre resolve the tension 
by focusing too much on human morality and agency. The point is that grace and 
human responsibility must be held in tension. Any attempt to bring early closure to 
the tension is to deny either the realities of historical existence or the reality of God's 
verdict. Meilaender writes: 
To think that we could overcome the tensions would be to forget that theologians 
remain pilgrims. They may (and must) affirm the truth about reality revealed in 
Christ: that even the will of God that calls for our sanctification is a gracious will. 
They may (and must) affirm the truth of our experience within simple history: that, 
while we can believe even the demanding God to be unequivocally gracious, we 
cannot fully experience him as such. The desire for absolute conceptual consistency 
within the whole theological task - the desire to surmount the tension between these 
two pictures - must therefore be labeled as Gnostic. It is an attempt to leap beyond 
the boundaries of the Christian story and out of history before God brings that story 
to its close. 149 
Furious opposites are not quandaries to be resolved but mysteries that are 
essential to seeing the world rightly and shaping a life in conformity with this vision. 
To deny either the truth of grace or the truth of human responsibility is to fail to see 
the world from both angles of vision. It is to see the moral world with one eye closed. 
This 'one eye shut' theology loses that moral depth perception that comes with 
recognising the narrative quality of Christian existence. To deny that we experience 
the story as a journey is to deny the reality of our 'piecemeal', fragmented experience. 
To deny that there is an outside, authorial perspective, that is capable of judging 
human selves and history as a whole, reduces theology to anthropology. We are 
caught between a kind of docetic denial of our historical natures and a radical 
historicist denial of the relevance of divine judgement and mercy. To deny either the 
historical or the eternal perspective is to deny the Christian story. It is to deny that the 
Christian life is about faith and faithfulness; about believing the great acts of God as 
148 Theory and Practice of Virtue, p. 112. 
149 The Limits of Love, p. 146, n. 3. 
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rehearsed in the creeds and becoming disciples by the disciplined practices of the 
moral life. 
The tension between the metaphors of dialogue and journey is a permanent 
fixture of Lutheran ethics. To resolve it is to distort by simplification. This tension 
positively shapes Lutheran ethics and perceptions. Because this tension must remain 
unresolved, Lutheranism is committed to sustaining a certain kind of moral debate 
that Luther initiated in his argument with Latomus. It is a debate that Meilaender 
continues in his critical and appreciative reading of Pope John Paul II's encyclical 
Veritatis Splendor. 150 Meilaender's epigraph, citing Hans Urs von Balthasar's The 
Theology of Karl Barth, captures the importance of this debate. Balthasar states: 
Theology is ecclesial, or it is nothing at all. And if each Church remains faithful to 
Revelation, 'thinking its doctrines through to the end,' both sides might come to 
agreement at some specific spot. Says Barth: 'Let the Roman Catholic Church think 
through its doctrine on nature and grace, and the teaching on justification that was 
developed by Trent.' And to him we say: 'Let reformation theology think through 
its teaching on the visible church, on obedience and law, and also its dialectic about 
homo simul peccator etjustus. Then life will begin to flow through the Church's 
limbs. Questions will be posed, and the possibility of an answer will be real once 
again.l5l 
Meilaender's disagreement with Veritatis Splendor is very different from the 
disagreements among Roman Catholic theologians over natural law, the freedom of 
the conscience, and the notion of intrinsically evil acts. His task is to raise the 
Reformation questions about the relationship of personal identity to one's actions.152 
Meilaender rejects what he considers the encyclical's 'tight bond between faith and 
morality' because it leads to the dangerous conclusion that 'the fundamental choice 
for God cannot coexist with a deliberate choice to do what one knows to be gravely 
wrong. )\53 The disagreement is not with the encyclical's view that, 'Particular actions 
can shape the fundamental orientation of the soul, and that orientation is itself 
expressed in particular actions. )\54 This view is consonant with the Reformation's 
understanding that 'works can shape the person and the person is manifested in the 
works.' 155 
150 Pope John Paul II, The Splendor o/Truth (Boston, MA: st. Paul Books and Media, 1993). 
151 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 60. 
152 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 61. 
153 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 70. 
154 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 70. 
155 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith' , p. 70. 
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The problem revolves around the encyclical's assertion that there are acts that are 
so evil that they cannot coexist with saving faith. There are deliberate acts that one 
who has chosen God will not do. 156 Meilaender's disagreement with the notion of 
intrinsically evil acts is qualified. That is, he agrees with the Pope when, in rejecting 
the argument of prop ortiona lists and pragmatists, he asserts that acts may be judged as 
evil in advance of knowing their consequences. His disagreement is with regard to 
the meaning of these acts. In asking whether saving faith can coexist with an 
intrinsically evil act Meilaender notes that the encyclical 
simply leaves no room for a Reformation understanding of faith as thatfiducia 
which, clinging to Christ, makes us right with God even in our sin ... there is no 
room for a divided self who chooses what is evil yet clings to God. 157 
The distinction between evil acts and evil practices must be maintained. As the 
Roman Catholic theologian Josef Fuchs argues, 'specific, individual moral acts as 
such are not the acceptance or rejection of grace. '158 When the Pope speaks of 'a' 
choice or 'a' particular act separating the self from God, he establishes an 
unbreakable connection between human identity and moral performance. This leaves 
no room for the conception of the self as simultaneously justified and sinner. 
Meilaender concludes that the encyclical is in error to argue that 'the evil of any act so 
overcomes the division of the self that there is no longer any simul, no longer a 
"disobedient" one who still claims to the promise that in Jesus God is for us.' 159 
The complexity of the question concerning the effect of an evil act on one's 
relationship with God is evident in Luther's reflections on King David's acts of 
adultery, murder, and blasphemy. In the Smalcald Articles Luther viewed David's 
identity and action as united, placing him wholly under condemnation. David's 
actions resulted in the loss of saving faith because he had no right to claim with 
Augustine that '[I]t was I who willed it, and it was I who was unwilling. It was the 
same "I" throughout. But neither my will nor my unwillingness was whole and 
entire.'160 However, in his Galatians commentary (c.1535), Luther explains David's 
failure not as a faith-destroying act but as a 'great horrible lapse'. David's sin is the 
156 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 72. 
157 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 73. 
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result of weakness, not intention. It is an isolated act rather than a persisting 
practice. 161 Seen in this way, Luther now argues that David's identity is detennined by 
forgiveness rather than by his sinful act(s). This distinction is lost when the 
encyclical claims that man's acts are responsible for man's moral perfection. Person 
and perfonnance are so closely united that there is an all or nothing relationship 
between action and belief. The fundamental choice for God must always be evident 
in every action. 162 On the contrary, Meilaender claims that it is theoretically possible 
to journey 'away from God while, at the same time, through faith taking shelter in 
Jesus as One who has acted on my behalf. '163 
Here Meilaender seems to be flirting with antinomianism as he attempts to define 
and limits ethics within the doctrine of forgiveness. Taking the whole corpus of 
Meilaender's writings into consideration, it can be stated categorically that his work is 
hardly threatened by antinomianism. However, the fact that Meilaender, at times, 
sounds as ifhe is, reflects a certain ambiguity that Lutheran theology must remain 
committed to and committed to working through. This is because, as Reinhold 
Niebuhr observed, 'Forgiveness as a fonn of love which is beyond good and evil, is 
bound to be offensive to pure moralists.' 164 This morally offensive emphasis on 
forgiveness is necessary because the pastoral care of souls is central to Lutheran 
ethics. This pastoral practice, especially in confession and absolution, requires that 
the pastor maintain a distance between the self s identity and its actions. Meilaender 
writes: 
Weare situating ourselves to practice that most difficult of theological arts - the 
distinction of law and gospel - in the care of souls ... no general rule can be given 
here, for the art of theological judgment is needed. We should not, I repeat, attempt 
to spin an ethic out of the distinction between law and gospel, but neither should we 
imagine that the care of souls can be satisfactorily carried out unless and until we 
have loosened the tight fit that John Paul has established between judgments of the 
work and of the person. 165 
160 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 77, quoting St. Augustine, Confessions, Bk. 10, Ch. 11 
(my emphasis). . . 
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The care of souls requires that pastors be simultaneously capable of ethical 
reflection and of transcending ethical judgments with the word of forgiveness. While 
this distinction between law and gospel is an insufficient basis for a systematic ethic, 
the distinction ought not be rendered irrelevant for Christian moral reflection. 
Meilaender's ethics stand somewhere between the relative unimportance that ethics 
has played in Lutheran theological reflection and the exaggerated importance of ethics 
in the Roman Catholic and other ecclesial traditions. As I have been arguing, the 
Christian life is certainly a journey, but not only a journey. It must also leave room 
for the verdict of grace. To do this Meilaender must keep the metaphors of journey 
and dialogue in furious opposition in a way that is lacking in Veritatis Splendor. 
A Lutheran ethic, then, requires a rich enough conceptual vocabulary to assert 
simultaneously that the declared righteous are righteous indeed though, perhaps, 
corrupt in deeds. Meilaender must disagree with the encyclical's assertion that grave 
misdeeds render the self incapable of hearing God's word of promise. Meilaender 
states, 'We must strive to retain the capacity to make both judgments - of the deed 
and the person - as best we can, in accord with the word of God, given us in Jesus and 
the Scriptures.' 166 The challenge of a Lutheran ethic, which intends to maintain the 
simultaneity of the self as righteous and sinner, is to take morality seriously, but not 
ultimately so. Pride of place goes to forgiveness. The looming question is whether 
this distinction between the identity and action finally makes for an incoherent ethic 
that unravels in moral inarticulacy. Meilaender obviously does not think so because it 
is possible to articulate the relationship between ethical judgements and the reality of 
forgiveness. 
In Veritatis Splendor the ruling metaphor is the Christian life as journey. This is 
clear in the encyclical's exposition of the wealthy young ruler who came to Jesus 
asking him to explain what good he should seek. This question about the good is 
taken to express the desire to make incremental moral progress toward the telos who 
is God. The means of progress toward the good is attentive obedience to what is 
right. Meilaender takes care not to have us draw the wrong conclusion that the Pope's 
emphasis on obedience is a rejection of the doctrine of grace. Indeed, the journey is 
begun as a response to God's gracious invitation and it is sustained as grace gives one 
166 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 80. 
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the power to keep the law by which one find one's way back to God. 167 Grace is 
important in Veritatis Splendor. The problem is that its 'precise role' is unclear. 168 
The ambiguity arises because it is not clear how fellowship with God is a present 
reality and how it is a future achievement. When understood as an achievement, 
fellowship depends on meeting certain conditions: the commandments, which are 'the 
way and condition of salvation' , must be kept. 169 In this case, obedience is the cause 
(rather than a sign) of fellowship with God. Grace must be understood as a 
demanding invitation to fulfil what seems to be humanly impossible. 170 This point is 
made by Jesus when he meets the man's claim to have fulfilled the law's demands by 
requiring that he give up his wealth. 
This impossible demand scandalised the disciples. They themselves are not at all 
certain of the role of grace in the Christian life. They do not know 'whether grace 
empowers the journey back to God from start to finish, or whether it only builds upon 
our own attempts to keep the commandments.' 171 Putting aside any suggestion of 
semi-Pelagianism, Meilaender argues that the emphasis on meeting certain conditions 
effectively diminishes the importance of the dialogue. 172 This transforms grace into an 
ancillary instrument of that obedience which is the real means of moral progress and 
salvation. 173 Grace remains impotent unless and until it is joined to human co-
operation. 
Such a description of the role of grace is not so much wrong as it is insufficient. 
This point is made in Meilaender's consideration of Karl Barth's interpretation of the 
story of the rich young man. 174 For Barth, the human disorder is not that sinners are 
quantitatively distanced from God. Indeed, this would be a kind of denial of the 
relevance of the incarnation where God has come near to humanity. The incarnation 
is a sign of God's presence on earth and the divine intention to close the distance 
between God and sinful human beings. Because Jesus is present, the young man is 
already within the sphere of Christ's grace. The critical distinction is whether he 
167 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 63. 
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responds to this presence in the obedience of faith or in the disobedience of unbelief. 
Barth states that the rich man has 'all possessions except one-the fulness of Jesus. 
And this is what condemns him.' 175 The critical problem is not that we are distant 
from God but that we cannot yet receive his fullness. 
The key to Barth's exposition is not the reaction of the rich man to Jesus' demands 
but the astonished reaction of the disciples. The disciples were the obedient. They 
had left everything to follow Jesus; yet they found the demands of Jesus upon the 
wealthy man to be impossible. Even in their obedience, the disciples understood how 
near they stood to 'the edge of the abyss of disobedience. ' 176 The disciples are again 
made aware of how great and impossible is that first step of obedience. How could 
they have done what they now conclude is an impossible task for the rich young 
ruler? Barth states: 
[T]he impossible became possible to them. To them? No, it was never possible to 
them. It was still possible only to God. But in the knowledge that what is possible 
only to God has become possible for them, in this confidence, in this humility or 
boldness - we can now say simply infaith - they became obedient. They accepted 
it as true that Jesus was obedient for them ... they believed, i.e., they were pleased to 
have His ability attributed to them, to have their own inability covered over by his 
ability ... they undertook to live in the shade and shelter of his ability. . .. If they do 
not lack the one thing that is needful for the fulfillment of the divine command, it is 
certainly not because they themselves possess it and achieve it. It is only because it 
is there for them in Jesus. It is only because they are pleased to accept it by faith in 
him. 177 
Barth's christology diverges from the encyclical's emphasis on the imitation of Jesus. 
For Barth, Jesus is the saviour in whom one finds shade and shelter. The disciples' 
astonishment reflects how, even in their obedience, they have not experienced growth 
or progress in their Christian life. The step they once took, now 'has to be taken again 
and again in all its difficulty. "78 For Barth, the life of the disciple is not first and 
foremost concerned with the incremental moral steps that move from alienation to 
fellowship with God. Rather, the aim of the Christian life is to live in the full 
presence of Christ, made possible by his fulfilment of the demands of the law. 
For Barth, either Christian ethics begins with fullness rather than deficiency, or it 
ceases to be of comfort to the troubled conscience. An ethic that begins in lack fills 
the disciple with fear of its impossible demands. When Jesus tells the rich young man 
175 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 65, quoting Barth, Church Dogmatics 11/2, p. 623. 
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to sell everything, the disciples stand with the rich man in astonished disbelief at 
Jesus' inordinate demands. They again become aware of the impossibility of meeting 
Jesus' demands. Opposing this interpretation, Veritatis Splendor sees Jesus as 
inviting the rich ruler to continue his journey toward God by means of radical 
obedience. Barth stresses the dependence of the disciple on God's grace so that the 
journey can only begin because Christ has bridged the unbridgeable abyss. 
For Barth, the problem is not that we cannot complete the journey, but that we 
cannot meet the demands for commencing the journey. To complete the journey, the 
disciples do not need a teacher or model for imitation: they need a Saviour to be 
obedient/or them. 179 Meilaender states that 'At such moments - which means, 
potentially, at any and every moment - they need to hear a promise they can trust, an 
invitation not to moral struggle but to take shade and shelter in the cover of Jesus' 
ability. n80 The gospel as promise relativises rather than rejects the importance of the 
journey metaphor. How then do we sustain a teleological notion of the Christian life 
and its attendant vocabulary of progress? A Lutheran ethic must maintain the two 
centres of the gospel: its power and its pardon. When speaking of progress in the 
journey of faithfulness, one employs the language of power. When speaking of one's 
relationship to God in faith, one employs the language of pardon. If Meilaender is 
correct about this two-fold centre of Lutheran ethics, to be authentically Lutheran and 
consistent with the rationality of its tradition, Lutheranism must become more 
Thomistic. MacIntyre is at least partially correct, then, when he notes: 
Take away or reject the Aristotelianism in the Thomist account, but leave the 
despair of moral achievement and the gratuitousness of grace, and what is 
foreshadowed is Luther. What an adequately corrected Aristotelianism provides for 
Aquinas, which is notably absent in Luther and in his ideological heirs, is an 
opportunity for showing how the understanding of prudence, justice, temperateness, 
and courage in the light afforded by charity, hope, and faith, and more especially 
charity, which is the form of all the virtues, furnishes a richly detailed account of 
the morallife. 181 
The notion of grace as pardon abstracted from grace as power renders deprives 
Lutheran theology of the kind of conceptual depth needed to articulate the place of 
morality within the Christian life. In a word, abstracting pardon from empowerment 
leaves Lutheranism morally inarticulate. 
179 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 69. 
180 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 68. 
181 Three Rival Versions, p. 141. 
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Meilaender's work demonstrates how Lutheranism may be more Thomistic 
without abandoning its central commitment to justification by grace through faith. 
Even though a Lutheran ethic cannot decisively say that a 'particular deed makes the 
simul of faith impossible', this does not mean that moral actions are insignificant or 
that certain practices may not destroy faith.182 Rather, Meilaender wishes to say that 
the Christian moral vision can never fully see beyond the epistemological problem 
caused by sin, nor can it forget how the cross manifests a righteousness that is real 
even when it is, for a time, hidden. Certainly these notions of sin and righteousness 
problematise the Lutheran's ability to pass moral judgement. But as Lutheran moral 
reflection is primarily concerned with vision rather than blame, patience in passing 
moral judgements will be seen as a necessary virtue in our moral formation. 
Meilaender offers a noteworthy insight into this approach to ethics in his brief 
consideration of the biblical story of Elisha and Naaman. Naaman, a commander in 
the Syrian army, upon being healed by Elisha, committed himself to refrain from 
offering sacrifices to any god but the Lord. However this commitment created a 
moral quandary that forced Naaman to (apparently) back-pedal in his journey toward 
God. Naaman says to Elisha, 'But may the LORD forgive your servant for this one 
thing: When my master enters the temple of Rimmon to bow down and he is leaning 
on my arm and I bow there also - when I bow down in the temple of Rimmon, may 
the LORD forgive your servant for this.' Elisha responds by absolving Naaman with 
the benediction, 'Go in peace. 'i83 The prophet Elisha's advice to Naaman is an 
exemplary model of moral reflection in the service of soul--craft. Elisha's relaxing of 
ethical demands illustrates a care for souls that takes seriously the simultaneity of 
Naaman's identity as saint and sinner. It may also illustrate, in the judgement of 
Veritatis Splendor, how one damages the 'harmony betweenfaith and life.'184 While 
the Pope's warning rightly acknowledges the risk involved in setting aside ethical 
demands, Meilaender asserts that 'the Lutheran, at least, should be willing to run 
some risks' in maintaining this tension between ethics and soul--craft. That this 
tension may be abused or confused is a risk worth taking in order to preserve the right 
to declare the absolution 'Go in peace.' For the Lutheran theologian, moral 
inarticulacy is not the worst thing that can happen. What is far more damaging is the 
182 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 82. 
183 2 Kings 5: 18-19. 
184 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 62, quoting John Paul II, The Splendor of Truth, # 26. 
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inability or unwillingness 'to speak the gospel to anyone whose self is deeply divided 
and who seeks God's promise of grace. '185 
Meilaender's emphasis on grace speaks to a pastoral concern raised by Fergus Kerr 
in his criticism of MacIntyre. Kerr argues that MacIntyre's view of tragedy as having 
its cause in human sin, error or ignorance leads to an inordinate ethical focus on 
affixing blame. 186 The problem is that there are tragic situations, such as with the 
fireman who experiences guilt because he was able to rescue only some of the people 
from a burning building, where blame must not be allowed to enter into the picture. 
Kerr states that this fireman 
should not blame himself for the deaths of those left behind, whose lives he could 
have saved only if he had not rescued some of those whom he did. But, as everyone 
knows, this kind of guilt is often felt. That is one reason why counselling is offered 
to rescuers and suchlike in the aftermath of disasters. Whatever their personal 
religious beliefs, those who are called upon to offer counsel in such cases are surely 
doing their best to take the appearance of a 'moral' dimension out of what were in 
fact simply practical problems. 187 
Though Meilaender and Kerr do not agree on many theological issues, on the problem 
of guilt and moral demands their views come together. Kerr's example shows why 
ethical reflection must be capable of something more than moral judgement. While 
Kerr tends to see the answer in abandoning the notion of the unity of the virtues, 
Meilaender maintains the unity of virtues while arguing that tragedy is a sign that this 
broken world cannot finally be fixed except by God's gracious intervention. The first 
task of ethics is not, therefore, to assign culpability but to be an aid to that kind of 
accountability that sees and says how we may live virtuously in a broken world. 
Once the task of ethics is laid out in this way, hope is recognised as the central 
virtue. As such moral reflection, in Meilaender's view, is to teach us how to see the 
world in spe rather than in re. 188 Consider how hope shapes Meilaender's 
understanding of suffering at the end of life when he argues that the aim of Christian 
compassion is not to eliminate suffering, and certainly not to eliminate sufferers, but 
to 'maximize love and care' . 189 Once we lose hope in God's gracious intervention, we 
are vulnerable to the promethean temptation to alleviate suffering by any means, 
185 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 81 (my emphasis). 
186 Kerr, 'Moral Theology after MacIntyre', p. 39. 
187 Kerr, 'Moral Theology after MacIntyre', p. 44. 
188 Meilaender, 'Justification Through Faith', p. 81. 
189 The Limits of Love, p. 90. 
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including evil means. 190 Moreover, when all these measures fail, which eventually 
they must, the complete abandonment of hope is manifest in the conclusion that, at 
some point, suffering warrants the active elimination of the sufferer. The alternative 
is the hopeful recognition that our suffering, and our ethical reflection on this 
suffering, points us to a deliverance which is greater than that which can be achieved 
by means of any human performance. 191 The aim of Lutheran ethical reflection, very 
simply put, is to think systematically about the significance of those human actions 
which have the power to shape the soul even as they lack the power to save it. 
The success of Lutheran moral reflection, centred as it is in simultaneity, is not 
measured by its ability to yield crisp, clean moral judgements. Rather, Meilaender 
takes his cue from Augustine who saw moral reflection as an aid to making 'sense of 
his world, to find in it what meaning he could, [and] to praise it wherever possible.'I92 
As for Augustine, and so also for contemporary Christians in a morally ambiguous 
time, this task requires that ethical reflection be shaped by the virtue of hope. 
Augustine's theological vision allowed him to assert in spe that the secular efforts of 
mankind were not wholly in vain, even if they were, in re, coming to an end. This 
hope was centred in the belief that the story of Rome's fall was not the whole story, 
but an episode in the greater story of God's salvation. In this story, the Christian lives 
in the 'constant swaying to and fro' between two realities represented as two cities. 
This simultaneity allowed Augustine to consider truthfully the awful unfolding events 
of his time without finally succumbing to the cult of futility. \93 
In response to MacIntyre's claim that Lutheranism lacks the conceptual depth to 
offer a 'richly detailed account of the moral life' ,1941 have argued that Meilaender's 
ethic gainsays this charge while demonstrating the importance of the Lutheran 
understanding of justification for ethical reflection. In view of what I take to be the 
success of Meilaender's ethic, I must now clarify my own view of MacIntyre's 
importance. While I reject MacIntyre's judgment that Lutheranism is, as a matter of 
philosophical necessity, incapable of sustaining a rational ethic, I do not think that, as 
a historical judgement of Lutheranism in practice, he is far wide of the mark. If the 
190 The Limits of Love, p. 91. 
191 The Limits of Love, p. 92. ., . . 
192 Faith and Faithfulness, p. 33. Meilaender quoting Charles Noms Cochrane, Chnstzamty and 
Classical Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 318. 
193 Faith and Faithfulness, pp. 33-34. 
194 Three Rival Versions, p. 141. 
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presence of the bureaucratic and therapeutic are signs of moral disorder, there are few 
modem American church bodies that escape indictment. In addition, the abiding 
presence of antinomianism within the Lutheran theological tradition further 
substantiates the judgement that Lutheranism suffers from its own discrete form of 
moral inarticulacy, a disorder that MacIntyre has rightly diagnosed. The remaining 
question is how Lutheranism might apply MacIntyre's critical and constructive moral 




LUTHERAN ETHICS AFTER MACINTYRE 
1. Introduction 
Meilaender's account of the Lutheran simultaneities answers MacIntyre's doubts 
about the possibility of a rational Lutheran ethic. Meilaender does this by 
demonstrating how these simultaneities are necessary to reconcile the notion of moral 
rationality with the radical implications of forgiveness and Christian freedom. I am 
now in position to move from the possibility of Lutheran ethics to a consideration of 
the necessity of Lutheran ethics. To a significant degree, the necessity of a Lutheran 
ethic is a particular expression of a more general conclusion regarding the necessity of 
ecclesial ethics. Brad Kallenberg, perhaps too abruptly though not inaccurately, 
speaks to this issue when he avers that Christian ethics has become necessary because 
secular ethics is unable to answer the 'why be moral' question: 'Utility is out. Kant 
is mistaken. Social contract is irrelevant. Reasons to be moral must be Christian 
reasons. Morality amounts to living the gospel faithfully.' I According to Kallenberg, 
Christian ethics is necessary because the church is perhaps the only institution capable 
of sustaining the kinds of counter-cultural communities and practices which can make 
a significant impact on the moral landscape of American culture. 
To say that there is a cultural moral vacuum does not ensure that the church will be 
able to adequately fill this vacuum. Although the moral resources are present, 
Lutheran churches must contend with certain intramural and extramural moral 
disorders. According to the Lutheran theologian, Robert Benne, we must examine 
Lutheran ethics 'with some urgency because ... Lutheranism as a living tradition is at 
risk.'2 particularly, Lutheranism is at risk because of its inability to transmit the 
I Brad Kallenberg, 'Positioning MacIntyre within Christian Ethics', p. 61. 
2 Robert Benne, 'Lutheran Ethics: Perennial Themes and Contemporary Challenges', in eds. Karen L. 
Bloomquist and John R. Stumme, The Promise of Lutheran Ethics (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1998), 
p. 11. 
tradition to new generations.3 The problem of inadequate moral formation is 
compounded by ambivalence about the place of moral formation in the theological 
task. As such, MacIntyre's critical and constructive moral philosophy is a necessary 
resource for Lutherans in thinking through our internal moral and intellectual 
disorders and in addressing the moral decline in culture. Benne argues that fulfilling 
this task depends on the church's ability to sustain the practices of moral formation. 
My argument unfolds in three parts. 
First, in order to consider the moral challenges facing the church in postmodern 
times, I shall consider an essay by the late Yale law professor Arthur Leff, which is 
entitled, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law. '4 Leff sets the stage for my discussion 
of the necessity of a Lutheran ethic by spelling out the troubling implications of 
Nietzschean philosophy in American culture. Second, I shall discuss an essay by the 
Lutheran theologian Reinhard Hutter, which maintains that once freedom is 
understood to have a positive shape, we can see how teleologicalform and moral 
formation are necessary elements of freedom. 5 Third, I shall reflect on the 
consequences of grounding moral formation in the reading of scripture. In the first 
part of this section I discuss Richard Hays' recent book, The Moral Vision of the New 
Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation, where he defines four tasks related to 
the use of scripture for moral formation. This account provides a theoretical 
framework for my reading of the parable of the Good Samaritan which aims to 
demonstrate how moral reflection in scripture depends on the imaginative 
transformation of auditors into narrative characters, and how this form of moral 
reflection is critical to the Lutheran understanding of the Gospel. We tum again to 
consider how the threat of nihilism necessitates a Lutheran ethic. 
2. Nihilism and the Necessity of Lutheran Ethics 
3 Benne 'Lutheran Ethics', p. 12. 
4 Arthur' Allen Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', Duke Lawlournal6 (1979), pp. 1229-
1249. . .. F d d G d' Cd' 
5 Reinhard Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran EthICS: ChristIan ree om a~ o. s o~an s , 
in eds. Karen L. Bloomquist and John R. Sturnme, The Promise of Lutheran EthiCS (MInneapohs, 
MN: Fortress, 1998), pp. 31- 54. 
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The contemporary church faces ethical challenges that would have been 
unimaginable to the Lutheran Reformers.6 One is struck by the radical difference 
between present ethical concerns and the past debates between Lutherans and Roman 
Catholics over natural law , the natural capability of fallen reason to comprehend 
reality, and the epistemological impact of sin. Then, the debate was waged over how 
much of the objective world, the universal law, or the will of God could be discovered 
apart from revelation. Now, as postmodernism presumes that objectivity, God, and 
universal laws are human inventions, contemporary ethical reflection has no room 'for 
any conception of final ends, of ends to be discovered rather than decided upon or 
invented. '7 
In the essay, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law,' Arthur Leff spells out the 
moral and legal implications of this postmodern rejection of modern foundationalism 
and premodern theism.8 Phillip Johnson, a professor of law, avers that Leffs essay, 
though virtually unknown outside the legal world, is one of the best descriptions of 
the postmodernist impasse.9 Leff argues that if morality is not divinely sanctioned, it 
lacks any moral or legal grounding. While Leff understands how this view might lead 
to a more brutish and violent world, he cannot see any plausible alternative. 
I want to believe - and so do you - in a complete, transcendent, and immanent set 
of propositions about right and wrong, findable rules that authoritatively and 
unambiguously direct us how to live righteously. I also want to believe - and so do 
you - in no such thing, but rather that we are wholly free, not only to choose for 
ourselves what we ought to do, but to decide for ourselves, individually and as a 
species, what we ought to be. What we want, Heaven help us, is simultaneously to 
be perfectly ruled and perfectly free, that is, at the same time to discover the right 
and the good and to create it. 10 
Modernity is ambivalent about this rejection of objective moral standards. We want 
freedom. We also fear others' freedom. This irresoluteness is reflected in Senator 
Joseph Biden's interview of Clarence Thomas during Thomas' Supreme Court 
confirmation hearing. Biden, concerned to nail down Thomas' somewhat elusive 
understanding of natural law, tried to tease out his commitments by drawing a 
6 For an assessment of the disturbing uniqueness of the present moral situation in the United States, 
from a Christian point of view, see Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon, .Resident Alie~s: Life in 
the Christian Colony (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989), pp. 15-29. A SImIlarly alarmmg 
assessment from the secular point of view is the late Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987). 
7 First Principles, Final Ends, pp. 6-7. 
8Arthur Allen LefT, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', Duke Lawlournal6 (1979), pp. 1229-1249. 
9 Phillip E. Johnson, 'Nihilism and the End of Law', First Things 31 (March, 1993), pp. 19-25. 
10 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1129. 
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distinction between 'good' and 'bad' natural law. Summarising Biden's distinction, 
Johnson states: 
[G]ood natural law does not dictate a moral code to be imposed upon individuals; 
instead, it protects the right of individuals to make moral decisions free from 
dictation by either legislators or judges. Finally, good natural law is not a static set 
of 'timeless truths' but rather an evolving body of ideals that changes to pennit 
government to adjust to new social challenges and new economic circumstances. In 
short, good natural law doesn't prevent us from doing anything we really want to 
dO,11 
Biden wishes to maintain a notion of natural law, which would be the foundation 
for inalienable rights, while refusing to grant objective moral authority to this natural 
law. Said another way, Biden wants a conventional foundation for inalienable rights, 
rather than a foundation of 'timeless truths', which would be open to the evolution of 
moral ideals. Though, according to Leff s argument, this view is nonsense, it is the 
kind of nonsense that has certain purchase with the legal profession, and far reaching 
implications for those whose do not have the money and influence to oversee the 
'evolution' of moral ideals. When inalienable rights are merely the constructions of 
free human beings, the pressing question is which humans shall do the constructing? 
Leff 's personal ambivalence about the freedom from objective moral law is also 
reflected in lawyers' efforts to maintain metaphysical language even when they have 
rejected the notion of transcendent norms. This has led to a new species of emotivist 
legal writing that seeks to disguise the loss of the transcendent moral authority with 
the use of an empty metaphysical language. 12 While the loss of objectivity has its 
dark possibilities, it also produces 'an exhilarated vertigo'. The rejection of 
transcendent moral limits is accompanied by 'a simultaneous combination of an 
exultant "We're free of God" and a despairing "Oh God, we're free!'" 13 We desire to 
be free of normative obligations. We simultaneously fear that lawlessness may be a 
less than promising prospect, especially if nihilism should become our permanent 
condition. Whatever else may be said about our present moral situation, Leff is certain 
that there cannot be a return to moral objectivity. Why is this? Human beings do not 
accept the authority of moral judgements unless they are convinced that these 
judgements are finally 'immune from further criticism'; that they are 'not created by 
II Johnson 'Nihilism and the End of Law', p. 19. 
12 Leffh~orously characterises this trend as, 'Anything you can do I can do meta.' He attributes the 
phrase to Leon Lipson. Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1230. 
13 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1233. 
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the finder' and that they cannot be 'changed ... or even challenged.'14 We are willing 
to restrain the will to power when we are convinced that the moral law applies to 
everyone, that everyone plays by the same rules, and that everyone is under the same 
moral authority. Once we believe that moral judgements are 'mine', not in the sense 
that I own up to them but that I am their originator, they lack this kind of moral 
authority. The failure of moral authority is evident in the inability of our moral 
judgements to pass the test which Leff colloquially calls the 'grand sez who?' The 
plain language in pubs and schoolyards is a sign of moral disorder and that, being 
unable to rationally resolve differences, we tum to non-rational means to end these 
differences. 
This modem dilemma is contrasted with other times when human beings 
accepted moral authority. For example, Leffnotes that the command, 'Thou shalt not 
commit adultery', though not particularly well-liked or self-evidently good, was once 
accepted as morally authoritative. The command was authoritative only because it 
was thought to express the will of an authoritative Evaluator. The authority of the 
command did not depend on its intelligibility. Rather, the command's moral authority 
was evident in that unwilling agents would still conclude, 'I ought not because He 
said I ought not, and why He said that is none of my business.' 15 While this kind of 
prohibition offends our Kantian sensibilities, it was still considered a sufficient reason 
to act against the internal proclivities of concupiscence. It was a command that 
expressed a morality that was 'God-based' and 'supernaturally constituted'. In this 
system, adultery was forbidden because it offends God's will and so is 'naturally' 
bad. 16 
Leff explores the relationship between the 'natural' and the will of God by 
introducing into the discussion the linguistic function of the 'performative'. A 
performative is 'a statement that does not describe facts or conform to them but 
instead constitutes them, creates them, "performs" them.' 17 To say, 'I am taking a 
walk' is a report. It describes what is taking place. To say 'I swear' or 'I do' reports 
nothing. These statements, rather, are performatives that reconstitute relationships. 
They are speech that changes the relationship of those involved in the saying and 
14 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1230. 
IS Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1231. 
16 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1231. 
17 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1231. 
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hearing of the performative. We are assured that in jurisprudence, the performative is 
neither arcane nor magical. When we say 'I promise', in a very real way we initiate a 
new reality. Vows, contracts, and promises change the way people view and act 
toward one another. What happens, Leffwonders, when a performative is uttered by 
an 'omniscient, omnipotent, and infinitely good being' who has a relationship with all 
of reality? Reality itself is defined. The natural is spoken into being. When God says 
'Let there be light', the word makes light a reality in a dark world. There is no gap 
between the natural reality of light and the judgement, 'it is good.' The natural and 
judgements about the natural are both the result of God's performative speech. IS 
God's speech, 'let there be' creates the natural 'is' from which we derive moral 
'oughts' . 
These moral judgements depend upon the existence of a transcendent, creating and 
speaking Being. However, Nietzsche's influence renders such discussions of a 
natural moral law superfluous. God is dead and the moral and legal consequence of 
this 
death of God turns out not to have been just His funeral; it also seems to have 
effected the total elimination of any coherent, or even more-than-momentarily 
convincing, ethical or legal system dependent upon finally authoritative 
extrasystemic premises.' 19 
The natural dies in the wake of the death of the supernatural. According to Judge 
Richard Posner, this means that any attempt to establish the natural foundation of law 
must fail. 
Even the term 'natural law' is an anachronism. The majority of educated 
Americans believe that nature is the amoral scene of Darwinian struggle. 
Occasional attempts are made to derive social norms from nature so conceived, but 
they are not likely to succeed. It is true that a variety of widely accepted norms, 
including the keeping of certain promises, the abhorrence of unjustified killing of 
human beings, and perhaps even the sanctity of property rights, promote the 
adaptation of the human species to its environment. But so does genocide.20 
Apart from the divine, we cannot determine which aspects of our natural 
experience are normative. Who determines whether or not nature sanctions genocide, 
private property, or keeping marriage vows? After Nietzsche, the fundamental moral 
problem is to decide, 'who ought to have God's validating power.' The problem is 
that there are no objective criteria by which we may validate one moral or legal 
18 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1232. 
19 Leff 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1232. 
20 Jo~son, 'Nihilism and the End of Law', pp. 20-21. (No bibliographical details are given.) 
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system based in human experience 'without thereby necessarily validating every legal 
system. '21 This failure to validate any moral and legal system means that each 
individual is 'his own ultimate evaluative authority. '22 The death of God means the 
apotheosis of each human being. We have all become, says Leff, moral godlets. 
Although the godlet has become the foundational moral unit, Leff also argues that 
ethical solipsism is unacceptable. Now we must determine which godlet or 
community of godlets determines normative morality. One precedent is found in the 
pantheon of ancient Babylon, where conflict between gods is resolved by the 'big 
Gods' eating the little ones. 23 This 'whoever-wins-is-God' option is neither plausible 
nor palatable.24 Leffwonders if there is any alternative as he states: 
If monad A believes X, and monad B believes Y, it is central to the system that there 
is no criterion for choosing between X and Y. The moment one suggests a criterion, 
then individual men have ceased to be the measure of all things, and something else 
- and that necessarily means someone else - has been promoted to the (formally 
impossible) position of evaluator-in-chief.25 
And, as MacIntyre reminds us, once choices are no longer subj ect to rational moral 
criteria, 'There is no appeal beyond the realities of power. '26 Leff further unpacks the 
implications of this reduction of morality to power. 
The reason that the 'grand sez who' renders us inarticulate is that our moral and 
legal assertions are not based on 'an unchallenged evaluative system. '27 Leffthen 
points out just how loquacious this inarticulacy can be: 
We can say that a valid legal system must have some minimum process for rational 
determination and operation. We can say that the majority cannot consistently 
disadvantage any minority. We can say that whatever else the majority can do, it 
cannot systematically prevent a minority from seeking to become a majority. We 
can say all sorts of things, but what we cannot say is why one say is better than any 
other, unless we state some standard by which it definably is. To put it as bluntly as 
possible, if we go to find what law ought to govern us, and if what we find is not an 
authoritative Holy Writ, but just ourselves, just people, making that law, how can 
we be governed by what we have found?28 
The human mind is quite capable of constructing a variety of ethical and legal systems 
that support imperatives, duties, and moral commands. Some examples include 
Robert Nozick's foundation of individual rights, or Richard Posner's fundamental 
21 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1234. 
22 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1235. 
23 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1235. 
24 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1235. 
25 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1237. 
26 Whose Justice?, p. 66. 
27 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1240. 
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axiom that 'no person may dominate any other', or John Rawls' imaginary original 
position.29 It is not that we have become incapable of making declarative judgements. 
Some declare that reality is the neo-Marxist faith in 'the blessed future when there 
will be only one class' .30 Others declare that the will 'of the people' established by 
the Constitution or the latest poll creates inalienable rightS. 31 The problem remains 
that these declarations have no any moral authority to withstand the 'sez who?' of its 
rivals. 
By what authority, we might ask, are rights asserted and duties commanded? 
Phillip Johnson recognises the problem this question presents as he writes: 
If we give X a right to do as she wants, and she wants to get an abortion, we must 
soon face the question of protecting her from Y, who wants to protect the rights of 
the unborn children. If majority opinion in the legislature favors some restrictions 
upon abortion, and there is no specific language in the Constitution on the subject, 
then 'pro-choice' forces have to invoke something very much like a natural law 
duty to get their way. 'Thou shalt not interfere with a woman's right to choose 
abortion; indeed, thou must help to pay for abortion through tax money; more than 
that, thou shalt not legislate that the woman contemplating abortion must be fully 
informed about the potential adoptive parents who desperately want to provide a 
loving home for her unborn child.' Sez who?32 
No moral or nonmoral assertion can be rationally defended. As Leff surveys the 
catastrophic political events of this past century, he expresses a sense of urgency 
about our moral inarticulacy: 
All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we have. Given what we know about 
ourselves, and each other, this is an extraordinarily unappetizing prospect; looking 
around the world, it appears that if all men are brothers, the ruling model is Cain 
and Abel. Neither reason, nor love, nor even terror seems to have worked to make 
us 'good,' and worse than that, there is no reason why anything should. Only if 
ethics were something unspeakable by us could law be unnatural, and therefore 
unchallengeable. As things stand now, everything is up for grabs. 
Nevertheless: 
Napalming babies is bad. 
Starving the poor is wicked. 
Buying and selling each other is depraved. 
Those who stood up and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and Pol Pot - and 
General Custer too - have earned salvation. 
Those who acquiesced deserved to be damned. 
There is in the world such a thing as evil. 
[All together now:] Sez who? 
God help US. 33 
28 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1247. 
29 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', pp. 1242-1243. 
30 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1242. 
31 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1247. 
32 Johnson, 'Nihilism and the End of Law', p. 21. 
33 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1249. 
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Johnson is not put off by the rhetorical force of Leffs conclusion. While 
recognising Leffs 'brilliant skeptical analysis,' Johnson wonders why he considers 
no alternative to nihilism.34 Why not, for instance, argue that the refusal to jettison 
metaphysical language and his own stirring condemnation of cruelty and complicity 
are linguistic signs of moral objectivity. Johnson states, 'If we know that totalitarian 
mass murder is evil, and that those who acquiesced in it deserve damnation, then we 
know something about the absolute evaluator as well. '35 As Leff sees no premodern 
alternative to nihilism, he cannot entertain the possibility that the present nihilism 
may be transitional stage which leads back to the restoration of premodern notions of 
rationality. This possibility is considered by the Lutheran theologian, Robert Jenson, 
in his essay, 'How the World Lost its Story'. The essay's title reflects Jenson's view 
that postmodernity names a reality where the story of modernity is 'dying around us,' 
and there is no story to takes its place. Hence postmodernism is 'an historical reality 
defined purely by negations. '36 According to Jenson, Nietzsche has special insight into 
our situation in recognising that 'the nihilism in which Western civilization ends was 
to be at once a collapse into decadence and the fulfillment of an absolute freedom. 
There would at once appear the hollow 'last man' and the glorious 'superman.' The 
'last man' is plainly on the scene, but superman is so far missing. '37 
The reality of nihilism as a transitional stage, Jenson argues, must shape the 
Christian church's understanding of its mission to world. The church must come to 
see that postmodernism is not a time without stories, but a time in which many stories 
contend to become the successor of the Enlightenment story and the dominant account 
of reality. The mission of the postmodern church is to enter this narrative agon and 
offer its peculiar account of reality. The church's task is to make 'dramatic sense' of 
the world. 38 Dramatic sense means that there is an external world 'out there' that 
exists apart from texts and readers. World events have a 'sequential dramatic 
coherence' quite apart from the observing, reading or hearing subject. This view of 
reality, having its origin in Jewish and Christian theology, is contrasted with the late 
modem world-view expressed in, inter alia, Beckett's Waitingfor Godot, Sartre's 
Nausea, or the music of John Cage. These works reflect two characteristics of the 
34 Johnson, 'Nihilism and the End of Law', p. 22. 
35 Johnson, 'Nihilism and the End of Law', p. 22. 
36 Robert Jenson, 'How the World Lost Its Story', First Things 36 (Oct., 1993), pp. 19-24. 
37 Jenson, 'How the World Lost Its Story', p. 19. 
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postmodern world. First, an accurate postmodernist account of life must be a 
collection of ultimately meaningless and episodic events and characters. 39 Second, 
any account of the world that has the coherence of a story is, by definition, inaccurate 
and inauthentic. It claims to be a story about the external world when, in fact, it is an 
account of the subj ective perception of the author. Where premodern and postmodern 
world-views agree is that 'If God does not invent the world's story, then it has none, 
then the world has no narrative that is its own. If there is no God ... there is no 
narratable world. '40 
How then is the church to carry out its mission to a world devoid of God and 
meaning? Jenson answers, 'If the church does notfind her hearers antecedently 
inhabiting a narratable world, then the church must herself be that world. '41 The 
church responds to inarticulacy by pointing to the narratable world in word and acts. 
The story is both told and enacted in the church's liturgical and moral life. That the 
world is going somewhere rather than nowhere is reflected in the alternative calendar 
of the church year which discovers the trajectory of history in remembering the events 
of the life of Christ, and in the Eucharist which makes us participants in that life.42 In 
sharp contrast to the pessimism expressed by MacIntyre in After Virtue, Jenson thinks 
that nihilism may be afelix culpa, offering the church a new opportunity to present its 
story.43 Seizing this opportunity, however, depends upon the church's ability to 
adequately respond to the Dionysian counter-narrative. Nietzsche presents the 
opposition in this way: 
Dionysus versus the 'Crucified': here you have the contrast. It is not a difference in 
regard to the martyrdom - but the latter has a different meaning. Life itself, Life's 
eternal fruitfulness and recurrence, caused anguish, destruction, and the will to 
annihilation. In the other case, the suffering of the 'Christ as the Innocent One' 
stands as an objection against Life, it is a formula for its condemnation .... the 
problem concerns the meaning of suffering, whether a Christian or a tragic meaning 
be given to it.44 
38 Jenson, 'How the World Lost Its Story', p. 20. 
39 Jenson, 'How the World Lost Its Story', pp. 20-21. 
40 Jenson, 'How the World Lost Its Story', p. 21. 
41 Jenson, 'How the World Lost Its Story', p. 22. 
42 Jenson 'How the World Lost Its Story', pp. 22-23. 
43 For an 'extended consideration of Christianity as a force for the transvaluation of values see Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian Interpretation of History (New York: Scribner, 
1965), pp. 197ff. . 
44 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluatwn of All Values, Vol. 2, No. 
1052, trans. Anthony M. Ludouici (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), p. 421. 
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The question remains whether the world's story after nihilism will be expressed in the 
Eucharistic or the Dionysian celebration? 
The church's ability to gainsay the Dionysian rival is closely related to the 
worship and moral life of the church. Jenson notes: 
[T]he church's assemblies must again become occasions of seeing. We are told by 
Scripture that in the Kingdom this world's dimness of sight will be replaced 
by ... 'beatific vision.' It is a right biblical insight that God first of all speaks and that 
our community with him and each other is first of all that we hear him and speak to 
him .. .in this age, the church must be a place where beatific vision is anticipated and 
trained.45 
In sharp contrast to a world that increasingly sees life as 'one damned event after 
another', the church's cultus is a response to MacIntyre's fundamental moral 
question, 'Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?'46 When the church 
proclaims that its story makes dramatic sense of the world, it commits itself to being a 
place that trains others to anticipate and participate in this story. This participation is 
both liturgical and moral. The claim that participation in this story is liturgical and 
moral presents Lutheran ethics with its defining problematic that was partially defined 
in Leffs essay. In his view, as human beings wish to be 'simultaneously ... perfectly 
ruled and perfectly free', and as these positions are mutually excluding, we must 
either choose form or freedom.47 Contrary to this, Jenson argues that the church's 
story, which imposes a narrative form on human experience, is not only compatible 
with freedom, it is a story in which freedom is a central theme. In recognising the 
crucial importance of the question of form and freedom for Lutheran ethics, I shall 
now discuss Reinhard Hutter's argument that Lutheran ethics is capable of holding 
together the 'furious opposites' of form and freedom only by understanding these 
terms within a teleological framework. 
3. Commands, Freedom and the Teleological Shape of Lutheran 
Ethics 
A defining characteristic of Lutheranism is its argument over the relative 
importance or unimportance of good works. On the one hand, this debate may be a 
sign of a tradition in good order for, as MacIntyre states, 'A living tradition is an 
45 Jenson, 'How the World Lost Its Story', p. 24. 
46 After Virtue, p. 216. 
47 Leff, 'Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law', p. 1129. 
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historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part 
about the goods which constitute that tradition. '48 Vital traditions 'embody 
continuities of conflict. '49 On the other hand, this debate may be a sign of a tradition 
in disorder, a tradition whose debates prove to be interminable because they are 
rationally unresolvable. Hutter's essay is an important contribution to the argument 
about good works for its insight into various aspects and influences of this debate and 
for the progress the essay makes toward defining the nature of a Lutheran ethic. 
For Hutter, the troubling questions for Lutheran ethics are centred in how we 
reconcile the law as morally normative with the freedom of the gospel. However, 
Hutter argues, because Lutheranism suffers from a conceptual impoverishment which 
reduces freedom to the notion of 'freedom from', it cannot reconcile morality with the 
gospel. This impoverishment is the source of two very different problems. The first 
problem relates to the tendency in Protestant theology to define itself by its opposition 
to the Roman Catholic understanding of justification, which transforms 'the doctrine 
of justification by faith alone .. .into the formal principle ofProtestantism.'50 Hutter 
wishes to maintain that the doctrine of justification by faith alone is the central 
doctrine of the church, which ought to mean that it is 'the very floor on which we 
stand', rather than what it has become, namely 'a ceiling that has to cover 
everything. '51 When every aspect of the theological task must directly relate to the 
article of justification, Lutheran ethics runs into difficulty by defining freedom as a 
'freedom from'. This view of freedom tends to suspect that a teleological ethical 
reflection and notions of moral formation threatens to undermine the Christian's 
freedom from forms and laws. 52 
The second reason why Lutherans tend to define freedom negatively as a 'freedom 
from' is the influence of the Kantian view of the self as autonomous. 53 Once freedom 
is understood to be synonymous with autarky, God's law must be viewed as a 
heteronomous imposition from which agents must be liberated. 54 This view 
effectively shrinks the gospel down to the message that 
48 After Virtue, p. 222. 
49 After Virtue, p. 222. . . 
50 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 33. Hutter refers to Gustaf Wmgren, CreatIOn 
and Law (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1961). 
51 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 33. 
52 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 34. 
53 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 38. 
54 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 32. 
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we are radically and unavoidably accepted by God. The 'life of faith' that brings 
forth good works and is directed toward the neighbor's service is now inscribed into 
the logic of 'motivation' and 'effect. ,55 
Moral reflection is now confined to the question of motive and what most matters is 
the disposition of the heart and the individual's conscience. This view of the gospel 
internalises and personalises ethics so that any thought of moral education, formation, 
communal obligation, and an authoritative narrative are viewed as external threats to 
the freedom of this gospel. The problem is that once morality is so internalised, it is 
on the same path that emotivism takes to moral inarticulacy. The threat is that 
Lutheran theology will undermine its moral foundation and so be unable to rationally 
condemn evil or commend a positive moral vision. 
In calling this focus on motive into question, I do not wish to suggest that the 
Lutheran concern to guard Christian freedom from legalism is misplaced. I shall 
rather argue that the unintended consequence of this reduction renders Lutheranism 
vulnerable to a theoretical and practical antinomianism which, in tum, gives occasion 
for a reactionary legalism to take hold.56 The insidious problem with antinomianism 
is not that it consistently rejects any positive moral content but that this content is 
supplied either by someone's 'unexamined desires' or by 'personal political 
preferences'.57 The problem is that, as MacIntyre's account of tradition makes clear, 
there are no historical communities that are ever free of moral content. Moral content 
will either reflect the explicit commitments of a tradition or the moral content will 
reflect unexamined and unaccountable preferences. Once ethics is sufficiently 
internalised and reduced to personal motive, the ecclesial community has no rational 
means to call into question the unexamined moral content, be it antinomian or 
legalistic. As the reduction of ethics to motive affects the Lutheran congregation in 
ways similar to the effect of emotivism in culture, it is not surprising that debates 
within these congregations are increasingly shrill. 
Hutter's discussion of the Kantian influence on the Lutheran understanding of 
forensic justification strengthens my connection between the ethics of motive and 
emotivism. According to Hutter, Lutheranism's moral disorder originates in the 
strange mixture of theology and philosophy that defined freedom solely as the 
55 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 34. 
56 Paul Althaus offers a more developed discussion of this problem in, The Divine Command: A New 
Perspective on Lal'.' and Gospel, trans. Franklin Sherman (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1966). 
57 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 36. 
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'freedom from' limits. This view transfonns God's law into the 'archenemy of 
human freedom (libertas),. The mixture of this erroneous understanding of forensic 
justification and Kantian autonomy rendered Lutheran theology inarticulate and 
unaccountable in providing a positive account of the shape of the Christian life. When 
justification is mixed with Kantian autonomy, freedom must be defined as 'essentially 
without gestalt.' There can be no positive teleological account of the Christian life 
because it would be nothing more than a 'sophisticated fonn of works-righteousness' 
that also contradicts 'the self-legislative nature of human freedom. '58 As such, there 
is no room for a morality that sees freedom defined as 'practicing God's 
commandments as a way oflife.'59 
According to Benne, the crucial test of Lutheranism is whether its notion of 
'ecstatic' motivation finally makes it impossible for the church, as a living tradition, 
to fonn the moral lives of its members.60 The problem is that because Lutherans are 
'dazzled ... by the wonder and profundity of God's justifying grace in Christ,' they 
'are tempted to think that the only really interesting ethical question is the 
motivational one. '61 However, the reduction of ethics to motive is to condemn it to 
moral inarticulacy. That is, we can never say to another that perhaps their motive is 
wrong and certainly the expression of this motive is wrong. Better stated, we can say 
just about anything, we just have no authority to say it openly. This means, according 
to MacIntyre, that Lutheran communities, once rendered incapable of moral order, 
will be ordered by coercive or manipulative means. The argument leads us to the 
paradoxical conclusion that preserving Christian freedom requires that we relegate 
moral order to the realm of the manipulative. This leads us to ask what has gone 
wrong? 
Hutter locates the fundamental Lutheran error in 'freedom from' understanding 
which has its origin in three misreadings of Luther's view of freedom: 
A Christian is perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. 
A Christian is perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.62 
58 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 35. 
59 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 33. 
60 Benne 'Lutheran Ethics', p. 28. Also see Martha Ellen Stortz, 'Practicing Christians: Prayer as 
Formati~n', in eds. Karen L. Bloomquist and John R. Stumme, The Promise of Lutheran Ethics 
~Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1998), pp. 55-73. 
1 Benne, 'Lutheran Ethics', p. 27. 
62 Luther, The Freedom of a Christian, p. 344. 
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Hutter argues that to read Luther rightly is to see a positive relationship between 
freedom and moral responsibility. This positive relationship is undermined in three 
ways: 1) The antinomian error abstracts the first proposition from the second so that 
freedom is unhinged from the limits of responsibility. As such normative divine 
commands are viewed as incompatible with the antinomian version of freedom. 2) 
The dogmatic/legalistic error abstracts the second proposition from the first so that 
obedience is no longer the embodied free expression of the gospel and more a rigid 
conformity to a clear, categorical, and heteronomous command. 3) The third 
misreading dichotomises the inner, non-corporeal, spiritual life from the 'outer' 
political and economic life.63 This error places an unbridgeable gulf between the 
spiritual kingdom of the gospel and the earthly kingdom of law so that the application 
of God's commands to the Christian's life is rejected as confusing the two kingdoms. 
Each of these misreadings of freedom effectively renders God's law irrelevant for 
the Christian life. This leads to the ironic conclusion that the same doctrine that 
predicates utter dependence of sinners on God's action is also the license for 
independence from God. God's justification, Hutter observes, justifies living as if 
God does not exist: 
What has happened? Instead of Luther's 'happy exchange' between the person's 
sin and Christ's righteousness, during the last two hundred years there has been 
quite an 'unhappy exchange' between God and the self-sufficient subject. God is 
no longer the defining horizon of the human good, the end of all things, and present 
in our conscience. The eschatological horizon ofa life with God, God's utter 
proximity, the utter closeness of God's commandments, slowly but increasingly 
have turned into a mode of life according to the methodological procedure of 
modem science: etsi Deus non daretur, as if God did not exist. Thus the thinking 
and judging individual subject has become the central focus in theories of ethics and 
in the practical ways people go about their lives.64 
Hutter's sources for the amelioration of these conceptual errors are Barth's theology 
and recent papal encyclicals. For Barth, as the mortally wounded self who is utterly 
dependent on Christ, autarky cannot be synonymous with Christian freedom. Persons 
trapped in the sinful condition do not need to be left alone: they need the intervention 
of the God who alone is free. 65 Freedom depends on God's intervention and rescue. 
Freedom is defined, first and foremost, as a positive restoration of the vertical 
relationship with God and the horizontal relationship to others. Furthermore, 
63 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 41. 
64 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 37. 
65 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 39. 
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understood as a relationship with a 'thou' rather than an 'it', freedom cannot be 
reduced to the static mathematical point of justification. As noted earlier, this 
justification is the foundation of Lutheran theology, not the ceiling. When freedom is 
understood relationally, Hutter notes that it is not surprising that 'God's 
commandments reemerge as a theme in close connection with Christian freedom. '66 
Hutter also recognises certain correctives in the papal encyclical, Veritatis 
Splendor. 
The importance of this encyclical for Protestantism in general and Lutheranism in 
particular is that it could awaken our ethical reflections from their theological and 
conceptual slumber caused by the canonization of Enlightenment convictions in the 
center of our moral matrix.67 
Once more, Lutheranism has conceived of the self as 'shriveled down' to a 'punctual' 
mathematical point. The Thomistic view of the self is one who is developing along 
the 'way' .68 The moral selfis on a journey that moves from disorder to the realisation 
of its potentiality. Understood in this way, it is not at all problematic to speak of a life 
that is enabled by virtue and encumbered by vice. 
Clearly, Hutter's moral vision is very much like Meilaender's view of the 
Christian life as ajoumey. For Meilaender, the journey metaphor teaches us not to 
settle on a moral theory that neglects moral experience, but one that does not 
forget that theologians remain pilgrims. They may (and must) affirm the truth about 
reality revealed in Christ: that even the will of God that calls for our sanctification is 
a gracious will. They may (and must) affirm the truth of our experience within 
simple history: that, while we can believe even the demanding God to be 
unequivocally gracious, we cannot fully experience him as such. The desire for 
absolute conceptual consistency within the whole theological task - the desire to 
surmount the tension between these two pictures - must therefore be labeled as 
Gnostic. It is an attempt to leap beyond the boundaries of the Christian story and 
out of history before God brings that story to its close.69 
Moralformation is an unintelligible term without a positive form. In Luther's 
theology, this form is defined by the telos of a life directed toward God and toward 
the created good. Given the positive shape of the Christian life, freedom is 
understood as the movement of the human toward that good who is God. Moreover, 
as there are better and worse ways to use our freedom in the journey toward God, we 
66 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 39. 
67 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 32. 
68 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 39. 
69 The Limits o/Love, p. 146, n. 3. 
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need the law as 'an external principle of action that gives shape and fonn to this 
freedom by directing it toward both God and created goods. no 
Luther finds no incompatibility between freedom and a positive fonn of life as he 
observes: 
We should think of the works of a Christian who is justified and saved by faith 
because of the pure and free mercy of God, just as we would think of the works 
which Adam and Eve did in Paradise, and all their children would have done if they 
had not sinned ... The works of a believer are like this. Through his faith he has been 
restored to Paradise and created anew, has no need of works that he may become 
righteous; but that he may not be idle and may provide for and keep his body, he 
must do such works freely only to please God.71 
Salvation is the partial but real restoration of prelapsarian reality. The reality of 
salvation admits a notion of freedom as the positive fonn of life that is 'proper to that 
state of being. '72 In his Lectures on Genesis, Luther argues that the Christian life is 
centred in reverence to the Creator and delight in the creation: 
And so when Adam had been created in such a way that he was, as it were, 
intoxicated with rejoicing toward God and was delighted also with all the other 
creatures, there is now created a new tree for the distinguishing of good and evil, so 
that Adam might have a definite way to express his worship and reverence toward 
God. After everything had been entrusted to him to make use of it according to this 
will, whether he wished to do so for necessity or for pleasure, God finally demands 
from Adam that at this tree of the knowledge of good and evil he demonstrate his 
reverence and obedience toward God and that he maintain this practice, as it were, 
of worshipping God by not eating anything from it. 73 
Prelapsarian peace with God is embodied in the fonns of worship and obedience. 
Obedience is not incompatible with intoxicating delight. There is a seamless 
connection between reverence and revelry. Both are modes of free participation in a 
reality that is made known through positive and prohibitive commands. 'Do not eat 
of the fruit' and 'Be fruitful and multiply' are commands that demarcate reality from 
its opposite. After the fall, these commands take on an alien function of accusing us 
of our inordinate love of the unreal. However, this alien function does not preclude 
the possibility that after the fall, the commands that once called reality into existence, 
may now recall us to the real that has been 'submerged and forgotten under the 
70 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 32 (my emphasis). 
71 Hutter 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 42, quoting Luther, 'The Freedom of the 
Christia~', in ed. Harold 1. Grimm and trans. W.A. Lambert, Luther's Works Vol. 31 (Philadelphia, 
P A: Muhlenberg Press, 1957), p. 360. 
72 Hutter 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 42. 
73 Hutter: 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 42, quoting Luther, Lectu.res on Genesis . 
Chapters 1-5, in ed. and trans. laroslav Pelikan, Luther's Works Vol. 1 (St. LoUIS, MO: ConcordIa 
Publishing House, 1958), p. 1. 
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conditions of sin. n4 The commands do not merely condemn. They remain mnemonic 
signs of a paradise lost. 
How then do we explain our po st-lap sari an condition? David Yeago admits that 
sin has wrought a radical change. However, it is crucial to note that the change is not 
in the commands but in the one to whom these commands are directed. Everything 
depends upon the identity of the one to whom these commands are directed. 
The commandment is not given to Adam so that he might become a lover of God by 
keeping it; Adam already is a lover of God, 'drunk with joy towards God,' by virtue 
of his creation in the image of God, by the grace of original righteousness. The 
commandment is given, rather, in order to allow Adam's love for God to take form 
in a historically concrete way of life .. .in the cultus Dei, the concrete social practice 
of worship ... that one who understands the law spiritually remembers that all God's 
commandments presuppose a subject deified by grace, a human being who is drunk 
with joy toward God and rejoices in all God's creatures. This is, after all, precisely 
what Jesus teaches: the law and the prophets hang on the double commandment of 
love, the commandment to love God with all our heart, soul, mind, and strength and 
our neighbor as ourselves.75 
Justification means that the object of God's commands is the deified selfin Christ. 
This self is no longer turned in on itself. It is turned toward God in reverence and 
toward the neighbour in love. This turning cannot but take a positive form in human 
action. The command to love God and the neighbour is a sign of a self that is free 
from being turned in on itself, and so, is capable of hearing the commands of God as a 
'living and spiritual flame.' These commands are 'not teaching but living, not word 
but reality, not sign but fulfillment. '76 It is not law but torah.77 The once curved in 
and now converted selfis capable of delighting in the word and worship of God. For 
Luther, the new reality is expressed when the Psalter joins worship with expressions 
of delight in God's commands: 
For Luther a decisive outcome of the eschatological fulfillment of faith in Christ is 
the dilectio legis, the delight in the law, 'where the law is not anymore law' (W A 
50, 565, 18t). For this reason Ps. 119 with its rich and mixed use of 'law,' 
74 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 50. 
75 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 43, quoting David Yeago, 'Martin Luther on 
Grace, Law, and Moral Life: Prolegomena to an Ecumenical Discussion of Veritatis Splendor', The 
Thomist 62 (1998), p. 180. 
76 Hutter 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 44. 
77 Discu~sing the third or 'pedagogical' use of the law, Hutter states that 'it is crucial to distinguish 
between "law" on the one hand and "commandment," "mandate," "torah" on the ~~er hand. Due to 
the condition of sin, "law" in both its ftrst and second use has an enforcing, restrammg, and convIctmg 
character. This is not inherent in God's law but is the result of the radical human estrangement from 
God. As the gestalt of the way of life with God - the embodiment of genuine humane freedom - the 
enforcing, restraining, and convicting elements are lost.' Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran 
Ethics', p. 182 n. 16. 
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'commandment' 'mandate,' and 'torah' remained for Luther the center of the 
Psalter.78 
Hutter still must attempt to reconcile his positive view of God's command with 
the accusing function of the law (lex semper accusat). The law's capacity to accuse is 
not proper to the law. It is due to the abnormality of the subject's separation from 
God. So long as there is alienation from God, there is accusation by the law. Again, 
so long as the identity of the Christian is simul justus et peccator, the law must always 
exercise the accusing function. Yeago states: 
What happens after sin comes on the scene is simply that this subject presupposed 
by the commandment is no longer there; the commandment no longer finds an 
Adam living an 'entirely divine life,' 'drunk with joy towards God,' but rather an 
Adam who has withdrawn from God, who believes the devil' s lies about God and 
therefore flees and avoids God. It is precisely the anomaly of this situation that 
causes the commandment to become, in Luther's terms, 'a different law' (alia lex).79 
The tension of the simul must be maintained. We must be able to assert that the law 
always accuses while recognising that the law does not only accuse. 80 The law always 
accuses because the struggle between the spirit and the flesh will not be resolved until 
the Eschaton. Because the law does not only accuse, we may take delight in its 
positive function. 
The law functions positively in outlining the form of the free life and in directing 
the formation of the self towards ever increasing participation in the free life. As the 
subject of the divine command is a divided self, the positive function of the command 
is easily stated and terribly difficult to practice. The law that demands the impossible 
reformation of the sinful self also directs and forms us in the image of Jesus, the 'joy 
of man's desiring.' It is this latter positive function of the law which has been 
overshadowed by the accusing function of the law. This is most evident in the laity's 
assumption that after the baptism of children, communion or marriage, one does not 
expect to be treated as an initiate or apprentice in a positive form of life. The 
assumption is that the efficacy and completeness of sacramental grace means that no 
further formation need follow from the sacrament. The efficacy of the sacrament of 
God's presence is a license to be left alone. To be left alone is not liberation, but it is 
to be bereft of the necessary resources for moral and spiritual progress. 
78 Hiitter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 186, n. 44. 
79 Hiitter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 43. 
80 Hiitter mentions the importance of maintaining a distinction between the positive function of 
commands over against the condemning function of law. Private Conversation, December 3, 1998. 
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Hutter's alternative is to develop the relationship of discipline to the positive 
shape of a life ordered to freedom. His strategy is to situate the passions within the 
Christian life as Luther did in describing the Christian life as a kind of intoxication 
with God. However, not every desire leads to God. Hence we must be capable of 
distinguishing between these desires whose end is God and those which merely 
imitate the divine. Cupiditas is a capable mimic of caritas. For this reason, we need 
the commands of God to discern what seems good from what is truly good. These 
commands direct desire away from enslaving passion toward passionate participation 
in Christian freedom. 81 Hutter notes that Augustine clearly understood that for desires 
to be rescued as goods, they had to be redirected back toward God. 82 Though deified 
desires are not good, the desires of the deified are potentially very good. This means 
that desires must not become idols or they will lead to demonic frustration. 83 
However, like Eve, our desire to eat of the forbidden fruit blinds us to seeing the 
command of God as a safeguard of our freedom and a guide into ever-increasing 
participation in freedom. 
Hutter examines covetousness as a desire that finally subverts our freedom 
because it leads to frustration rather than flourishing. The frustration of covetousness 
is variously expressed as the futile attempt to purchase the whole world at the cost of 
one's soul, placing eternal hope in goods that are too easily spoiled by moth, thieves 
or rust, or imagining that one is capable of serving two masters. Knowledge of this 
frustration does not, of course, arrest human covetousness. Covetousness is easy to 
denounce in others and difficult to detect in oneself. We face an epistemological 
difficulty in distinguishing between desires that merely seem to participate in the good 
of freedom from those that truly participate in this good. In order to participate in this 
life, we must be trained to distinguish rightly ordered from disordered passions and 
we must be capable of appreciating the good of rightly-ordered passions. This 
Below, I consider a work by Paul Althaus where he attempts, with limited success, to make this 
distinction. 
81 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 47. 
82 Hutter 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 47. 
83 Luthe;'s defmition of a god distinguishes true faith from idolatry. He writes that 'A god is that to 
which we look for all good in which we fmd refuge in every time of need. To have a god is nothing 
else than to trust and believe Him with our whole heart. As I have often said, the trust and faith of the 
heart alone make both God and an idol. If your faith and trust are right, then your God is the true God. 
For these two belong together, faith and God. That to which your heart clings and entrusts itself is, I 
say, really your God.' Martin Luther, The Large Catechism, in ed. and trans. Theodore G. Tappert, The 
Book o/Concord (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1959), p. 365. 
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requires an appropriate discipline. Hutter defines this discipline according to the 
analogy of askesis. 
Without desire we would cease to be human; without God as desire's ultimate end 
we become inhumane. Therefore Christian freedom has to be understood as true 
askesis or chastity; to let all our desires be ordered by and fulfilled in the 
communion with God that begins in grasping Christ in faith. Instead of being 
governed by the unsatiability of our desires seeking fulfillment in finite goods, we 
become free to desire our ultimate good. In communion with God we receive the 
finite goods of creation that we also desire.84 
, 
Askesis is essential to freedom because it is the means by which unruly desire is ruled 
and directed. Said another way, if we hope to live in a right relationship to the created 
goods, we must be capable of not coveting. Hence the Christian needs to know why 
one need not covet. Luther states: 
For if the heart looks for divine favor and relies upon it, how is it possible that a 
man should be greedy and worry? He must be sure beyond a doubt that God cares 
for him; therefore he does not cling to money; he uses it also with cheerful liberality 
for the benefit of his neighbor, and knows well that he will have enough, however 
much he may give away. For his God, whom he trusts, will not lie to him nor 
forsake him, as it is written, Psalm xxxvii: 'I have been young, and now am old; 
never have I seen a believing man, who trusts God, that is a righteous man, 
forsaken, or his child begging bread.' Therefore the Apostle calls no other sin 
idolatry except covetousness, because this sin shows most plainly that it does not 
trust God for anything, expects more good from its money than from God; and, as 
has been said, it is by such confidence that God is truly honored or dishonored.85 
Covetousness is prohibited so that one may enjoy a life free from worry. The 
corollary of being free from worry is that we are now free for generosity toward 
others. The command does not ensure that gratitude toward God will be concretely 
embodied in generosity to others, nor does it specify how this gratitude and generosity 
shall be concretely embodied. There are large areas of freedom yet to be discerned. 
The work of the command, Hutter states, is to provide 'inward "training" in God's 
commandments, starting from the Decalogue and moving toward the Sermon on the 
Mount, in order to shape the way a person's intentionality gives gestalt to Christian 
freedom. '86 
Askesis is the disciplined participation in the life of gratitude and generosity 
whose causal antecedent is forensic justification. How then does moral discipline 
become a threat to forensic justification? The need for the language of discipline 
84 Hutter 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 47. 
85 Ma~ Luther, Treatise on Good Works, in ed. James Atkinson and trans. W.A. Lambert, Luther's 
Works Vol. 44 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), p. 108. 
86 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 50. 
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readily admits the language of human agency. We are to discipline inordinate desire 
and to live the life of worship and witness. Forensic justification, contrariwise, is 
based in divine agency and human passivity. By sustaining this tension between 
divine and human action, Lutheran ethics becomes capable of appreciating the good 
in good works without neglecting the very real dangers of these works. Luther states: 
For the greatest of all questions has been raised, the question of Good Works; in 
which is practised immeasurably more trickery and deception than in anything else, 
and in which the simpleminded man is so easily misled that our Lord Christ has 
commanded us to watch carefully for the sheep's c10things under which the wolves 
hide themselves. Neither silver, gold, precious stones, nor any rare thing has such 
manifold alloys and flaws as have good works, which ought to have a single simple 
goodness, and without it are mere color, show and deceit.87 
Good works are easily put to bad uses. Good works have great potential for abuse. For 
this reason, John Webster argues that Luther attempted to articulate a discretely 
Christian grammar of 'doing'. This means that theological ethics must be 
characterized by a distinct manner of thought and speech which occupies its own 
independent grounds and operates by its own procedures, which is generated by the 
divine utterance, which is responsible to the church as a world of meaning and to 
the texts which authoritatively define and describe that world of meaning, and 
which is not necessarily embraced by or even contiguous with other ways of 
speaking or habits ofthought.88 
Webster cites a passage from the 1535 Galatians lectures where Luther states that a 
theological account of doing in faith is 'another sphere and a new realm ... one that is 
different from moral doing. '89 Luther was suspicious of morality; he was not, 
however, suspicious of God's commands. He states that 'we have to learn to 
recognise good works from the commandments of God, and not from the appearance, 
size, or number of the works themselves, nor from the opinion of men or human law 
or custom.'90 
We avoid the abuses of morality by recognising that the accent of the grammar of 
'doing' falls first and foremost on God's 'doings'. In the analogy of grammar, human 
agency is an enclitic - a part of speech that has no intelligibility apart from its 
grammatical antecedent. 91 Human action means nothing abstracted from divine action. 
Webster notes this referential dependence in Luther's understanding of conscience: 
87 Luther, Treatise on Good Works, p. 21. 
88 Webster, Barth's Moral Theology, p. 157. 
89 Webster, Barth's Moral Theology, p. 157, quoting Luther, Lectures on Galatians -1535, p. 262. 
90 Webster, Barth's Moral Theology, p. 158, quoting Luther, 'Treatise on Good Works', p. ~94. 
91 Webster, Barth's Moral Theology, p. 164, citing Wilfried Joest, Ontologie der Person bel Luther 
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1967), pp. 233-274. 
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As with questions of spiritual predication, so with the matter of conscience: the 
magnetic centre of the moral world is not the self but God, and faith becomes 
correspondingly elevated as the orientation of the self to that centre ... ' [I]t is faith 
which confers on the conscience the ability correctly to judge, as God judges, 
persons before actions and actions in the light of persons. Or, perhaps more 
accurately, faith is the power of the conscience to accept God's judgements about 
the person rather that those which the conscience arrives at naturally, or by 
inference from actions. ,92 
Luther's focus on divine agency deconstructs morality; it does not deny or reject 
morality. John Milbank considers this aspect of Luther's theology when he asks the 
question, 'Can morality be Christian?' His answer includes an insightful summary of 
Luther's understanding of human action as he writes: 
For all that Luther fails to see that faith is from the outset received and enacted 
charity or a habitus, he nonetheless and in a remarkable fashion shows how every 
good work is itself nothing but faith or confidence. The confident man, believing in 
plenitude does not steal, and does not need to tell lies to protect himself. .. The 
Christian good man is simply for Luther an artist of being, trusting the perfect 
maker of all things. Essentially his message is that of Augustine: without worship 
there can be no other virtue (Civitas Dei xix, 4,21) for worship gives everything 
back up to God, hangs on to nothing and so disallows any finite accumulation which 
will always engender conflict. Confident worship also knows that in offering it 
receives back, so here the temporal world is not denied, but its temporality is 
restored as gift and thereby rendered eternal. Only the vision and hope of heaven 
makes us socially and politically just on earth and how is it, one wonders, that we 
have ever come to think otherwise? 93 
Human works are not to be the frightful, grasping response to scarcity but the 
embodied participation in the plenitude of grace. This is why participation in this 
reality is so often summarised as expressions of gratitude toward God and generosity 
toward others. The good, whether given or received, is always a gift and so, ought 
never be represented as an achievement or calculated as earned merit. To those who 
would wrongly conclude that such a notion of gift renders action unimportant, Luther 
whimsically notes, 'But some say: "Yes, rely upon that, take no thought, and see 
whether a roasted chicken will fly into your mouth!" I do not say that a man shall not 
labor and seek a living; but he shall not worry, not be greedy, not despair, thinking 
that he will not have enough. '94 
Luther does not provide a theory of human action. His concern is to rather 
cultivate a habit of seeing human action in the light of grace. The reality of grace 
means that our understanding of the good in human action will be ambiguous. It is 
92 \\'ebster, Barth's Moral Theology, p. 166, citing \LG. Baylor, Action and Person. Conscience in 
Late Scholasticism and the Young Luther (Leiden: Brill. 1977), p. 228. 
93 John ~1ilbank, 'Can \1orality Be Christian?' Studies in Christian Ethics 8 (1995), pp. 58-59. 
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not that human action is rendered unimportant. It is that grace makes it impossible to 
calculate the importance of human action. This inability to calculate the good of good 
works is essential if we are to sustain rightly the tension between God's work and 
human good works. Meilaender notes how Lewis Hyde's exploration of the sense of 
interdependence manifested in certain tribal gift exchanges captures this tension: 
Gift exchanges - in which the gift is received and given again, though not returned 
to the original giver - illustrate 'circular' rather than simply 'reciprocal' giving. 
'[W]hen the gift moves in a circle no one ever receives it from the same person he 
gives it to ... it is as if the gift goes around a comer before it comes back. I have to 
give blindly.' In doing this I may seem insufficiently attentive to my own 
fulfillment. .. But in the providence of God 'the gift ... moves toward the empty 
place ... Our generosity may leave us empty, but our emptiness then pulls gently at 
the whole until the thing in motion returns to fill us again. ,95 
Seeing the reality of grace comes only by participation in the mystery of sacrifice and 
generosity. We cannot know grace if we refuse to act towards God and towards others 
as if this grace is real. Meilaender further explains the relationship of the active life 
lived to grace in stating: 
However often life may present us with the necessity of choosing between our own 
good and that of another, we should not deny that the selfs good comes from 
attention to others and may rightly be sought there. For this is how God cares for 
us. 'The courtesy of the Emperor has absolutely decreed that no man can paddle his 
own canoe and every man can paddle his fellows ... ' Thus, in practice it may be 
almost impossible to specify where joy in someone else's good begins and desire 
for our own good stops ... This is, in fact the very rhythm of the divine life, a rhythm 
we are called to learn, a rhythm God has enacted also in our history: 'He saved 
others; himself he cannot save.,96 
We come to see the reality of grace by participation in the reality of grace. 'The 
wise man,' Dietrich Bonhoeffer states, 'is the one who sees reality as it is, and who 
sees into the depths of things. That is why only that man is wise who sees reality in 
God. '97 Training the sight does not mean looking 'somewhere out beyond reality in 
the realm of ideas. It lies in the midst of history. '98 Historical beings are body and 
soul, whose training in seeing reality comes by the formation of thoughts, words and 
deeds. This is what it means to be historical. 
94 Luther, Treatise on Good Works, p. 108. 
95 Meilaender, Faith and Faithfulness, pp. 56-57, quoting Lewis Hyde, 'Some Food We Could Not 
Eat: Gift Exchange and the Imagination', The Kenyon Review 1 (Fall, 1979), pp. 45 & 53. 
96 Meilaender, Faith and Faithfulness, p. 57, quoting C.S. Lewis, Arthurian Torso (London: Oxford, 
1948), p. 123. . 
97 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. and trans. Eberhard Bethge (New York: MacmIllan, 1949), p. 68. 
98 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 69. 
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Milbank asks 'how is it. .. that we have ever come to think otherwise?' We think 
otherwise because we are confused about the grammar of doing. Turned in on 
ourselves, and away from God and the neighbour, the self cannot see rightly when it 
is the subject or the object of action. This confusion is most evident not in vice, but in 
the ethical theories which focus on self-preservation or self-achievement as the 
highest human good. Inordinate attention to human works (both vicious and virtuous) 
displaces the centrality of faith in the agency of God. Hutter notes that Luther's ethic 
of freedom 'points us toward a "dec entered self' that understands itself as essentially 
gifted and its freedom as inherently relational. This dec entered self is shaped by a 
way of life whose end is "good works" and whose shape is explicit in God's 
commandments. '99 Luther states: 
A Christian lives not in himself, but in Christ and in his neighbor. Otherwise he is 
not a Christian. He lives in Christ through faith, in his neighbor through love. By 
faith he is caught up beyond himself into God. By love he descends beneath 
himself into his neighbor. Yet he always remains in God and in His love. 100 
The decentred self, is now 'free from' being turned in on itself, and is free to 
understand rightly the grammar of doing right. 
The fundamental focus of the grammar of doing is on the indicative rather than 
the imperative. Ethics is first and foremost concerned with descriptions of what is 
vertically and horizontally real, and so, it must be capable of articulating categorically 
true statements about the will of God and what I owe to my neighbour. Hutter states 
that the first question of Christian ethics is not 'What ought I now to do?' but 'What 
does the world really look like?' Description of the world is 'everything'. 'In 
describing a "situation''', Hutter writes, 'the morally decisive choices and moves are 
already made.' 101 The commands describe reality before they demand particular 
action. They are truthful signs of the meaning of a God- and grace--centred reality. 
The accent on the indicative is embodied in an ethic that is focused 
first and foremost on God's future for and with us, the resurrection of the dead, the 
last judgment, and the everlasting enjoyment of the triune God. Second, it hinges 
on God's past for and with us, the creation of the contingent world we know, God's 
election of Israel, and the life, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, God 
incarnate in human flesh. Third, Christian life hinges on God's presence with and 
for us, in God's word proclaimed, in baptism and Holy Communion, in the ongoing 
presence of Israel and in the tangible body of Christ, the church, and in God's 
ongoing and sustaining care for God's creation and all of God's creatures, human 
99 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 40. 
100 Luther, The Freedom of the Christian, p. 371. 
101 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 46. 
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and nonhuman. Three times God, and each time irreplaceably constitutive of the 
Christian life. 102 
What place does the imperative play in this grammar of doing? The commands 
are signs of a life of freedom that invite the participation of one who is 'graciously 
addressed by God's commandments.' 103 These commands do indeed circumscribe 
'essential moral notions like dishonoring one's indebtedness, unjust killing (that is, 
murdering), stealing, lying, coveting what is not one's own, and most fundamentally, 
failing to acknowledge the very source of our being as creatures. '104 They identify 
evil acts in order to keep these acts from swelling into destructive practices. The 
commands are 'short-hand reminders' of the shape, form and beauty of the Christian 
life. They define the trajectory under which the Christian, as an 'artist of being, ' is 
able continually to 're(dis)cover' his or her freedom. lOS Freedom/rom the accusation 
of the law admits a positive appreciation and praise/or the law. Hence Luther did not 
think it inconsistent to advise his students to read, meditate, and scrutinise Psalm 119 
in order to learn how one may praise God for his commands. 
If a Lutheran ethic is to respond to the crisis of moral inarticulacy, it must be 
capable of reconciling freedom and moral formation. One of the defining debates of 
Lutheran moral theology is to steer a path between the Scylla of freedom as 
antinomian license and the Charybdis of legalism and dogmatism. The ongoing task 
for Lutheran theology is to articulate a third way between the antinomian and 
dogmatic disorders. In the following section I argue that the success of this task 
depends upon the right use of scripture in moral formation. 106 
4. Scripture and Moral Formation 
Is Lutheranism a cause of or cure for moral inarticulacy? The answer depends 
upon whether the Lutheran understanding of the gospel is compatible with the 
practices of moral formation. According to David Yeago, this question forces 
Lutheranism to reconsider its construal of the relationships of law to gospel as an 
102 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 37. 
103 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 53. 
104 Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 50. 
lOS Hutter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 51. 
106 For a thoughtful, though inconclusive discussion by the Lutheran essayists in The Promi~e of . 
Lutheran Ethics regarding the function of scripture in Lutheran ethics see, 'The Role of Scnpture ill 
Lutheran Ethics', in eds. Karen L. Bloomquist and John R. Stumme, The Promise of Lutheran Ethics 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1998), pp. 161-168. 
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unmitigated antagonism. In the attempt to escape the law's cruel demands, Lutheran 
theology has made it difficult to find a place for moral reflection and formation within 
the theological task. Yeago outlines the theological problem in this way: 
[T]he law oppresses because it proposes a determinate ordering of our existence and 
calls for a specified response, and it follows that the gospel liberates because it 
delivers from determinate order and specific response. The law/gospel distinction 
thus conceived, at whose heart is an antagonism, or at least an irresolvable tension, 
of form and freedom, of order and authenticity. Form and order impose despair or 
promote self-righteousness; salvation is liberation from form and order and the 
law's cruel demand for them .. .If the law/gospel distinction is a final antithesis, then 
any commandment, any call for one ordering of life rather than another, will by 
definition be the law from which the gospel frees us. 107 
Under this description, the gospel promotes a theoretical and practical antinomianism 
that finally must reject practices of moral formation. 
Paul Althaus takes up the challenge of the law's opposition to the gospel by 
arguing for a distinction between God's law and God's command. In defining this 
distinction, he argues that the grammatical mood appropriate to the law is the 
imperative while the indicative is appropriate to the notion of command. Ethics 
descends, then, from the indicative rather than the imperative. This distinction allows 
Althaus to speak of obedience as compatible with freedom because obedience is 
defined as the embodiment of the Christian's desire to participate in the new reality of 
the gospel. Obedience remains necessary though 'this necessity is thereby 
characterized as a necessity of the "is," not of "ought.'" 108 Insofar as we live in the 
ideal realm of the indicative, the moral life does not require threats and fear. Rather, 
the Christian simply needs to know or be reminded of what is. 
Althaus' claim that the imperative has no place within a Lutheran ethic while 
admitting commands is problematic as he does not explain how commands cease to 
have imperatival force. What he does argue is, imperatives are unnecessary because 
the indicative leads the Christian to act 'in such and such a manner; he can do no 
other.' 109 However, as Christians remain simultaneously righteous and sinners, they 
often fail to do or desire that which is consistent with the indicatives in scripture's 
story. By considering an analogous circumstance, it will be evident why the 
indicative ought not carry the whole linguistic weight of our moral reflection. 
107 David S. Yeago, 'Gnosticism, Antinomianism, and Reformation Theology: Reflections on the Costs 
ofa Construal', Pro Ecclesia 2 (1993), pp. 41-42. 
108 Althaus, The Divine Command, p. 37. 
109 Althaus, The Divine Command, p. 38. 
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Christian parents do not confront grave theological difficulties when addressing their 
baptised children with imperatives. In fact, the relationship of parent to child makes it 
imperative that they address their children with imperatives. It would seem foolish, if 
not scandalous, to suggest that a parent ought not do so. If the imperative does not 
undermine the gospel in the community of the family, why should we conclude that it 
necessarily subverts freedom in the ecclesial community? 
I raise this concern about the imperative not in to order solve the problem but to 
note that this weakness is not fatal to Althaus' argument. His distinction between 
command and law rightly calls into question the dependence of ethics upon 
imperatives. It also accents the importance of the freedom of the gospel as a crucial 
theme for Lutheran moral reflection. While the accent on the freedom of the gospel 
creates a certain tension within Lutheran ethics, Althaus also points out how this 
version of the moral life rings true to the fragmented character of human experience: 
The gospel is simultaneously and unalterably command; faith is immediately and 
unavoidably deed, behavior. Does this assertion lead us back under the law again? 
No! For under the gospel it is not the case that the Lord God demands works that 
are pure and whole and, if we cannot achieve them ... proceeds to damn us. Rather, 
we live - with our partial, fragmentary, sin - stained actions - under God's 
protection and forgiveness, for the sake of Christ. Under the law, everything must 
be whole and unstained. Under the gospel, God freely reckons our meager 
obedience and works as whole and pure on account of Jesus Christ and our abiding 
in him. What he asks of us is not integrity and totality of the new life, but our 
readiness for it; he wants our action, paltry and fragmentary as it may be, as a sign 
that we are really serious, that we really want to live by and in his love. Thus the 
very same deed ofa Christian that requires God's forgiveness on account of its 
fragmentary and sinful character is at the same time a work of an enactment of faith, 
and, as such, life in salvation. llo 
The logic of the gospel limits the importance of morality; it does not eliminate it from 
the theological task. Althaus' downplaying of integrity and totality (except as a future 
hope) is not a rejection of ethics; it acknowledges the historical reality of the uneven 
and fragmentary character of our moral experience. We need neither hide this failure 
of integrity nor allow it to drive us to despair for the moral life is finally the free 
participation in Christ's cruciform life. III 
I \0 Althaus The Divine Command, p. 31. 
III As Bonhoeffer contrasts biblical ethics with the ethics of Kant, he criticises Kant for his fanatical 
search for ethical purity and universality which is the 'quest for the superman, the endeavour to 
outgrow the man within the man, the pursuit of the ~eroic" the c~lt of the demigod.' For Kant, 
formation is more concerned with the use of power m the formmg ofa world by means of plans and 
programmes.' Contrariwise, Christian ethics understands formation to be 'concerned only WI~ the one 
form which has overcome the world, the form of Jesus Christ. Formation can only come for thiS form.' 
Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 80 -81. 
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The Lutheran suspicion of ethics is ironic once the question of moral formation is 
seen in the broader discussion of form and freedom. Yeago observes that even as 
Lutheran theology tends toward antinomianism, it sustains passionate debates over 
issues in dogmatic theology. If dogmatic form limits and shapes belief without being 
accused of undermining the gospel's freedom, then moral form should also be able to 
limit and shape behaviour without incurring the accusation of undermining this 
freedom: 
A dogma is, after all, a rule; it is precisely a call for a particular ordering of thought 
and language, for a determinate reflective response to the love of God ... Within a 
horizon structured by the absolute antithesis of law and gospel, of form and 
freedom, dogma must be suspect simply as such, as a form of that oppression and 
bondage from which the gospel liberates US. 112 
Where there is a form there must also be practices of conformation. Even the notion 
of the freedom of the gospel cannot but be articulated in dogmatic forms to which 
belief is to conform. Presumably, then, this conformation of belief does not 
undermine the very dogma of Christian freedom being articulated in dogmatics. If 
conforming belief does not subvert the freedom of the gospel, then neither should 
conforming behaviour. 
Supporting this assertion can be done in rather short compass by pointing out the 
moral forms and conformation already functioning in the church. MacIntyre asserts 
that moral form is already present in a community because of the nature of grammar, 
the implications of narrative, and the in a community's according of canonical status 
to a text. First, consider the form of grammar. I noted above that MacIntyre refers to 
Nietzsche's insight into the relationship of grammar to belief in God: 'I fear we are 
not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar.' 1 \3 MacIntyre comments 
on this passage, noting: 
What Nietzsche meant by belief in grammar was belief that the structure of 
language somehow mirrors and presupposes belief in an order of things, in virtue of 
which one mode of conceptualizing reality can be more adequate to that reality than 
another. 114 
Accepting that there is a right and wrong way of linguistically conceptualising reality 
is a step on a slippery slope that leads to the notion of a meaningful universe and the 
existence of God. Language is loaded. For Nietzsche at least, to use language is to be 
112 Yeago, 'Gnosticism, Antinomianism, and Reformation Theology' , p. 43. 
113 Three Rival Versions, p. 98. 
114 Three Rival Versions, p. 98. 
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committed to a meaningful universe. The structure of language reflects the fonn of the 
universe and presumes that beings who live in this universe must confonn to this 
form. 
Second, if narrative theory is as MacIntyre says it is, the Lutheran commitment to 
sola Scriptura is necessarily a moral commitment. The Bible is a unified story that 
runs through the events of creation, fall, exodus, redemption, and the Eschaton. This 
form imposes a meaning on the raw material of human experience so that Christians 
can claim to make narrative sense of the world. The popular novelist, Madeleine 
L 'Engle, although writing about the genre of fantasy, notes how such stories function 
at the moral level: 
the moral level is what the story has to say. It is impossible for the writer of fantasy 
to say nothing ... the impulse behind the writing of fantasy is usually an attempt on 
the part of the writer to express something, a particular personal concern. I 15 
If it is impossible for a fantasy story to say nothing at the moral level, the same may 
be said of the story of what God is doing in the world. It is thus a distortion of 
scripture when Lutheran hermeneutics and homiletics neglect the moral sense of this 
story. 
Third, the corollary of a community's recognition of a canonical text is that it 
commits itself to the formation of readers. Writing about education in general, 
MacIntyre states: 
An educated community can exist only where there is some large degree of shared 
background beliefs and attitudes, informed by the widespread reading of a common 
body of texts, texts which are accorded a canonical status within that community.116 
In MacIntyre's account of Augustinian moral inquiry, the formation of readers is both 
intellectual and moral. In order to read texts rightly, one needs to become 'a different 
kind of person - and thus a different kind of reader.' The formation of readers 
requires certain practices, authorities and teachers who reorder and transfonn the self 
by the inculcation of' certain attitudes and dispositions, certain virtues.' 117 Well-
formed readers are capable of reading texts accurately and imaginatively so that they 
could know with accuracy what is going on and may imaginatively participate in the 
life of the text. MacIntyre states that 
115 Madeleine L'Engle, Forward to Paul F. Ford, Companion to Narnia: A Complete Guide to the .. 
Enchanting World of C.S. Lewis's The Chronicles of Narnia ( San Francisco: Harper, 1980), pp. Xll-
xiii (my emphasis). 
116 MacIntyre, 'The Idea of an Educated Public', p. 19. 
117 Three Rival Versions, pp. 82-83. 
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the reader in his or her own life enacts and reenacts that of which he or she reads in 
Scripture; the enacted narrative of a single life is made intelligible within the 
~amework of~he dramatic. history of which Scripture speaks. So the reading of texts 
IS part of the hIStOry of which the same texts speak. The reader thus discovers him 
or herself inside the scriptures. 118 
Learning to read involves infonning the intellect and fonning the character. Moral 
fonnation is not merely analogous to how we teach reading. In teaching reading, we 
are already participating in a fonnative moral practice. Since Lutheran communities 
already practice the fonnation of readers, it is essential that Lutherans pay critical 
attention to the moral function of scripture. 
In The Moral Vision of the New Testament, Richard Hays presents a systematic 
consideration of the moral function of scripture. The primary focus of scripture, as the 
title of Rays' book indicates, is the shaping of moral vision. Unlike overly critical 
studies of scripture, Rays presumes that Christian ethics begins with the canonical 
authority of scripture. Christian ethics does not require a fonnal apologetic for 
scripture, but rather begins with the claim that the New Testament authorises a 
concrete shape of the Christian's and the church's life. 119 Hence scripture is not one 
among many sources or classics. l2O Rather, 'the Bible's perspective is privileged' over 
experience, reason or tradition and therefore is the final authority that establishes the 
nonns of the Christian life. 121 Rays states that 'the canonical Scriptures constitute the 
norma normans for the church's life, whereas other sources of moral reflection 
(church tradition, philosophical reasoning, scientific investigation, or religious 
experience) are authoritative qua norma normata. 122 The Bible is not a nonn however, 
because it is a repository of 'timeless truths' or a system of 'preordained 
propositions.'123 Rather, the Bible's claim is that it declares that the story of God's 
action in creation, the incarnation of Jesus, and the eschatological denouement is a 
truthful account of what is going on in the world. 
118 Three Rival Versions, p. 83. 
119 Hays, The Moral Vision a/the New Testament, p. 10. 
120 Hays, The Moral Vision a/the New Testament, pp. 296-297. . . 
121 This section, entitled, 'How Shall We Use the Texts?' (pp. 291-312), follows upon a cntIcal 
discussion of the use of scripture in the theologies of Barth, Yoder, Hauerwas, Schussler-Fiorenza and 
Reinhold Niebuhr. This section attempts to distil these various approaches to scrip.ture in order ~o show 
h w each author uses scripture to advance 'normative proposals about the most faIthful and fruItful 
a;proaches to shaping a Christian ethic in response to the New Testament's witness.' The Moral Vision 
of the New Testament, p. 291. 
1~2 Hays, The Moral Vision a/the New Testament, p. 12. 
123 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 300. 
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In Hays' Methodist henneneutical tradition, reading scripture for its moral vision is 
unproblematic. The same cannot be said of Lutheran henneneutics. Alister McGrath 
explains that this problem goes back to the henneneutical problems that arose with 
medieval theology's fourfold interpretative scheme known as the Quadriga, which 
included the literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and the anagogical sense. 124 
McGrath points out in his discussion that Luther criticised this scheme because the 
literal sense was being overshadowed by the other three senses which Thomas 
combined into the spiritual sense. 125 McGrath is careful to point out that this criticism 
did not lead to the conclusion that the literal meaning of scripture must exclude the 
other modes of interpretation. Luther writes, 'In the Scriptures no allegory, tropology, 
or anagogy is valid unless that same truth is explicitly stated literally somewhere else. 
Otherwise, Scripture would become a laughing matter.' To reduce everything to the 
literal would be a way of killing scripture. McGrath notes that in Luther's reading of 
the Old Testament, he made the distinction between the "'killing letter" (litera 
occidens)' or the 'crudely literal or historical reading of the Old Testament - and "the 
life-giving spirit" (spiritus vivificans) .. . which is sensitive to its spiritual nuances and 
prophetic overtones.' The literal meaning has precedence. Yet this must not tum into 
a letter that kills the life-giving spiritual interpretation. 
Accepting a place for the moral function of scripture, Hays identifies four 
discrete though overlapping tasks that make up the moral reading of scripture. These 
are 1) the descriptive task, which aims at reading the 'individual witnesses closely'. 
2) the synthetic task, which aims at finding the common elements in the discrete 
witnesses. 3) the hermeneutical task, which aims at bringing the text 'to bear upon 
our own situation'. 4) the pragmatic task, which spells out how the truth of scripture 
124 Alister McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) pp. 207-208, 
quoting Martin Luther. (No further bibliographical details are given.) 
125 For Aquinas, the spiritual interpretation included the allegorical, moral and anagogical. After 
recognising the objection that the multiple senses of scripture 'produce confusion and deception and 
destroy all force of argument', he defmes each division by their function stating, 'Therefore that fIrst 
signifIcation whereby words signify things belongs to the fIrst sense, the ?is~oric~l or. literal. That 
signifIcation whereby things signifIed ?y words have themsel:es also a sIgmfIcatIOn IS call~d the 
spiritual sense, which is based on the lIteral, and p~esupposes It.:. Therefore, so far as the .thmgs of the 
Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there IS the allegoncal sense; so far as the thm?s done In 
Christ or so far as the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there IS the moral 
sense.' But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense.' 'Whether 
in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?' Thom~s Aquinas, Summ.a Theologica, First Part, 
Question 1, Article 10, trans. New Advent Inc. (1996) Onlme. Internet. AvaIlable. 
http://www.newadvent.org/summall00ll0.htm. 
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is to be embodied in the church's moral practices. 126 Given the limits of this chapter, I 
shall only give a cursory account of each of these tasks. 
The descriptive task in reading scripture is fundamentally exegetical. Here the 
reader of scripture must be disciplined so as not to be too eager to harmonise scripture 
or extract from texts only that which is immediately relevant for teaching. 127 The 
descriptive task aims to read biblical texts for their distinctive themes and discrete 
patterns of reasoning. For example, Paul's ethic is concerned to articulate life in 
fellowship with Christ's suffering. The Gospel of Mark describes the meaning of 
taking up Christ's cross; Matthew, the meaning of the Christ's kingdom; Luke, the 
power of the Spirit; and John, love as caring for others and (especially in Revelation) 
resisting evil. 
Description is necessary because the commands of scripture are tersely stated 
conclusions that come at the end of a 'developmental history of the moral teaching 
traditions within the canon'. Commands are unintelligible until they are connected to 
the 'thick descriptions' of the New Testament communities' moral practices and 
ethos.128 The descriptive task is particularly critical for an ethic that claims its 
imperatives are derived from indicatives. This mirrors Hutter's observations that once 
an adequate description of a situation is stated, 'the morally decisive choices and 
moves are already made. ' 129 
To attribute such moral weight to the descriptive task requires the decisive 
rejection of the 'no ought/rom is' argument. To rob description of its moral force, 
argues MacIntyre, reflects an impoverished moral culture which has lost 'the notion 
of essential human purpose or function.' 130 The alternative is to reclaim the ability to 
speak of the essential function of 'man' in ways similar to speaking of the essential 
function of a clock or a farmer so that it becomes possible to say what a morally good 
or bad man is in ways analogous to our judgements of good and bad clocks or 
farmers. The claim of the descriptive operation is that, because the church is capable 
126 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 462. 
127 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 3. 
128 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 4. 
129 Hiitter, 'The Twofold Center of Lutheran Ethics', p. 46. 
\30 After Virtue, p. 59. See also L. Gregory Jones, 'Learning to Descri?e', ~ Transformed Judgment: 
Toward a Trinitarian Account of the Moral Life (Notre Dame, IN: UniVersIty of Notre Dame Press, 
1990), pp. 20-72. 
232 
of saying what is, it is able to say what ought to be, and what path moves from the 
present circumstances 'toward a man's true end.'131 
The synthetic task looks for 'some coherence' and harmony among the discrete 
New Testament witnesses. Hays admits that it remains an open question among 
scholars whether it is 'possible to describe a unity of ethical perspective within the 
diversity of the canon.' He contrasts his position with Wayne Meeks' view that the 
ideological diversity of the New 
Testament means that it is irreducible to any single coherent scheme. Hays argues 
that Meeks' thesis, ifit is correct, requires that ethicist give up speaking of a 
normative New Testament ethic, and come to recognise that the task of ethics is only 
to describe 'the ethos and practices of the individual communities represented by the 
New Testament documents.' 132 While Hays is critical of Meeks, he also recognises 
that those who have attempted to reduce the Bible to, for example, the principle of 
love or political liberation have relied upon 'exegetical distortion of the texts' and 
'forced harmonization of the New Testament's diverse perspectives.,m The 
alternative to facile continuity and radical diversity is found in the three focal images 
of community, cross, and new creation. 134 Consider a brief description of these foci. 
, The church,' says Hays, 'is a countercultural community of discipleship, and this 
community is the primary addressee of God's imperatives. ' 135 As scripture speaks to 
those who are members of Christ's body the church, it speaks to persons already in 
relationship with God and others in the sacramental community. This conformity 
resists the world by ordering its life together my means of the renewal of the mind 
rather than by coercive or manipulative means. 136 
131 After Virtue, p. 53. , ' 
132 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 4. Hays refers to Wayne Meeks, A Hermeneutics 
of Social Embodiment', Harvard Theological Review 97 (1986), pp. 176-186. 
133 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 190. 
134 Hays supports his assertion with a reference to David Kelsey, w~o sta~es that 'at the ~oot o~ a 
theological position there is an imaginative act in which the theologIan trIes to catch up, m a smgle 
metaphorical judgment the full complexity o~ God's pr~sen~e in, though, and, over-aga,mst, the , 
activities comprising the church's common lIfe and which, m tum, both proVIdes the ~lscnmen agaI,nst 
which the theology criticizes the church's current form of speech and life, and dete~es the ~ecuhar a 
"shape" of the "position.'" Hays, The Moral Vision of,the New. Testament, p. 194, quotmg DaVId 
Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (PhIladelphIa, PA: Fortress, 1975), p, 163, 
135 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 196. Cf. Romans 12:1-2, 
136 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p, 196. 
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The second image of the cross has less to do with a particular theory of atonement 
and more to do with the example of self-giving love. 137 The cross is an icon of the 
kind of disciplined life which is to be imitated. 'To be Jesus' disciple,' Hays states, 
'is to obey his call to bear the cross, thus to be like him.' 138 At first blush, an ethic of 
the cross has little in common with the ethics of eudaimonia. Yet this is not a 
necessary opposition because the cross is also a participation in the koinonia of 
Christ's suffering (Phil. 3:10). And as the writer of Hebrews states, a sacrifice that is 
freely offered is not incompatible withjoy.139 In view of this free and joyful sacrifice, 
the paradigmatic embodiment of the cruciform community is Paul's patriarchal 
conception of marriage. Marriage in the New Testament is to be a concrete 
manifestation of the counter-cultural community. As such, headship cannot be 
synonymous with domination or violence. It is rather a community of sacrifice that 
stands as sign against those who sustain communal peace by means of scapegoats and 
false sacrifice. 140 Hence where Scriptural passages cluster around the image of the 
cross, they aim to cultivate the sacrificial form of life that makes one fit to enjoy the 
bonds of marriage and the ecclesial community. 
Eschatology, Hays' third focus, is the way that theology thinks about the 
teleological end of Christian ethics. According to Hays, this end must not be 
understood as mere potentiality but as a proleptic hope which the church now actively 
participates in: 
Thus, the New Testament's eschatology creates a critical framework that 
pronounces judgment upon our complacency as well as upon our presumptuous 
despair. As often as we eat the bread and drink the cup, we proclaim the Lord's 
death ... until he comes. Within the anomalous hope-filled interval, all the New 
Testament writers work out their understandings of God's will for the community.141 
Hope claims to know somehow the outcome of history without claiming to know how 
and when this happy denouement is to take place. The 'now and not yet' character of 
the new creation is the foundation of the church's aim to be a community that is 
simultaneously sacrificial and hopeful - marked by death and the promise of life. The 
137 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 197. 
138 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 197. . . 
139 Hays states, 'The prevailing vision of the moral life in Hebrews ... IS charctenzed not so much, by 
love as by patient endurance, holding fast the confession, following the example of Jesus' suffenng 
obedience (Heb. 5 :7-1 0, 12: 1-2). The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 201. 
140 For an excellent consideration of the moral and theological problems of sacrifice see 1. Bottum 
'Girard Among the Girardians', First Things 61 (March, 1996), pp. 42-45. 
i41 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 198. 
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themes of community, cross and the Eschaton draw together the diverse New 
Testament witnesses making possible the synthetic task. 
The third task of reading scripture is the hermeneutical, where the reader applies 
particular texts to the present situation. Hays argues that the hermeneutical task must 
attend to the four different ways that the New Testament addresses moral issues. 
There are rules, principles, paradigms and a symbolic world. Although these 
categories are not altogether clear, (for example, one cannot be sure where rules end 
and principles begin), the discussion of the relationship of paradigms to principles and 
rules is enlightening. Paradigms are imaginative stories where narrative characters 
model praiseworthy or blameworthy conduct. The parable of the Good Samaritan 
offers paradigmatic examples of good and bad ways to respond to the question, 'who 
is my neighbour?' The parable shifts moral reflection from moral rules and principles 
to identification with the perspectives of the narrative characters. Once the auditor is 
confronted with the question of who the neighbour is, the parable imaginatively 
moves the auditor from aloof inquirer to a character within the story. 142 
The introduction of imagination would seem to undermine Hays' claim that 
scripture serves as the moral norm of the church. Imagination seems to accept the 
contemporary notion that reduces the meaning of a text to the particular reader's 
response. Hays' notion of imagination fundamentally rejects this kind of intellectual 
solipsism. Imagination is how we come to see that, in the reading of scripture within 
the ecclesial community, we are actually carrying on, what Hauerwas calls a 
'conversation with one another and God ... across generations,143 and participating in 
what Chesterton somewhere calls 'the democracy of the dead.' The function of 
imagination is to set the Christian and the community 'within the world articulated by 
the texts. '144 This focus on imagination fits well with how Barth understood his 
theological task as placing 'himself and his readers in "the strange new world within 
the Bible. "'145 Once readers of scripture discover themselves within the world of the 
142 Hays cites a lecture in which Oliver O'Donovan remarked that 'interpreter~ ,:ho think that. they c~n 
determine the proper ethical application of the Bible solely through more sophIstIcated exegeSIS are like 
people who believe that they can fly if only they flap their arms hard enough.' The Moral Vision of the 
New Testament, p. 3. 
143 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 210, quoting Hauerwas, A Community of 
Character, p. 64. 
144 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 6. , 
145 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 237, quoting Karl Barth, The Word ofGo~ and the 
Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 28-50. (Hays 
pagination.) 
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Bible, they are moved from being only hearers of the word to being participants in the 
world of the Bible. 
The fourth, pragmatic, task aims 'to produce persons and communities whose 
character is commensurate with Jesus Christ and thereby pleasing to God. '146 This 
definition of the pragmatic task invites agreement and criticism. On the one hand, I 
take it to be a positive tum in ethics from the isolated self to the self in community 
and as an inheritor of a tradition. As such, I agree with Hays that the ethical task is to 
form persons and communities 'whose character is commensurate with Jesus Christ.' 
On the other hand, that this formation makes one 'pleasing to God' is problematic. 
Lutheran ethics does not address persons who are potentially at peace with God, and 
whose 'lived obedience' somehow establishes this peace. In his criticism of this 
aspect of Hays' proj ect, Meilaender warns against turning Jesus into a moral 
exemplar, because it fails to see that Jesus' role as saviour is unique and different 
from the call to imitate his pattern of life. 147 Hays comes close to advocating the 
dangerous view that righteousness is authentic only when it is obvious. Using 
Meilaender's distinction, introduced in the last chapter, Hays' pragmatic task aims at 
a righteousness that is in re rather than in spe. There seems to be little possibility of a 
righteousness that remains hidden beneath the scandal of the cross or a moral integrity 
that simultaneously righteous and sinful beings may hope for but never, in this life, 
attain. 148 The problem is that the pragmatic mode collapses the distance between the 
Christian's identity and actions. In MacIntyre's terms, it makes the goods of 
excellence subservient to the goods of effectiveness, which tends to displace the 
ethics of character, which depends upon a commitment to the good, with an ethic of 
calculation which is committed to good results. While I think that Hays' 
understanding of the pragmatic task is potentially dangerous, these criticisms should 
not be read as a wholesale rejection of the pragmatic mode. Indeed, the Lutheran 
theologian Carl Braaten points out that Lutheranism's failure to attend to the 
146 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 7. . ' 
147 Gilbert Meilaender, 'The Moral Vision of the New Testament', reVIew of Richard Hays, The Moral 
Vision of the New Testament, First. Things 78 (Dec., 19~7), pp. 61-64. " , 
148 Hays is certainly aware of the dIstance that Lutheramsm puts between one s actIOns and one s 
identity. However he concludes that the notion of the simul justus et pecc~tor leads ~s ~o , 
'underestimate the trans formative power of God's grace and obscure a major emphasIs m Paul s moral 
vision.' The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. 44. 
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pragmatic task has left a moral vacuum in the life of Lutherans which is too readily 
filled by rival understandings of morality. 149 
Though this discussion of Hays' four modes of reading scripture at the moral level 
is admittedly incomplete, it serves as a theoretical framework for the performance of a 
reading of the parable of the Good Samaritan. As might be anticipated from previous 
discussions, my reading of the parable operates primarily within the descriptive task. 
My intent is to show how the parable, which is initiated by the pragmatic question 
regarding the limits of one's love to the neighbour, moves the inquirer from being a 
hearer of the story to a participant in the story. 
5. Teaching Goodness 
To those not familiar with the Lutheran problematic, my struggle to offer a 
Lutheran moral interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan must seem strange 
indeed. One anticipates the response: 'Of course the parable is a moral tale, how could 
it be read otherwise?' In response to this view, I shall argue that the parable is not, 
first and foremost, a moral tale, and for this reason it is most useful for Christian 
moral reflection. Defending this view requires that I take a rather circuitous 
hermeneutical path through the twists and turns in the story of the Good Samaritan. 
In a passing reference to the parable, Meilaender asserts that Christian ethicists 
ought to begin their inquiry at the lawyer's side, also seeking to press Jesus to be clear 
about the limits of one's moral obligation in loving the neighbour. Merely pointing 
out that Jesus never directly answers the lawyer's questions ought not to lead us to 
conclude that Jesus rejects ethical inquiry. Yet no less a light than Karl Barth seems to 
support such a dismissive attitude when he writes 'When the serpent promised Adam 
and Eve that they would become as God, what he had in mind ... was the establishment 
of ethics. '150 Ethics is the instrument by which sinners stake out their autarky 
especially from God, but also from the neighbour. It is the way we 'studiously' avoid 
149 Carl Braaten states that when we do not think through the moral implications of our theological 
commitments, the functional morality of the Christian will reflect some fonn of · occasionalism, 
actualism, and situationism.' Carl Braaten, 'Natural Law in Theology and Ethics', in eds. Carl E. 
Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, The Two Cities a/God: The Church's Responsibility/or the EarthZ\' 
City (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1997), p. 55. 
150 Nigel Biggar, The Hastening that Waits: Karl Barth's Ethics (<?xford, Clarendon, 1993), p. 7, r 
quoting Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. II Part 2, eds. G.W. Bronuley and T.F. Torrance, trans. G,\\ . 
Brorniley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), p. 448. 
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any kind of 'commitment to the good' be it directed vertically or horizontally. 151 The 
role of ethics is to justify self-will while 'cloaking' selfishness in 'religious 
language. '152 The aim of ethics is to domesticate God's call and elevate man's self-
protecting judgement. Nigel Biggar summarises Barth's criticism of ethics as he 
writes: 
[S]o far as God's will is identified in an ethical system with a particular 'basic 
view', with a fundamental idea or principle, it is brought under human control. This 
is because such a principle will invariably be general and will therefore require 
specification in particular cases, with the result that through interpretation and 
application it will in practice be surrendered to private human judgement. In such a 
casuistic system Barth reckons that, at best, the human will is obliged by the general 
principle; but at worst we pour 'the dictates and pronouncements of our own self-
will into the empty container of a fonnal moral concept. .. justifying our own will in 
the concrete situation.' 153 
Barth's criticism of ethics deconstructs the real agenda behind the lawyer's 
inquiry. Ethics is one of the ways the self attempts to protect itself from others. Even 
so, Meilaender asserts that we cannot press our ethical inquiry until we take our place 
'at the lawyer's side.' Ethics begins with the practical need to get Jesus to articulate 
the limits of our moral obligations. 154 Ethics begins by asking, 'Who is my 
neighbour?' and 'What do lowe him?' If Christian ethics has practical application, 
we must spell out the meaning and limits of one's moral duty. 155 Ethical reflection 
begins with the realisation that one cannot do everything and one ought not do 
nothing. Between everything and nothing historically situated and limited beings 
must deliberate and determine what they will and will not do. 
This is where Christian ethics begins. It is not its end. Though the parable was 
initiated by a question which disguised the lawyer's fear of sacrifice, it ends with the 
command to 'go and do likewise.' The question is how we move from such an 
unpromising start to the conclusion where it now becomes plausible for the lawyer to 
accept the invitation to imitate the Samaritan's goodness? This transformation is 
effected by the moral function of the parable. That is, the parable removed the lawyer 
lSI Biggar, The Hastening that Waits, pp. 10-14. Of course, Barth does nO.t merely raise doubts about 
the importance and effectiveness of ethics. Like Luther, he grants that ethics has a modest though 
necessary role in the theological task. 
152 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, pp. 236-237. 
153 Biggar, The Hastening that Waits, p. 9, quoting Barth, Church Dogmatics IU2, pp. 664-665. 
154 The Limits of Love, p. 33. ., . 
155 McDonald states that the parable of the Good Samaritan, according to Jeremias, emphaSised the 
historical realism of the debate about the limits of duty in relation to one's neighbour.' J.I.H. 
McDonald, 'The View From the Ditch - and Other Angles: Interpreting the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan' , Scottish Journal of Theology 49 (1996), p. 26. 
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from his legal paradigm and placed him within the paradigmatic narrative, giving him 
a perspective from which he could fruitfully follow through his moral inquiry. In this 
view, the parable is not a rej ection of the lawyer's ethical inquiry, but a radical 
redirection of this inquiry. By making the lawyer a participant in the story, he came 
to see that that there is no authentic generosity toward others that does not first spring 
from gratitude toward God. 
According to recent scholarship, parables were a favourite instrument for altering 
points of view, because they have an imagination-facilitating function that 
subversively transfonns auditors of the story into actors in the story. lI.H. McDonald 
argues that the success of a parable in overcoming the 'resistance, rationalisation and 
self-deception' of the auditor is due to its ability to lift the auditor out of his or her 
'real' universe into the imaginative universe of the story. 156 McDonald notes that 
parables' are not illustrations, nor does their significance lie in some kind of 
intellectual distillation from the images they contain.' They are stories that are 
thrown alongside of (parabole) historical events and characters in such a way as to 
change the way in which these things are perceived. Moral perspectives are 
transfonned once one accepts the indicatives of the story by entering into the logic of 
the story. This logic of the indicative follows a path to certain and surprising 
imperatives and condemnations. 157 The paradigm example of laying down 'the logic 
of the story' is Nathan's parable of the ewe lamb spoken to King David. 158 
The natural flow from the indicative to the imperative depends upon the 
development of setting, character and plot. This development is successful when the 
gap between the is and the ought is narrowed and finally bridged. Nathan's successful 
subversion of David's self-deception depended on somehow getting the king to 
involve himself in the pathos of the parable. The brilliance of this strategy is that 
Nathan never moves beyond the indicative description of the indulgence of the 
wealthy man and the death of the pampered lamb. 'Tell the truth,' a poem by Emily 
Dickenson wisely advises, but 'tell it slant.' Nathan embodies this advice as he 
appears to be reporting an actual occurrence in the kingdom. However, the logic of 
the story slowly develops a discursive web that snares David by seducing him to react 
156 McDonald, 'The View From the Ditch', p. 23. 
157 McDonald, 'The View From the Ditch', p. 23. 
158 McDonald, 'The View From the Ditch', pp. 22-23, 36. 
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'with furious outrage at a rich man's contemptible crime against a poor one.' 159 his 
own condemnation. 
David was not mistaken in presuming that the logic of the story required a 
moral judgement though he failed to see that it was he who was in the dock. This 
denial of reality was the latest instance of a string of denials. Though he was king, 
David remained safely in his palace rather than lead Israel into battle, (2 Sam. 11: 1). 
His adultery denied his role as husband and denied Bathsheba her role as wife. 
Finally, David's ruthless repayment of death for Uriah's faithful service indicated the 
depth of his moral callousness as well as the hypocrisy of his condemnation of the 
rich poacher. Though this account treats David's transformation as an unlikely 
occurrence, it nevertheless took place as the parable allowed David a vantage point 
from which to experience the full weight of the gravity of his actions. 160 Now able to 
judge his actions rightly, he willingly submits to the condemnation, 'You are the 
man!' 
The parable of the Good Samaritan functions in a similar way. The lawyer, 
like David, was incapable of right moral judgment until he had a right understanding 
of his identity. In the state of self-deception, his ethics aimed to limit his moral 
liabilities. In viewing goodness as a liability, he was incapable of rightly hearing the 
command to imitate the Samaritan and become a willing participant in this form of 
goodness. The lawyer needed to be transformed. He had to be moved from his 
fearful calculation and fixation on his liability to an ethic centred in the plenitude of 
grace. This transformation depended upon the lawyer being offered several realistic 
possibilities for dealing with the fearful scarcity and insecurity of life on the way. 
The parable divides the human race into victims and non-victims, and then 
articulates three possible modes of participation in the non-victim class. The first 
possibility, represented by the thieves, is to avoid becoming victims by being the 
victimisers. Power is the glue of the community. Those who prey together stay 
together. We ought to take our lead from Augustine who did not treat lightly the 
unity among thieves. Garry Wills records that Augustine thought that 'Even robber 
bands, if they function at all, have perverted good things at the basis of their power to 
159 David Gelemter, 'David, Done Right', review of Robert Atler, The David Story: A Translation with 
Commentary of 1 and 2 Samuel (New York: Norton, 1999), National RevieH' 51 (Sept., 1999), p. 60. 
160 David McCracken, The Scandal of the Gospels: Jesus, StOlY, and Offense (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p. 137. 
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do bad-not only their God derived existence, but sufficient concord to act as a group, 
to share common risks and rewards, to perdure on the basis of cooperation. '161 
Moreover, Augustine saw in this co-operation an insight into the operations of unjust 
governments. Viewing Roman history as a catalogue of aggressive conquests he asks, 
'and what are governments but brigandage on a grand scale?' 162 Clearly the robbers 
offer a plausible social structure for contending with the insecurity of life on the way. 
The 'clerics' offer a more respectable response to this insecurity. Their answer 
to violence was a thinly-veiled indifference that, we are told, would not have 
surprised those who heard the story. These clerics, it seems, were known to be clever 
in their ability to escape moral obligation by playing one duty over against another 
duty. By law the clerics were forbidden to touch a corpse before the perfonnance of 
their religious duties. On their way to discharge their official functions, they were 
now bound by law not to attend to the fallen victim. Luther, in sizing up the 
behaviour of the professionally religious, notes that this event 
certainly must have happened on a Sabbath day, when they were going to worship 
and wanted a good excuse for letting the wounded man lie. They doubtless said: 
Ah, God preserve me from touching this man today; I must not make myself 
unclean now and I must not miss the service, and so on. 163 
The clerics do more than embody an alternative response to insecurity. With their 
introduction, the story moves to its moral denouement. Jeremias states, 'According to 
the triadic fonn of popular stories ... the audience would now have expected a third 
character, namely, after the priest and the Levite, an Israelite layman ... What was fully 
unexpected and disconcerting was that the third character who fulfilled the duty of 
love, was a Samaritan.' 164 
According to John Dominic Crossan, henneneutical errors abound in the facile 
reading of the parable as a morality play. The Samaritan is not an example of charity 
or neighbourliness, a 'damning indictment of social, racial, and religious superiority', 
nor a call for radical involvement. 165 Crossan states that the point of the parable 'is 
not that one should help the neighbor in need. In such an intention the naming of the 
161 Wills, Saint Augustine, p. 117. . . 
162 Henry Chadwick, Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). p. 99, quotmg Augustme, The 
City of God, Bk.19: Ch.14. . . 
163 Martin Luther, 'Sermon at the Dedication of Torgau Castle', m ed. and trans. John \V. Doberstem, 
Luther's Works 51 (Philadelphia, PA: Muhlenberg, 1959), p. 340. . 
164 Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, trans. S.H. Hooke (New York: Scnbner, 1963), p. 20·t 
165 John Dominic Crossan, In Parables: The Challenge of the Historical Jesus (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1973), p. 57. 
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helper as a Samaritan before a Jewish audience would be unnecessary, distracting, 
and, in the final analysis, inimical and counterproductive. '166 The aim of the parable is 
to call all moral judgements into question: 
'The whole thrust of the story demands that one say what cannot be said, what is a 
contradiction in terms: Good + Samaritan ... the story demands that the hearer 
respond by saying the contradictory, the impossible, the unspeakable ... But when 
good (clerics) and bad (Samaritan) become, respectively, bad and good, a world is 
being challenged and we are faced with polar reversal. 167 
Crossan effectively argues that the point of the parable is not to make of the 
Samaritan a moral example. However, once Crossan explains the parable in terms of 
irony, subversions and reversals, it is no longer useful for any kind of moral 
reflection. His conclusion that the parable breaks 'abruptly into human consciousness' 
and demands 'the overturn of prior values, closed options, set judgements, and 
established conclusions', subverts all moral judgements and lands us back into the 
slough of post modern inarticulacy. We must consider an alternative interpretation. 
Such an alternative is put forward by Richard Hays who argues that the parable 
creates a 
'dissonance of thought in order to restructure meaning relationships' . .. The world 
we know-or thought we knew-is reconfigured when we 'read' it in counterpoint 
with the New Testament. The hermeneutical task is to relocate our contemporary 
experience on the map of the New Testament's story of Jesus. By telling a story 
that overturns our conventional ways of seeing the world, the New Testament 
provides the images and categories in light of which the life of our community ... is 
reinterpreted. 168 
Unlike Crossan, Hays sees the parable subverting conventional morality in order to 
initiate us into the alternative morality of the Christian story. Subversion is the 
prologue to conversion. It is what we need in order to hear the command to 'go and do 
likewise' as a joyous corollary of the gospel. The intent of the parable is to first call 
into question conventional moral ideas in order to instruct us in the nature of the 
gospel and invite us to participate in that reality. This is done by the entrance of the 
Samaritan which was to the hearers of the time, as Jeremias notes, 'disconcerting in 
the extreme.' 169 This character does not clarify the moral vision or lead to decisive 
166 Crossan, In Parables, p. 64. 
167 Crossan, In Parables, p. 64. 
168 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p. ~~2, ~uoting St,even J .. Kra~tchi~k's, 'A Necessary 
Detour: Paul's Metaphorical Understanding of the PhIllpplan Hymn , HOrizons in Bzbhcal Theology 15 
(1993), p. 15. . . , 
169 Jeremias, The Parables Of Jesus, pp. 141 & 204. See also McDonald, 'The VIew From the DItch, p. 
26. 
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action so much as he confounds the hearers and entangles them in a story that excites 
their prejudices and incites their incredulity. The character of the Samaritan brings us 
to consider two closely related hermeneutical conclusions. The first, as McDonald 
points out, is that 'ultimately, the parable is not simply about the Good Samaritan but 
the story of Jesus. n70 The parable is not first and foremost about the imitation of Jesus 
but about the identity of Jesus. Jesus is the despised one who cares for the fallen 
victim. 
The second follows from this in that, as Jesus occupies the role of Samaritan, the 
only vacant role in the story is that of victim. According to Andrew McKinnen, 
the governing strategy of the story is to put the hearer in the place of the victim, to 
interpret the law from the place of the victim, to interpret the law as the perspective 
of the victim ... the victim constitutes the perspective from which the tale is told, or 
rather from which it is to be heard and from which accordingly that law takes on 
meaning and reference. 171 
The intent of the parable is to situate the lawyer as victim and to observe the 
person and mission of Jesus from that perspective. 172 Now situated as victim, he is 
able to ask what it means to be a neighbour to others. From the victim's perspective, 
the fundamental question regarding neighbourliness is no longer concerned with 
limiting one's liabilities against the claims and needs of others. The key question from 
the victim's perspective is whether there is any reason to believe that he can count on 
others to care for him. As victim, he either lives by mercy or he does not live at all. 
Once situated as victim, the lawyer is in a position to appreciate the importance of 
mercy in a way that he could not see until he was the recipient of mercy. Once the 
lawyer is situated as victim, his question, 'Who is my neighbour?' may be 
answered. 173 As victim, his concern is not to protect his wealth from the demands of 
moral obligation. Indeed, as victim, the theologically loaded question 'What must I 
do to inherit eternal life?' is almost humorous. Victims can do nothing. Likewise 
victims need not worry about nailing down their moral obligations to God and to the 
neighbour because they own nothing and therefore owe nothing. Theirs is a truly 
nihilistic plight. Once reduced to nothing, the chief moral concern of the victim is not 
to limit the demands of others but to find a reason to believe that his poverty and 
170 McDonald 'The View From the Ditch', p. 37. 
171 Andrew M'cKenna, 'Biblical Structuralism: Testing the Victimary Hypothesis', Helios 17 (1990), p. 
83. 30 
172 McDonald, 'The View From the Ditch', p. 27 refers to Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, p. . 
173 McDonald, 'The View From the Ditch', p. 36. 
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passivity will not be the end of the story. The victim needs reasons to believe that it is 
rational to describe his plight as 'blessed'. 
We must question the idea that the blessedness of poverty could be a rational 
judgement. The more plausible view is that in the context of violence and 
indifference, mercy is an unrealistic solution. The salvation of the victim depends on 
an unbelievable character acting in unbelievable ways. Jack T. Sanders argues that 
the ahistorical Samaritan poses a real problem for the story and so the command to 
imitate the Samaritan is an impossible ethic. The Samaritan, he notes, acts 
as no man ever behaved! Not only does he stop to render aid, but he provides 
ambulance service; not only does he provide ambulance service, but he remains at 
the hospital overnight as attending physician and a nurse; not only does he offer 
special medical care, but he tenders up his Blue Cross card ... as a guarantee of 
payment for all further hospital bills for the injured man, however extensive they 
may be. And then he rides off into the west. 174 
The Samaritan offered aid because he had unlimited resources and leisure. His is the 
ethic of lottery winners and other fairy tale characters who promise to do good to all 
with their unlimited resources. Sanders suggests that we take seriously the view that 
imitating the Samaritan would leave us to 'starve to death or end up derelicts.' 175 If 
this parable indeed has no purchase on reality, waiting for the Good Samaritan is 
tantamount to waiting for Godot. 
The parable's aim is to first allow us to see the reality initiated in the incarnation of 
Jesus. In this light, that the Samaritan responds in an unrealistic fashion to the 
unquestionably real condition of the victim is not surprising. It is precisely because 
the Samaritan is not subject to human limitations that he is able to reverse the robbers' 
actions. They a) strip, b) beat down, and c) leave the man for dead while the 
Samaritan a) clothes and washes, b) binds and lifts up, then c) leaves the man in the 
care of the inn-keeper in order to be restored to life. 176 We do not question the reality 
of predatory evil nor do we hesitate to condemn, at least in others, moral indifference 
to and acquiescence in this evil. Our problem is that a solution based in calculation 
and power is more believable than a solution that depends on something so 
unpredictable as mercy. The inescapable point is that the truthfulness of the story fully 
depends upon whether the incarnation is trustworthy. Once the lawyer's moral focus 
174 McDonald, 'The View From The Ditch', p. 31, quoting Jack T. Sanders, Ethics In The New 
Testament: Change And Development (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), pp. 7-8. 
175 McDonald, 'The View From the Ditch', p. 32. 
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was diverted from his moral obligations, he became capable of seeing that in this 
world 'everything gained and everything claimed follows upon something given, and 
comes after something gratuitous and unearned. '177 Jesus' command to imitate the 
ahistorical Samaritan's impossible charity was not to be heard as obligation but as an 
invitation to participate in a form of life grounded on the unrealistic reality of mercy -
a reality which the lawyer had caught a glimpse of in the parable. In the narrative 
construction of the parable, it was rational for that victim to depend upon the 
gratuitous mercy of a sworn enemy. The question for Christians and for Christian 
ethics is whether or not we are living within that kind of story. 
Two things need to be stressed concerning the ahistorical quality of the Samaritan 
and a realistic Christian ethic. The first is to underscore my earlier assertion that the 
Samaritan's goodness points us towards the christo logical identity of the Samaritan. 
Within the logic of the incarnation, the entrance of Christ is not as a deus ex machina 
interruption of the story. It is the story. To recognise this parable as the story of Jesus 
means that ethics is not at the centre or point of the story. It is, as Luke presents it, an 
after-thought. It is an invitation to participate in this conspiracy of mercy initiated by 
the incarnation. The primary accent of the parable is not on this human participation 
but on the mercy that is central to the story of the incarnation. This means that the 
parable cannot be reduced to a morality tale or to a moral maxim. The point is driven 
home in a sermon on love by the nineteenth--century Scottish novelist and theologian 
George McDonald who states: 
The love that is more than law, and renders its breach impossible, lives in the 
endless story, coming out in active kindness, of neighbourhood; yea, in tenderness 
and loving-kindness-the Samaritan-heart akin to the Jew-heart, the Samaritan 
hands neighbours to the Jewish wounds. 178 
The lawyer reminds us that it is possible to recite the two great commands to love 
God and love the neighbour without understanding that story which renders these 
commands intelligible. Unless and until he entered into the endless story of mercy, 
ethics would only be about fulfilling obligation. 
176 Daniel Patte, 'An Analysis of Narrative Structure and the Good Samaritan', Semeia: An 
Experimental Journal For Biblical Criticism 2 (1974), pp. 18-19. 
177 Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture, trans. Alexander Dru ( New York: Mentor-Omega, 
1963), p. 33. ld I B 
178 George McDonald, 'Love Thy Neighbour', in ed. Charles Erlandson, George McDona : T Ie est 
from All His Works (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1988), p. 178. 
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My second observation is that we must attend to Hays' pragmatic test. For all 
its problems, we still must ask whether the goodness of the Samaritan is capable of 
embodiment in the real world. We may, of course, assert that the story of grace is true. 
However, it is an empty assertion if grace fails to become embodied in the practices of 
the church. The pragmatic test is dangerous but no less necessary. Hence the 
challenge must be answered with anecdotal evidence of concrete goodness rendered 
intelligible by appeal to this parable. The late author and philosophy professor Philip 
Hallie's Lest Innocent Blood be Shed recounts the extraordinary actions of very 
ordinary persons. 179 Although Hallie was not a Christian, his study of the Huguenot 
community ofLe Chambon's rescue of over three thousand refugees of Hitler's anti-
Jewish purges concluded that his data on the actions of the rescuers could only be 
explained by the religious reasons given by the rescuers. 180 Hallie reports his 
historical findings while probing for the reasons why this community should have 
acted with heroic mercy when so many others failed to act. 
The difficulty of articulating what happened and why it happened is expressed in 
Hallie's response to a very critical letter by one of his readers: 
There is only one important thing to say about the Holocaust. It was merely a 
geological-type almost inanimate event (physical event). No one was responsible. 
No one started it. No one could stop it. [L]e Chambon wasn't even in the war. 
Nothing happened west of National Route 7 in southern France. 181 
Hallie summarises the remainder of the letter which stated that 'only vast forces like 
great armies "make history," make and break human institutions. The story of a few 
nonviolent eccentrics who did nothing to stop Hitler's armed forces mattered only to a 
few mushy-minded moralists like me. ' 
Hallie was tempted to respond to the letter with the words: 
Vast institutional cruelties exist because people like you believe that flesh-and-
blood individuals can do nothing that counts. Well, something happened west of 
National Route 7 in southern France. Real people with their own proper names 
saved real human beings in that village. And these precious few people count. 182 
179 Phillip Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood be Shed: The Story of the Village of Le Chambon And How 
Goodness Happened There (New York: HarperPerennial, 1979).. ' . 
180 In an essay on Nazi era rescuers, Richard John Neuhaus takes Issue WIth one study that concludes, At 
best religiosity was only weakly related to rescue'. Cf. Samuel P. and Pearl M. Oliner, The Altruis~ic , 
Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (New York: The Free ~ress, 198,8). Neuhaus ,states, this 
is an astonishing statement that is at odds with the fmdings of the study Itself whIch, ~s he po~ts out, 
emphasises how the rescuers' values were largely forged in religious contexts, America Agaznst Itself 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame,.1992), pp. 113-114. 
181 Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood be Shed, p. XIV. 
182 Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood be Shed, p. xv. 
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In the end he concluded 'that there was an abyss between the writer of that letter and 
me, an abyss that no words could bridge.' Hallie did not send the letter. Rather, he 
sent a postcard ofLe Chambon with the message: 'Thanks for your point of view. 
Still, something really happened here. '183 
The writer of the letter was of course correct in saying that in the story of the 
movements of power, 'nothing happened' in Le Chambon-sur-Lignon. However the 
story of power was not the rescuers' story. Drawing upon the memory of persecution 
in their Huguenot history and the Christian scriptures, they had come to recognise that 
the practices of mercy were an effective resistance against the inhuman exercise of 
power. Unsurprisingly, the parable of the Good Samaritan was a paradigmatic story 
that sanctioned this dangerous resistance of mercy. 184 Hallie notes how this story made 
sense of their 'extraordinary obligation' to practice 'active, dangerous love' toward 
the victims of Hitler's anti-semetic policies that came to them for help. What is even 
more extraordinary were the references to the Good Samaritan to explain why the 
rescuers did not consider their response to the crisis to be extraordinary. The parable, 
rather than the historical circumstances of evil and acquiescence, established the 
moral norms of this community. When called on to give an account of why they acted 
so differently from others in France and Germany, these people were dismissive of 
any suggestion that they were exceptional. In the logic of the story of Good 
Samaritan, mercy was the only adequate response to a force that had created so many 
victims. Neuhaus recognises the same response of rescuers who responded to 
questions about their participation by saying, 'We did not start. It started. We had no 
choice. '185 
Hallie expresses a kind of frustration in getting at the causes of heroic action 
stating: 
To understand the story of Le Chambon is not merely a matter of understanding 
historical and moral facts. A fact is plain, even obvious, once you simply face it. It 
is part of the quotidian world, and when you know it, you simply know it; you are 
not mystified by it. But the story ofLe Chambon has more than everyday factual~ty 
in it. It has something supernatural in it. .. the story of all those rescues had a feelmg 
of mystery about it. 186 
183 Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood be Shed, p. xv. 
184 Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood be Shed, p. 110. 
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Then, in a final chapter aptly entitled, 'The Ethics of Life and Death: How Goodness 
Happened Here,' Hallie makes a final attempt to explain the reasons for the rescuers' 
actions. He notes that an ethic of negative prohibitions that forbids inflicting hann to 
others does not finally explain why some should courageously show positive mercy to 
others. To explain the village ofLe Chambon, he would need to point to an ethic that 
goes beyond mere 'restraint upon the destructive drives of human beings.' Hallie 
continues: 
Like the negative commandments, it has taken various forms, but these forms all 
revolve around the injunction to help those who are in mortal danger. The positive 
laws say, in effect: 'Do something to prevent betrayal, hatred, and murder. .. And 
Jesus explains the commandment to love one's neighbor as oneself with the 
story ... ofthe Good Samaritan who helped a man left half-dead by thieves. 187 
Hallie, for all his philosophical sophistication, finally accepts the explanation of those 
who participated in the rescue: they were imitating the goodness of the Samaritan. 
Explaining this outpouring of mercy, Hallie concludes that what matters most in 
ethics is not codes but character: 'In short,' he states, 'ethics is only a matter of 
character. '188 Once we come to this conclusion, we then see that 
Narrative, plot, and character, especially when the characters involved in the action 
are surrounded and pervaded by a world intimately involved in their deeds and 
passions, can help us understand 'good' and 'evil' in large, clear, and concrete 
terms. And narrative can show us the many gray areas between good and evil, as 
well as the many differences of opinion about what kind of persons or action is 
good and evil. .. Rich regions of human history as revealed in narrative illuminate 
ethics as much as ethics illuminates those regions. 189 
This observation about the importance of character brings me back to the origin 
of this thesis. It is an awkward position to be in, having spent so many words 
attempting to describe and remedy the problem of moral inarticulacy, then arriving at 
the unspectacular conclusion that Christian ethics begins and ends with the belief in 
the canonical story of God's love for us and through us to the neighbour. The lawyer, 
like Lutherans, knew the moral rules and wanted to argue about their limits and 
applicability. Jesus avoided the argument by advancing moral inquiry and formation 
through vision-shaping parable. The parable was the appropriate response because the 
187 Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood be Shed, p. 282. 
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issue of character is at the centre of our ethical debates. The lawyer needed to 
somehow get the/eel of what it was like to be a character in this unfolding story. 
Once he began to see past the obligatory imperatives by taking up his place within the 
story, he was then granted that perspective from which he could freely consider the 
invitation to become a free participant in this story. From this perspective it becomes 
clear why Meilaender maintains that ethics is not 'primarily a tool for fixing guilt and 
responsibility', but is 'first and foremost, one of the ways in which we train ourselves 
and others to see the world rightly' 190 Ethical reflection, like the enactment of the 
liturgy, the celebration of the Eucharist, and memorialising the life of Christ in the 
church year, helps Christians attend to the meaning of the church's story and how it is 
best embodied in the lives of those who see themselves as freely participating in this 
story. 
189 Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood be Shed, p. 280. 
190 Meilaender, The Limits of Lm'c, p. 92. 
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CONCLUSION 
Periodically, throughout the writing of this thesis, my parents would ask, 
'What is it exactly that you are writing about?' As both were firmly located in the 
Lutheran tradition, they wanted to know why and how MacIntyre's work was 
important for the church. Given the depth and complexity of MacIntyre's writings, it 
may seem strange to say that this simple question is itself MacIntyrean. The moral 
philosopher, MacIntyre writes, 'has to recognize that any true account of the human 
good is incomplete and inadequate, unless and until it enables us to understand how 
particular plain persons, including her or himself, are able to move toward their 
particular goods.' 1 This conclusion is an attempt to give a simple answer, though not 
as simple as I would like, to the question of how MacIntyre's writings are good for 
the church. An adequate answer to this question needs to show how MacIntyre's 
critical and constructive writings aid the church's task to be simultaneously a refuge 
from and a mission to the postmodem world. 
MacIntyre's critical philosophical and historical narrative clarifies the 
postmodem context and cultural conditions under which the church's task must be 
pursued. In MacIntyre's diagnosis, the moral disorder of emotivism is manifested in 
the symptoms of a 'self-assertive shrillness' and 'indignant self-righteousness' in our 
moral disagreements. 2 Because our culture is deprived of rational ways to carry on 
moral debate, the public and private spheres are increasingly described as 'culture 
wars', or, as MacIntyre says it, 'civil war carried on by other means.'3 MacIntyre's 
conclusion in After Virtue is that our society is beyond repair so that the only rational 
response to our moral situation is to withdraw into communities of virtue. While I 
have argued that this summons is inadequate, it is not completely offbase. Drawing 
on MacIntyre's work, Stanley Hauerwas effectively demonstrates why the Christian 
church must function as a refuge from the postmodem moral disorder and how the 
1 MacIntyre, 'Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy', p. 3. 
2 After Virtue, p. 71. 
3 After Virtue, p. 253. 
church's moral, educational and liturgical practices are valuable resources for shaping 
a community of character. For Hauerwas though, it remains an open question as to 
whether the church has the character to be this kind of community. 
While Hauerwas explains how the church functions as a refuge, it is unclear 
how MacIntyre's work is an aid to the church's mission to the postmodem. This 
mission is concisely articulated in Peter's directive to 'Always be prepared to make a 
defence (apolgian) to anyone who calls you to account for the hope that is in you yet 
do it with gentleness and respect. '4 Against the background of MacIntyre's account of 
the emerging irrationality of emotivism and the incommensurability between rival 
traditionsS this passage's call for a rational and civil exchange between the Christian 
and the world seems quixotic. However, in support of Peter's directive, Edward 
Oakes concludes his essay on MacIntyre's work with the outrageously optimistic 
claim that MacIntyre has made the distance between rival traditions 'a little less 
abysmal, a little less intimidating', and he has brought 'the possibility of a serious 
encounter between emotivists, rationalists, and Aristotelian Thomists a little bit 
closer.'6 As these observations come at the end of the essay, Oakes leaves us to 
wonder just how MacIntyre's work brings rivals 'a little bit closer', especially when 
MacIntyre himself seems to arrive at the opposite conclusion. In an addendum to this 
essay, Oakes elaborates on this question stating: 
On the one hand, Scotland's most influential moral philosopher since David Hume 
will insist that any moral discourse is inherently ideological and that, accordingly, a 
rapprochement between moral systems will perforce take place under the 
Aristotelian test. On the other hand, MacIntyre will also insist that the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic synthesis is but one tradition among many with no more 
claim to an adjudicating overview than any other tradition. At least in some 
passages, MacIntyre is what might be oxymoronically described as a postmodernist 
Thomist. This is most strikingly evident in his treatment of the universality of 
human rights. On the one hand, 'rights talk' is a particular discourse that makes no 
sense out of the context of Western Enlightenment traditions; on the other hand, 
gross violations of the inherent dignity of human beings rightly arouse his ire, 
especially when justified in utilitarianlMarxist terms. [I]t is perhaps the , 
irresolvability of this dilemma that accounts for a certain thrashing on the beach m 
MacIntyre's later writings. Rather than addressing specific ethica~ i,ssues, ~e has 
sought to address the conundrums of the built-in incommenSUra?Ihty of,nval 
traditions. This might account for the impression one gets from tIme to ~Ime that, the 
serious encounter between emotivists, rationalists, and Thomists for whIch I praIsed 
4 1 Peter 3: 15. 
S MacIntyre, 'Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble?' p, 78. 
6 Oakes, 'The Achievement of Alasdair MacIntyre', p. 26. 
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him in my last paragraph has taken place more in MacIntyre's mind than in the 
public at large. But in our shrill times, even that is a considerable achievement.7 
Surely Oakes does not mean to say that the hope of rapprochement is only a 
reality in MacIntyre's mind. If MacIntyre is an aid to the church's mission, his work 
must somehow bring the church closer to its rivals in reality. I offer two reasons for 
seeing MacIntyre's work as an aid to the church's mission. First, as I discussed in my 
second chapter on MacIntyre's constructive philosophy, he argues that the vocabulary 
of progress (which includes terms like 'closer') is intelligible only in terms of some 
movement toward a particular goal. The problem for postmodernists is that, by 
rejecting the teleological structure, their use of the vocabulary of progress becomes 
unintelligible. MacIntyre argues that 'the protagonists of the dominant standpoints in 
contemporary philosophy' are not entitled to use vocabulary that speaks of 
'movement towards', because they are unable to answer the question, 'movement 
towards what?,g More simply put, until modem moral philosophers can 'tell us their 
telos', they cannot say what progress is. Contrary to the plight of post moderns, as the 
church claims to know the telos of the world's story it is entitled to say what 'closer' 
means and to carry out its mission to achieve this closeness. 
My second reason to think that MacIntyre's understanding of rationality is an 
aid to the church's mission is that he gives good reasons for the church to be confident 
about its ability to carry out this task. I will support this assertion with an analogy 
rather than an argument. The Edinburgh theologian Duncan Forrester characterises 
the current moral situation, with its 'plurality of goals and widely divergent 
commitments', as a society 'whose conflicts are played out like a game of Australian 
Rules Football, in which ... few rules seem to be recognized, and the referees' 
attempts to enforcement are patchy and ineffective.'9 While Forrester thinks that our 
cultural situation may be likened to 'an arena without rules or referee', 10 an alternative 
interpretation of postmodemity is that, what appears to be a game without rules and 
referees, is actually a new game with a new set of rules. Before the failure of 
Enlightenment rationality was documented, moral debate could be likened to an 
Olympic figure skating competition where representatives of rival moral theories 
7 Oakes, 'The Achievement of Alasdair MacIntyre', p. 26. 
Edward Oakes, 'Correspondence', First Things 43 (May, 1994), p. 67. 
g First Principles, Final Ends, p. 66. 
9 Duncan B. Forrester, Beliefs, Values and Policies in a Secular Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
p.4. 
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perfonned before a panel of putatively impartial judges who scored the perfonnances 
against a perceived objective standard. There were occasional munnurs of bias 
, 
especially by religious competitors who would either be barred from the competition 
or earned inexplicably low scores. Still, in spite of this perceived ill-treatment, it was 
generally assumed that the judgements of the enlightened judges were somehow 
rational. In time, however, others began to question the claims of a special gnosis by 
the judges and the presumed objectivity of the judgements which arbitrarily privileged 
some and penalised others. Eventually it was concluded that the agon of the ice 
hockey rink, where teams are evaluated by their goals, would be a better mode of 
rational evaluation. 
While this analogy 'limps' in all sorts of ways, my point is to show that, 
according to MacIntyre's philosophy, the church may be well-suited for the 
postmodern ice hockey rink. MacIntyre's critical and constructive accounts of 
rationality argue that the clash of rival rationalities is much less like figure skating and 
more the ice hockey competition. Moreover, as the cultural game has changed, 
MacIntyre's work shows why and how the church must utilise its resources and 
sharpen its skills to engage its competition. II Commenting on the present social 
situation, Forrester observes that as no tradition 'has a privileged position in public 
discourse', the church, along every other competitor 
comes to the public square not as a referee or arbitrator, not as a recognized 
authority to which appeal may be made, but as a participation or contributor that 
must demonstrate by skill and insight the value of the contribution. [The church] 
does not have a reserved place in the public arena, but must constantly earn its 
position. 12 
The question is whether the church has the resources and skills to 'constantly earn its 
position' in the public debate. Meilaender notes that the recent moves toward virtue 
ethics, which MacIntyre has played a decisive role, suggests that the church is quite 
capable of entering into the postmodem agon of public discussion: 
If action flows from vision and vision depends upon character, then religious beliefs 
may be of great importance in the shaping of an ethic. Religio~s disciplines (e.g., 
confession and prayer) may affect what we see and do by shapmg th~ persons we 
are. This suggests the possibilities for breaking through - or by-pa.ssmg - the 
seemingly endless debates about the relation of religion and morahty that gr~,,: ou~ 
of the Kantian tradition in ethics. The question will no longer be whether rehgIOn IS 
10 Forrester, Beliefs, Values and Policies in a Secular Age, p. 3. . 
II Cf. John Milbank, 'Postmodem Critical Augustinianism: A Short Summa m Forty Two Responses to 
Unasked Questions', Modern Theology 7 (1991), pp. 225-237. 
12 Forrester, Beliefs, Values and Policies in a Secular Age, p. 6. 
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somehow necessary to morality if morality is understood in tenns of the vision by 
which we see the world, a vision shaped by our character, and a character shaped 
(for the believer) by the disciplines of the religious life.\3 
While there are good reasons to be hopeful about the church's ability to discharge 
its moral task in the postmodem context, much has also been said regarding Lutheran 
deficiencies (and they are many), that would lead one to doubt Lutheranism's ability 
to fulfil the task of being a refuge from and mission to the postmodem world. As it is 
not at all clear how the church will respond to this task, it is crucial that Lutheran 
moral reflection remain centred in that grace which reminds us of the reality of divine 
action and the limits of human action. This grace entitles the church to pursue its task 
with intellectual and moral passion, while simultaneously enjoying that holy 
nonchalance which T.S. Eliot captures so very well: 'For us, there is only the trying. 
The rest is not our business. '14 
13 Gilbert Meilaender, 'Virtue in Contemporary R~l~gious Thought', in ed. Richard John Neuhaus, 
Virtue Public and Private (Grand Rapids, MI: WIlham B. Eerdmans, 1986), p. 9. l 17 
14 T.S. Eliot, 'East Coker', The Four Quartets (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 194_ ), p. . 
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